1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:01,080 What is up, guys? 2 00:00:02,640 --> 00:00:06,840 So, we all got really humbled recently. 3 00:00:08,200 --> 00:00:21,460 A highly, widely used and highly respected hardware wallet, the cold card, just got undone in literally the worst possible way. 4 00:00:22,380 --> 00:00:28,000 It was realized that the keys generated in the device itself actually had no entropy. 5 00:00:28,000 --> 00:00:35,780 there was the randomness was essentially skipped so you know how the point of a bitcoin key is to 6 00:00:35,780 --> 00:00:43,600 make it so attempting to guess your private key is like trying to pick out an atom at any particular 7 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:49,920 location anywhere in the literal known universe and that even trying to guess them takes the 8 00:00:49,920 --> 00:00:58,080 entire energy of the sun? Well, the mistake in the cold card firmware basically made it so your key 9 00:00:58,080 --> 00:01:07,820 was hidden in the size of about a football field and took about 20 minutes, 10 to 20 minutes of GPU 10 00:01:07,820 --> 00:01:17,960 worth of energy. And 10 to 20 minutes of GPU energy got exploited in mass and just started 11 00:01:17,960 --> 00:01:20,160 wiping all of these wallets. 12 00:01:20,480 --> 00:01:21,640 I'm sure you've heard by now. 13 00:01:23,000 --> 00:01:24,840 It's a hell of a mess. 14 00:01:25,620 --> 00:01:27,380 Mechanic couldn't even join us today. 15 00:01:27,800 --> 00:01:33,400 I know he's probably scrambling to find and help 16 00:01:33,400 --> 00:01:36,040 and do all sorts of stuff around this mess. 17 00:01:36,900 --> 00:01:40,960 But we do have my brother, myself, and Steve on the show, 18 00:01:40,960 --> 00:01:46,020 and we get into a lot of things about what the hell we learned from this. 19 00:01:46,020 --> 00:01:53,180 some of the like how we how could we have you know it's really easy to be like hindsight pick 20 00:01:53,180 --> 00:01:58,700 out all the things that we don't like or that weren't perfect like what hard and fast rules 21 00:01:58,700 --> 00:02:05,340 can we determine so that if we went back we could see forward that this problem was going to arise 22 00:02:05,340 --> 00:02:10,880 because it doesn't help us if we can like identify things that you know justify the way we the 23 00:02:10,880 --> 00:02:18,320 horrible way we feel about it in hindsight because that won't stop it from happening again and 24 00:02:18,320 --> 00:02:26,300 so that's kind of the point of this episode and probably a little while going forward to figure 25 00:02:26,300 --> 00:02:36,200 out what what exactly did we learn from this and also to understand that ai has changed the game 26 00:02:36,200 --> 00:02:53,180 And it's not just like, oh, this would never have been found without AI. It's simply that the scope of people and the capacity to find and exploit a weakness is now available to a million times as many people as it was previously. 27 00:02:53,180 --> 00:03:00,740 and that should be taken into account because a lot of security in software and stuff is just 28 00:03:00,740 --> 00:03:07,580 people not having the time or the energy to go poke holes in everything it's difficult now it's 29 00:03:07,580 --> 00:03:16,420 not now it just takes a couple of conversations with Kimmy and Fable 5 to find a hole and then 30 00:03:16,420 --> 00:03:24,640 write a script to exploit it and that's what i think happened and that means that 31 00:03:24,640 --> 00:03:31,440 you know when we started coding with ai when we when we got to that point with llms 32 00:03:31,440 --> 00:03:40,020 we should have realized that the lindy effect and the built-in assumptions about all the devices and 33 00:03:40,020 --> 00:03:43,680 the software we were using should have been reconsidered it should have been retested 34 00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:51,220 because the dynamics the conditions of the environment had changed enough 35 00:03:51,220 --> 00:03:58,540 that it's extremely unlikely for those assumptions to have held true and i think we have a perfect 36 00:03:58,540 --> 00:04:05,020 example of exactly when it does it um so we get into a lot of stuff we get into other things as 37 00:04:05,020 --> 00:04:10,440 well but you know it's hard to not just kind of like talk about all the things that happened here 38 00:04:10,440 --> 00:04:12,720 and how people behaved. 39 00:04:13,260 --> 00:04:15,640 NVK carried himself 40 00:04:15,640 --> 00:04:19,400 and the nature of open source 41 00:04:19,400 --> 00:04:20,360 versus source available, 42 00:04:20,560 --> 00:04:22,600 something that I absolutely did not appreciate 43 00:04:22,600 --> 00:04:25,640 and what it might have meant for the scrutiny 44 00:04:25,640 --> 00:04:27,680 or the lack thereof. 45 00:04:28,700 --> 00:04:32,700 So I won't lead the episode too much. 46 00:04:33,800 --> 00:04:36,060 Steve and Jeff have some really good points. 47 00:04:36,660 --> 00:04:38,260 So we'll just go ahead and get into it. 48 00:04:38,980 --> 00:04:40,080 I hope you guys are safe, by the way. 49 00:04:40,440 --> 00:04:49,080 get your crap off a cold card um i have a uh um i had a cold card in every one of my setups every 50 00:04:49,080 --> 00:04:54,120 single one of them i somehow managed to dodge this bullet um i haven't dodged every bullet in the past 51 00:04:55,160 --> 00:05:02,040 but get your uh i've got like a video last video kind of gives you a walk through or hopefully a 52 00:05:02,040 --> 00:05:22,843 simple process a bunch of other people have as well um so please just get it off your cold card don assume it safe just do it there no reason not to And it a good practice to just refresh your whole setup and go through everything again anyway So take it as an opportunity If you 53 00:05:22,843 --> 00:05:29,763 didn't lose coins, thank God. If you used a passphrase, if you rolled the dice. But with that, 54 00:05:29,763 --> 00:05:35,583 let's go ahead and get into today's episode. This is Guy's Roundtable. Staying humble. 55 00:05:37,503 --> 00:05:49,803 welcome to the round table it's been a hell of a 24 hours i have not had that much sleep 56 00:05:49,803 --> 00:05:59,543 um uh i apparently am the only one who was uh in the group i think that is vulnerable to a single 57 00:05:59,543 --> 00:06:04,983 sig cold card uh thing that i had to take care of in the middle of the night um but we'll get 58 00:06:04,983 --> 00:06:11,083 into it in just a minute uh welcome back to the show uh steve oh mechanic cannot be with us which 59 00:06:11,083 --> 00:06:17,183 is very very sad because i'm sure he would have a lot to say about this um but we do have steve 60 00:06:17,183 --> 00:06:27,183 and jeff what is up guys how you doing uh jeff what's what's new with you uh i mean i don't know 61 00:06:27,183 --> 00:06:27,803 I'm good. 62 00:06:28,063 --> 00:06:28,263 I'm, 63 00:06:28,503 --> 00:06:28,823 I'm, 64 00:06:28,923 --> 00:06:29,163 uh, 65 00:06:29,343 --> 00:06:29,543 okay, 66 00:06:29,603 --> 00:06:29,763 good. 67 00:06:29,883 --> 00:06:31,903 Steve preparing, 68 00:06:32,143 --> 00:06:35,603 preparing to preparing to see you guys. 69 00:06:35,603 --> 00:06:36,103 And, 70 00:06:36,103 --> 00:06:36,623 um, 71 00:06:37,523 --> 00:06:38,003 uh, 72 00:06:38,383 --> 00:06:40,763 and we're going up to Canada stand to, 73 00:06:40,883 --> 00:06:43,623 to see my brother trapped in exile. 74 00:06:44,043 --> 00:06:44,463 Um, 75 00:06:44,823 --> 00:06:46,183 and, 76 00:06:46,343 --> 00:06:46,683 um, 77 00:06:47,763 --> 00:06:48,183 I don't know, 78 00:06:48,203 --> 00:06:48,383 man. 79 00:06:48,463 --> 00:06:48,903 It's, 80 00:06:49,003 --> 00:06:49,983 it's so like, 81 00:06:49,983 --> 00:06:51,863 I talked to my lawyer, 82 00:06:51,863 --> 00:06:55,823 like sometime a couple of weeks back or something. 83 00:06:55,823 --> 00:06:56,103 And, 84 00:06:56,183 --> 00:06:57,163 and just, 85 00:06:57,183 --> 00:07:06,743 like the like it's so demoralizing to to like the the the nature of our situation and the likelihood 86 00:07:06,743 --> 00:07:14,523 that there's going to be any sort of uh help granted is yeah it's basically has made it very 87 00:07:14,523 --> 00:07:20,583 hard to find like to finish filling out the mountain of paperwork that i still have yeah um 88 00:07:20,583 --> 00:07:38,283 And even like writing, it's so weird. It's such a weird feeling to have a problem that is so massive in my own life and to not be able to communicate anything about how. 89 00:07:38,283 --> 00:07:46,283 like it you know in in compare like when you start writing about it it somehow just feels 90 00:07:46,283 --> 00:07:54,763 trivial like it doesn't like i don't know how to make anyone feel the importance that that it is to 91 00:07:54,763 --> 00:08:04,203 you or why yeah no i i get that um and i mean because we're we're fine we're not gonna like 92 00:08:04,203 --> 00:08:12,783 die or anything um but you got your keys you got i mean you got your um yeah yeah i don't have i 93 00:08:12,783 --> 00:08:20,683 don't have a single sig cold card wallet or anything like that um and so um so i'm you know 94 00:08:20,683 --> 00:08:28,423 we're okay but um but it's just can't come home it's just a whole whole different yeah can't come 95 00:08:28,423 --> 00:08:31,323 home. And it's just so weird. 96 00:08:31,943 --> 00:08:36,483 You can frame it in a lot of different ways. I don't want to frame it like I'm some sort of horrible 97 00:08:36,483 --> 00:08:40,583 poor me victim. But how crazy 98 00:08:40,583 --> 00:08:44,023 is it that anybody from anywhere in the world 99 00:08:44,023 --> 00:08:48,623 can come to the US, pop out a baby, and then that baby 100 00:08:48,623 --> 00:08:52,603 goes home with a full citizenship and a passport. They can 101 00:08:52,603 --> 00:08:56,403 be raised in India or wherever for 102 00:08:56,403 --> 00:09:05,583 18 years and then come back with all of the benefits of citizens. They're completely an 103 00:09:05,583 --> 00:09:12,603 American citizen, whether they speak the language, no shared cultural values, nothing. 104 00:09:12,823 --> 00:09:20,263 They come back as a full American citizen and then can apply to bring any of the rest of their 105 00:09:20,263 --> 00:09:28,283 family here um or to the u.s and then i am an american citizen i looked it up actually our 106 00:09:28,283 --> 00:09:36,723 family on both sides dates back to prior to the country even being a country really i didn't know 107 00:09:36,723 --> 00:09:44,023 both sides of our family american americans all four surnames all four surnames of like our 108 00:09:44,023 --> 00:09:46,243 parents go back to pre-1776 109 00:09:46,243 --> 00:09:47,123 that's nuts 110 00:09:47,123 --> 00:09:49,783 are from a couple 111 00:09:49,783 --> 00:09:52,223 may even be from the 1600s 112 00:09:52,223 --> 00:09:53,863 but their presence 113 00:09:53,863 --> 00:09:55,763 in North Carolina in particular 114 00:09:55,763 --> 00:09:57,763 dates back to early 115 00:09:57,763 --> 00:10:00,043 1700s well I know that on 116 00:10:00,043 --> 00:10:01,903 mom's mom's side 117 00:10:01,903 --> 00:10:03,923 somewhere there's like a 118 00:10:03,923 --> 00:10:05,923 tiny bit of Native we're like as much 119 00:10:05,923 --> 00:10:08,003 Native American as Elizabeth Warren I think 120 00:10:08,003 --> 00:10:08,303 right 121 00:10:08,303 --> 00:10:11,723 2064 122 00:10:11,723 --> 00:10:13,263 yeah 123 00:10:14,023 --> 00:10:33,786 Yes they are the ones that are likely here have been here the longest And so like early 1700s is when the primary migration for all of them was the and so but you can get married and your wife will never be so yeah so I can get married and 124 00:10:33,786 --> 00:10:42,526 if she wasn't already and in progress of becoming a Canadian citizen it's very likely she would never 125 00:10:42,526 --> 00:10:47,186 be allowed here like there it's at this point you know we don't know how long this forever war is 126 00:10:47,186 --> 00:10:54,806 going to take and you know two weeks man two weeks to flatten the regime it's it's very insane 127 00:10:54,806 --> 00:11:05,326 two weeks to fix the fix the middle east bitcoin is is uh a great help to people in iran and a 128 00:11:05,326 --> 00:11:12,386 great help to anyone that has to escape the u.s or you know do things internationally anyway 129 00:11:12,386 --> 00:11:20,806 But ironically, because of capital controls, they cannot buy directly from manufacturers for almost all the time. 130 00:11:21,006 --> 00:11:23,706 So none of the people we know over there have a cold card. 131 00:11:24,666 --> 00:11:25,126 That's good. 132 00:11:25,306 --> 00:11:26,026 That's good for them. 133 00:11:26,246 --> 00:11:27,086 That's good for them. 134 00:11:28,546 --> 00:11:30,086 Steve, how are you doing, man? 135 00:11:30,626 --> 00:11:30,946 Safe? 136 00:11:31,186 --> 00:11:34,346 Are you safe from the cold card hurricane? 137 00:11:35,566 --> 00:11:37,806 Yeah, I'm safe from it. 138 00:11:37,886 --> 00:11:39,806 But, I mean, it's affected me deeply. 139 00:11:39,806 --> 00:11:41,566 By the way, we didn't mention at the beginning. 140 00:11:41,566 --> 00:11:46,346 We're recording this the day after the cold card hack. 141 00:11:46,726 --> 00:11:46,986 Oh, yeah. 142 00:11:47,026 --> 00:11:48,246 I guess this will be out for a bit. 143 00:11:50,506 --> 00:11:51,686 I've been up all night. 144 00:11:52,226 --> 00:11:53,626 I'm sure a guy has too. 145 00:11:55,266 --> 00:11:58,066 We've all been trying to figure out what's going on. 146 00:11:58,186 --> 00:12:00,486 I'm sure by the time listeners are listening to this, 147 00:12:00,826 --> 00:12:03,326 everything will be much more clear. 148 00:12:05,166 --> 00:12:07,746 Yeah, just gut punched. 149 00:12:07,746 --> 00:12:16,726 I think about all of the people that I recommended cold cards to over the years 150 00:12:16,726 --> 00:12:23,466 I feel just this enormous weight on my heart about that 151 00:12:23,466 --> 00:12:31,166 like how many took my advice and don't even like I can't even contact them you know yeah right 152 00:12:31,166 --> 00:12:36,046 I've been hitting up yeah all morning yeah I've been sending texts everybody I can think of 153 00:12:36,046 --> 00:12:37,466 everybody I can think of. 154 00:12:38,786 --> 00:12:39,086 Yeah. 155 00:12:40,926 --> 00:12:42,166 And then there's the 156 00:12:42,166 --> 00:12:44,186 anger that I'm trying to 157 00:12:44,186 --> 00:12:45,946 suppress about 158 00:12:45,946 --> 00:12:47,986 NBK 159 00:12:47,986 --> 00:12:50,406 and his pompousness 160 00:12:50,406 --> 00:12:52,246 and his arrogance over 161 00:12:52,246 --> 00:12:53,886 the years. And 162 00:12:53,886 --> 00:12:56,246 I still 163 00:12:56,246 --> 00:12:58,426 don't understand how 164 00:12:58,426 --> 00:13:00,186 they could have missed this. 165 00:13:01,946 --> 00:13:04,226 I just... For the amount 166 00:13:04,226 --> 00:13:05,826 of scrutiny and like 167 00:13:06,046 --> 00:13:10,126 extra things that they stick into all the other stuff, 168 00:13:10,386 --> 00:13:13,466 this seems like the craziest thing to have missed. 169 00:13:14,786 --> 00:13:15,346 Yeah. 170 00:13:15,526 --> 00:13:20,846 I mean, I'm trying to keep my mind from going conspiratorial with it. 171 00:13:21,066 --> 00:13:21,166 Yeah. 172 00:13:22,106 --> 00:13:25,046 That's where I'm at because I know right now it's just, 173 00:13:25,526 --> 00:13:27,566 how do we get the word out? 174 00:13:27,926 --> 00:13:31,606 I mean, do you want to give a rundown of what happened 175 00:13:31,606 --> 00:13:32,886 or do you want me to or what? 176 00:13:32,886 --> 00:13:40,406 um well i mean sure people know by now but sure um but just just in case um and i'm 177 00:13:40,406 --> 00:13:45,126 hopefully a video is going out while we're recording this because i just did a rant on it 178 00:13:45,126 --> 00:13:52,606 and tried to get as much relevant details this is why my thought about the theme of this show 179 00:13:52,606 --> 00:14:04,026 so to speak, is humility. Because I feel like NVK's dismissal, and I've heard it from a number 180 00:14:04,026 --> 00:14:09,806 of people, you know, and I have appreciation for people who are pretty stubborn and, you know, 181 00:14:09,806 --> 00:14:20,366 stick to their gums and who will be contrarian. But also to just, you know, not be willing to 182 00:14:20,366 --> 00:14:23,946 admit that you're wrong is a bad security mentality. 183 00:14:25,106 --> 00:14:29,966 You know, and to dismiss when somebody finds something that could be a vulnerability. 184 00:14:31,866 --> 00:14:37,886 It seems like it may have had nothing to do with it, but it coincided. 185 00:14:38,166 --> 00:14:39,746 So it's hard to say it didn't. 186 00:14:40,246 --> 00:14:47,846 But when they got really kind of protectionist and defensive about the use of their system, 187 00:14:47,846 --> 00:14:52,766 like from the, what was it, the GPL license, I believe, originally, 188 00:14:53,506 --> 00:14:56,846 or I might have that backwards, but when it was basically open source 189 00:14:56,846 --> 00:14:59,686 and then they went to source available, 190 00:15:00,246 --> 00:15:04,766 it actually forced them to rewrite all of the firmware. 191 00:15:04,766 --> 00:15:10,766 And this was in the 2020, I believe, somewhere in the 2019 to 2021 zone 192 00:15:11,306 --> 00:15:12,526 that all of this was occurring. 193 00:15:12,526 --> 00:15:25,526 And they updated their stuff in an attempt to move away from the setup that was being cloned for a different product for a competitor, because they were very unhappy about this. 194 00:15:25,526 --> 00:15:44,749 And there were other reasons for them to do this There were other things that they were also trying to implement and take advantage of at the same time So they could have very well rewritten the firmware anyway but the fact that they were trying to be protectionist and not have other people use what they built 195 00:15:46,168 --> 00:15:48,109 it was an added factor. 196 00:15:48,109 --> 00:15:50,789 It was definitely a piece of the puzzle. 197 00:15:50,789 --> 00:15:53,529 And this is when they introduced a bug 198 00:15:53,529 --> 00:15:56,629 that basically killed the onboard entropy 199 00:15:56,629 --> 00:15:58,829 when creating a seed phrase. 200 00:15:58,829 --> 00:16:02,168 So everything about like protect your hardware wallet, 201 00:16:02,168 --> 00:16:09,609 make sure that nobody can guess the pin and it bricks if you do it too many times and that you 202 00:16:09,609 --> 00:16:16,989 can it's wiped every time you unplug it and all this the the dummy wallets all of it all of it is 203 00:16:16,989 --> 00:16:24,668 on top of the fact on the assumption that your key has 256 bits of entropy or 128 with 12 and 204 00:16:24,668 --> 00:16:30,129 24 seed words and all that stuff and there's no way to look at your seed words and know that 205 00:16:30,129 --> 00:16:36,769 there's high entropy but essentially what was happening the vulnerability the failure of the 206 00:16:36,769 --> 00:16:44,249 firmware was so bad that keys on chain that are publicly testable against meaning it's just 207 00:16:44,249 --> 00:16:51,529 publicly available to brute force and just see if maybe i can get into it essentially had from mk3 208 00:16:51,529 --> 00:16:58,289 on like was the entropy of a rough like a eight character password which is very easy to brute 209 00:16:58,289 --> 00:17:05,769 force um in mark 4 mark 5 and q had an extra layer so there's like a handful of different 210 00:17:05,769 --> 00:17:14,448 things that go into the um the like base entropy or elements of creating the the actual key and 211 00:17:14,448 --> 00:17:22,129 it's like the buttons that you press the time code the time stamp in the device the uid of the chip 212 00:17:22,129 --> 00:17:27,329 or device or whatever i think there's like one or two other things but the thing is is that like 213 00:17:27,329 --> 00:17:32,689 these are all very range limited. So if you've never connected your device to the internet or to, 214 00:17:33,069 --> 00:17:36,669 if you air gapped it, which was the whole point of cold card, right, is to air gap the whole thing, 215 00:17:37,269 --> 00:17:42,769 is if you've never air gapped it, then when you boot it up, your timestamp is going to be starting 216 00:17:42,769 --> 00:17:47,889 at zero. And so like, if you set up the key within the first 10 minutes, there's your, I got like, 217 00:17:48,369 --> 00:17:54,789 you know, 200 tries to figure out where your timestamp was, right? And if, or 600, if you did 218 00:17:54,789 --> 00:18:04,769 in 10 minutes. And then your UID is also bounded. Like, you know what range of IDs the device is 219 00:18:04,769 --> 00:18:10,809 likely to have. The amount of the buttons that you press, you can just walk through the process 220 00:18:10,809 --> 00:18:16,909 of pressing the buttons and see what was likely the input into the thing. And so if you can kind 221 00:18:16,909 --> 00:18:23,708 of get that initial seed, that initial data, which maybe there's just like, you know, it's like a 222 00:18:23,708 --> 00:18:26,149 seven or eight digit number, right? 223 00:18:26,208 --> 00:18:28,549 Something that you can do on a GPU like that 224 00:18:28,549 --> 00:18:30,228 and all the possibilities. 225 00:18:31,649 --> 00:18:34,248 And then literally there's no, 226 00:18:34,468 --> 00:18:37,008 the added entropy that was supposed to generate 227 00:18:37,008 --> 00:18:39,708 the super complex key failed. 228 00:18:41,029 --> 00:18:43,728 You can just deterministically recreate the key 229 00:18:43,728 --> 00:18:47,109 on the Mark III and Praveen actually did this. 230 00:18:47,309 --> 00:18:49,589 He put, after the vulnerability was disclosed, 231 00:18:49,669 --> 00:18:52,169 and this is the crazy thing about being in the age of AI, 232 00:18:52,169 --> 00:18:57,309 is that people who don't know anything about anything are able to just plug this into fable 233 00:18:57,309 --> 00:19:02,329 give it the github give it the disclosure and then tell it to create a script to exploit this 234 00:19:02,329 --> 00:19:09,269 and it's working kimmy can just like one or two shop the thing um and praveen literally did this 235 00:19:09,269 --> 00:19:15,649 and he uh made a post that he regenerated the private key of two of the address that had already 236 00:19:15,649 --> 00:19:21,149 been addresses that had already been emptied and proved that he could basically empty it again 237 00:19:21,149 --> 00:19:23,649 and it took like minutes 238 00:19:23,649 --> 00:19:26,488 and so people who did everything right 239 00:19:26,488 --> 00:19:29,369 who wrote down their seed phrase 240 00:19:29,369 --> 00:19:30,708 who got a hardware wallet 241 00:19:30,708 --> 00:19:33,669 who literally did everything they were supposed to 242 00:19:33,669 --> 00:19:35,468 and did the cypherpunk wallet 243 00:19:35,468 --> 00:19:37,869 and took the right recommendations 244 00:19:37,869 --> 00:19:40,889 and the people who would actually know 245 00:19:40,889 --> 00:19:44,029 what the hell, why the hell dice rolls were important 246 00:19:44,029 --> 00:19:45,569 because they got a freaking cold card 247 00:19:45,569 --> 00:19:46,829 because it lets you do that 248 00:19:46,829 --> 00:19:50,008 are the people who got most hit by this 249 00:19:51,149 --> 00:19:53,789 And they are all vulnerable. 250 00:19:53,909 --> 00:19:55,188 Everything after like 2020. 251 00:19:56,008 --> 00:19:57,329 They're all vulnerable. 252 00:19:57,849 --> 00:20:00,049 And if you update, they have a new firmware version. 253 00:20:00,488 --> 00:20:03,928 And if you update the firmware, it's your seed. 254 00:20:04,069 --> 00:20:07,228 It's your original seed that makes your device better. 255 00:20:07,228 --> 00:20:13,228 And your device is no longer at risk or whatever. 256 00:20:13,428 --> 00:20:16,869 If you generated a new seed, well, now it would finally have some damn entropy. 257 00:20:17,569 --> 00:20:19,629 But your balance. 258 00:20:19,629 --> 00:20:27,149 i'm not sure i believe this about the firmware oh i'm not i'm i'm saying that like if this was a 259 00:20:27,149 --> 00:20:31,609 fix i'm not i'm not i'm not using any cold cards i've removed cold cards from my setup my 260 00:20:31,609 --> 00:20:36,269 recommendation is to don't touch cold but just just think about the logic here yeah they're saying 261 00:20:36,269 --> 00:20:43,968 that they released firmware that fixed the problem right they're saying this yeah so 262 00:20:43,968 --> 00:20:48,968 So that means that the problem was in the firmware. 263 00:20:48,968 --> 00:20:49,968 It was in the firmware. 264 00:20:50,011 --> 00:20:58,051 identifiable. And when they made this new firmware, they confirmed that the firmware was 265 00:20:58,051 --> 00:21:04,691 indeed pulling the real random numbers from the true random number generator. That means 266 00:21:04,691 --> 00:21:13,751 they have the possibility to confirm that the firmware is pulling the numbers from the true 267 00:21:13,751 --> 00:21:19,171 random number generator. They have that possibility to diagnose that and find that. 268 00:21:19,171 --> 00:21:38,551 And they didn't. And you're telling me that for five years. They did. Given that they have the possibility to confirm. They can unit test that their firmware is pulling numbers from the true random numbers generator. They never tested that. The logic does not make sense at all. 269 00:21:38,551 --> 00:21:52,491 I mean, either you don't put out firmware and you say, sorry, we have no way of knowing when we put out new firmware, if it is indeed pulling numbers from our true random number generator. 270 00:21:53,711 --> 00:21:57,991 But if you say that, you know, that the firmware is working now. 271 00:21:59,171 --> 00:22:03,551 What the fuck happened for five years? 272 00:22:04,551 --> 00:22:06,251 You never tested. 273 00:22:06,251 --> 00:22:12,891 you had the ability to test that your firmware could pull from the random number generators 274 00:22:12,891 --> 00:22:21,291 and you and you didn't test that like that's what i'm saying is like i'm trying so hard to 275 00:22:21,291 --> 00:22:29,731 not go conspiratorial here like it's it just blows my freaking mind it's like changing the 276 00:22:29,731 --> 00:22:35,431 consensus code to bitcoin and then not running it on testnet first you know like i can understand 277 00:22:35,431 --> 00:22:39,451 being complacent they're like oh mark one and mark two and the first versions of mark three 278 00:22:39,451 --> 00:22:43,591 they're all secure we're all we're safe and then like think like i don't need to test this again 279 00:22:43,591 --> 00:22:52,831 but you changed it you changed it you know i mean the simplest thing you could do so like you know 280 00:22:52,831 --> 00:22:59,611 you you take one of these cold cards out of production and you rewire it to do nothing 281 00:22:59,611 --> 00:23:04,691 but produced random seeds continuously for five years. 282 00:23:05,591 --> 00:23:11,091 Then you look at the space of the seeds that it's continually producing. 283 00:23:11,271 --> 00:23:14,471 I get that you couldn't do that in like a day or two 284 00:23:14,471 --> 00:23:17,411 because the processor probably doesn't run fast enough. 285 00:23:17,411 --> 00:23:22,891 But like all hardware manufacturers need to have all of their devices 286 00:23:22,891 --> 00:23:27,051 producing new seeds on loop nonstop. 287 00:23:27,051 --> 00:23:36,971 It just blows my freaking mind that the world's simplest tests of hardware devices is not being done. 288 00:23:37,511 --> 00:23:39,311 I mean, I'm not trying to freak everybody out. 289 00:23:39,471 --> 00:23:42,471 And maybe there's something I'm just not seeing here. 290 00:23:42,751 --> 00:23:42,791 Maybe. 291 00:23:44,011 --> 00:23:49,111 Yeah, I don't have the lines of code in front of me. 292 00:23:49,111 --> 00:24:01,091 Maybe the answer to my first question is that it was genuinely impossible for them to tell whether or not the firmware was pulling from the random number generator. 293 00:24:02,311 --> 00:24:10,871 Or there was reason to assume that it was, but the reason that it wasn't wasn't obvious, you know? 294 00:24:10,871 --> 00:24:17,231 well i mean but because like the way i read it you know another thing that doesn't make sense to me 295 00:24:17,231 --> 00:24:25,171 that the the pseudo random number generator the one that doesn't work very well is a fallback 296 00:24:25,171 --> 00:24:31,251 option for the real random number generator and that's the one that was being used and why does 297 00:24:31,251 --> 00:24:37,791 it not have 128 bits of entropy why does the fallback have anything why is that there in the 298 00:24:37,791 --> 00:24:45,451 first place i mean like if the true random number generator is not working the device needs to not 299 00:24:45,451 --> 00:24:51,111 turn on it doesn't need to fall back into a different mode that's a good it should just 300 00:24:51,111 --> 00:24:58,891 absolutely not function why in the world did they design a fallback mechanism to what would be a 301 00:24:58,891 --> 00:25:03,831 purpose of having a bad random number generator in there ever what would be any purpose of that 302 00:25:03,831 --> 00:25:11,231 that's what I'm saying it's like this does not make any freaking sense at all yeah a fallback 303 00:25:11,231 --> 00:25:16,651 for that makes no sense that's like saying that there's a fallback for getting into your hardware 304 00:25:16,651 --> 00:25:25,131 wallet without a pen you know it's like no you don't get into it without the pen like I see in 305 00:25:25,131 --> 00:25:32,071 in the automotive world and and divide everything now the engineering the failure mode engineering 306 00:25:32,071 --> 00:25:33,531 is just completely gone. 307 00:25:33,951 --> 00:25:36,191 People don't think about failure modes at all. 308 00:25:36,711 --> 00:25:37,651 But what you're describing 309 00:25:37,651 --> 00:25:39,871 is instead of 310 00:25:39,871 --> 00:25:42,211 a Lexus forgetting how to roll its windows up 311 00:25:42,211 --> 00:25:44,231 when the battery dies, which is a thing, 312 00:25:44,791 --> 00:25:45,751 what you're saying is that 313 00:25:45,751 --> 00:25:48,371 if the battery dies, the Lexus 314 00:25:48,371 --> 00:25:50,451 remembers how to roll the windows up 315 00:25:50,451 --> 00:25:51,171 but only halfway. 316 00:25:51,771 --> 00:25:54,371 Why the fuck would you have a mode 317 00:25:54,371 --> 00:25:55,591 where it only goes up halfway? 318 00:25:56,691 --> 00:26:07,828 That doesn make sense So that means you thought about the failure mode and you made it shitty like you made it shittier than like it just doesn purposefully made it not work no i think it i 319 00:26:07,828 --> 00:26:13,808 think it's more like um let's say you have a car with a braking system but you have a computer 320 00:26:13,808 --> 00:26:19,748 that that will not turn on the car if it knows that the brakes don't work yeah sure and then 321 00:26:19,748 --> 00:26:27,248 what you do is you build in a braking system that you know that doesn't work that is a backup 322 00:26:27,248 --> 00:26:33,388 mode and you know the real uh brakes aren't working and then you put it into the backup 323 00:26:33,388 --> 00:26:38,808 mode that you know doesn't work and then you let them drive the car you call it the emergency brake 324 00:26:38,808 --> 00:26:44,568 but the emergency brake doesn't work yeah and you know that the emergency doesn't break doesn't work 325 00:26:44,568 --> 00:26:49,888 it's not a surprise like why was that random number generator in there the operation should 326 00:26:49,888 --> 00:26:54,208 be deterministically tied to whether or not the freaking electrons go through the true random 327 00:26:54,208 --> 00:27:00,088 number generator like exactly and you're telling me they did not have the ability 328 00:27:00,088 --> 00:27:06,408 to to see whether the electrons went through the the random number generator but now magically all 329 00:27:06,408 --> 00:27:15,768 of a sudden they do and the firmware they know goes through that now i mean i'm i'm i'm doing 330 00:27:15,768 --> 00:27:21,608 this again man i might i'm just a roller coaster of emotions it just goes from being really sad 331 00:27:21,608 --> 00:27:28,208 gut punch don't get mad anger isn't happening or anger isn't helpful and but 332 00:27:28,208 --> 00:27:37,208 I just oh god I don't know you're gonna release this later yeah if anybody has a 333 00:27:37,208 --> 00:27:42,728 cold card and they still haven't moved it away as of this recording I have yet 334 00:27:42,728 --> 00:27:48,788 to have been watching carefully or closely for anybody with a mark for mark 335 00:27:48,788 --> 00:27:58,708 five or q to who's got hit and so far i haven't seen it um which means they haven't seen what 336 00:27:58,708 --> 00:28:06,608 a mark four mark five or q get wiped yet oh no there's i was on spaces all night man there's tons 337 00:28:06,608 --> 00:28:14,428 of them shit they're not posted i didn't see them in yeah i mean there's spaces running 24 7 on 338 00:28:14,428 --> 00:28:19,208 Twitter, if you hop in there, like all you have to do is listen for 30 minutes. I mean, people don't 339 00:28:19,208 --> 00:28:24,788 post on X, but they'll, they'll say it in spaces. Like I got hacked. I got hacked. I got hacked. 340 00:28:24,888 --> 00:28:32,628 I got hacked. It is, I mean, I mean, to put a cap on it, I have to realize, okay, 341 00:28:33,548 --> 00:28:40,768 the Bitcoin space, you have the ETF people, you have the custody on Coinbase people. You're already 342 00:28:40,768 --> 00:28:42,708 talking about most people there. 343 00:28:43,308 --> 00:28:48,328 Once you move into the hardware wallet space or the wallet space, you got people that just 344 00:28:48,328 --> 00:28:49,928 don't have much on their phone wallets. 345 00:28:50,348 --> 00:28:55,948 Then you have kind of the Trezor people and the Ledger people, and that's probably half. 346 00:28:56,288 --> 00:28:59,908 Then you have the cold card people, which is like another half. 347 00:28:59,908 --> 00:29:06,888 And then we're talking about the cold card people that didn't do a dice rolls or whatever 348 00:29:06,888 --> 00:29:07,728 might be. 349 00:29:07,728 --> 00:29:13,708 um most of the called card people i don't know um but then you do then you have like seed signer 350 00:29:13,708 --> 00:29:21,068 and the dice rollers and stuff so like the overall community i mean what are we talking about maybe 351 00:29:21,068 --> 00:29:29,908 it's probably a handful of percentage right yeah i mean it's it's not enormous or is it because 352 00:29:29,908 --> 00:29:36,088 like are the exchanges using this too on the back end like that's what that's what that's what 353 00:29:36,088 --> 00:29:44,848 scares me is you know which multi-sig at coinbase has a cold card in it is it even multi-sig you know 354 00:29:44,848 --> 00:29:51,348 um yeah actually i maybe i shouldn't think about it like that because when i say etf and 355 00:29:51,348 --> 00:29:57,928 and coinbase like it's all this stuff is on a hardware wallet somewhere yeah it's like 356 00:29:57,928 --> 00:30:08,348 or i don't know but um the fact that every single group has somebody in it who's saying i got white 357 00:30:08,348 --> 00:30:13,708 everybody that i know that i've asked i've tried to get them to confirm they're all mark three but 358 00:30:13,708 --> 00:30:18,908 i haven't been on any spaces so my subset of the people i've been in contact with is probably way 359 00:30:18,908 --> 00:30:24,828 less than people jumping up and i don't think it's even started yet man i don't think half the people 360 00:30:24,828 --> 00:30:27,548 that got hacked even know yet. 361 00:30:27,868 --> 00:30:30,068 You know, we got lucky with the first one 362 00:30:30,068 --> 00:30:32,768 because the attacker like sent themselves a honeypot. 363 00:30:32,888 --> 00:30:35,768 But imagine if the attacker made different transactions 364 00:30:35,768 --> 00:30:37,588 for each person he hacked. 365 00:30:37,988 --> 00:30:38,088 Yeah. 366 00:30:38,248 --> 00:30:41,448 There would be absolutely no way to tell on chain 367 00:30:41,448 --> 00:30:44,448 what was a part of this hack job. 368 00:30:45,208 --> 00:30:47,328 And there's a ton of them being spent 369 00:30:47,328 --> 00:30:49,828 with like huge sats per V-byte 370 00:30:49,828 --> 00:30:54,108 and people are suggesting that those are hacks. 371 00:30:54,828 --> 00:30:57,348 It's hard to determine exactly. 372 00:30:58,868 --> 00:31:02,908 But, God, this is going to go on for a long time. 373 00:31:04,728 --> 00:31:08,088 Yeah, I mean, this is going to go on for a long time. 374 00:31:10,568 --> 00:31:19,364 I mean surprisingly so I been checking the price and unless something changed in the last hour 375 00:31:22,744 --> 00:31:23,384 Yeah. 376 00:31:23,564 --> 00:31:27,004 Surprisingly, the price is like only moved like 1%. 377 00:31:28,324 --> 00:31:29,264 Yeah. 378 00:31:29,324 --> 00:31:30,004 Price is done. 379 00:31:30,924 --> 00:31:31,564 That's nothing. 380 00:31:31,564 --> 00:31:39,944 Which is, I guess, you know, I don't understand this relationship really, you know, like. 381 00:31:40,004 --> 00:31:45,624 it's always been weird to me how the price i mean the prices stay completely flat through all these 382 00:31:45,624 --> 00:31:51,224 spam wars i mean like the the the price just sometimes just seems so unrelated to what's 383 00:31:51,224 --> 00:31:55,784 going on under the hood but like i you know i wonder if there's going to be like a new york 384 00:31:55,784 --> 00:32:03,864 times article on monday or something or but maybe it's like nope people are just gonna be like yeah 385 00:32:03,864 --> 00:32:09,984 look we have it's just gonna sound like another hack yeah it's just gonna look yeah bitcoin has 386 00:32:09,984 --> 00:32:17,024 like one of these weird hacks like once a year you know like um it just happens like is it but 387 00:32:17,024 --> 00:32:21,964 i think it's just so real because we know what cold card meant to the to the maxis to the real 388 00:32:21,964 --> 00:32:28,444 ones you know yeah i think it literally this this hits different to the people that get it 389 00:32:28,444 --> 00:32:33,584 like that actually know something about managing keys and cold storage. 390 00:32:34,644 --> 00:32:38,184 And this hits them harder than it hits anybody else. 391 00:32:38,684 --> 00:32:40,644 Cause like none of the normies, 392 00:32:41,024 --> 00:32:44,664 none of the normies and like basic crypto people had a cold card, 393 00:32:44,924 --> 00:32:45,264 you know? 394 00:32:46,264 --> 00:32:47,984 Like it was only the really serious people. 395 00:32:47,984 --> 00:32:48,644 I feel like. 396 00:32:51,144 --> 00:32:52,344 Ledger's unaffected. 397 00:32:52,884 --> 00:32:54,164 Ledger's unaffected. 398 00:32:54,244 --> 00:32:55,024 Jesus Christ. 399 00:32:55,024 --> 00:33:02,964 well i mean so that that there's another point okay yeah these ledgers and uh treasers they say 400 00:33:02,964 --> 00:33:09,384 that they're uninfected because they know for sure that their firmware pulls from the the random 401 00:33:09,384 --> 00:33:18,744 number generator yeah is this is this knowable or not like if this is knowable whether it pulls 402 00:33:18,744 --> 00:33:25,004 from the random number generator or not and cold card went five years without even looking yeah i 403 00:33:25,004 --> 00:33:32,064 just find that so hard to believe man i mean the the amount of negligence there like if they have 404 00:33:32,064 --> 00:33:38,064 to go to court for this and they have to tell the court that they they never tested whether their 405 00:33:38,064 --> 00:33:44,684 random number gender was even turned on like oh my god and that's the only way they can get out of 406 00:33:44,684 --> 00:33:53,424 it i think right because they they can't say they they did test it like i oh man we'll probably know 407 00:33:53,424 --> 00:33:54,824 more in the next couple of days. 408 00:33:56,484 --> 00:33:57,724 They were a little bit vague 409 00:33:57,724 --> 00:33:59,524 about the post on it, 410 00:34:00,184 --> 00:34:02,504 but I didn't, 411 00:34:02,644 --> 00:34:03,024 I haven't, 412 00:34:03,084 --> 00:34:04,584 there's a couple of things 413 00:34:04,584 --> 00:34:05,024 I've saved 414 00:34:05,024 --> 00:34:06,504 that I haven't got into specifics. 415 00:34:08,124 --> 00:34:10,164 For anybody who still has 416 00:34:10,164 --> 00:34:11,904 something on a cold card, 417 00:34:13,604 --> 00:34:16,404 just the easiest way, 418 00:34:16,564 --> 00:34:17,384 the first thing to do 419 00:34:17,384 --> 00:34:18,464 is literally just get it off. 420 00:34:19,424 --> 00:34:20,544 If you have any other wallet 421 00:34:20,544 --> 00:34:21,224 set up already, 422 00:34:21,504 --> 00:34:22,584 just go ahead and move it. 423 00:34:22,584 --> 00:34:22,924 Get it on, 424 00:34:22,924 --> 00:34:28,824 yeah any wallet green wallet aqua wallet anything on your phone anything is safer than a gold guard 425 00:34:28,824 --> 00:34:34,824 set up a uh uh nunchuck any kind of like basic software wallet you probably already have a 426 00:34:34,824 --> 00:34:41,744 software wallet that you're using in some fashion or that you know of or have set up just use that 427 00:34:41,744 --> 00:34:48,784 one um make a new key if you don't have one and just send it to it um for those of you who don't 428 00:34:48,784 --> 00:34:56,304 have the software wallet that you set up with with your cold card immediately accessible uh if you 429 00:34:56,304 --> 00:35:03,504 just do sparrow is my favorite on desktop um i'm not even sure if they have this for mobile probably 430 00:35:03,504 --> 00:35:11,504 not but maybe they do maybe they do but sparrow um you can just connect the hardware wallet and then 431 00:35:11,504 --> 00:35:19,804 it will see it and uh which you have to turn it on in settings actually um the the usb uh in the 432 00:35:19,804 --> 00:35:25,624 cold card but import the key store and then it will search all you don't have to like select oh 433 00:35:25,624 --> 00:35:31,104 i want seguit legacy or taproot or whatever your derivation path it just searches the whole derivation 434 00:35:31,104 --> 00:35:35,244 path and just finds are their addresses here are their balances here whatever and then you can 435 00:35:35,244 --> 00:35:40,404 immediately spin from it so it's like no previous setup sparrow doesn't have to know what's going on 436 00:35:40,404 --> 00:35:46,104 you just plug it in you say import and then it will go and you can find your balances um obviously 437 00:35:46,104 --> 00:35:52,084 doesn't work for multi-sig with you know you need a multi-sig setup but for a single sig cold card 438 00:35:52,084 --> 00:35:59,064 you can do that that is the quickest way that i know um to just see what's on the cold card and 439 00:35:59,064 --> 00:36:06,744 then get it off uh and just get it off yeah and we should be clear that um there if you did roll 440 00:36:06,744 --> 00:36:11,744 your dice a hundred times like it's advised to. 441 00:36:11,744 --> 00:36:15,744 There is no evidence that that is broken. 442 00:36:15,744 --> 00:36:19,744 That that's any different than any other. 443 00:36:19,744 --> 00:36:37,240 So Wicked last night on Spaces was talking about the test that he did with importing words and then adding the random dice rolls 444 00:36:37,240 --> 00:36:48,180 And he imported the same words and added the same dice rolls, both on the cold card and on the seed sign or bit key or whatever. 445 00:36:48,520 --> 00:36:50,640 And he got identical results. 446 00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:51,680 Got an identical phrase. 447 00:36:51,840 --> 00:36:52,140 Okay. 448 00:36:52,140 --> 00:36:52,720 Okay, good. 449 00:36:52,980 --> 00:36:54,840 So it is properly taking dice rolls. 450 00:36:55,200 --> 00:36:56,260 That's a good test. 451 00:36:57,080 --> 00:36:58,420 Shout out to Wicked for that one. 452 00:36:58,760 --> 00:36:59,720 Yeah, shout out to Wicked. 453 00:36:59,720 --> 00:37:03,980 So we do know, we don't have any evidence to believe that. 454 00:37:05,720 --> 00:37:08,060 There was a fallback that ignored the dice rolls. 455 00:37:09,660 --> 00:37:13,700 Yes, we don't have any evidence that the dice rolls could have been ignored, 456 00:37:13,980 --> 00:37:15,220 is what I'm saying. 457 00:37:15,220 --> 00:37:23,840 um you're the the idea of having the having the wallets just set up to generate keys over and over 458 00:37:23,840 --> 00:37:29,660 is is like that's a good test makes perfect sense yeah like why would you not be doing that yeah 459 00:37:29,660 --> 00:37:35,960 well i mean i mean if you're if you're building hardware wallets that should definitely be 460 00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:41,580 something on your mind but but that's a great test because then the longer it runs you can just 461 00:37:41,580 --> 00:37:47,120 analyze it for crashes you know for for for collisions or whatever and there shouldn't be 462 00:37:47,120 --> 00:37:53,860 any so you know if you if you've got any then you're you you know statistically oh there's 463 00:37:53,860 --> 00:38:00,440 something very wrong here so yeah well you can just statistically check your your your key space 464 00:38:00,440 --> 00:38:04,960 and you'll just see that there's a tiny range it's like why am i not getting tiny yeah absolutely 465 00:38:04,960 --> 00:38:10,460 why there's this huge space why the hell is it all grouped together yeah i guess if you're running 466 00:38:10,460 --> 00:38:12,960 if part of your randomness was a timestamp, 467 00:38:13,540 --> 00:38:15,680 just leaving one running wouldn't work. 468 00:38:16,820 --> 00:38:19,460 Or would it, is that part of your... 469 00:38:20,080 --> 00:38:21,320 You could run it for years 470 00:38:21,320 --> 00:38:23,300 and your timestamp range would still just be so tiny. 471 00:38:24,460 --> 00:38:25,420 It would be tiny. 472 00:38:25,580 --> 00:38:28,000 I just mean that you might not, 473 00:38:28,260 --> 00:38:29,340 would you end up with a collision? 474 00:38:30,000 --> 00:38:32,840 Well, it wouldn't be about collision. 475 00:38:33,040 --> 00:38:33,860 It would be about ranging. 476 00:38:34,280 --> 00:38:34,560 Okay. 477 00:38:35,260 --> 00:38:37,720 The timestamp is only to initiate 478 00:38:37,720 --> 00:38:39,880 the pseudo random number generator. 479 00:38:39,880 --> 00:38:47,540 the bad run all that iud stuff it's just to like give it a seed and then once it gets the seed it 480 00:38:47,540 --> 00:38:52,160 starts going so you could just give it the seed once and just run it continuously and like you 481 00:38:52,160 --> 00:38:57,340 said like you don't even have to do the whole search space you can just analyze like the number 482 00:38:57,340 --> 00:39:02,520 of collisions that you're getting and like you know the first month or so and that should 483 00:39:02,520 --> 00:39:08,640 statistically tell you right you know if you're getting like you know 10 collisions where you 484 00:39:08,640 --> 00:39:11,920 You should be able to get a collision in a couple of minutes because that's what people are doing right now. 485 00:39:12,340 --> 00:39:13,920 Well, that's what the that's what the GPU. 486 00:39:14,360 --> 00:39:19,900 I mean, if you're actually running this on the hardware, the actual hardware, it's going to be like 100 times slower. 487 00:39:20,020 --> 00:39:22,500 But to test your firmware, you don't need to test it on the hardware. 488 00:39:22,880 --> 00:39:24,580 You should test it on the hardware also. 489 00:39:25,180 --> 00:39:27,500 But you should first test your firmware on the GPU. 490 00:39:28,180 --> 00:39:28,720 You know? 491 00:39:29,160 --> 00:39:30,200 Yeah, I mean, that's true. 492 00:39:30,960 --> 00:39:32,060 Your model of it. 493 00:39:32,060 --> 00:39:39,760 but the issue is pulling from like if you tried to simulate this what it not in the actual card 494 00:39:39,760 --> 00:39:44,460 like you wouldn't have the hardware of the true random number generator so you i think you do have 495 00:39:44,460 --> 00:39:51,500 to actually run this test on the card itself okay but still yeah why are why are they not running 496 00:39:51,500 --> 00:39:57,540 you should have multiple multiple wallets set up running this if if it's if they're slow 497 00:39:57,540 --> 00:40:04,580 run 10 of them you know run 100 of them yeah 100 of them whatever and like you said like i mean 498 00:40:04,580 --> 00:40:11,680 and people might accuse me of like monday morning uh quarterbacking here like hindsight's 2020 yeah 499 00:40:11,680 --> 00:40:20,040 i don't know man i i don't think so man just testing just proving that the data you're getting 500 00:40:20,040 --> 00:40:25,300 is from the random number generator that doesn't seem oh only in hindsight would you have thought 501 00:40:25,300 --> 00:40:26,100 to test that. 502 00:40:27,020 --> 00:40:27,680 I don't know. 503 00:40:29,040 --> 00:40:31,480 Well, for all the other hardware wallet manufacturers 504 00:40:31,480 --> 00:40:33,440 out there, don't. 505 00:40:34,920 --> 00:40:36,640 Don't get caught on something that stupid. 506 00:40:37,360 --> 00:40:37,980 You know, like, 507 00:40:38,980 --> 00:40:41,360 now you have the opportunity to let someone else 508 00:40:41,360 --> 00:40:42,880 take the fall. 509 00:40:43,460 --> 00:40:44,540 If you haven't done that, 510 00:40:45,240 --> 00:40:46,940 if you're not doing that, 511 00:40:46,980 --> 00:40:48,140 if you're not checking that, 512 00:40:48,220 --> 00:40:50,220 or you did miss a unit test 513 00:40:50,220 --> 00:40:50,980 for something like that, 514 00:40:50,980 --> 00:40:52,900 because you just assume that the open source tool 515 00:40:52,900 --> 00:40:54,840 you used is going to do the job 516 00:40:54,840 --> 00:40:55,340 for you 517 00:40:55,340 --> 00:40:57,780 you got lucky 518 00:40:57,780 --> 00:41:00,780 you got lucky as shit that cold card 519 00:41:00,780 --> 00:41:02,760 did it first 520 00:41:02,760 --> 00:41:04,440 because now you have no excuse 521 00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:06,680 like your true 522 00:41:06,680 --> 00:41:08,820 random number generator should be 523 00:41:08,820 --> 00:41:10,480 deterministically tied to the 524 00:41:10,480 --> 00:41:12,900 operation of the device 525 00:41:12,900 --> 00:41:14,800 and you should test 526 00:41:14,800 --> 00:41:16,340 the ever loving shit 527 00:41:16,340 --> 00:41:18,440 out of the fact that that's happening 528 00:41:18,440 --> 00:41:20,640 this is everybody's life 529 00:41:20,640 --> 00:41:22,720 savings this is everybody 530 00:41:22,720 --> 00:41:24,680 That's somebody's exit plan, man. 531 00:41:26,300 --> 00:41:26,780 Yeah. 532 00:41:28,040 --> 00:41:34,860 I do have a positive note or something that has changed deep inside of me because of this, which is a good thing. 533 00:41:35,160 --> 00:41:35,340 Yeah. 534 00:41:35,340 --> 00:41:39,620 I had been kind of on the fence about the open source nature of things. 535 00:41:39,997 --> 00:41:47,617 I've at times in my life defended a private company for keeping some of their stuff closed source. 536 00:41:48,017 --> 00:41:48,097 Same. 537 00:41:48,257 --> 00:41:48,977 That's done. 538 00:41:49,517 --> 00:41:55,457 I'm sorry, Scott, 9,000, BitX, Scott, like you're right. 539 00:41:55,637 --> 00:41:56,417 I was wrong. 540 00:41:56,917 --> 00:42:01,057 There is absolutely no excuse for anything like this to be closed source. 541 00:42:01,977 --> 00:42:02,817 I agree. 542 00:42:02,957 --> 00:42:03,937 Absolutely none. 543 00:42:04,097 --> 00:42:04,297 I agree. 544 00:42:04,297 --> 00:42:07,877 I mean, those days are over for something like this. 545 00:42:07,877 --> 00:42:18,197 I mean, if it's code that you're running, that only you are running on your server and you're not distributing that code to anybody else, that's one thing. 546 00:42:18,317 --> 00:42:24,797 But if you're baking that code inside of a device and you're selling it to people, that shit has to be open source. 547 00:42:24,797 --> 00:42:45,197 Yeah. Honestly, in just the age of AI, like the conditions of the ability to reproduce and exploit something have changed so dramatically in like time and resource costs that I think like 10, 15 years ago, there was a better case to be made. 548 00:42:45,197 --> 00:42:46,277 today 549 00:42:46,277 --> 00:42:49,717 I think you're only hurting yourself 550 00:42:49,717 --> 00:42:51,777 and I also 551 00:42:51,777 --> 00:42:53,337 think that we as 552 00:42:53,337 --> 00:42:55,397 like Bitcoiners 553 00:42:55,397 --> 00:42:57,577 now don't have any excuse not to be 554 00:42:57,577 --> 00:42:58,837 red teaming all this crap 555 00:42:58,837 --> 00:43:01,397 this is actually why I 556 00:43:01,397 --> 00:43:03,637 still think that like for like 557 00:43:03,637 --> 00:43:05,497 what do you mean by red teaming? 558 00:43:05,717 --> 00:43:07,697 using an open source 559 00:43:07,697 --> 00:43:09,037 software and 560 00:43:09,037 --> 00:43:11,757 giving it to Fable 5 and spending 561 00:43:11,757 --> 00:43:13,657 a couple of hours or taking 562 00:43:13,657 --> 00:43:18,497 a little bit every single day to learn about how something works, have it explain something, 563 00:43:18,617 --> 00:43:23,737 and then just have it brute force and help come up with things like, well, maybe you could 564 00:43:23,737 --> 00:43:24,137 do this. 565 00:43:24,457 --> 00:43:25,637 Could we attack it this way? 566 00:43:25,877 --> 00:43:26,777 And just go to town. 567 00:43:27,397 --> 00:43:28,237 Just go to town. 568 00:43:28,757 --> 00:43:33,037 Think about, like, be adversarial to all the stuff that we use. 569 00:43:33,997 --> 00:43:36,977 Like, is that not our obligation to make it better? 570 00:43:38,257 --> 00:43:41,837 And people who don't know jack about code can now actually participate. 571 00:43:41,837 --> 00:43:44,497 you know a lot of it is just brute forcing 572 00:43:44,497 --> 00:43:46,717 a lot of it is just like 573 00:43:46,717 --> 00:43:48,637 actually putting the 574 00:43:48,637 --> 00:43:50,117 the code to the chip 575 00:43:50,117 --> 00:43:52,737 now and you don't need to know 576 00:43:52,737 --> 00:43:54,897 what the code means to do it anymore 577 00:43:54,897 --> 00:43:56,257 so 578 00:43:56,257 --> 00:43:58,817 and I think 579 00:43:58,817 --> 00:44:00,677 that's when when hackers 580 00:44:00,677 --> 00:44:02,637 are doing that in the opposite direction they're 581 00:44:02,637 --> 00:44:04,637 trying to find vulnerabilities that way the only time 582 00:44:04,637 --> 00:44:06,577 we the only way we build the stuff safe 583 00:44:06,577 --> 00:44:07,517 is if we're doing it too 584 00:44:07,517 --> 00:44:10,397 is the 585 00:44:10,397 --> 00:44:11,297 I mean 586 00:44:11,297 --> 00:44:14,017 guy and I were talking about this a little bit earlier 587 00:44:14,017 --> 00:44:15,937 do we have any 588 00:44:15,937 --> 00:44:18,077 like how sure 589 00:44:18,077 --> 00:44:20,217 are we that the tap signers 590 00:44:20,217 --> 00:44:21,957 and stuff are okay 591 00:44:21,957 --> 00:44:23,737 have you heard anything about that Steve 592 00:44:23,737 --> 00:44:25,677 I mean 593 00:44:25,677 --> 00:44:27,997 the failure mechanism 594 00:44:27,997 --> 00:44:29,937 that cold card has is 595 00:44:29,937 --> 00:44:32,377 definitely unique to them 596 00:44:32,377 --> 00:44:33,337 to their setup 597 00:44:33,337 --> 00:44:35,697 it was because the 598 00:44:35,697 --> 00:44:38,197 portion of the thing that had the failure 599 00:44:38,197 --> 00:44:39,817 was not open source like 600 00:44:39,817 --> 00:44:42,777 pretty much all the other hardware wallets, 601 00:44:43,077 --> 00:44:44,337 the code is open source, 602 00:44:44,497 --> 00:44:47,677 and people have verified that this mechanism 603 00:44:47,677 --> 00:44:50,057 just does not exist in other ones. 604 00:44:51,777 --> 00:44:54,917 I mean, we can't be sure that there's not another. 605 00:44:55,837 --> 00:44:57,757 Is there some, is there, I mean, 606 00:44:57,757 --> 00:44:59,757 I guess it could be possible that there was some fault 607 00:44:59,757 --> 00:45:03,537 in the random number generation in the tap signers? 608 00:45:04,477 --> 00:45:06,537 Because that's theirs too, right? 609 00:45:06,537 --> 00:45:13,137 Did they use that same mechanism to generate the keys, the fundamental keys for the tap signers that get sent out? 610 00:45:13,257 --> 00:45:13,977 For the tap signer. 611 00:45:14,017 --> 00:45:14,897 Oh, I have no idea. 612 00:45:15,317 --> 00:45:15,457 Yeah. 613 00:45:15,677 --> 00:45:16,617 That's a great question. 614 00:45:16,617 --> 00:45:17,097 I don't know either. 615 00:45:17,237 --> 00:45:19,077 And I freaking love the tap signers. 616 00:45:19,257 --> 00:45:23,457 I have them in every, I have more tap signers in my setups than I have cold card. 617 00:45:24,197 --> 00:45:26,817 And I'll be honest, that scares me. 618 00:45:27,197 --> 00:45:31,477 Like they've said that tap signers are fine, you know, all that stuff. 619 00:45:31,477 --> 00:45:33,317 but you know 620 00:45:33,317 --> 00:45:34,037 the first announcement 621 00:45:34,037 --> 00:45:34,697 was that 622 00:45:34,697 --> 00:45:35,857 Mark 4, Mark 5 623 00:45:35,857 --> 00:45:36,657 and Q were fine 624 00:45:36,657 --> 00:45:37,297 and it was only 625 00:45:37,297 --> 00:45:38,057 Mark 3 that was 626 00:45:38,057 --> 00:45:38,397 honorable 627 00:45:38,397 --> 00:45:39,757 gave it a couple 628 00:45:39,757 --> 00:45:40,637 hours and that 629 00:45:40,637 --> 00:45:41,417 wasn't true anymore 630 00:45:41,417 --> 00:45:44,937 so 631 00:45:44,937 --> 00:45:49,637 it's unbelievable 632 00:45:49,637 --> 00:45:52,317 yeah 633 00:45:52,317 --> 00:45:54,777 I guess there's 634 00:45:54,777 --> 00:45:56,177 another slightly 635 00:45:56,177 --> 00:45:57,017 positive thing 636 00:45:57,017 --> 00:45:57,697 that's not very 637 00:45:57,697 --> 00:45:58,217 positive 638 00:45:58,217 --> 00:45:59,537 apparently there's 639 00:45:59,537 --> 00:46:00,217 kind of a movement 640 00:46:00,217 --> 00:46:00,977 for the white 641 00:46:01,477 --> 00:46:09,057 hack hackers that are just stealing everyone's funds and with the hope that they're going to be 642 00:46:09,057 --> 00:46:16,197 able to return them to them someday i reached out to a number of people but i got mixed results i 643 00:46:16,197 --> 00:46:24,597 think everybody's just like yeah like i got two gpus you know like i could i could go to town and 644 00:46:24,597 --> 00:46:30,677 just try to preemptively but like but it's like you know what if you take somebody who's was 645 00:46:30,677 --> 00:46:35,517 actually going to like you run into this problem like there's no way for it not to have so many 646 00:46:35,517 --> 00:46:41,937 trust issues and so many like verification issues you know yeah and then that's all on you and that's 647 00:46:41,937 --> 00:46:47,077 all on you it's all on you it immediately becomes like my responsibility to try to figure it out and 648 00:46:47,077 --> 00:47:01,960 if you fuck up it might be you that goes to jail yeah yeah yeah yeah i mean that that the serious risk i mean but it like i i feel so i feel so helpless though to be like i not i just gonna like 649 00:47:01,960 --> 00:47:07,960 post an episode and then just good luck guys you know just like feels fucking 650 00:47:07,960 --> 00:47:11,080 i don't think there's anything else we can do 651 00:47:11,080 --> 00:47:17,440 you know the attempt to orchestrate that like 652 00:47:17,440 --> 00:47:24,460 you know there's like an element because like you could get you can have scammers who just 653 00:47:24,460 --> 00:47:28,800 hack the keys too and then find out that like you'd have to make it that your address 654 00:47:28,800 --> 00:47:34,440 you know your ad the addresses that you got would you would not be able to make public 655 00:47:34,440 --> 00:47:40,080 because then you just have hackers come in and be like oh they're mine and then like okay well 656 00:47:40,080 --> 00:47:40,520 what do you do? 657 00:47:40,580 --> 00:47:43,320 You KYC the people so that when you send it to them, 658 00:47:43,940 --> 00:47:44,920 if somebody else conflicts, 659 00:47:45,360 --> 00:47:47,540 conflicts that contested, 660 00:47:47,580 --> 00:47:48,920 I mean that, 661 00:47:49,080 --> 00:47:49,340 Oh, 662 00:47:49,340 --> 00:47:49,580 it's like, 663 00:47:49,620 --> 00:47:49,720 well, 664 00:47:49,720 --> 00:47:52,300 it was this guy that I gave the Bitcoin to, 665 00:47:52,440 --> 00:47:52,900 you know, 666 00:47:52,900 --> 00:47:53,160 like, 667 00:47:53,220 --> 00:47:56,700 cause then they just got hacked a different way. 668 00:47:57,040 --> 00:47:57,700 You know, 669 00:47:57,740 --> 00:47:58,300 like the, 670 00:47:58,300 --> 00:47:58,620 the, 671 00:47:58,620 --> 00:48:03,760 the thief still got the coins and you know, 672 00:48:03,800 --> 00:48:04,120 what's, 673 00:48:04,240 --> 00:48:05,180 what is it now that I, 674 00:48:05,260 --> 00:48:07,140 I have KYC information for people? 675 00:48:07,340 --> 00:48:07,380 Like, 676 00:48:07,460 --> 00:48:07,940 like, 677 00:48:08,020 --> 00:48:08,360 I don't, 678 00:48:08,360 --> 00:48:11,320 there's no easy solution. 679 00:48:11,560 --> 00:48:12,420 It doesn't work. 680 00:48:12,560 --> 00:48:14,1000 You don't want to do that unless you're an expert. 681 00:48:15,320 --> 00:48:17,140 Unless you're like, you know. 682 00:48:17,300 --> 00:48:19,280 Expert, very public about it. 683 00:48:19,380 --> 00:48:20,800 You distribute the trust. 684 00:48:21,680 --> 00:48:22,280 Like, you know. 685 00:48:23,200 --> 00:48:25,860 Somebody at Coinbase might be able to do this 686 00:48:25,860 --> 00:48:27,940 with a huge announcement. 687 00:48:29,260 --> 00:48:32,220 But I don't think an individual can do this. 688 00:48:32,220 --> 00:48:32,500 Yeah. 689 00:48:35,300 --> 00:48:37,160 I don't see how they could even do it. 690 00:48:37,160 --> 00:48:44,560 I mean, unless you had some proof that, oh, this money moved one time from a Coinbase address. 691 00:48:44,860 --> 00:48:47,080 And so we pulled it out of this address. 692 00:48:47,180 --> 00:48:49,600 I mean, how do you like... 693 00:48:49,600 --> 00:48:51,920 You could do it like a callback like that, maybe. 694 00:48:53,020 --> 00:49:01,220 Is that if you could just check all of your customers, because like most of them now have to say that like, oh, I am sending out to my address. 695 00:49:02,200 --> 00:49:06,680 And like basically commit to that being the case. 696 00:49:07,160 --> 00:49:17,900 And then they could scan all of those addresses and try to brute force all of them and then basically extract it and withhold it for that known account. 697 00:49:18,960 --> 00:49:25,400 But you run the risk of them having sent it to somebody else because it's people they've already KYC'd. 698 00:49:25,480 --> 00:49:35,020 They wouldn't be able to do it outside of their customer base in any sensible way or realistic way, I think, without just a ton of other problems. 699 00:49:35,020 --> 00:49:43,760 um yeah but still we need i mean hopefully this will happen sooner rather than later but 700 00:49:43,760 --> 00:49:54,940 i think we need a real good explanation for why this was not tested earlier because 701 00:49:54,940 --> 00:50:03,320 i know this is steve conspiracy hat guy but we need to know that this was not a state attack 702 00:50:03,320 --> 00:50:12,820 that i mean this is a backdoor this is a backdoor into a hardware wallet that's exactly what this is 703 00:50:12,820 --> 00:50:20,160 what kind of employees whether it's an intentional backdoor or an accidental backdoor is a question 704 00:50:20,160 --> 00:50:26,880 but this is absolutely a backdoor into your hardware wallet how did it get here is it really 705 00:50:26,880 --> 00:50:32,680 believable that it could have gotten here by accident like i'm i mean i'm doing this because 706 00:50:32,680 --> 00:50:39,240 we're recording you know if if this was live i probably wouldn't be you know i'd just be trying 707 00:50:39,240 --> 00:50:44,520 to help people do what they can do but you know people aren't gonna see this year this till monday 708 00:50:44,520 --> 00:50:52,360 right yeah um but yeah i mean yeah if you're hearing this on monday and you still haven't 709 00:50:52,360 --> 00:50:57,660 done anything about your cold card that doesn't have any uh your random dice rolls added to it 710 00:50:57,660 --> 00:51:05,700 like get on it now yeah if you're doing going this on the way to work turn around you got sick 711 00:51:05,700 --> 00:51:10,800 and like it really does suck because i've you know i've heard a lot of people 712 00:51:10,800 --> 00:51:17,640 on these spaces being like yeah um i'm gonna i'm going into gold for a little bit 713 00:51:17,640 --> 00:51:25,560 or um yeah i i'm done with self-custody you know i'm i i can't do this and this is the worst lesson 714 00:51:25,560 --> 00:51:34,620 yeah that is awful but i can't you can't fault somebody for well you can't but at the same time 715 00:51:34,620 --> 00:51:42,620 like multi-sig is the answer and it's not that hard anymore um but cold card multi-sig's broken 716 00:51:42,620 --> 00:51:51,400 too cold card well you don't use cold card sure but yeah you could i mean if you had a cold card 717 00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:53,700 in a multi-sig setup, you're fine. 718 00:51:54,440 --> 00:51:55,1000 Right? Like, you still need to fix it. 719 00:51:55,1000 --> 00:51:56,100 Not really. 720 00:51:57,180 --> 00:51:59,140 I mean, you got like a month, maybe. 721 00:51:59,760 --> 00:52:11,622 Right You need to fix it But if you have one cold card in a multi setup you have one compromise key Right having one key compromise is 722 00:52:11,622 --> 00:52:13,783 And as I understand it too, 723 00:52:14,082 --> 00:52:15,542 is that if you haven't, 724 00:52:16,142 --> 00:52:18,902 because of how the script is revealed on spend, 725 00:52:19,182 --> 00:52:21,062 so if you created a multi-sig, 726 00:52:22,022 --> 00:52:27,222 even if it's three cold cards, 727 00:52:27,222 --> 00:52:36,262 you only sent bitcoin to it and you never sent bitcoin out that not until you first send it out 728 00:52:36,262 --> 00:52:44,602 have you revealed the information necessary to begin brute forcing your keys um or to reveal 729 00:52:44,602 --> 00:52:50,082 basically the nature of your multi-sig setup it's it's just a hash essentially up to that point 730 00:52:50,082 --> 00:52:56,102 but yeah but you better you better send it all at once you've got to send it all at once with a 731 00:52:56,102 --> 00:53:01,682 high fee because like if you can the second they see that and they recognize that this is in the 732 00:53:01,682 --> 00:53:08,402 key space of vulnerable things they could recreate two of the keys in minutes and well no they already 733 00:53:08,402 --> 00:53:12,962 have they already have the private keys for all of your public keys they just didn't know those 734 00:53:12,962 --> 00:53:21,302 public keys went together oh shit i didn't just think about that yeah you got to slip stream it 735 00:53:21,302 --> 00:53:28,122 like you got to do it out of band you got to mine your own freaking transaction 736 00:53:28,122 --> 00:53:34,862 oh my god i didn't even think about that they could just go ahead just generate everything 737 00:53:34,862 --> 00:53:47,102 yeah i mean i multi-signature and you know i'm i've always had this feeling um that's why i 738 00:53:47,102 --> 00:53:52,602 rolled the dice originally is that i took a lot of classes in my electrical engineering days about 739 00:53:52,602 --> 00:53:57,722 randomness and random number generation yeah and i just walked away from all those feelings 740 00:53:57,722 --> 00:54:05,202 yeah it's it's very deep in my heart i feel like every time we talk it's something like that comes 741 00:54:05,202 --> 00:54:13,142 up i yeah it is it's like electronics do not do randomness guys randomness comes from reality 742 00:54:13,142 --> 00:54:20,322 yeah like they say there's a maybe there's a true random number generator in these cards that's 743 00:54:20,322 --> 00:54:25,562 because it's like sensing something about reality you know it's sensing the amount of particles 744 00:54:25,562 --> 00:54:29,962 hitting it or something the best random number generators are like things that use like the 745 00:54:29,962 --> 00:54:37,522 camera or something that even if it's use noise from the mic image from the camera like sensor 746 00:54:37,522 --> 00:54:42,522 like like like even like the iphone the iphone like secure element stuff or whatever takes like 747 00:54:42,522 --> 00:54:45,182 data from every single sensor you have, 748 00:54:45,662 --> 00:54:46,942 like every single thing. 749 00:54:48,042 --> 00:54:48,382 And like. 750 00:54:49,322 --> 00:54:51,322 That's got to come from reality, man. 751 00:54:51,522 --> 00:54:53,622 Like you should always roll dice. 752 00:54:54,522 --> 00:54:55,082 Always. 753 00:54:56,082 --> 00:54:57,682 It should come with a freaking paradise. 754 00:54:57,862 --> 00:55:00,122 Because if you think about those sensors, 755 00:55:00,182 --> 00:55:00,982 like you're talking about, 756 00:55:01,022 --> 00:55:03,382 like the temperature sensor or the microphone sensor 757 00:55:03,382 --> 00:55:04,462 or something like that, 758 00:55:05,362 --> 00:55:08,142 you're assuming that the sensor is working correctly. 759 00:55:09,462 --> 00:55:12,302 Like what if something goes wrong with a sensor? 760 00:55:12,522 --> 00:55:17,302 And there's not predictable noise, you know, like. 761 00:55:17,742 --> 00:55:19,202 Yeah, exactly. 762 00:55:22,242 --> 00:55:23,002 Yeah. 763 00:55:23,762 --> 00:55:25,002 Roll the dice. 764 00:55:26,302 --> 00:55:30,462 Another way, another like stepping back and looking at this. 765 00:55:31,122 --> 00:55:39,542 Yes, right now we are in this moment when the most serious accident was to self-custody people. 766 00:55:39,542 --> 00:55:51,042 If you step back and you look at Bitcoin as a whole, it's still not even close that the most risks happen to the people that give their coins to exchanges. 767 00:55:52,142 --> 00:56:00,262 Still on the whole, 99% of hacks happen to exchanges, you know, like in terms of amount of Bitcoin. 768 00:56:00,262 --> 00:56:11,502 And the reason this one hurts so much, both in the the hacks themselves and in the amount stolen is just because it hit self-custody. 769 00:56:11,783 --> 00:56:15,102 Like that's what makes it so different because that almost never happens. 770 00:56:15,102 --> 00:56:26,382 Like, yeah, you can one off somebody or break into a treasure that you have in your person and you're like trying to get something off ramp, you know, whatever. 771 00:56:26,382 --> 00:56:32,842 like those are like edge case and like always already very difficult to protect against anyway 772 00:56:32,842 --> 00:56:41,402 um because the attack vector is different but this is like a fundamental i the way that 773 00:56:41,402 --> 00:56:49,402 maybe tens of thousands maybe tens of thousands of people generated keys is fundamentally f'd 774 00:56:49,402 --> 00:56:58,242 you know so like everybody's individual sort of yeah you can compare it to like like the airplane 775 00:56:58,242 --> 00:57:04,262 crash compared to every other transportation crash but this airplane had it is is a safer 776 00:57:04,262 --> 00:57:08,362 way to travel but this airplane had a lot of a lot of important people on it yeah 777 00:57:08,362 --> 00:57:23,545 you know this is still just stuff around bitcoin you know like it not a fundamental problem with I think It not a fundamental problem with the key system You know it it a it the human error 778 00:57:23,545 --> 00:57:25,085 of an implementation of it. 779 00:57:26,465 --> 00:57:26,905 And, 780 00:57:27,945 --> 00:57:30,125 but man, 781 00:57:31,045 --> 00:57:31,665 you know, 782 00:57:31,785 --> 00:57:33,445 it exposes something 783 00:57:33,445 --> 00:57:34,485 about the nature 784 00:57:34,485 --> 00:57:36,885 of Bitcoin's 785 00:57:36,885 --> 00:57:38,525 guarantee 786 00:57:38,525 --> 00:57:41,085 is, 787 00:57:41,165 --> 00:57:41,845 is how 788 00:57:41,845 --> 00:57:51,785 reliant it is on you know bobby shell actually had a a good point is you know we shouldn't be 789 00:57:51,785 --> 00:57:59,825 putting so much faith in things created by man because humans are fallible and that there's an 790 00:57:59,825 --> 00:58:07,985 element to that that even suggests that you know bitcoin itself has a shelf life bitcoin itself has 791 00:58:07,985 --> 00:58:17,385 a degree of risk that something like gold doesn't have. 792 00:58:18,225 --> 00:58:30,025 And that will always be an element of the speed and a kind of feedback loop of its Lindy effect. 793 00:58:30,945 --> 00:58:36,085 You know, like that people will only trust software so far. 794 00:58:36,085 --> 00:58:42,325 people only trust a network so far it's a lot easier to trust a rock that hadn't humans had 795 00:58:42,325 --> 00:58:51,005 nothing to do with you know um and that despite the fact that i think the nature of its vulnerabilities 796 00:58:51,005 --> 00:59:00,045 is very different than something like fiat and something like gold it is it's not simply it is 797 00:59:00,045 --> 00:59:09,805 better by an order of magnitude in something like fiat, but it also has a very different failure 798 00:59:09,805 --> 00:59:16,485 mode when something like this can go wrong. Who cares whether or not like quantum is theoretical 799 00:59:16,485 --> 00:59:24,645 or total BS or not, but the idea that there could be a failure of the cryptography itself, 800 00:59:24,645 --> 00:59:31,745 even if it's just an implementation you know uh uh aes or ecdsa or whatever could 801 00:59:31,745 --> 00:59:38,945 could literally just be especially in the age of ai like there could just be a vulnerability in the 802 00:59:38,945 --> 00:59:45,405 fundamental implementation of it not even in the theory not even in the fact of whether or not 803 00:59:45,405 --> 00:59:49,445 the curve itself is broken. 804 00:59:51,045 --> 00:59:51,845 But right. 805 00:59:52,125 --> 00:59:52,785 There could be, 806 00:59:52,905 --> 00:59:55,045 there could be something that was done wrong. 807 00:59:55,265 --> 00:59:55,465 Yeah. 808 00:59:55,765 --> 00:59:56,485 And of course, 809 00:59:56,565 --> 00:59:56,845 quantum, 810 00:59:56,945 --> 00:59:58,305 like this is a dry run for quantum, 811 00:59:58,625 --> 00:59:58,925 you know, 812 00:59:58,965 --> 01:00:00,045 like if you send your coins, 813 01:00:00,045 --> 01:00:00,465 like, 814 01:00:00,585 --> 01:00:02,085 and you expose your hash, 815 01:00:02,145 --> 01:00:03,285 you expose the script at all. 816 01:00:03,845 --> 01:00:04,245 Like, 817 01:00:05,065 --> 01:00:08,305 like this is the type of thing that would occur. 818 01:00:08,305 --> 01:00:08,845 And I think, 819 01:00:09,145 --> 01:00:12,925 I think it lends a little bit more credence to the idea that we should be 820 01:00:12,925 --> 01:00:15,125 putting a little bit into the insurance policy. 821 01:00:15,405 --> 01:00:22,945 no matter how stupid it may seem to think it's anything other than theoretical from a practical standpoint. 822 01:00:23,945 --> 01:00:26,265 Is that everything is just diversification. 823 01:00:26,605 --> 01:00:28,945 I don't think that gold is an insurance policy. 824 01:00:29,565 --> 01:00:34,465 I don't think that because how long ago would somebody have thought? 825 01:00:34,545 --> 01:00:37,405 They still try to tell you that a diamond is a good investment. 826 01:00:37,925 --> 01:00:39,245 You can buy a real diamond. 827 01:00:39,945 --> 01:00:41,305 Don't buy one of these lab diamonds. 828 01:00:41,405 --> 01:00:42,265 Buy a real diamond. 829 01:00:42,265 --> 01:00:44,745 I'm like, you can't tell the difference. 830 01:00:44,745 --> 01:00:49,545 you can't tell the difference between a real diamond and a lab diamond if someone doesn't 831 01:00:49,545 --> 01:00:55,605 who's making it doesn't put in the die that makes it different yeah right it's artificial scarcity 832 01:00:55,605 --> 01:01:02,325 now so there is no like diamonds are completely worthless completely like there is no value there 833 01:01:02,325 --> 01:01:07,725 it's you might as well have well they're worth the amount of heat that it takes the amount of 834 01:01:07,725 --> 01:01:13,565 heat and pressure it takes to make them or they're sure that's their base price right is the the 835 01:01:13,565 --> 01:01:19,405 cost to make more and so as energy costs drop in terms of you know your ability to produce energy 836 01:01:19,405 --> 01:01:28,265 like that is not it's not a significant like i guess proof of work is now the it's now the cost 837 01:01:28,265 --> 01:01:34,905 of a diamond um but i mean you know it takes a lot of heat to make glass too and you know you can get 838 01:01:34,905 --> 01:01:42,705 what are they the the um i throw away glass zirconium or whatever yeah you know like it just 839 01:01:42,705 --> 01:01:48,005 we're heading to a place and and that's a good thing like and in some ways it's great because 840 01:01:48,005 --> 01:01:52,605 it'll probably happen very hard and you can you can make that's what i was going to say is you can 841 01:01:52,605 --> 01:01:58,185 make you can make all sorts of really great cutting tools and stuff with diamond blades and that's 842 01:01:58,185 --> 01:02:02,685 awesome but the problem is is that that means the diamond is not a good investment and that means 843 01:02:02,685 --> 01:02:09,665 that it could mean that all sorts of rocks and things can be you know we can we may be able to 844 01:02:09,665 --> 01:02:16,005 one day figure out how to transition one thing to another and and then you no longer have scarcity of 845 01:02:16,005 --> 01:02:23,425 gold or anything else i mean we kind of know that you can irradiate like with enough energy 846 01:02:23,425 --> 01:02:29,965 you can turn lead into gold you know um well what i'm saying is that it may be that something 847 01:02:30,008 --> 01:02:35,368 Like Bitcoin is the only thing that is possibly trustworthy in the long run. 848 01:02:35,588 --> 01:02:39,048 But during the transition, we have to beat the hell out of it for a really long time. 849 01:02:39,508 --> 01:02:39,708 Right. 850 01:02:40,108 --> 01:02:44,088 Is this going to be the version that makes it the whole way? 851 01:02:44,428 --> 01:02:44,608 Yeah. 852 01:02:46,688 --> 01:02:51,708 I still, there's still no question of that in my mind. 853 01:02:51,708 --> 01:02:59,028 Like Bitcoin is going to be the money on earth or some fork of Bitcoin, some kind of cryptocurrency. 854 01:03:00,008 --> 01:03:04,708 It's the primary. It still remains like I'm not divesting from anything, you know. 855 01:03:05,888 --> 01:03:12,388 Yeah. I mean, interesting to think about the the uniqueness of its trust. 856 01:03:13,528 --> 01:03:25,068 Profile, like, you know, like, how do people begin to trust or believe in what's the limit of the capacity of people who don't understand something to to use it safely? 857 01:03:25,068 --> 01:03:32,548 um and i think i think in that context it's less about that does bitcoin become the dominant money 858 01:03:32,548 --> 01:03:37,548 or the idea of a cryptographic money become dominant or i think that's i think that's just 859 01:03:37,548 --> 01:03:41,588 where we're headed like a digital money that remains digital and is cryptographically secure 860 01:03:41,588 --> 01:03:47,248 i think is the only path forward to actually have to actually have progress either that we or we're 861 01:03:47,248 --> 01:03:52,228 just going to be stagnant to a certain degree until we figure it out or there's going to be 862 01:03:52,228 --> 01:03:54,988 this massive drain is gonna be like walking through, you know, 863 01:03:55,008 --> 01:04:00,548 syrup, like until we get to that. And the question is, how long 864 01:04:00,548 --> 01:04:04,468 does it take? I think, the more difficult it is to trust and 865 01:04:04,468 --> 01:04:09,028 more, the more pushback there is against the Lindy effect, 866 01:04:09,868 --> 01:04:14,428 proving that it it will survive, you know, like the, the more 867 01:04:14,428 --> 01:04:17,848 it's kind of threatened, or we have these, there is a quantum 868 01:04:17,848 --> 01:04:21,748 key thing, I think, if we have any sort of preparation or 869 01:04:21,748 --> 01:04:29,148 whatever um like i think it can survive that but how many more decades does that does that add to 870 01:04:29,148 --> 01:04:38,148 it being the the the standard kind of thing you know um so i don't know well and to have digital 871 01:04:38,148 --> 01:04:43,788 money at all it feels like it's got to have this got to be this system or something like it i don't 872 01:04:43,788 --> 01:04:51,088 know how banks are going to survive i mean they're still just leaking in a way that you know yeah 873 01:04:51,088 --> 01:04:58,488 like having a pool system at all is just not working you know um yeah i don't i don't know 874 01:04:58,488 --> 01:05:03,388 how that's going to survive the age of ai interrupts or causes causes problems yeah right 875 01:05:03,388 --> 01:05:11,848 yeah causes problems with that even worse than than this yeah it's crazy it's crazy how much 876 01:05:11,848 --> 01:05:20,668 yeah i mean i think the um we're gonna get past this and yeah you know people are gonna know they 877 01:05:20,668 --> 01:05:26,488 have to roll dice and people hardware manufacturers are going to know that they have to um everything's 878 01:05:26,488 --> 01:05:31,808 got to be open source and like the combination of those like the the dice rolling thing that's 879 01:05:31,808 --> 01:05:36,528 going to get rid of the whole random number generator thing that's that's just going to be 880 01:05:36,528 --> 01:05:42,148 a part of the responsibility now um but honestly it's fun and it's like it's like rewarding it's 881 01:05:42,148 --> 01:05:48,988 one of those like um you know you know you know it's like oh do i have to trust this device you 882 01:05:48,988 --> 01:05:51,088 You know, it really removes a lot of that trust. 883 01:05:51,208 --> 01:05:54,568 You're like, your subconscious knows the randomness is there. 884 01:05:56,028 --> 01:05:58,848 So self-custody is still the way forward. 885 01:05:58,948 --> 01:06:01,088 Sorry if that wasn't what you guys are talking about. 886 01:06:01,968 --> 01:06:03,308 No, no, that makes sense though. 887 01:06:03,488 --> 01:06:07,508 Like, because it is these moments that even create the mottos. 888 01:06:07,508 --> 01:06:11,528 Like this will probably be the, you know, be your own entropy. 889 01:06:13,408 --> 01:06:14,368 Roll your own crypto. 890 01:06:14,688 --> 01:06:15,788 Roll your own crypto. 891 01:06:15,788 --> 01:06:19,848 we were wrong 892 01:06:19,848 --> 01:06:23,388 oh Jesus 893 01:06:23,388 --> 01:06:25,528 don't roll your own crypto but roll your own 894 01:06:25,528 --> 01:06:26,168 randomness 895 01:06:26,168 --> 01:06:27,888 roll your own randomness 896 01:06:27,888 --> 01:06:30,128 but hold your own keys 897 01:06:30,128 --> 01:06:31,908 stay humble stack sats 898 01:06:31,908 --> 01:06:33,988 and roll your own randomness 899 01:06:33,988 --> 01:06:35,348 I like that 900 01:06:35,348 --> 01:06:37,488 I got a funny story about yesterday 901 01:06:37,488 --> 01:06:39,568 morning before any news of the hack 902 01:06:39,568 --> 01:06:41,308 came out I was sorry just 903 01:06:41,308 --> 01:06:42,528 every hardware wallet 904 01:06:42,528 --> 01:06:45,028 just offer that 905 01:06:45,788 --> 01:06:47,988 Get a good pair of dice. 906 01:06:48,088 --> 01:06:55,108 Get an open source dice creation tool and put a pair of dice in with your hardware wallet and let people do the dice rolls. 907 01:06:55,828 --> 01:06:59,408 Maybe 99% of people don't do it, but just hint at it. 908 01:07:00,408 --> 01:07:02,048 That can't be expensive. 909 01:07:02,668 --> 01:07:05,068 You know, your $200 freaking hardware wallet. 910 01:07:05,628 --> 01:07:09,928 Put $2 worth of high quality dice in there. 911 01:07:09,928 --> 01:07:15,408 Is there a protocol for like 32-sided die or whatever? 912 01:07:16,248 --> 01:07:17,268 Sure there is. 913 01:07:18,128 --> 01:07:25,488 We could get it down to 24 good rolls from the customer, from the user. 914 01:07:26,228 --> 01:07:28,888 I bet that can be a standard. 915 01:07:29,708 --> 01:07:30,808 Roll your own randomness. 916 01:07:32,528 --> 01:07:33,348 Oh, man. 917 01:07:34,568 --> 01:07:58,864 But yeah it is exactly things like you know it not like I have more times than I can count that there have been days like this in Bitcoin You know they all been different and have had different degrees in attacking or been a kick to the balls or hit in the gut to different groups or different subsets 918 01:07:58,864 --> 01:08:26,165 And I think a big part of why this one just hurts so bad is that this has been the most reliable, the rules that were followed and the laws or lessons that were followed by the people who got hit in this one have been the most hardened and most reliable for the entire history of Bitcoin. 919 01:08:27,005 --> 01:08:28,804 And even they got hit. 920 01:08:28,864 --> 01:08:40,524 you know um that's like that's the really painful thing about this and i am shocked by the number of 921 01:08:40,524 --> 01:08:46,725 people like kudos to everybody out there because i didn't even freaking dice roll on my cold heart 922 01:08:46,725 --> 01:08:53,665 like i just trusted i just trusted the the randomness in the device i you know i just was 923 01:08:53,665 --> 01:08:58,545 like i got a hardware wall i got my keys offline i'm just generating you know i got this is overkill 924 01:08:58,545 --> 01:09:05,985 already i totally dismissed it and the number of people who you know just because i talked about it 925 01:09:05,985 --> 01:09:09,885 on the show or because it was like the cool element of the feature of coin kite that you 926 01:09:09,885 --> 01:09:15,304 could roll your own dice and they understood entropy like the number of people in the audio 927 01:09:15,304 --> 01:09:20,645 nights audio knots are people that i've talked with who said yeah i got it and i just rolled my 928 01:09:20,645 --> 01:09:26,404 own dice just for fun or i like that's why i got the cold card like kudos to those people man 929 01:09:26,404 --> 01:09:28,885 like way to go 930 01:09:28,885 --> 01:09:30,244 way to go 931 01:09:30,244 --> 01:09:30,984 that's awesome 932 01:09:30,984 --> 01:09:33,825 to actually 933 01:09:33,825 --> 01:09:36,544 go the extra mile and think that 934 01:09:36,544 --> 01:09:38,225 hard and specific 935 01:09:38,225 --> 01:09:40,565 like now I feel stupid for never 936 01:09:40,565 --> 01:09:42,144 having done it I didn't even tried it 937 01:09:42,144 --> 01:09:44,584 I've never even tried the roll your dice like I've talked about 938 01:09:44,584 --> 01:09:46,464 it like a bunch because I thought I think it's 939 01:09:46,464 --> 01:09:48,505 cool to have it as a feature but I just thought about it 940 01:09:48,505 --> 01:09:50,285 as an arbitrary feature you know 941 01:09:50,285 --> 01:09:52,184 like not like a not a 942 01:09:52,184 --> 01:09:54,265 important to have but just kind of a nice to have 943 01:09:54,265 --> 01:09:55,364 um 944 01:09:55,364 --> 01:10:01,965 and I just got shown up by like a bunch of random plebs who did it. 945 01:10:04,465 --> 01:10:05,065 Respect. 946 01:10:07,385 --> 01:10:07,904 Respect. 947 01:10:09,184 --> 01:10:10,804 Can I tell my quick story now? 948 01:10:11,124 --> 01:10:11,705 Tell your story. 949 01:10:11,844 --> 01:10:12,325 Tell your story. 950 01:10:12,864 --> 01:10:13,344 Okay. 951 01:10:13,445 --> 01:10:15,085 So yesterday morning before the hack, 952 01:10:15,804 --> 01:10:18,825 I was driving to pick my wife up from a doctor's appointment 953 01:10:18,825 --> 01:10:24,904 and I was listening to the recent interview with Natty Brunel 954 01:10:24,904 --> 01:10:32,664 and Jack Mallers about how he's, you know, got forced out of 21. 955 01:10:33,325 --> 01:10:34,825 You guys heard about that, right? 956 01:10:35,565 --> 01:10:40,724 No, I haven't heard the details, but I pseudo heard a rumor. 957 01:10:40,885 --> 01:10:41,705 Somebody mentioned it. 958 01:10:41,945 --> 01:10:43,885 And maybe it was in the Raleigh Bitcoin thing or something. 959 01:10:43,984 --> 01:10:45,604 I saw a comment somewhere. 960 01:10:45,604 --> 01:10:53,904 Well, the TDLDR on that is that 21 wanted him to sell Strike to 21. 961 01:10:53,904 --> 01:11:03,084 I mean, Mallers maintained individual ownership over Strike, had no intentions of making it a public company. 962 01:11:03,664 --> 01:11:08,705 The board of 21 said, hey, you know what will make 21 look a lot better? 963 01:11:09,484 --> 01:11:12,224 It's if we own Strike, Jack. 964 01:11:15,505 --> 01:11:18,044 And that was the end of that. 965 01:11:18,505 --> 01:11:20,224 Kudos. Walk away from that shit. 966 01:11:20,224 --> 01:11:26,445 And that Jack just, Jack's walked away from a lot of money because he was just like, no, man, that's my baby. 967 01:11:26,565 --> 01:11:27,104 I'm sorry. 968 01:11:27,145 --> 01:11:28,265 I'm not selling you my baby. 969 01:11:28,484 --> 01:11:28,785 Amen. 970 01:11:28,785 --> 01:11:31,885 And so, good on him for that. 971 01:11:31,885 --> 01:11:32,385 Amen. Shout out to Jack. 972 01:11:32,525 --> 01:11:33,165 Good on you. 973 01:11:33,364 --> 01:11:33,744 Yeah, man. 974 01:11:33,785 --> 01:11:34,364 Shout out to Jack. 975 01:11:34,765 --> 01:11:49,285 But another thing that Jack said in that interview is like, you know, one thing I've learned about bear markets is that when you think it's really bad and just like it can't get any worse, it's about to get 10 times worse. 976 01:11:50,224 --> 01:11:56,525 And when he said that, I was just like, huh, I guess I could get a little worse. 977 01:11:57,084 --> 01:11:57,825 Hours later. 978 01:11:58,205 --> 01:12:01,804 I was like, I guess I could go down to 50K or something. 979 01:12:02,025 --> 01:12:03,184 Like, I guess he's right. 980 01:12:03,364 --> 01:12:09,864 And it was just like, then in a matter of hours, it was just like, boom. 981 01:12:10,445 --> 01:12:11,825 All self-custody. 982 01:12:12,425 --> 01:12:15,724 Dude, he called it so well. 983 01:12:16,645 --> 01:12:18,025 So well, man. 984 01:12:18,025 --> 01:12:20,005 So I'm very out of the loop. 985 01:12:20,224 --> 01:12:22,684 What the hell is 21 and what happened? 986 01:12:22,684 --> 01:12:24,804 21 is the Bitcoin treasury company. 987 01:12:27,925 --> 01:12:31,645 We're just going to dilute our equity to buy more Bitcoin 988 01:12:31,645 --> 01:12:36,505 and then you can buy our equity to own the shares of Bitcoin companies. 989 01:12:38,005 --> 01:12:39,964 So are they wrecked because of the price? 990 01:12:39,964 --> 01:12:45,205 I think 21 was also one of the ones that had the intent, 991 01:12:45,304 --> 01:12:48,804 but I don't think, of owning profitable Bitcoin companies as well. 992 01:12:49,265 --> 01:12:49,705 Exactly. 993 01:12:49,705 --> 01:13:03,621 and guess what the only profitable bitcoin company is right now Strike Strike And so and all the treasury companies I not sure how much you kept up with it but they just getting obliterated 994 01:13:04,101 --> 01:13:06,761 Like, just absolutely obliterated. 995 01:13:09,961 --> 01:13:18,141 And so, Jack was like, as they said, you know, apparently 21 was trying to buy Strike. 996 01:13:18,141 --> 01:13:23,981 be like well for profitable companies this would be great for 21 to have in their thing so that we 997 01:13:23,981 --> 01:13:32,341 can sell 21 and make 21 look better and uh good on jack for for keeping that separate um 998 01:13:32,341 --> 01:13:42,461 he walked away from 100 million man i mean oh i'm sure strike valuation is large yeah strike is a 999 01:13:42,461 --> 01:13:45,981 great company dude i know a lot of people i know a lot of people who have been sending their bitcoin 1000 01:13:45,981 --> 01:13:51,661 to strike if if 21 is struggling so bad how would they have the money they would just like raise 1001 01:13:51,661 --> 01:13:59,101 money from somewhere else to buy strike they got no problem raising money man yeah you know and 1002 01:13:59,101 --> 01:14:06,501 they have a crap ton of bitcoin like like a an enormous amount um but you're tying it to the 1003 01:14:06,501 --> 01:14:10,701 structure the question is is the structure going with these treasuring companies is like they raise 1004 01:14:10,701 --> 01:14:17,001 all this money and they say they're going to do this mixture of like buying companies and buying 1005 01:14:17,001 --> 01:14:22,141 Bitcoin, but they can't find any companies to buy. So they just end up buying Bitcoin and the 1006 01:14:22,141 --> 01:14:30,121 Bitcoin price just keeps going down. Yeah. So, yeah. Hey, I do have something that that's in 1007 01:14:30,121 --> 01:14:34,821 your world a little bit. For the first time ever, I retweeted something that was slightly political. 1008 01:14:34,821 --> 01:14:48,061 It was Fauci, a clip from him five years ago saying, like, I'd be happy to take the stand and tell everybody everything because I got nothing to hide. 1009 01:14:48,201 --> 01:14:51,661 And then it fast forwards to his clip last week where he pleads the fifth. 1010 01:14:51,661 --> 01:14:52,421 I plead the fifth. 1011 01:14:52,781 --> 01:14:54,881 I'm like, what color is your tie? 1012 01:14:55,661 --> 01:14:55,881 Yeah. 1013 01:14:56,841 --> 01:14:59,281 Oh, dude, all the Fauci stuff. 1014 01:15:00,841 --> 01:15:01,141 Yeah. 1015 01:15:01,261 --> 01:15:02,221 Let's do that. 1016 01:15:02,221 --> 01:15:05,381 I want to read something that just is insane to me. 1017 01:15:06,621 --> 01:15:10,941 The lies on that son of a bitch, dude. 1018 01:15:11,461 --> 01:15:13,581 Like, all of it seems like clown world to me. 1019 01:15:13,661 --> 01:15:16,781 Like, this is all just for show and nothing's going to come of it. 1020 01:15:17,021 --> 01:15:18,221 He's got a pardon. 1021 01:15:18,461 --> 01:15:19,921 So, like, nothing's going to happen. 1022 01:15:20,261 --> 01:15:25,261 Well, the pardon should not, like, they could destroy the pardon if they wanted to. 1023 01:15:25,341 --> 01:15:30,981 There's no, you can't issue blanket pardons for something somebody hasn't done. 1024 01:15:30,981 --> 01:15:33,681 Like that's just completely, complete nonsense. 1025 01:15:33,701 --> 01:15:34,581 But they're not going to. 1026 01:15:34,681 --> 01:15:38,941 But the Trump administration wants to do it for themselves. 1027 01:15:39,301 --> 01:15:49,181 And so they're going to honor it so that they can also grant themselves a blank and pardon when they leave and get away with all the crap they've been doing. 1028 01:15:50,661 --> 01:15:52,301 But I don't know. 1029 01:15:52,301 --> 01:16:00,521 Like what bothers me now is that everybody is still talking about it like, oh, yeah, it was a lab leak. 1030 01:16:00,521 --> 01:16:05,901 oh, it was this, it was that. It's like, no, motherfucker. They used your tax money. They 1031 01:16:05,901 --> 01:16:12,161 created a bioweapon in conjunction with China and they released the thing because China had 1032 01:16:12,161 --> 01:16:18,001 Hong Kong uprisings they needed to squash. BB was about to go to jail and the US needed to crush 1033 01:16:18,001 --> 01:16:22,121 the first of the Epstein, like needed to drown out the first of the Epstein controversy. 1034 01:16:22,581 --> 01:16:27,701 This was on purpose. It's been on purpose. It's been happening. Lyme disease was on purpose. 1035 01:16:27,701 --> 01:16:36,121 Like the pharmaceutical companies have been generating these literal chronic illnesses to line their own pockets. 1036 01:16:36,581 --> 01:16:39,861 They've been doing this for like for years and decades and decades. 1037 01:16:39,981 --> 01:16:43,241 Like the thing, the allergy to meat is something they created. 1038 01:16:43,681 --> 01:16:45,101 Lyme disease is something they created. 1039 01:16:45,621 --> 01:16:48,721 Like and thankfully, what's his name? 1040 01:16:49,801 --> 01:16:51,941 RFK actually came out and said this. 1041 01:16:52,841 --> 01:16:56,681 But but there's still everybody's just oh, it was just a leak. 1042 01:16:56,681 --> 01:17:00,821 these things were leaked from labs rfk said yeah this was leaked and this was leaked too 1043 01:17:00,821 --> 01:17:06,421 and so that is like the first person that's saying things that are like oh okay maybe you 1044 01:17:06,421 --> 01:17:11,961 should question whether it's actually a leak or not but like it just bothers me so bad that like 1045 01:17:11,961 --> 01:17:17,141 everything is treated like this is an accident or these were not they're just oh they're just 1046 01:17:17,141 --> 01:17:23,341 poor incompetent people no these people are just no they're malicious listen to this listen this 1047 01:17:23,341 --> 01:17:29,901 They're, they're malicious. They're malicious. This is about power control and profit at the 1048 01:17:29,901 --> 01:17:38,401 hand of government enforcement. Um, and it's in his freaking diary. It's in all of the stuff that 1049 01:17:38,401 --> 01:17:44,161 is leaked. Listen to this after much going back and forth. This is something that Fauci wrote. 1050 01:17:45,341 --> 01:17:49,361 This is his words after much going back and forth between the CDC and the other docs, 1051 01:17:49,361 --> 01:17:56,741 including me, Vivek, Steve Cha, and to some extent, David Kessler. We thought we had gotten them to 1052 01:17:56,741 --> 01:18:16,657 pull back from making the statement that the vaccines were not effective at all in preventing infection and transmission The reason this is an issue is that if they came out with that statement which in fact is not entirely true since there is some degree of modest but declining protection as you would expect then this would conflict with the statement and effort of 1053 01:18:16,657 --> 01:18:21,457 recommending people get the updated bivalent BA5 vaccine in September. And in addition, 1054 01:18:21,457 --> 01:18:26,717 it would undermine the DOJ's efforts at mandates for vaccines under certain circumstances. 1055 01:18:27,277 --> 01:18:32,137 In any event, the CDC agreed to pull back on the statement of absolute lack of efficacy of 1056 01:18:32,137 --> 01:18:34,597 vaccines against infections and transmission. 1057 01:18:39,597 --> 01:18:41,497 They said that they, 1058 01:18:41,637 --> 01:18:48,457 they have tried to get them and succeeded in getting them to not tell people 1059 01:18:48,457 --> 01:18:50,977 that this isn't going to do shit for you. 1060 01:18:51,037 --> 01:18:52,117 That it's not effective. 1061 01:18:52,477 --> 01:18:53,597 That it's not effective. 1062 01:18:53,597 --> 01:18:59,617 That it does not prevent transmission to keep everybody in freaking bags 1063 01:18:59,617 --> 01:19:02,097 with crap over their faces. 1064 01:19:02,137 --> 01:19:03,537 locked out of schools, 1065 01:19:03,737 --> 01:19:05,517 locked out of going to the grocery store 1066 01:19:05,517 --> 01:19:08,457 because it would undermine the DOJ's efforts 1067 01:19:08,457 --> 01:19:11,677 at mandating them that they get the damn shot. 1068 01:19:13,957 --> 01:19:15,857 And he profited from all of this. 1069 01:19:15,957 --> 01:19:17,777 He has shares in all of this shit. 1070 01:19:19,177 --> 01:19:20,157 And this is exactly the thing. 1071 01:19:20,337 --> 01:19:23,597 The people in the FDA do not have to say 1072 01:19:23,597 --> 01:19:25,657 what they have investments in. 1073 01:19:27,677 --> 01:19:29,217 They share all of this stuff. 1074 01:19:29,297 --> 01:19:30,717 They all get paid for this stuff. 1075 01:19:30,717 --> 01:19:34,557 we also know that he was getting paid for rimdesivir 1076 01:19:34,557 --> 01:19:35,617 and rimdesivir 1077 01:19:35,617 --> 01:19:38,637 they tried to push it in response 1078 01:19:38,637 --> 01:19:40,597 to one of those Ebola scares 1079 01:19:40,597 --> 01:19:41,377 previously 1080 01:19:41,377 --> 01:19:43,557 every few years 1081 01:19:43,557 --> 01:19:45,537 Ebola's coming 1082 01:19:45,537 --> 01:19:48,437 they do some sort of thing and the news tries 1083 01:19:48,437 --> 01:19:50,317 to push and create a sort of pandemic 1084 01:19:50,317 --> 01:19:51,697 but usually 1085 01:19:51,697 --> 01:19:54,317 it just doesn't last more than 1086 01:19:54,317 --> 01:19:55,337 a week or so 1087 01:19:55,337 --> 01:19:57,417 Zika or some sort of thing 1088 01:19:57,417 --> 01:20:00,397 during one of the Ebola scares 1089 01:20:00,397 --> 01:20:06,317 they tried to use remdesivir as a treatment and it was causing kidney failure. 1090 01:20:07,217 --> 01:20:13,357 Well, kidney failure presents as pulmonary edema, which is fluid in your lungs. 1091 01:20:14,017 --> 01:20:21,717 And so what he did was he said, oh, well, that means we need a respiratory virus to push my cure. 1092 01:20:21,717 --> 01:20:44,597 He owns shares in remdesivir and the hospitals got paid like somewhere between five and 15 grand to administer remdesivir to people when they anybody that came in that was sick and remdesivir was causing kidney failure, which then looked like pneumonia, which was the next step that which got people put on the ventilators. 1093 01:20:44,597 --> 01:20:47,557 so basically anybody that came into the hospital 1094 01:20:47,557 --> 01:20:49,517 they jacked up the death numbers 1095 01:20:49,517 --> 01:20:51,457 to make as much money as they could 1096 01:20:51,457 --> 01:20:52,057 off of it 1097 01:20:52,057 --> 01:20:54,837 they jacked it up as high as they could 1098 01:20:54,837 --> 01:20:56,197 and here's the crazy thing 1099 01:20:56,197 --> 01:20:59,097 do you know when the death stopped? 1100 01:21:00,197 --> 01:21:01,937 the moment the payment stopped 1101 01:21:01,937 --> 01:21:05,717 the moment the payment stopped 1102 01:21:05,717 --> 01:21:06,237 that makes sense 1103 01:21:06,237 --> 01:21:08,417 if you look at the chart 1104 01:21:08,417 --> 01:21:10,997 and what's funny is that 1105 01:21:10,997 --> 01:21:12,937 this means one of two things 1106 01:21:12,937 --> 01:21:20,337 either people actually stopped dying because they they changed their their actions of how 1107 01:21:20,337 --> 01:21:25,197 they um and probably a little bit of both because they changed their actions to have more people 1108 01:21:25,197 --> 01:21:33,317 survive um and actually stop doing stupid or things that literally kill people or and probably 1109 01:21:33,317 --> 01:21:38,797 the larger subset is that they were lying about who's dying from covid they were just putting it 1110 01:21:38,797 --> 01:21:44,557 on you know people who were killed in motorcycle accidents and people who were shot yeah which we 1111 01:21:44,557 --> 01:21:50,177 have tons of evidence of and that all they stopped doing why would they need to do that 1112 01:21:50,177 --> 01:21:55,637 if they're not no longer getting paid and it was literally april april 2022 and this this just like 1113 01:21:55,637 --> 01:22:02,097 spike spike spike and then april and it's like down it's gone everybody's healthy now everybody's 1114 01:22:02,097 --> 01:22:07,237 everybody's fine um and this is where this is how they do all their numbers of you know six million 1115 01:22:07,237 --> 01:22:08,977 people saved and 1116 01:22:08,977 --> 01:22:11,177 the whole thing is just utter 1117 01:22:11,177 --> 01:22:11,517 bullshit. 1118 01:22:13,137 --> 01:22:15,177 Anybody trying to trust 1119 01:22:15,177 --> 01:22:17,037 any of the data around all this, if you pay 1120 01:22:17,037 --> 01:22:18,797 people to come up with a statistic, 1121 01:22:19,077 --> 01:22:20,837 to make a statistic, you will get a statistic. 1122 01:22:22,157 --> 01:22:22,237 Like, 1123 01:22:22,817 --> 01:22:25,017 if you know 1124 01:22:25,017 --> 01:22:27,037 nothing about human nature, if you don't 1125 01:22:27,037 --> 01:22:28,997 understand that shit right there. 1126 01:22:31,217 --> 01:22:33,057 I saw a great meme this morning. 1127 01:22:33,257 --> 01:22:35,457 It was Fat Bastard from Austin Powers. 1128 01:22:35,457 --> 01:22:37,437 and it said at the top 1129 01:22:37,437 --> 01:22:39,177 why are you selling our country 1130 01:22:39,177 --> 01:22:40,797 to US politicians 1131 01:22:40,797 --> 01:22:42,637 why are you selling out our country 1132 01:22:42,637 --> 01:22:45,277 to another country to a foreign power 1133 01:22:45,277 --> 01:22:47,297 because I ate a baby 1134 01:22:47,297 --> 01:22:51,637 and that's like all of our politicians 1135 01:22:51,637 --> 01:22:53,017 have all like 1136 01:22:53,017 --> 01:22:55,437 eaten children 1137 01:22:55,437 --> 01:22:56,757 and they're participating 1138 01:22:56,757 --> 01:22:59,937 they're participating 1139 01:22:59,937 --> 01:23:00,857 in this insanity 1140 01:23:00,857 --> 01:23:03,537 that's funny 1141 01:23:03,537 --> 01:23:06,697 I don't know man 1142 01:23:06,697 --> 01:23:07,477 it's crazy 1143 01:23:07,477 --> 01:23:11,557 sorry for being 1144 01:23:11,557 --> 01:23:13,237 distracted I got 1145 01:23:13,237 --> 01:23:14,557 bartender drama 1146 01:23:14,557 --> 01:23:16,797 bartender drama? 1147 01:23:17,037 --> 01:23:17,697 how's that going? 1148 01:23:18,117 --> 01:23:18,517 you know 1149 01:23:18,517 --> 01:23:19,617 I tell you 1150 01:23:19,993 --> 01:23:21,513 One thing that makes me feel better. 1151 01:23:22,913 --> 01:23:23,533 There are bars. 1152 01:23:23,673 --> 01:23:25,013 There's only two types of bars. 1153 01:23:25,453 --> 01:23:29,353 There's bars that have too much drama and there's bars that nobody goes to. 1154 01:23:31,153 --> 01:23:35,753 So I carry that in my back pocket pretty much every day. 1155 01:23:36,533 --> 01:23:38,053 At least I have problems. 1156 01:23:38,533 --> 01:23:40,013 You know, I could have no problems. 1157 01:23:40,693 --> 01:23:40,873 Yeah. 1158 01:23:41,113 --> 01:23:42,133 Could have no problems. 1159 01:23:42,333 --> 01:23:42,453 Yeah. 1160 01:23:43,953 --> 01:23:45,233 Oh, my boyfriend's. 1161 01:23:46,853 --> 01:23:47,513 Oh, good. 1162 01:23:47,513 --> 01:23:48,593 Your boyfriend's what? 1163 01:23:48,593 --> 01:23:56,653 My boyfriend's stranded in Wendell and his car is broken down and I got to go get him. 1164 01:23:56,873 --> 01:23:59,013 I'm going to be like three hours late for work. 1165 01:23:59,093 --> 01:24:03,273 I'm like, is he calling a tow truck? 1166 01:24:04,353 --> 01:24:06,833 Is he towing the car back to Raleigh? 1167 01:24:07,593 --> 01:24:09,473 I'm pretty sure he can hop in the tow truck. 1168 01:24:11,013 --> 01:24:12,113 That's how that works. 1169 01:24:13,133 --> 01:24:14,093 That's how that works. 1170 01:24:14,393 --> 01:24:17,893 Yeah, I'm not sure I'm buying this story. 1171 01:24:18,593 --> 01:24:24,393 because i said triple a is very cheap you should buy all of your employees triple a 1172 01:24:24,393 --> 01:24:29,413 i know actually i said that i was like i'll give you my triple a number and i'll make sure he gets 1173 01:24:29,413 --> 01:24:40,513 in the truck but yeah this one guys after uh i got a couple people's i was so worried about 1174 01:24:40,513 --> 01:24:47,193 one of my best friends um i was i was really scared that maybe i had given him one of my 1175 01:24:47,193 --> 01:24:53,373 extra mark threes not thinking about it um okay what was what would be the difference right you 1176 01:24:53,373 --> 01:25:04,493 know like then uh but uh it's crazy to think how how close you can always be to losing something 1177 01:25:04,493 --> 01:25:15,213 that you count on you know like you don't know everything you can't plan for everything 1178 01:25:15,213 --> 01:25:17,493 and 1179 01:25:17,493 --> 01:25:20,713 as soon as you think you do know 1180 01:25:20,713 --> 01:25:21,613 and you are certain 1181 01:25:21,613 --> 01:25:24,413 you're usually going to be humbled 1182 01:25:24,413 --> 01:25:26,653 like and the longer 1183 01:25:26,653 --> 01:25:27,573 you aren't humbled 1184 01:25:27,573 --> 01:25:29,573 you're just waiting 1185 01:25:29,573 --> 01:25:32,213 you're just waiting for it 1186 01:25:32,213 --> 01:25:35,033 but like 1187 01:25:35,033 --> 01:25:35,953 yup 1188 01:25:35,953 --> 01:25:38,053 I went back out and I was just like 1189 01:25:38,053 --> 01:25:39,333 my kids are good 1190 01:25:39,333 --> 01:25:41,533 they're out playing in the front yard 1191 01:25:41,533 --> 01:25:44,453 just cause they like dirt 1192 01:25:44,453 --> 01:25:54,753 you know because they like dirt i was eating it um family's good we got a good house 1193 01:25:54,753 --> 01:26:03,673 yeah it's full of bullshit and disorderly and organ unorganized but i do uh have to confess 1194 01:26:03,673 --> 01:26:11,293 um i the majority i mean all of my net worth i mean i own the bar but all my net worth other 1195 01:26:11,293 --> 01:26:12,813 that is still in Bitcoin. 1196 01:26:13,253 --> 01:26:18,913 I did sell enough to cover the small loan that I took out. 1197 01:26:19,513 --> 01:26:22,413 So that brought my net worth back to zero. 1198 01:26:22,853 --> 01:26:25,133 And now it's all still in Bitcoin. 1199 01:26:27,153 --> 01:26:29,613 But yeah, I just wanted to confess to that. 1200 01:26:29,613 --> 01:26:29,833 That's fair. 1201 01:26:30,293 --> 01:26:32,093 I've never really sold any Bitcoin, 1202 01:26:32,393 --> 01:26:34,293 but I just sold enough to cover that loan. 1203 01:26:35,493 --> 01:26:36,453 You never know. 1204 01:26:37,173 --> 01:26:38,293 You never know, man. 1205 01:26:38,293 --> 01:26:39,393 if Bitcoin goes to zero, 1206 01:26:39,693 --> 01:26:41,773 I can still survive. 1207 01:26:41,933 --> 01:26:42,713 But I, 1208 01:26:42,913 --> 01:26:43,813 if Bitcoin goes to zero, 1209 01:26:43,813 --> 01:26:45,613 I'm definitely gonna be debt free for, 1210 01:26:45,913 --> 01:26:46,273 like, 1211 01:26:46,453 --> 01:26:46,913 for sure. 1212 01:26:47,313 --> 01:26:47,793 Yeah. 1213 01:26:48,493 --> 01:26:48,733 No, 1214 01:26:48,773 --> 01:26:49,093 that's, 1215 01:26:49,513 --> 01:26:49,733 uh, 1216 01:26:49,733 --> 01:26:50,573 but I don't think it will. 1217 01:26:50,773 --> 01:26:53,453 We're two days out now and the price hasn't even budged. 1218 01:26:53,873 --> 01:26:54,113 Yeah. 1219 01:26:54,253 --> 01:26:55,593 Like it's just so crazy. 1220 01:26:55,993 --> 01:26:56,473 Um, 1221 01:26:56,553 --> 01:26:57,833 but honestly, 1222 01:26:57,833 --> 01:27:02,533 like anybody who criticizes somebody for that is, 1223 01:27:02,753 --> 01:27:04,793 is just unbelievably foolish. 1224 01:27:05,553 --> 01:27:06,313 You know, 1225 01:27:06,553 --> 01:27:08,233 like the whole point, 1226 01:27:08,293 --> 01:27:12,373 of Bitcoin is sovereignty and security. 1227 01:27:13,593 --> 01:27:16,873 And like, that's the philosophy around it. 1228 01:27:16,953 --> 01:27:20,233 And that doesn't mean aping in every last thing. 1229 01:27:20,313 --> 01:27:22,413 Like that means being secure, you know, 1230 01:27:22,473 --> 01:27:24,893 like that means having like a foundation 1231 01:27:24,893 --> 01:27:26,033 that you can count on. 1232 01:27:26,373 --> 01:27:31,293 And that means just as much on, you know, 1233 01:27:31,353 --> 01:27:34,853 hedging your bets and not over-leveraging. 1234 01:27:34,853 --> 01:27:36,613 I have learned that freaking lesson. 1235 01:27:36,613 --> 01:27:39,113 god I have learned that lesson 1236 01:27:39,113 --> 01:27:41,253 I've been so stupid 1237 01:27:41,253 --> 01:27:43,773 with that 1238 01:27:43,773 --> 01:27:46,013 it's crazy that 1239 01:27:46,013 --> 01:27:48,513 bitcoin was at 120,000 1240 01:27:48,513 --> 01:27:50,293 and my liquidation level 1241 01:27:50,293 --> 01:27:52,153 is at like 30,000 1242 01:27:52,153 --> 01:27:54,053 and I'm 1243 01:27:54,053 --> 01:27:56,473 like I got nervous today 1244 01:27:56,473 --> 01:27:58,573 how nuts is that 1245 01:27:58,573 --> 01:27:59,313 yeah 1246 01:27:59,313 --> 01:28:02,393 bitcoin don't give a shit 1247 01:28:02,393 --> 01:28:03,253 90% drop 1248 01:28:03,253 --> 01:28:04,873 oh my god 1249 01:28:04,873 --> 01:28:05,913 yeah 1250 01:28:06,613 --> 01:28:16,473 and it can do it oh man speaking of which uh unchained capital wouldn't pick up the phone 1251 01:28:16,473 --> 01:28:21,593 today and then i i because like unchained capital right like so they have multi-six 1252 01:28:21,593 --> 01:28:39,290 with probably cold card managing yeah tons of cold cards nunchucks recommended wallet is cold card exactly everyone is like you go to yeah do an unchained capital loan they like we accept some other uh hardware devices but really use a cold card so 1253 01:28:39,290 --> 01:28:45,110 that probably means they're all using cold cards on their back end they're all freaking out man 1254 01:28:45,110 --> 01:28:48,910 do you think those guys are sitting in their freaking cubicles rolling dice 1255 01:28:48,910 --> 01:28:51,890 I don't think they are man 1256 01:28:51,890 --> 01:28:52,670 nope 1257 01:28:52,670 --> 01:28:56,230 so like what's going on 1258 01:28:56,230 --> 01:28:58,170 like I'm missing their 1259 01:28:58,170 --> 01:29:00,410 they said they wouldn't pick up the phone today 1260 01:29:00,410 --> 01:29:02,370 and then they emailed everybody that said 1261 01:29:02,370 --> 01:29:03,770 we're going to have office hours 1262 01:29:03,770 --> 01:29:06,210 basically you can call 1263 01:29:06,210 --> 01:29:08,010 and shut the fuck up and listen for an hour 1264 01:29:08,010 --> 01:29:14,030 so I'm actually missing that 1265 01:29:14,030 --> 01:29:14,410 but 1266 01:29:14,410 --> 01:29:16,630 I mean 1267 01:29:16,630 --> 01:29:18,750 I can look at that 1268 01:29:18,750 --> 01:29:25,230 multi-sig so it's fine i will say too that um i uh 1269 01:29:25,770 --> 01:29:34,170 you know all criticisms and stuff aside from for coin k coin kite and indk and all the rest or 1270 01:29:34,170 --> 01:29:41,530 whatever it ain't easy to build stuff man you know no it ain't easy man it is not easy to build shit 1271 01:29:41,530 --> 01:29:47,370 i'm trying to give them the benefit of the doubt i really am i really am i just can't 1272 01:29:47,370 --> 01:29:49,350 stop that conspiracy guy in my head. 1273 01:29:49,430 --> 01:29:50,530 He's always going, dude. 1274 01:29:51,130 --> 01:29:51,830 He's an ass. 1275 01:29:52,450 --> 01:29:55,590 He bugs the shit out of me all the time. 1276 01:29:56,210 --> 01:29:56,770 All the time, dude. 1277 01:29:56,770 --> 01:29:57,730 He's just poking at me. 1278 01:29:58,030 --> 01:29:58,750 Knock, knock, knock. 1279 01:29:59,210 --> 01:30:00,490 Somebody did this on purpose. 1280 01:30:00,870 --> 01:30:01,470 Somebody did it on purpose. 1281 01:30:01,470 --> 01:30:02,910 Remember I was right about Bitcoin? 1282 01:30:03,050 --> 01:30:04,170 Remember I was right about COVID? 1283 01:30:04,310 --> 01:30:04,570 Remember? 1284 01:30:04,810 --> 01:30:05,030 Remember? 1285 01:30:11,690 --> 01:30:13,650 What'd I tell you when you heard Fauci talk? 1286 01:30:13,650 --> 01:30:14,210 What'd I tell you? 1287 01:30:14,230 --> 01:30:14,950 What'd I tell you? 1288 01:30:16,010 --> 01:30:17,230 I mean... 1289 01:30:17,370 --> 01:30:18,550 Earth is flat there. 1290 01:30:18,790 --> 01:30:19,050 I'm like, dude. 1291 01:30:22,170 --> 01:30:24,910 And most of my life is built on that guy, so. 1292 01:30:27,370 --> 01:30:30,390 I can't ignore him completely. 1293 01:30:31,850 --> 01:30:32,910 Oh, God. 1294 01:30:33,450 --> 01:30:34,230 What an asshole that guy is. 1295 01:30:34,230 --> 01:30:36,170 It's like that episode of Mr. Robot, man. 1296 01:30:38,010 --> 01:30:38,950 Wait, which one? 1297 01:30:39,150 --> 01:30:40,830 Man, I need to watch that whole show. 1298 01:30:40,990 --> 01:30:41,770 I started that. 1299 01:30:42,290 --> 01:30:45,250 Honestly, just watch the first two episodes. 1300 01:30:45,250 --> 01:30:52,470 that's where you'll get what that show is about and how awesome it is after that and then you're 1301 01:30:52,470 --> 01:30:57,970 done um no after that it's still entertaining just because of the action and the plot and stuff 1302 01:30:57,970 --> 01:31:03,990 but like the like the i watched the first season it was good it was really good i wanted to continue 1303 01:31:03,990 --> 01:31:08,750 i thought you hadn't seen it all okay no yeah i mean i wouldn't say it gets a lot better as you 1304 01:31:08,750 --> 01:31:14,210 go on the first season but just evil corp i was about to say i never saw i never saw the e-coin 1305 01:31:14,210 --> 01:31:22,070 stuff which i i really wanted to because all the memes about it you know i mean uh evil corp and the 1306 01:31:22,070 --> 01:31:28,610 the consortium michael saylor's consortium i mean those things are freaking identical 1307 01:31:28,610 --> 01:31:35,030 aren't they jeff did you see it did you see mr robot no i haven't seen it at all i mean don't 1308 01:31:35,030 --> 01:31:44,090 you think guy uh am i stretching it a little too far i don't know i'm talking to your conspiracy 1309 01:31:44,090 --> 01:31:45,770 guy um 1310 01:31:45,770 --> 01:31:50,290 I don't know I don't know man 1311 01:31:50,290 --> 01:31:52,150 I don't know how to think about like I've always 1312 01:31:52,150 --> 01:31:54,010 had like a lot of respect like cause that whole 1313 01:31:54,010 --> 01:31:56,230 consortium stuff like I cannot 1314 01:31:56,230 --> 01:31:58,270 imagine any two companies 1315 01:31:58,270 --> 01:32:00,270 less 1316 01:32:00,270 --> 01:32:01,930 that I would be like 1317 01:32:01,930 --> 01:32:03,390 man why the hell 1318 01:32:03,390 --> 01:32:05,770 are you BlackRock and Coinbase 1319 01:32:05,770 --> 01:32:08,330 BlackRock and Coinbase 1320 01:32:08,330 --> 01:32:09,170 come on 1321 01:32:09,170 --> 01:32:10,410 come on 1322 01:32:10,410 --> 01:32:13,510 we're not Wall Street 1323 01:32:13,510 --> 01:32:21,310 fidelity digital assets has been pretty dope they were like the fidelity bitcoin crew was awesome 1324 01:32:21,310 --> 01:32:29,170 like way back in 2012 and 2013 yeah i don't know about them anymore i don't know man um but that's 1325 01:32:29,170 --> 01:32:37,250 a that's a hell of a weird group right there i certainly don't it's got bitcoin foundation vibes 1326 01:32:37,250 --> 01:32:43,330 to me yeah um and it's not a good look i wouldn't want i would want on being a piece like just like 1327 01:32:43,330 --> 01:32:54,670 like you know like for the the pain and the the fallout of block stream and adam back and uh 1328 01:32:54,670 --> 01:33:02,530 what's his face uh like ruben and everybody who had continuous conversations with epstein 1329 01:33:02,530 --> 01:33:07,210 and even if it was all even if every single thing that i found they were all talking about money 1330 01:33:07,210 --> 01:33:08,630 They were all talking about investments. 1331 01:33:08,790 --> 01:33:09,910 That was the whole conversation. 1332 01:33:10,150 --> 01:33:12,670 The dude had tons of money and he was throwing money at everybody. 1333 01:33:12,990 --> 01:33:14,490 So of course they were, 1334 01:33:14,910 --> 01:33:15,510 you know, 1335 01:33:15,530 --> 01:33:16,770 those conversations happened, 1336 01:33:16,770 --> 01:33:18,410 but Jesus Christ, 1337 01:33:18,510 --> 01:33:19,550 when do you not learn that? 1338 01:33:19,630 --> 01:33:19,710 Like, 1339 01:33:19,750 --> 01:33:21,510 just don't associate with these people, 1340 01:33:21,690 --> 01:33:22,810 you know, 1341 01:33:23,310 --> 01:33:24,870 like don't put, 1342 01:33:25,070 --> 01:33:26,390 don't have like, 1343 01:33:26,470 --> 01:33:27,270 be like Jack. 1344 01:33:27,330 --> 01:33:29,990 If black rock is going to sign on to your thing, 1345 01:33:30,190 --> 01:33:31,370 be like Jack, 1346 01:33:31,510 --> 01:33:32,190 just think, 1347 01:33:32,290 --> 01:33:32,690 you know, 1348 01:33:33,070 --> 01:33:34,930 maybe I don't want black rock in the, 1349 01:33:34,930 --> 01:33:36,010 in the group that, 1350 01:33:36,010 --> 01:33:36,990 that, 1351 01:33:36,990 --> 01:33:52,146 Even if I not even talking to him I just don want him on that piece of paper with my name You know Yeah there a there a thing i think that happens too is that i mean i think they will use your association with them against you i think all 1352 01:33:52,146 --> 01:33:58,046 of this bitcoin fund you know and which has done serious damage people literally i see all the time 1353 01:33:58,046 --> 01:34:03,546 on facebook people think bitcoin was created by epstein now it doesn't make any sense it's 1354 01:34:03,546 --> 01:34:09,826 completely retarded so stupid but they were successful in associating bitcoin with epstein 1355 01:34:09,826 --> 01:34:11,646 in some circles. 1356 01:34:12,106 --> 01:34:15,386 So, you know, I'm not sure how big it is exactly. 1357 01:34:15,946 --> 01:34:17,646 Maybe I'm just seeing bots, you know, 1358 01:34:17,666 --> 01:34:19,326 trying to retweet it or whatever. 1359 01:34:19,646 --> 01:34:21,366 But I have people ask me, you know, 1360 01:34:22,466 --> 01:34:26,366 and I think that there is some degree to which 1361 01:34:26,366 --> 01:34:30,186 when you associate yourself with some of these people, 1362 01:34:30,666 --> 01:34:32,586 they now think they own you. 1363 01:34:33,306 --> 01:34:35,566 And you have basically entered the mafia 1364 01:34:35,566 --> 01:34:37,006 and you cannot leave. 1365 01:34:37,006 --> 01:34:39,346 there is a degree to which if you 1366 01:34:39,346 --> 01:34:41,506 interact, you enter 1367 01:34:41,506 --> 01:34:42,866 into a transaction with 1368 01:34:42,866 --> 01:34:45,486 Miriam Adelson, she thinks she 1369 01:34:45,486 --> 01:34:47,506 can kill you if you don't play 1370 01:34:47,506 --> 01:34:49,206 by her rules anymore. I 1371 01:34:49,206 --> 01:34:50,866 literally think that that is 1372 01:34:50,866 --> 01:34:53,366 truly the case with some of these people. 1373 01:34:53,786 --> 01:34:55,246 I wouldn't want anything to do with 1374 01:34:55,246 --> 01:34:56,186 anybody 1375 01:34:56,186 --> 01:34:59,186 attached to BlackRock or anything else. 1376 01:34:59,526 --> 01:35:01,286 There is some reason that all 1377 01:35:01,286 --> 01:35:03,086 these companies owned by BlackRock 1378 01:35:03,086 --> 01:35:04,846 or that BlackRock owns shares in 1379 01:35:04,846 --> 01:35:13,246 have to have like a a rainbow pride day commercial like like why do the carolina panthers have a 1380 01:35:13,246 --> 01:35:19,986 fucking rainbow commercial like nobody that doesn't have nobody that watches football gives a 1381 01:35:19,986 --> 01:35:25,386 fuck about any of that why it like and i the guy that owns the carolina panthers 1382 01:35:25,386 --> 01:35:33,026 comes into our hometown sometimes in his 120 foot yacht or whatever it is and i actually want like i 1383 01:35:33,026 --> 01:35:37,906 I wanted to ask like I I've seen him a couple times and actually asked him some stuff about his boat and whatever. 1384 01:35:37,906 --> 01:35:40,826 And and it was not long after that that I saw the commercial. 1385 01:35:41,026 --> 01:35:42,886 I was like, what is it like? 1386 01:35:43,186 --> 01:35:45,246 Do you have babies in a closet somewhere? 1387 01:35:45,366 --> 01:35:45,686 Like what? 1388 01:35:45,786 --> 01:35:50,566 What is it that is like there's no way you give a shit about this. 1389 01:35:51,066 --> 01:36:01,946 Like, what actually is it that is causing all of these fucking companies to like shoot themselves in the foot with marketing that they know? 1390 01:36:01,946 --> 01:36:18,006 I mean, like Target did it. Budweiser did it. They all they all like do these stupid things that they know they have to know is going to hurt them. But it's part of the, you know, the cultural, the moral degradation agenda. 1391 01:36:18,726 --> 01:36:24,266 I think it's that the fiat political club becomes more important than the customer base. 1392 01:36:24,886 --> 01:36:26,006 Yeah, because. 1393 01:36:26,586 --> 01:36:28,246 Same with what's happening with the core. 1394 01:36:28,246 --> 01:36:46,706 It's about dominance and not being fought by the political system. It's going to put you on a 45 degree incline while everybody else just get pats on the back and is standing next to the dude at the speech and getting all the coverage on every mainstream media thing. 1395 01:36:46,706 --> 01:36:47,686 if you're aligned, 1396 01:36:48,426 --> 01:36:48,606 you, 1397 01:36:48,986 --> 01:36:50,326 life is just easy. 1398 01:36:50,626 --> 01:36:51,506 If you're big, 1399 01:36:51,566 --> 01:36:52,686 if you're rich and you're aligned, 1400 01:36:52,826 --> 01:36:53,746 everything's easy. 1401 01:36:53,986 --> 01:36:54,646 If you, 1402 01:36:54,746 --> 01:36:56,726 if you do not step in line, 1403 01:36:56,986 --> 01:37:00,646 it's just like the people like I saw the video the other day of everybody 1404 01:37:00,646 --> 01:37:01,946 standing over that girl, 1405 01:37:01,946 --> 01:37:04,466 like with their fist and she won't take, 1406 01:37:04,666 --> 01:37:07,006 she like wouldn't put her fist up over. 1407 01:37:07,106 --> 01:37:08,506 I think it was the black lives matter. 1408 01:37:08,586 --> 01:37:08,886 I don't know. 1409 01:37:08,906 --> 01:37:09,646 It was one of those stupid, 1410 01:37:09,646 --> 01:37:11,906 like you're either with us or against us. 1411 01:37:11,966 --> 01:37:12,106 Yeah. 1412 01:37:12,106 --> 01:37:12,966 All that stuff. 1413 01:37:13,046 --> 01:37:13,226 Yeah. 1414 01:37:13,226 --> 01:37:13,426 Yeah. 1415 01:37:13,606 --> 01:37:13,986 And, 1416 01:37:14,046 --> 01:37:14,266 uh, 1417 01:37:14,266 --> 01:37:15,526 and she just wouldn't do it. 1418 01:37:15,906 --> 01:37:16,346 Like, 1419 01:37:16,346 --> 01:37:21,446 that's the thing who wants to live like that who wants to live with 800 people standing over and 1420 01:37:21,446 --> 01:37:26,526 screaming in their face and that's what it's like and as soon as you get into that group 1421 01:37:26,526 --> 01:37:32,386 those all those social pressures come with it and it's tied to every every benefit that you got 1422 01:37:32,386 --> 01:37:42,026 you know how epstein got girls to basically become sex slaves was he would find i heard so many of 1423 01:37:42,026 --> 01:37:47,666 these stories or whatever of this girl who thought that she was just saved, that he bought 1424 01:37:47,666 --> 01:37:52,926 her an apartment in New York, which was nothing for him on his budget, you know, set her up, 1425 01:37:53,266 --> 01:38:00,446 got her in touch with the modeling agency and gave her a life for months and months, 1426 01:38:00,446 --> 01:38:05,746 got her used to it, got her comfortable. And then just, you know, it says you should have fun with 1427 01:38:05,746 --> 01:38:12,586 this friend of mine and then just edged them into it and then just just attached as many strings as 1428 01:38:12,586 --> 01:38:20,286 possible to their livelihood so that they felt trapped that like oh I made it I'm I'm pleased 1429 01:38:20,286 --> 01:38:25,706 now I appreciate this person they helped me they've done all of these great things my life 1430 01:38:25,706 --> 01:38:29,846 has totally changed all of these opportunities in are in front of me and now I only have to get on 1431 01:38:29,846 --> 01:38:35,866 my knees this one time. I only have to get on my knees this second time, you know? And after you 1432 01:38:35,866 --> 01:38:41,206 compromise yourself just a couple of times, then it's just normal. Then it's just how you have to 1433 01:38:41,206 --> 01:38:45,226 play the game. This is just the social pressure you have to. And that's what they're doing. 1434 01:38:45,306 --> 01:38:49,826 They're getting on their knees, you know, in all the different ways. They're doing the commercial 1435 01:38:49,826 --> 01:39:04,842 that everybody says they have to do They adhering to their group because they don want to lose the investors they just got They they don want the political system to uh to fight them They don want the mainstream media to stop talking about them and thinking 1436 01:39:04,842 --> 01:39:06,162 that they're the good guys. 1437 01:39:06,642 --> 01:39:07,082 Uh, 1438 01:39:07,082 --> 01:39:08,142 they don't want to be Trumped. 1439 01:39:08,562 --> 01:39:08,982 Like, 1440 01:39:09,022 --> 01:39:09,242 you know, 1441 01:39:09,302 --> 01:39:12,242 look what happened to him and he's playing, 1442 01:39:12,482 --> 01:39:14,362 he's playing the game. 1443 01:39:14,362 --> 01:39:14,862 Like he, 1444 01:39:14,982 --> 01:39:15,662 like he even, 1445 01:39:15,902 --> 01:39:16,362 he's, 1446 01:39:16,462 --> 01:39:17,802 he's sold out completely, 1447 01:39:17,802 --> 01:39:18,122 dude. 1448 01:39:18,202 --> 01:39:18,702 He didn't even. 1449 01:39:19,642 --> 01:39:20,762 And that's the thing. 1450 01:39:20,822 --> 01:39:21,202 Is it like, 1451 01:39:21,202 --> 01:39:26,602 as soon as BlackRock is on that piece of paper alongside your name, don't think that just because 1452 01:39:26,602 --> 01:39:31,822 you feel really strongly about it, that you're not putting yourself in that position. Like you're 1453 01:39:31,822 --> 01:39:40,662 setting yourself up to, it's leverage. It's leverage. You're going into debt on what you 1454 01:39:40,662 --> 01:39:45,862 can get out of it. You're not owning your opinion. You're not owning your position. You're not owning 1455 01:39:45,862 --> 01:39:50,922 your company. You're leveraging. You're just leveraging in the social and political sphere. 1456 01:39:51,202 --> 01:39:57,642 You want their association and their money for its benefits, but you're going to pay for its price. 1457 01:40:00,422 --> 01:40:01,062 Yeah. 1458 01:40:01,282 --> 01:40:06,922 The funniest thing about that announcement with the consortium, it was like two days. 1459 01:40:07,582 --> 01:40:18,522 Day one was Michael Saylor saying we announced this consortium, $15 million sent to core devs to work on the projects that we think are important. 1460 01:40:18,522 --> 01:40:28,142 and and and in that announcement it was like importantly we will not take a position on 1461 01:40:28,142 --> 01:40:35,342 bips on soft fork proposals that was in the language that consortium day two very next day 1462 01:40:35,342 --> 01:40:42,302 michael saylor 110 point essay taking a passionate position on a bip soft fork outcome 1463 01:40:42,302 --> 01:40:52,262 it was it was like it was almost comical it's just like bro could you like space this out like 1464 01:40:52,262 --> 01:41:01,002 even like a week like two weeks to flatten the curve man can you know like come on nobody in 1465 01:41:01,002 --> 01:41:05,542 their right mind thinks the consortium isn't going to be taking positions on soft forks 1466 01:41:05,542 --> 01:41:08,502 Show me one person who believes that. 1467 01:41:11,102 --> 01:41:12,462 That was just funny. 1468 01:41:13,282 --> 01:41:14,342 As if they couldn't. 1469 01:41:14,402 --> 01:41:16,182 He originally said, let's not do this. 1470 01:41:18,402 --> 01:41:27,602 Didn't he originally say like some years ago that we don't need anybody donating money to the devs to like direct development. 1471 01:41:27,602 --> 01:41:31,562 He's completely 180'd on so many things. 1472 01:41:31,562 --> 01:41:33,182 Like I will never sell my Bitcoin. 1473 01:41:33,382 --> 01:41:34,582 I will never sell my Bitcoin. 1474 01:41:34,582 --> 01:41:36,002 Oh, of course I'm going to sell my Bitcoin. 1475 01:41:36,262 --> 01:41:37,902 I will never fund core devs. 1476 01:41:37,942 --> 01:41:40,742 I will never fund funding core devs is a tack on Bitcoin. 1477 01:41:40,942 --> 01:41:42,822 I'm going to be the largest funder of core devs. 1478 01:41:42,882 --> 01:41:45,482 Like, I mean, he's just spiraling, dude. 1479 01:41:45,842 --> 01:41:48,122 I just think this guy has lost it. 1480 01:41:48,582 --> 01:41:49,722 I think it's like one of those things, 1481 01:41:49,782 --> 01:41:54,202 like you end up with like these platitudes that don't make any sense. 1482 01:41:54,202 --> 01:41:56,582 Like you never sell your Bitcoin or whatever. 1483 01:41:56,662 --> 01:41:58,542 Like people are going to take you literally for that. 1484 01:41:58,602 --> 01:41:59,662 And that's not possible. 1485 01:42:01,642 --> 01:42:03,882 That's not, that's not even like slightly realistic. 1486 01:42:04,582 --> 01:42:11,462 You know, like, like how in what world could nobody ever sell their Bitcoin, you know? 1487 01:42:11,562 --> 01:42:16,382 And so how do you do anything other than set yourself up for failure when. 1488 01:42:16,582 --> 01:42:20,022 That's like, that is sort of like saying like, I'm, I'm going to live. 1489 01:42:20,042 --> 01:42:20,182 Sure. 1490 01:42:20,262 --> 01:42:31,502 It sounds better than I'm going to on net always have more Bitcoin, you know, but they're going to think you're never going to sell you Bitcoin and you are going to get drug through the mud. 1491 01:42:31,502 --> 01:42:39,082 when you do when you inevitably sell your 3000 bitcoin you know yeah and then he thought he made 1492 01:42:39,082 --> 01:42:47,842 it better by saying no what i meant was uh you don't sell your bitcoin he literally said that 1493 01:42:47,842 --> 01:42:53,502 he was like no see what i meant was you don't sell your bitcoin but i can still sell my bitcoin 1494 01:42:53,502 --> 01:42:54,902 He thought that made it better. 1495 01:42:58,642 --> 01:42:59,422 It's funny. 1496 01:42:59,742 --> 01:43:09,822 And what I think he did, aside from the fact that I think it makes him look foolish because he has to figure out how to justify a previous statement. 1497 01:43:09,822 --> 01:43:15,402 but he actually is right about the idea of like Bitcoin as a liquidity measure, 1498 01:43:15,402 --> 01:43:22,802 a liquidity tool that when you can sell 3000 Bitcoin in the market and then, 1499 01:43:22,802 --> 01:43:23,162 you know, 1500 01:43:23,202 --> 01:43:26,442 buy it back in two weeks and like basically nothing happens in the market, 1501 01:43:26,642 --> 01:43:30,562 you are proving to everyone that this is liquid monetary capital. 1502 01:43:30,742 --> 01:43:31,582 Like this is, 1503 01:43:31,962 --> 01:43:34,802 this is something that you can hold in your treasury and you get like, 1504 01:43:34,942 --> 01:43:37,142 he is doing the thing, 1505 01:43:37,562 --> 01:43:39,022 proving the point of Bitcoin, 1506 01:43:39,022 --> 01:43:44,102 but he's doing it in a way that makes his actions that would actually be 1507 01:43:44,102 --> 01:43:48,782 beneficial to the idea of Bitcoin as a treasury asset look like something that 1508 01:43:48,782 --> 01:43:50,182 he's failing at, 1509 01:43:50,662 --> 01:43:50,982 you know, 1510 01:43:51,062 --> 01:43:51,622 like that, 1511 01:43:51,842 --> 01:43:54,802 that he's now having to defend or change his statements or whatever. 1512 01:43:55,142 --> 01:43:55,622 Cause, 1513 01:43:55,922 --> 01:43:57,302 cause just the way it's framed, 1514 01:43:57,642 --> 01:43:58,002 you know? 1515 01:43:58,782 --> 01:44:00,482 But anyway, 1516 01:44:00,682 --> 01:44:00,962 that is, 1517 01:44:01,062 --> 01:44:03,282 I don't really care about the selling Bitcoin thing. 1518 01:44:03,382 --> 01:44:06,142 Like I don't think that's a big deal. 1519 01:44:06,242 --> 01:44:06,442 I mean, 1520 01:44:06,502 --> 01:44:08,642 you just sold something to get rid of your debt. 1521 01:44:08,642 --> 01:44:09,942 I'm like... 1522 01:44:09,979 --> 01:44:15,539 yeah exactly yeah of course you did the the bigger deal though is the funding core devs thing 1523 01:44:15,539 --> 01:44:23,499 oh yeah um i agree there because he literally said word for word if i ever start funding core 1524 01:44:23,499 --> 01:44:30,459 devs then i am attacking bitcoin he literally said that word for word two years ago yeah i was 1525 01:44:30,459 --> 01:44:37,099 about to say i haven't seen that but yeah i i remember the i remembered something he is attacking 1526 01:44:37,099 --> 01:44:43,719 Bitcoin. He's doing exactly what he said is my opinion, man. It's like that thing where you're 1527 01:44:43,719 --> 01:44:47,799 talking about with the companies, the Bud Light and the Carolina Panthers and stuff. Yeah, there's 1528 01:44:47,799 --> 01:44:52,159 that weird political thing. But another thing that's going on there is they just don't think 1529 01:44:52,159 --> 01:44:59,459 that their support system is irrelevant. It's like the man who divorces his wife, and then only when 1530 01:44:59,459 --> 01:45:04,979 he's divorced, he realized that his kids were giving him that emotional support system that he 1531 01:45:04,979 --> 01:45:06,039 needed to stay strong. 1532 01:45:06,039 --> 01:45:07,659 Like the once like, 1533 01:45:07,759 --> 01:45:11,199 like Bitcoin core and Carolina Panthers and Bud light, 1534 01:45:11,339 --> 01:45:12,099 Michael Saylor, 1535 01:45:12,239 --> 01:45:15,059 all these guys are saying these plebs are just not important. 1536 01:45:15,799 --> 01:45:16,579 And like, 1537 01:45:16,619 --> 01:45:20,319 I just think they're going to find out like the plebs are the support system. 1538 01:45:20,399 --> 01:45:22,919 The plebs are the thing that holds the whole thing up. 1539 01:45:24,559 --> 01:45:25,039 Yeah. 1540 01:45:25,419 --> 01:45:25,619 Yeah. 1541 01:45:25,619 --> 01:45:26,179 That's fair. 1542 01:45:28,179 --> 01:45:28,659 Wow. 1543 01:45:29,179 --> 01:45:29,659 But, 1544 01:45:29,759 --> 01:45:29,959 um, 1545 01:45:29,959 --> 01:45:30,279 Hey, 1546 01:45:30,339 --> 01:45:30,499 I, 1547 01:45:30,559 --> 01:45:31,519 I got to get going, 1548 01:45:31,619 --> 01:45:32,639 but I didn't want to do. 1549 01:45:32,899 --> 01:45:33,119 Yeah. 1550 01:45:33,759 --> 01:45:34,239 Yeah. 1551 01:45:34,239 --> 01:45:34,499 Yeah. 1552 01:45:34,979 --> 01:45:37,119 I just wanted to like end on one thing. 1553 01:45:37,119 --> 01:45:39,779 I'm getting a little annoyed at people saying, 1554 01:45:40,039 --> 01:45:42,879 trying to simplify this cold card thing as an AI hack. 1555 01:45:43,339 --> 01:45:44,139 You know, 1556 01:45:44,839 --> 01:45:45,999 it's like guys, 1557 01:45:46,359 --> 01:45:49,619 the random number generator was not plugged into the freaking 1558 01:45:49,619 --> 01:45:50,859 motherboard guys. 1559 01:45:51,479 --> 01:45:52,159 Okay. 1560 01:45:53,399 --> 01:45:54,359 Oh yeah. 1561 01:45:54,499 --> 01:45:57,539 Fancy AI discovered that the computer was unplugged. 1562 01:45:57,579 --> 01:45:58,519 No guys, 1563 01:45:59,239 --> 01:46:03,459 this was the random number generator was not connected. 1564 01:46:03,459 --> 01:46:11,679 this is not like some crazy genius ai thing yeah like i'm getting kind of annoyed seeing 1565 01:46:11,679 --> 01:46:18,079 that explanation everything it's just that the capacity like it does make it does make a huge 1566 01:46:18,079 --> 01:46:24,539 difference um that ai quote-unquote found this because it's somebody who couldn't have found it 1567 01:46:24,539 --> 01:46:30,799 who was able to exploit it it makes us it makes a difference in the realm of security and software 1568 01:46:30,799 --> 01:46:32,799 and software products, 1569 01:46:33,319 --> 01:46:36,239 similar to how anybody being able to post on YouTube 1570 01:46:36,239 --> 01:46:39,239 affects what used to be three broadcast companies 1571 01:46:39,239 --> 01:46:40,619 that controlled the narrative. 1572 01:46:41,459 --> 01:46:41,679 You know? 1573 01:46:41,879 --> 01:46:42,459 Yeah, that's true. 1574 01:46:43,199 --> 01:46:46,379 Is that it opens it up to an entire world 1575 01:46:46,379 --> 01:46:49,219 and there will be a very painful transitionary period 1576 01:46:49,219 --> 01:46:52,559 because we've thought for a long time 1577 01:46:52,559 --> 01:46:54,519 that devs are this magical, super smart. 1578 01:46:54,639 --> 01:46:55,299 It's kind of like, you know, 1579 01:46:55,359 --> 01:46:56,559 oh, doctors are super smart 1580 01:46:56,559 --> 01:46:58,499 and you got to just trust and do whatever they say. 1581 01:46:58,579 --> 01:47:00,359 It's like, oh, people are dying from the vaccine 1582 01:47:00,359 --> 01:47:13,143 and they lied about all this crap And now there this awakening of like oh my God I can trust the damn thing I can trust anything We all full of crap They all just getting shares of all the stuff that they tell me to inject in my body They don even really care what the consequences 1583 01:47:13,143 --> 01:47:20,643 are. Because when I'm up with an immune disorder and can't sleep or my kid has God knows what 1584 01:47:20,643 --> 01:47:27,223 side effects from all of this, they're sleeping. They're sleeping. They got paid more. In fact, 1585 01:47:27,223 --> 01:47:30,283 they might even get a bigger check one day, add to my prescription list. 1586 01:47:30,943 --> 01:47:35,343 And like that realization of the, 1587 01:47:35,343 --> 01:47:39,743 the kind of window into like being able to see that there's, 1588 01:47:39,903 --> 01:47:43,263 there's no magic sauce and everybody's just banging bricks together. 1589 01:47:44,763 --> 01:47:48,003 Is that, you know, you can just have an AI and just be like, 1590 01:47:48,503 --> 01:47:49,843 break the cold card. 1591 01:47:50,543 --> 01:47:56,223 And anybody with any degree of competency who really took the time to look 1592 01:47:56,223 --> 01:48:03,243 into it could have found that but that used to be a very small group of people you know um especially 1593 01:48:03,243 --> 01:48:10,003 with those who had access to something that's trying to be obscured um and you know would need 1594 01:48:10,003 --> 01:48:14,223 some degree of like reverse engineering if they don't see all the pieces of it or they don't have 1595 01:48:14,223 --> 01:48:22,643 the entire you know schema of the the tool or something and now that's just a that's just you 1596 01:48:22,643 --> 01:48:30,303 know how many tokens is it um and that means that a hundred thousand people can do something that 1597 01:48:30,303 --> 01:48:39,523 used to be in the realm of a hundred um yeah and that that means that it does change things 1598 01:48:39,523 --> 01:48:45,883 it does matter but this is not some super intelligence broke critical bitcoin security 1599 01:48:45,883 --> 01:48:55,203 this is a gpu was able to check something that used to take human time and labor that people 1600 01:48:55,203 --> 01:49:02,863 just didn't bother to check and something was built wrong something was just broken and it 1601 01:49:02,863 --> 01:49:09,923 poked the holes and found it you know um something wasn't freaking connected something the cord was 1602 01:49:09,923 --> 01:49:15,603 not into the back of the monitor and nobody was checking the monitor you know because it's facing 1603 01:49:15,603 --> 01:49:16,383 the other damn way. 1604 01:49:17,943 --> 01:49:18,923 All right, guys. 1605 01:49:19,023 --> 01:49:19,723 I got to run. 1606 01:49:20,523 --> 01:49:20,743 Yep. 1607 01:49:21,443 --> 01:49:21,743 All right. 1608 01:49:22,103 --> 01:49:22,643 Thanks, man. 1609 01:49:22,683 --> 01:49:23,343 See y'all later. 1610 01:49:24,063 --> 01:49:24,983 Great for the roundtable. 1611 01:49:25,523 --> 01:49:26,223 Catch you later. 1612 01:49:26,743 --> 01:49:27,603 That's our two sets. 1613 01:49:28,603 --> 01:49:28,963 Later. 1614 01:49:33,743 --> 01:49:35,363 I hope you guys enjoyed that episode. 1615 01:49:36,763 --> 01:49:37,563 Stay humble. 1616 01:49:39,023 --> 01:49:40,423 Realize that a lot of things are changing 1617 01:49:40,423 --> 01:49:42,623 and, you know, 1618 01:49:42,703 --> 01:49:45,003 there's no silver bullet to any of this. 1619 01:49:45,603 --> 01:50:11,047 I wish so badly that this hadn happened but I also I also see the anti You know I see I see how quickly everyone is responding and changing their behavior and changing how they think about this Like the number of people who have like I seen like four I been like trying to keep specifically a note especially on like the the Bitbox like now that Bitbox is a sponsor and I 1620 01:50:11,127 --> 01:50:14,987 it's another wallet that I've loved. I'm like, Jesus Christ, let's do security audits. Like 1621 01:50:14,987 --> 01:50:21,847 crazy. I do not want the F if I'm going to be doing this again. Um, and, uh, and I've, I've 1622 01:50:21,847 --> 01:50:27,527 gone through and have been in the process of doing my own stuff i haven't really gotten to devote that 1623 01:50:27,527 --> 01:50:32,307 much attention to it but all the audits um because it's you know fully open source and everything so 1624 01:50:32,307 --> 01:50:41,427 we can do that we can do that now which is scary that you know such a big shift has happened in 1625 01:50:41,427 --> 01:50:49,767 kind of the ground you know the playing field that we're standing on but you know it's also 1626 01:50:49,767 --> 01:50:55,827 wild that something that I could never verify, I can actually participate in now. 1627 01:50:56,407 --> 01:50:59,447 And it's not because I understand the code. It's because I might 1628 01:50:59,447 --> 01:51:05,367 have a little bit of creativity or good conceptual understanding about how to attack and where to 1629 01:51:05,367 --> 01:51:09,807 attack with these things. And I can learn and get better at those things. That's one of the 1630 01:51:09,807 --> 01:51:14,507 things I feel like I have done really good is understanding a risk profile, understanding attack 1631 01:51:14,507 --> 01:51:23,887 surfaces but that doesn't mean i know jack about firmware you know um and so i i think 1632 01:51:23,887 --> 01:51:28,687 in an attempt to try to force the silver lining out of the fact that it still just feels like 1633 01:51:28,687 --> 01:51:37,547 feels like hell right now um like i just i know people are like now we're in the zone of people 1634 01:51:37,547 --> 01:51:43,887 getting off vacation and coming home and finding out you know this is going to make everything 1635 01:51:43,887 --> 01:51:51,747 stronger you know anti-fragility is about the fact that it's not that something exists and bad 1636 01:51:51,747 --> 01:51:59,107 things don't happen like because it's because it's better quite the opposite it's that explicitly 1637 01:51:59,107 --> 01:52:08,207 when bad when the worst things happen it gets stronger um and i feel like i'm seeing all of 1638 01:52:08,207 --> 01:52:17,427 those signs and that an area where we have been complacent and frankly arrogant um not just you 1639 01:52:17,427 --> 01:52:24,047 know mbk's attitude but i mean like all of us all of us we just thought we had the hardware wallet 1640 01:52:24,047 --> 01:52:35,507 thing figured out you know we had our cypherpunk calculator and that was that and we got punished 1641 01:52:35,507 --> 01:52:36,067 for that 1642 01:52:36,067 --> 01:52:38,787 and so 1643 01:52:38,787 --> 01:52:41,847 not the first time 1644 01:52:41,847 --> 01:52:42,467 I've been humbled 1645 01:52:42,467 --> 01:52:44,887 certainly won't be the last 1646 01:52:44,887 --> 01:52:47,307 but the next time 1647 01:52:47,307 --> 01:52:48,147 let's 1648 01:52:48,147 --> 01:52:51,367 let's have it not hurt so much 1649 01:52:51,367 --> 01:52:51,887 let's 1650 01:52:51,887 --> 01:53:04,451 let stay vigilant on this one at least You know we should know the fucking entropy going into the hardware wallet 1651 01:53:04,591 --> 01:53:06,931 and we should verify the ever-loving shit out of that. 1652 01:53:07,191 --> 01:53:08,751 That thing needs 10,000. 1653 01:53:09,291 --> 01:53:10,271 That's what I'll do. 1654 01:53:10,351 --> 01:53:11,251 Maybe that's what I'll do. 1655 01:53:11,331 --> 01:53:13,531 I'm going to figure out how to do, 1656 01:53:13,531 --> 01:53:16,251 I'm just going to build myself a suite 1657 01:53:16,251 --> 01:53:18,411 from everybody else's stuff, probably, 1658 01:53:19,171 --> 01:53:20,751 a suite of the unit tests. 1659 01:53:20,751 --> 01:53:22,671 I'm going to run everything 1660 01:53:22,671 --> 01:53:24,471 every damn thing through it 1661 01:53:24,471 --> 01:53:26,871 but anyway 1662 01:53:26,871 --> 01:53:30,031 thank you guys for listening 1663 01:53:30,031 --> 01:53:32,471 if you want to replace 1664 01:53:32,471 --> 01:53:33,431 your cold card 1665 01:53:33,431 --> 01:53:35,771 I got a discount code for a bitbox 1666 01:53:35,771 --> 01:53:38,871 check on some of those audits 1667 01:53:38,871 --> 01:53:39,871 I'll have details 1668 01:53:39,871 --> 01:53:42,211 on my findings 1669 01:53:42,211 --> 01:53:44,611 and you know everything 1670 01:53:44,611 --> 01:53:46,191 about all the other hardware wallets 1671 01:53:46,191 --> 01:53:48,691 as I finally get time to go through it 1672 01:53:48,691 --> 01:53:56,291 and stay safe use multi-sig man it's just not that hard i should have pushed it harder because 1673 01:53:56,291 --> 01:54:00,451 that's the only reason i really dodged this bullet is because i had print even everything 1674 01:54:00,451 --> 01:54:06,931 that was vulnerable to cold cards it was multi-sig at least and that bought me enough time um so 1675 01:54:08,211 --> 01:54:15,251 stay safe learn what you can don't let this kill your passion for 1676 01:54:15,251 --> 01:54:23,611 you know sovereignty for actually getting to a better place you know these are 1677 01:54:23,611 --> 01:54:29,951 these are the growing pains of flipping the entire system upside down and i think people 1678 01:54:29,951 --> 01:54:34,231 just think oh it's just a digital thing it's like no everything is reversed everything is reversed 1679 01:54:34,231 --> 01:54:42,131 responsibility is reversed how you verify is reversed uh permission is reversed control is 1680 01:54:42,131 --> 01:54:50,031 reversed. The entire dynamic of how and why we interact with this thing, it is a push, not a pull. 1681 01:54:50,571 --> 01:54:56,451 The entire thing is reversed. It's turned on its head and it will take generations to really work 1682 01:54:56,451 --> 01:55:05,531 out all of the kinks and change the mindsets necessary and educate the people in such a way 1683 01:55:05,531 --> 01:55:11,091 that this will actually be the norm. This will actually be second nature. And in the meantime, 1684 01:55:11,091 --> 01:55:13,131 there's going to be a lot of growing pains. 1685 01:55:14,051 --> 01:55:15,671 And this was a particularly tough one. 1686 01:55:17,051 --> 01:55:19,931 So, with that, I'll catch you on the next episode. 1687 01:55:20,611 --> 01:55:22,351 Thank you guys for listening to the Roundtable. 1688 01:55:22,791 --> 01:55:23,811 Don't forget to subscribe. 1689 01:55:24,371 --> 01:55:25,491 I will catch you on the next one. 1690 01:55:25,991 --> 01:55:27,531 That is our two sets. 1691 01:55:41,091 --> 01:55:41,591 you