1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:01,360 There's a lot of emphasis on the moment 2 00:00:01,360 --> 00:00:04,140 at like how AI is making everything like less secure 3 00:00:04,140 --> 00:00:05,240 and all of this kind of stuff. 4 00:00:05,300 --> 00:00:07,000 And that is a part of the story. 5 00:00:07,120 --> 00:00:08,420 Like, of course, like any tool, 6 00:00:08,560 --> 00:00:11,680 any powerful tool has its like advantages 7 00:00:11,680 --> 00:00:13,560 and disadvantages or has the thing, you know, 8 00:00:13,560 --> 00:00:15,460 like bad guys can use it, good guys can use it. 9 00:00:15,520 --> 00:00:17,940 But the power that I think this actually gives 10 00:00:17,940 --> 00:00:19,840 the individual for doing stuff like recovery, 11 00:00:20,480 --> 00:00:21,900 like I think that in the long run, 12 00:00:21,940 --> 00:00:23,500 there's going to be way more people 13 00:00:23,500 --> 00:00:25,820 who use this to recover their funds 14 00:00:25,820 --> 00:00:27,000 than people who use it 15 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:28,360 and manage to steal someone else's fund. 16 00:00:28,360 --> 00:00:30,540 because the information you can give it, 17 00:00:30,600 --> 00:00:31,900 like I got it to interview me, 18 00:00:31,980 --> 00:00:33,780 like how did I store the seed words? 19 00:00:33,900 --> 00:00:36,060 Like did I do it in columns or did I do it in rows? 20 00:00:36,180 --> 00:00:37,160 Did I mix it, et cetera? 21 00:00:37,660 --> 00:00:40,060 All that stuff I can choose selectively to give to the AI. 22 00:00:40,180 --> 00:00:40,840 Whereas an attacker, 23 00:00:41,440 --> 00:00:44,460 they're basically going in with a kind of like a blank slate 24 00:00:44,460 --> 00:00:46,920 and trying to do an attack from, you know, 25 00:00:47,040 --> 00:00:49,520 relatively low amounts of like knowledge 26 00:00:49,520 --> 00:00:50,640 in terms of your setup. 27 00:00:58,360 --> 00:01:09,700 What is up, guys? Welcome back to Bitcoin Audible. 28 00:01:09,700 --> 00:01:15,300 I'm Guy Swang, the guy who has read more about Bitcoin than anybody else you know. 29 00:01:15,860 --> 00:01:20,360 And we've got a fantastic conversation today with my producer, actually. 30 00:01:21,200 --> 00:01:23,860 And a really good friend, great guy. 31 00:01:23,860 --> 00:01:28,120 If you don't know him, Stack to the Future on Twitter and socials. 32 00:01:28,200 --> 00:01:29,960 You got to follow him if you're not. 33 00:01:30,660 --> 00:01:36,780 But during the whole cold card incident, he had a bit of a scare. 34 00:01:37,520 --> 00:01:44,500 And it was one that I know all too well, like that feeling and that sense. 35 00:01:44,500 --> 00:01:50,660 And I know a lot of people have this where something, they think something terrible has happened 36 00:01:50,660 --> 00:01:57,340 or they don't know exactly how to get around it or adjust to something unexpected happening. 37 00:01:58,200 --> 00:02:02,740 And this was just a really, really interesting recovery story 38 00:02:02,740 --> 00:02:07,980 and an interesting case of exactly what went wrong and why. 39 00:02:08,820 --> 00:02:12,520 And I just think it's incredibly useful to break down these situations, 40 00:02:12,900 --> 00:02:17,400 whether they ended in a good story or a happy ending or a terrible ending, 41 00:02:17,580 --> 00:02:19,660 just because they're examples, right? 42 00:02:19,660 --> 00:02:32,260 You know, the whole idea is that we learn from each other and understand the nuance of all of these things by learning by other people's edge cases rather than having to all learn the same hard lessons ourselves. 43 00:02:33,100 --> 00:02:35,200 And I thought this would just be a really, really fun conversation. 44 00:02:35,500 --> 00:02:43,720 And it's good to actually get to sit down and hang out with my producer, not in the context of sending him work or vice versa. 45 00:02:46,300 --> 00:02:49,640 Great conversation. Really good. Glad we got to catch up. 46 00:02:49,660 --> 00:02:53,200 and I hope you guys really enjoy this one. 47 00:02:53,320 --> 00:02:56,740 This episode is brought to you by the Bitbox hardware wallet, by the way, 48 00:02:57,160 --> 00:03:01,920 and it's a fantastic open source from top to bottom hardware wallet. 49 00:03:01,920 --> 00:03:07,880 It's been around and tried and true through a lot of storms and all the things, 50 00:03:08,220 --> 00:03:11,920 and it's been a wonderful, wonderful little tool of mine, 51 00:03:12,260 --> 00:03:14,380 and I highly recommend it to people. 52 00:03:14,740 --> 00:03:17,780 I've got a 5% discount with code GUY. 53 00:03:17,780 --> 00:03:19,740 Link in details will be right down in the show notes. 54 00:03:20,080 --> 00:03:20,500 So check it out. 55 00:03:20,540 --> 00:03:24,460 It's also a great way to support the show, just to use my link when you're getting yourself 56 00:03:24,460 --> 00:03:25,020 a hardware wallet. 57 00:03:25,540 --> 00:03:33,380 With that, let's get into today's episode with Stack to the Future, and it is titled 58 00:03:33,380 --> 00:03:38,580 Invalid Checksum, How I Almost Lost My Bitcoin Stack. 59 00:03:41,320 --> 00:03:46,140 Where I have gotten to with Pearcast, I'm 100% convinced that I did. 60 00:03:46,140 --> 00:03:52,980 that I it it took two weeks of my life to kind of build out the the things that I've been distracted 61 00:03:52,980 --> 00:03:58,700 with most recently um and of course it took three years to build paracore and you know all of that 62 00:03:58,700 --> 00:04:08,080 stuff but I'm finally experiencing what it's like on the other on the backside of having it um and 63 00:04:08,080 --> 00:04:15,400 I'm like no I definitely should have like this is this is the way I should have done it um yeah 64 00:04:15,400 --> 00:04:17,780 Like this is such a huge unlock. 65 00:04:17,920 --> 00:04:19,540 I'm going to be able to do videos so quick. 66 00:04:19,920 --> 00:04:27,820 I've already got a temporary or like a first draft of the mobile version of Pearcast. 67 00:04:28,220 --> 00:04:42,280 And so what I'm going to do because it will, you know, it just syncs and ports straight through Pearcore or whatever is I want to be able to record on my desktop and then pick up with my phone, go outside and keep recording into the same timeline. 68 00:04:42,280 --> 00:04:43,240 That helps a lot. 69 00:04:43,340 --> 00:04:43,920 That helps a lot. 70 00:04:43,920 --> 00:04:48,080 I think that there's a, I think that there's, there's quite as, 71 00:04:48,540 --> 00:04:54,100 I feel like there's videos when you just kind of like have a variety of like 72 00:04:54,100 --> 00:04:56,720 locations and stuff, it's a bit more kind of varied. 73 00:04:57,240 --> 00:05:00,920 They seem to do better and people, I don't know, they're just more people. 74 00:05:01,680 --> 00:05:02,360 They're more engaging. 75 00:05:03,180 --> 00:05:03,340 Yeah. 76 00:05:03,480 --> 00:05:03,800 More engaging. 77 00:05:03,800 --> 00:05:08,520 They're more fun for me to like go out and just like, 78 00:05:08,580 --> 00:05:10,260 I got forced myself in one of them. 79 00:05:10,320 --> 00:05:12,400 There's just like go walking out in the woods. 80 00:05:12,400 --> 00:05:20,200 and it was just fun to do a video like that and it's also just kind of like boring to be watching 81 00:05:20,200 --> 00:05:25,140 minute one and then minute 15 of a video and you're looking at the same thing and the same 82 00:05:25,140 --> 00:05:32,860 person in the same situation you know like there's just no visual engagement or variety in it like 83 00:05:32,860 --> 00:05:36,480 why are you gonna have video if you're not if nothing's gonna be happening why do you need 84 00:05:36,480 --> 00:05:41,800 video for 90 of that right yeah do you watch julie i think he's called julian figaro 85 00:05:41,800 --> 00:05:43,120 yeah 86 00:05:43,120 --> 00:05:45,060 he's got the 87 00:05:45,060 --> 00:05:47,720 I think he's called the exit plan 88 00:05:47,720 --> 00:05:48,620 his channel 89 00:05:48,620 --> 00:05:52,380 and like I really love the way that he does his videos 90 00:05:52,380 --> 00:05:54,240 we shot the shit at one of the conferences and said we should do 91 00:05:54,240 --> 00:05:56,120 a project or a video together 92 00:05:56,120 --> 00:05:57,140 and then we totally forgot 93 00:05:57,140 --> 00:05:59,680 we should just do that randomly 94 00:05:59,680 --> 00:06:01,520 we should get him on actually 95 00:06:01,520 --> 00:06:04,080 that would be a great one we should just talk about 96 00:06:04,080 --> 00:06:06,280 oh my god I bet he's doing like all sorts 97 00:06:06,280 --> 00:06:08,220 of AI stuff with his like production flow 98 00:06:08,220 --> 00:06:10,280 and I am all 99 00:06:10,280 --> 00:06:11,580 about like how to make 100 00:06:11,800 --> 00:06:14,500 how to use AI to be more productive. 101 00:06:14,840 --> 00:06:17,260 Like I am, that has been like my, my number one thing, 102 00:06:17,320 --> 00:06:19,040 which is hilarious because I've not been very productive 103 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:21,120 because I've been so focused on building stuff with AI 104 00:06:21,120 --> 00:06:21,920 to be more productive. 105 00:06:22,840 --> 00:06:25,600 But I'm, I'm, I'm really getting there 106 00:06:25,600 --> 00:06:27,080 and I'm super stoked. 107 00:06:28,420 --> 00:06:31,060 Booting up and working on the episodes this morning was, 108 00:06:31,560 --> 00:06:34,740 I haven't been this invigorated about it in a while. 109 00:06:35,800 --> 00:06:38,100 So it's got me pretty jazzed again. 110 00:06:38,700 --> 00:06:39,640 And it's all mine. 111 00:06:39,720 --> 00:06:40,500 It's all peer to peer. 112 00:06:40,680 --> 00:06:41,140 Fuck them. 113 00:06:41,140 --> 00:06:42,140 fuck the platform 114 00:06:42,140 --> 00:06:43,260 they're done with that shit 115 00:06:43,260 --> 00:06:44,400 Jesus 116 00:06:44,400 --> 00:06:47,120 but yeah 117 00:06:47,120 --> 00:06:48,040 well dude 118 00:06:48,040 --> 00:06:49,660 we should probably 119 00:06:49,660 --> 00:06:50,260 add 120 00:06:50,260 --> 00:06:51,060 we should probably 121 00:06:51,060 --> 00:06:51,780 leave some of that shit in 122 00:06:51,780 --> 00:06:53,060 but welcome to the show man 123 00:06:53,060 --> 00:06:54,140 this is 124 00:06:54,140 --> 00:06:55,120 you've been on the show 125 00:06:55,120 --> 00:06:55,280 like 126 00:06:55,280 --> 00:06:57,340 at least once right 127 00:06:57,340 --> 00:06:58,400 I don't 128 00:06:58,400 --> 00:06:59,460 I don't know if I have 129 00:06:59,460 --> 00:07:00,680 so this is I think 130 00:07:00,680 --> 00:07:01,440 my first time 131 00:07:01,440 --> 00:07:02,100 being on Bitcoin 132 00:07:02,100 --> 00:07:02,800 well shit 133 00:07:02,800 --> 00:07:04,360 welcome to the show man 134 00:07:04,360 --> 00:07:05,360 long time producer 135 00:07:05,360 --> 00:07:06,340 first time 136 00:07:06,340 --> 00:07:08,020 first time guest 137 00:07:08,020 --> 00:07:09,580 that's awesome 138 00:07:09,580 --> 00:07:10,400 so we had a 139 00:07:10,400 --> 00:07:15,580 interesting few conversations right around the cold card incident. 140 00:07:16,800 --> 00:07:20,940 And you had a bit of a scare. 141 00:07:22,380 --> 00:07:26,180 And I think there's a lot of lessons to pull from it. 142 00:07:26,960 --> 00:07:30,760 Because I've run into a bunch of similar things, 143 00:07:30,760 --> 00:07:36,240 and it's crazy the number of times I've felt like I have done something terrible. 144 00:07:36,240 --> 00:07:50,320 Like I've made a serious, serious error and lost something only to finally be reassured 24 hours later, you know, like to finally recover or do whatever it is that I needed to do. 145 00:07:51,000 --> 00:07:55,360 And I think I gave a little bit of a scare to a relative of mine. 146 00:07:55,360 --> 00:08:04,400 I set her up previously with a Jade wallet and had her savings on it. 147 00:08:04,400 --> 00:08:09,000 and I've kind of like walked her through and she's gotten Bitcoin a couple more times, 148 00:08:09,120 --> 00:08:14,880 but she was very uncomfortable with it. The, the Jade was, it's like a little bit, 149 00:08:14,880 --> 00:08:20,760 it's not, it's just a little bit past kind of like the warm-y zone and she is not a very 150 00:08:20,760 --> 00:08:25,980 technical person. And then it was being real finicky with Bluetooth for some reason. The, 151 00:08:26,240 --> 00:08:30,600 that device in particular, like my Jade, I didn't really have much problem. It seemed to connect 152 00:08:30,600 --> 00:08:36,020 really well um but for some reason her phone or her jade was just being like real finicky and as 153 00:08:36,020 --> 00:08:40,160 soon as it wouldn't happen like the first time she's like oh god what do i do like she would 154 00:08:40,160 --> 00:08:44,100 like kind of lock up you know like so even like the slightest thing like bluetooth doesn't connect 155 00:08:44,100 --> 00:08:53,360 she's like something's wrong and uh and so uh i set her up and switched over all this stuff um and 156 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:58,960 but she had like a moment because i couldn't get the jade to connect and then i i wrote down 157 00:08:58,960 --> 00:09:05,520 a copy of her pin for the jade because we're like she just wanted to make sure that we've got you 158 00:09:05,520 --> 00:09:12,960 know extra backups and stuff and uh we have been communicating regularly on it i send her texts 159 00:09:12,960 --> 00:09:16,340 every six months and be like you got your you got your c phrase you know where it is you know like 160 00:09:16,340 --> 00:09:28,040 keep it safe um and uh when i uh broke out her jade i had forgotten that i had the pin number 161 00:09:28,040 --> 00:09:34,520 back in like my stash of like password pins and all that stuff that was like physical 162 00:09:34,520 --> 00:09:44,200 and I didn't bring it so we couldn't get into her jade and she was like oh no what does that mean 163 00:09:44,200 --> 00:09:48,040 like you know we're trying to like move and consolidate everything because she had purchased 164 00:09:48,040 --> 00:09:52,040 a little bit from me but I had kept it because she didn't know how to get she couldn't get back 165 00:09:52,040 --> 00:09:57,880 into her jade um and so I didn't have it we actually had to restore from seed out at a coffee 166 00:09:57,880 --> 00:10:06,360 shop but she did remember to bring her seed phrase um that she had like stashed away in her like you 167 00:10:06,360 --> 00:10:11,220 know hitting your little wallet below the wallet in their purse and you know all that stuff um which 168 00:10:11,220 --> 00:10:15,560 is kind of dangerous but you know generally speaking we we were doing a bunch of stuff with 169 00:10:15,560 --> 00:10:20,460 the bitcoin but it was funny we we did get it and i just did it in sparrow but all i could think was 170 00:10:20,460 --> 00:10:26,580 like god the panic most people would have like the the sheer panic and like how do you know 171 00:10:26,580 --> 00:10:34,500 what to do like i i booted up sparrow and you know scanned all the derivation pads but i saw her face 172 00:10:34,500 --> 00:10:39,940 when we were sitting right there she never would have touched she would have been scared to ever 173 00:10:39,940 --> 00:10:44,640 loving like if i wasn't there they would not nothing would happen nothing would happen yeah 174 00:10:44,640 --> 00:10:51,400 she and that was just a recovery from seed that was just a recovery from seed yeah it was just 175 00:10:51,400 --> 00:10:56,420 trying to get some stuff off a jade wallet like which is not a terrible wallet you know like a 176 00:10:56,420 --> 00:10:58,160 Jade's great. I love my Jade. 177 00:10:59,520 --> 00:11:04,120 And Bitbox is definitely more user-friendly, I think, 178 00:11:04,200 --> 00:11:05,780 typically speaking, than Jade. 179 00:11:06,340 --> 00:11:08,440 The hardware wallets are finally getting better, 180 00:11:08,500 --> 00:11:12,120 but I'm surprised by how many that I thought of previously 181 00:11:12,120 --> 00:11:14,840 as having really good user experience, 182 00:11:14,940 --> 00:11:17,900 but they were definitely Bitcoin techie user experiences. 183 00:11:18,600 --> 00:11:21,280 And then when I sit down with a normie, I'm like, oh, Jesus. 184 00:11:22,980 --> 00:11:26,280 I understand immediately why they're so intimidated. 185 00:11:26,420 --> 00:11:33,340 my stuff. And it's, and it's why I would have like, I recommended the cold card because I love 186 00:11:33,340 --> 00:11:39,880 the, the things about the verification from ledger. And in fact, I just talked about this 187 00:11:39,880 --> 00:11:45,940 in the video we were working on was the ledger hack was the, Oh, you can't see into the device. 188 00:11:46,660 --> 00:11:51,180 And so somebody implanted something into the device that stole your seed phrase that just 189 00:11:51,180 --> 00:11:54,980 watched the screen and cold cards like, Oh, we're not going to let all that happen. We're 190 00:11:54,980 --> 00:11:57,960 going to let you look in the device so you can see if it's changed or whatever. 191 00:11:58,020 --> 00:11:59,600 It's like, oh, but we forgot how to make entropy. 192 00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:02,560 We're just not even going to generate a cold card. 193 00:12:03,000 --> 00:12:06,240 We're just going to generate a seed from one to seven. 194 00:12:06,920 --> 00:12:08,980 You know, like we'll just, whatever. 195 00:12:09,280 --> 00:12:11,160 Somebody will guess it at some point. 196 00:12:12,800 --> 00:12:17,400 But so you had your funds. 197 00:12:17,580 --> 00:12:19,060 Were you on the cold card Mark IV? 198 00:12:19,060 --> 00:12:24,840 What was your general setup that got you in the panic mode? 199 00:12:24,980 --> 00:12:28,120 I had a cold card. 200 00:12:28,320 --> 00:12:31,580 I was in the exact risk group, basically, for the cold card hack. 201 00:12:31,740 --> 00:12:34,240 I was like, bang, like in the center of everything. 202 00:12:34,340 --> 00:12:35,160 Had the Mark III. 203 00:12:35,800 --> 00:12:37,360 Hadn't used a passphrase. 204 00:12:38,600 --> 00:12:43,180 I can't remember, actually, if the firmware version was for anyone with a Mark III, 205 00:12:43,320 --> 00:12:45,000 but I think whatever. 206 00:12:45,480 --> 00:12:47,640 It was anything after 2022, I think. 207 00:12:48,420 --> 00:12:52,520 Yeah, I was basically right in that risk category, essentially. 208 00:12:52,520 --> 00:13:09,802 And I so when that whole thing happened I was basically like I was freaking out I mean I saw the new like thankfully I kind of saw the news come in early um I think I saw I saw a a tweet from someone I think it might have been 209 00:13:09,802 --> 00:13:16,822 Groobles someone like that and he said like he'd been hacked I think um and basically was like you 210 00:13:16,822 --> 00:13:20,822 know my funds have got swept because you know you hear these stories and normally it's like uh 211 00:13:20,822 --> 00:13:25,562 is there something to it is someone just done something wrong like oftentimes you know people 212 00:13:25,562 --> 00:13:30,642 do something wrong and then they're like oh i i got hacked and it turns out like they did something 213 00:13:30,642 --> 00:13:35,342 wrong they didn't want to there was a heavy user error involved in that hack yeah exactly exactly 214 00:13:35,342 --> 00:13:41,642 but in this case i was like okay um there's something's going on here like something bad 215 00:13:41,642 --> 00:13:46,942 is actually happening uh and at that point i went and basically checked my funds had not at that 216 00:13:46,942 --> 00:13:53,302 point been swept uh so i thought right okay my funds are fine like uh but you know i needed to 217 00:13:53,302 --> 00:13:57,622 move them as soon as possible so i kind of went through that like emergency process of like i need 218 00:13:57,622 --> 00:14:05,122 to move these funds so for the cold card thing um i was i think honestly you know because like i live 219 00:14:05,122 --> 00:14:12,382 in like a u.s time zone right i think if that had been different like if i'd have been living 220 00:14:12,382 --> 00:14:17,922 or been visiting like europe at that point i'd have been screwed right because this i think the 221 00:14:17,922 --> 00:14:26,262 attack happened somewhere in the evening of uh like u.s time so i and i and it was like out you 222 00:14:26,262 --> 00:14:30,742 know you had to like a matter of kind of well possibly even less than hours you know to do 223 00:14:30,742 --> 00:14:38,202 a couple hours a couple hours yeah right so so i got kind of lucky with um just the fact that i 224 00:14:38,202 --> 00:14:44,262 managed to kind of like uh figure it out in time essentially um but then after that i was like okay 225 00:14:44,262 --> 00:14:48,522 I need to, like, I started looking at my setup generally 226 00:14:48,522 --> 00:14:52,142 because I've been one of these people who I've been wanting to set up multisig 227 00:14:52,142 --> 00:14:54,342 for a long time and just not done it. 228 00:14:54,742 --> 00:14:57,682 And I knew that, like, at some point, you know, I needed to do it. 229 00:14:57,742 --> 00:15:00,922 And I thought, right, okay, this is kind of like the warning shot, essentially. 230 00:15:01,122 --> 00:15:03,022 Like, I wanted, I already, I knew these funds. 231 00:15:03,102 --> 00:15:06,422 I was very aware, like, I have these funds on a call card 232 00:15:06,422 --> 00:15:08,802 and I didn't use a passphrase because I was kind of like, you know, 233 00:15:08,842 --> 00:15:13,622 much more, not like new to Bitcoin, but I guess just a bit more complacent. 234 00:15:13,622 --> 00:15:17,882 like the funds weren't worth as much when I put it on there. So I didn't kind of go to those lengths. 235 00:15:18,762 --> 00:15:23,282 So eventually I kind of came to the realization, right. Okay. This is, this is the time. The 236 00:15:23,282 --> 00:15:28,062 warning shots been fired. Like I need to move my funds to a multi-sig. So I started going through 237 00:15:28,062 --> 00:15:35,082 that process, like setting up funds on a multi-sig. And as I was going through it, like, you know, 238 00:15:35,082 --> 00:15:38,102 you have to do a lot of learning. Like it's one of those things, like it takes a little bit of time 239 00:15:38,102 --> 00:15:43,082 to get there, which I did. And then by the time I was kind of ready to move the funds, 240 00:15:43,082 --> 00:15:48,602 this was on like an old ledger wallet that i had in the sense that i had the i had the device and i 241 00:15:48,602 --> 00:15:54,842 had the the pin code which i had kind of like stored in in uh in like a password manager the 242 00:15:54,842 --> 00:15:59,502 pin code for the device so i was like okay i've got what i need i can get into the device so i got 243 00:15:59,502 --> 00:16:05,562 the i got the ledger out it was all ready to move it and i sent the funds sorry i didn't i didn't 244 00:16:05,562 --> 00:16:11,102 send the funds this was precisely the problem so i basically i i uh i tried to put the pin into the 245 00:16:11,102 --> 00:16:16,022 device that I had and it wasn't accepting the pin. So this was kind of like the first issue was that 246 00:16:16,022 --> 00:16:20,542 the pin wasn't being accepted. So I was like, all right, okay. It's not, you know, a huge concern. 247 00:16:20,542 --> 00:16:25,962 Like I need to try and try and, uh, this most of your stash. It was about half. Yeah. It was about 248 00:16:25,962 --> 00:16:32,742 half, about half. Yeah. So I, I was like, okay, I need to resolve the, the, you know, I need to 249 00:16:32,742 --> 00:16:36,682 basically do a recovery. So I thought, okay, this is why you have the recovery words. Like 250 00:16:36,682 --> 00:16:40,302 for situations like this, I didn't know why the pin was wrong. Uh, but I thought, okay, 251 00:16:40,302 --> 00:16:41,222 It's not a big concern. 252 00:16:41,382 --> 00:16:42,002 I have the recovery. 253 00:16:42,182 --> 00:16:43,982 And I hadn't used a passcode on the device. 254 00:16:44,082 --> 00:16:50,202 This was actually the reason I wanted to move the funds off this device specifically was because I knew that I hadn't used a passcode for that one as well. 255 00:16:50,702 --> 00:16:51,542 Sorry, a passphrase. 256 00:16:52,022 --> 00:16:59,562 So if I didn't have a passphrase set up, I was worried basically that another entropy bug would emerge from Ledger at some point. 257 00:16:59,622 --> 00:17:02,402 And I thought, like, I don't want to be vulnerable to that. 258 00:17:02,902 --> 00:17:06,442 So I kind of called my family members who had the words. 259 00:17:06,442 --> 00:17:12,802 So I'd split the words up basically, because obviously like if you are not using a passphrase, you know, you shouldn't have the 12 words stored somewhere. 260 00:17:12,942 --> 00:17:14,662 You want to split the words, right? 261 00:17:14,742 --> 00:17:18,882 Which is why I always, poor man's multi-stake essentially. 262 00:17:19,122 --> 00:17:19,282 Yeah. 263 00:17:19,422 --> 00:17:23,742 Which is why I always also kind of used 24 rather than 12 words. 264 00:17:23,782 --> 00:17:29,462 Because if you split 12 words in two, like, you know, your individual protection is rough. 265 00:17:29,862 --> 00:17:30,002 Yeah. 266 00:17:30,002 --> 00:17:30,502 Yeah. 267 00:17:30,962 --> 00:17:34,982 Because you like theoretically, you could brute force. 268 00:17:34,982 --> 00:17:41,462 if you've got if you find six words of 12 you could brute force six it'd take a long time but 269 00:17:41,462 --> 00:17:47,242 you could do it whereas if you find you know two sets of if you find one set of 12 words of a 24 270 00:17:47,242 --> 00:17:51,522 word seed essentially it has the same entropy it's just as hard for someone to crack it right so it's 271 00:17:51,522 --> 00:17:56,582 good luck so i i'd done the right thing in that sense so i basically i called the family members 272 00:17:56,582 --> 00:18:01,682 who had the uh the the seed words i said right okay can you give me the seed and i said and while 273 00:18:01,682 --> 00:18:05,162 While I was on the phone, I was like, by the way, can you just like check? 274 00:18:05,282 --> 00:18:09,762 Because I've also written the actual pin code for the device. 275 00:18:10,102 --> 00:18:13,602 I said, can you just send me the pin code that you've got written down as well? 276 00:18:13,642 --> 00:18:15,462 Because I know like my pin code is wrong. 277 00:18:16,122 --> 00:18:18,742 Turned out that they gave me the pin code and I was like, 278 00:18:18,782 --> 00:18:21,502 okay, I had this number as a zero and they have it as an eight. 279 00:18:22,242 --> 00:18:22,902 Something like that. 280 00:18:22,982 --> 00:18:24,662 I think it was between a zero and eight. 281 00:18:24,742 --> 00:18:25,702 I can't remember which way around. 282 00:18:26,822 --> 00:18:27,902 So I was like, okay, right. 283 00:18:28,122 --> 00:18:30,022 So now I've got the pin code. 284 00:18:30,082 --> 00:18:31,082 I don't really need the C words. 285 00:18:31,082 --> 00:18:31,802 So I was like, oh, you know what? 286 00:18:31,862 --> 00:18:33,242 Like, I don't really need the C words, actually. 287 00:18:33,442 --> 00:18:35,182 Like, I can just use the pin code here. 288 00:18:35,802 --> 00:18:39,222 I went back to the device, booted it up, the ledger. 289 00:18:39,522 --> 00:18:42,462 And if people are listening to who are ledger users, 290 00:18:42,762 --> 00:18:45,022 well, first of all, if you're a ledger user 291 00:18:45,022 --> 00:18:47,462 and you kind of bought one, like, from a few years back, 292 00:18:47,482 --> 00:18:49,982 I would say, like, just check it and see if it's still working 293 00:18:49,982 --> 00:18:51,102 because this is a known issue. 294 00:18:51,822 --> 00:18:54,422 And I don't think it's been very well communicated, honestly. 295 00:18:54,562 --> 00:18:56,142 Like, people are just kind of discovering this, 296 00:18:56,202 --> 00:18:59,082 but I feel like ledger needs to be more vocal about it 297 00:18:59,082 --> 00:19:00,942 and kind of preempt that people are going to have this issue. 298 00:19:01,082 --> 00:19:06,522 essentially there's a screen kind of degradation issue on the old ledger so i had the nano s from 299 00:19:06,522 --> 00:19:15,382 that i think it was two uh this must have been from around 2017 i think um okay so i i basically 300 00:19:15,382 --> 00:19:19,962 i turned the the device on and it was just completely scrambled everything like it was 301 00:19:19,962 --> 00:19:24,422 really difficult to tell but you could just about read the the numbers but it was it was really dim 302 00:19:24,422 --> 00:19:30,982 in parts so the parts were okay but in general like the the screen wasn't great so i turned it 303 00:19:30,982 --> 00:19:38,082 put the pin code in and like started essentially to do the process to move the funds. 304 00:19:38,842 --> 00:19:45,102 And I think it was, I went into the device kind of like the first time with the correct pin. 305 00:19:45,582 --> 00:19:48,842 And when I went to actually send the money out to the multi-sig, 306 00:19:48,902 --> 00:19:50,142 I was kind of all prepared for everything. 307 00:19:50,222 --> 00:19:51,102 I was about to send the money out. 308 00:19:51,222 --> 00:19:55,942 And, you know, one of the main kind of reasons you have like a hardware device 309 00:19:55,942 --> 00:19:57,422 is so you can double check the address. 310 00:19:57,422 --> 00:20:00,942 So you're sending the address and you want to make sure that it's not sending to a malicious address. 311 00:20:00,982 --> 00:20:05,982 so the device has that and a lot of people kind of skip it they just you know they just click okay 312 00:20:05,982 --> 00:20:10,262 whatever comes up on the screen but i was like okay this is half my stash i need to be pretty 313 00:20:10,262 --> 00:20:15,542 sure that the money that i'm about to send out here is uh like you know i'm not being attacked 314 00:20:15,542 --> 00:20:22,042 in any way but because of the screen issue on the device i couldn't read the um i couldn't like read 315 00:20:22,042 --> 00:20:27,062 the address and i was like this is dangerous like i don't want to be sending out to an address here 316 00:20:27,062 --> 00:20:28,822 that I can't verify. 317 00:20:29,082 --> 00:20:30,062 So I thought, you know, what's, 318 00:20:30,642 --> 00:20:31,922 like I still have the C words, 319 00:20:32,042 --> 00:20:33,262 so I'm not going to worry about this. 320 00:20:33,382 --> 00:20:35,122 So I kind of turned the device off, 321 00:20:35,322 --> 00:20:35,982 unblocked it, 322 00:20:36,562 --> 00:20:37,902 called my family members and said, 323 00:20:38,022 --> 00:20:39,962 look, I need to do this as like a recovery. 324 00:20:40,982 --> 00:20:42,382 Please send me the C words. 325 00:20:42,862 --> 00:20:44,142 So they sent me the C words. 326 00:20:44,242 --> 00:20:45,082 I have my 24. 327 00:20:45,262 --> 00:20:47,442 Yeah, dude, just interjection on that. 328 00:20:47,442 --> 00:20:50,362 Like not being able to see what's on your screen 329 00:20:50,362 --> 00:20:53,362 in a situation like that is so, 330 00:20:53,362 --> 00:20:58,522 is so unbelievably frustrating and extra dangerous 331 00:20:58,522 --> 00:21:03,702 because it's exactly those points that scammers go hard. 332 00:21:04,362 --> 00:21:08,922 They really try to feel like any malware or anything that you get. 333 00:21:10,082 --> 00:21:15,762 I had an episode, the episode we did with American HODL and K-Center, 334 00:21:15,762 --> 00:21:18,622 or whatever, is I mentioned somebody was talking about 335 00:21:18,622 --> 00:21:23,302 somebody who heard the advice of downloading Sparrow Wallet. 336 00:21:23,362 --> 00:21:28,562 and you know they're like i gotta i gotta like do all this stuff or whatever i gotta make sure 337 00:21:28,562 --> 00:21:35,182 that it's like properly transferred and uh but sparrow wallet does not have a mobile they don't 338 00:21:35,182 --> 00:21:42,542 have like ios but there is one in the store even though it's been reported you know dozens of times 339 00:21:42,542 --> 00:21:47,322 i've got who knows who knows how many times i've reported it as soon as this happened i was like 340 00:21:47,322 --> 00:21:48,302 Jesus Christ. 341 00:21:49,402 --> 00:21:52,642 But he downloaded the Sparrow wallet from iOS 342 00:21:52,642 --> 00:21:55,562 and sent his money to it. 343 00:21:55,562 --> 00:21:58,282 And it was like six Bitcoin life savings. 344 00:21:59,382 --> 00:22:01,382 Man, that is rough. 345 00:22:01,782 --> 00:22:02,702 Gone like that. 346 00:22:02,722 --> 00:22:03,562 Yeah, I mean, it is. 347 00:22:04,982 --> 00:22:06,502 Yeah, it's very crazy to me 348 00:22:06,502 --> 00:22:08,742 how these apps managed to actually make it 349 00:22:08,742 --> 00:22:09,602 into the app store at all. 350 00:22:09,762 --> 00:22:12,202 You would think that, you know, 351 00:22:13,042 --> 00:22:15,622 I guess like Google or Apple 352 00:22:15,622 --> 00:22:20,162 are at least looking just like they should just have like some kind of just a red list like okay 353 00:22:20,162 --> 00:22:25,222 if anything to do with bitcoin let's just have a human look at it and make sure this isn't trying 354 00:22:25,222 --> 00:22:29,162 to spoof something you would think that that would take five minutes for someone to do yeah not only 355 00:22:29,162 --> 00:22:37,282 that oh shit you can have ai do it now um but not only that but like i've had to like to get a 356 00:22:37,282 --> 00:22:44,262 developer account i've had to like do so much like kyc and all this stuff i've tried to protect like 357 00:22:44,262 --> 00:22:49,482 home address and, you know, that sort of stuff from just being exposed to another freaking 358 00:22:49,482 --> 00:22:51,642 thing on another freaking service. 359 00:22:53,522 --> 00:22:58,782 But largely, like they go out of their way to make sure that they can identify. 360 00:22:58,902 --> 00:23:03,942 But I don't understand how the Sparrow wallet is some like, oh, we'll never catch this guy. 361 00:23:04,322 --> 00:23:08,162 You know, like they should have a specific business entity. 362 00:23:08,362 --> 00:23:11,722 They should have a specific address and names and all this stuff. 363 00:23:11,742 --> 00:23:13,822 And they don't make it easy to go around that. 364 00:23:13,822 --> 00:23:19,722 like somebody has to work really hard to not be identified um in the app or in the developer 365 00:23:19,722 --> 00:23:26,242 system but this is kind of like uh endemic at the moment i mean some of these recent things 366 00:23:26,242 --> 00:23:31,422 have taken place like the the supply chain attack of ledger recently i'm like you know someone bought 367 00:23:31,422 --> 00:23:35,682 this company and you know it's either the people who were around the company before or the current 368 00:23:35,682 --> 00:23:41,922 or the people who bought it but i the fact that they had like a nda on like telling people that 369 00:23:41,922 --> 00:23:48,462 the company was bought that was bought to steal everybody's coins but also like that that is 370 00:23:48,462 --> 00:23:53,942 suspicious but if someone bought the company like could it have been the previous owners who bugged 371 00:23:53,942 --> 00:23:58,122 their own devices before they got bought out and was like we're getting bought out in a few months 372 00:23:58,122 --> 00:24:04,582 guys like this is our exit plan so i don't know like i'm not entirely sure whether like where the 373 00:24:04,582 --> 00:24:08,302 blame is going to fall but in any case it seems pretty clear that this is going to be a matter of 374 00:24:08,302 --> 00:24:12,042 just like you bring the guy who owned the company before you bring the guy who owned the company 375 00:24:12,042 --> 00:24:17,102 after and you basically figure out like okay at what point were these devices bugged you can put 376 00:24:17,102 --> 00:24:20,802 you can tell that from when they were delivered etc you can tell from the order book it should be 377 00:24:20,802 --> 00:24:27,102 really easy to figure out who who committed this crime but it seems like we're kind of living in a 378 00:24:27,102 --> 00:24:33,662 world where like this is becoming mainstream right these hacks are i don't know in my opinion it's 379 00:24:33,662 --> 00:24:39,022 spooky. The attacks that have happened and it all happening at once, I think it's spooky. And 380 00:24:39,022 --> 00:24:44,622 you see the lengths that governments and stuff are going to get hold of people's Bitcoin. 381 00:24:45,302 --> 00:24:49,122 Wouldn't surprise me if, I'm not saying the government themselves are doing it necessarily, 382 00:24:49,342 --> 00:24:53,262 but if they have someone's back and say, look, we're going to turn a blind eye to this because 383 00:24:53,262 --> 00:25:02,082 we're broke and we need some Bitcoin. There's definitely not a very good incentive alignment 384 00:25:02,082 --> 00:25:03,702 for protection. 385 00:25:04,922 --> 00:25:06,942 There's an incentive alignment 386 00:25:06,942 --> 00:25:08,222 for fear 387 00:25:08,222 --> 00:25:11,342 and keeping people 388 00:25:11,342 --> 00:25:13,242 away from sovereignty. 389 00:25:14,202 --> 00:25:16,042 So it doesn't even have to be 390 00:25:16,042 --> 00:25:17,802 like they sent the scammers a memo. 391 00:25:18,162 --> 00:25:19,302 It literally is just like 392 00:25:19,302 --> 00:25:22,602 behind the scenes 393 00:25:22,602 --> 00:25:24,662 in the FBI or whatever. 394 00:25:24,842 --> 00:25:25,062 It's like, 395 00:25:25,222 --> 00:25:26,522 this isn't really something 396 00:25:26,522 --> 00:25:27,382 that we need to spend 397 00:25:27,382 --> 00:25:28,502 a lot of resources on. 398 00:25:28,502 --> 00:25:29,642 The politicians 399 00:25:29,642 --> 00:25:31,402 and the congressional budgets 400 00:25:31,402 --> 00:25:33,882 don't really care if we spend much on this. 401 00:25:34,262 --> 00:25:35,002 And you want to know why? 402 00:25:35,322 --> 00:25:37,662 It's because it would be very nice. 403 00:25:37,762 --> 00:25:40,822 It's convenient for all of us if self-custody looks scary. 404 00:25:41,842 --> 00:25:46,582 So we'll put this investigation on the back burner 405 00:25:46,582 --> 00:25:48,562 and get to it in 2032 maybe. 406 00:25:49,562 --> 00:25:49,682 Right. 407 00:25:49,802 --> 00:25:52,842 But I mean, you know, even if we look back to this almost, 408 00:25:52,982 --> 00:25:55,142 for me, this seemed to start with FTX. 409 00:25:55,482 --> 00:26:09,364 It was a very obvious op And if they willing to do that with FTX like a major exchange and and kind of like very clearly there was something spooky going on there why shouldn we expect that the spookiness 410 00:26:09,364 --> 00:26:13,264 is going to continue in other ways like they've you they've played that card right they played the 411 00:26:13,264 --> 00:26:19,124 exchange kind of card like maybe multiple times because even the exchange hacks before them not 412 00:26:19,124 --> 00:26:23,624 just money stealing money but like exchange hacks before that have some spooky vibes it's almost like 413 00:26:23,624 --> 00:26:29,005 they have all of these these cards to play exchange hack exchange you know stealing money 414 00:26:29,005 --> 00:26:33,705 like and now we're kind of getting into the self-custody thing for you know entropy attack 415 00:26:33,705 --> 00:26:38,945 you know possibly possibly not could be like something spooky going on and then also like 416 00:26:38,945 --> 00:26:45,645 implants seems like every avenue is being considered now to basically like get people's 417 00:26:45,645 --> 00:26:51,584 bitcoin into you know bad people's hands like whether or not it's government so yeah it's um 418 00:26:51,584 --> 00:26:54,344 we're living through crazy times for sure. 419 00:26:55,225 --> 00:26:57,024 Well, I'll tell you, all the motivation, 420 00:26:57,584 --> 00:27:01,424 all the motivation in the work towards keeping it out 421 00:27:01,424 --> 00:27:04,005 of scammers and thieves' hands, 422 00:27:04,604 --> 00:27:06,524 very little of it is coming from the government 423 00:27:06,524 --> 00:27:09,864 and very much all and as much of it 424 00:27:09,864 --> 00:27:14,024 as probably can be publicly discerned 425 00:27:14,024 --> 00:27:17,184 is coming from just a bunch of Bitcoiners with AI credits. 426 00:27:18,684 --> 00:27:21,544 You know, like it's just, it's nothing but Bitcoin companies. 427 00:27:21,584 --> 00:27:28,965 I like government's not gonna come save us or fix all the catch all the bad guys um in fact the best 428 00:27:28,965 --> 00:27:34,584 investigations as to who has done a lot have been just random people on random bitcoiners just doing 429 00:27:34,584 --> 00:27:39,804 doing what they do and talking to services that like we had somebody log in that was checking 430 00:27:39,804 --> 00:27:45,284 these things just before these addresses got emptied and it happens to align with like 20% 431 00:27:45,284 --> 00:27:47,505 of the hack, you know, 432 00:27:47,584 --> 00:27:49,665 and spreading information around 433 00:27:49,665 --> 00:27:51,424 well before I'm sure police 434 00:27:51,424 --> 00:27:52,505 or even like, I'm sure, 435 00:27:52,665 --> 00:27:53,985 yeah, yeah, we'll file a report. 436 00:27:56,364 --> 00:27:57,184 Exactly, exactly. 437 00:27:57,324 --> 00:27:59,784 I mean, I would be very interested 438 00:27:59,784 --> 00:28:00,985 to see what happens with these 439 00:28:00,985 --> 00:28:02,485 because with these recent hacks, 440 00:28:02,985 --> 00:28:03,725 if that's true, 441 00:28:03,764 --> 00:28:04,505 and it does seem like 442 00:28:04,505 --> 00:28:05,505 there is some truth to that, 443 00:28:05,564 --> 00:28:07,104 that someone was checking the addresses 444 00:28:07,104 --> 00:28:08,024 before they were hacked, 445 00:28:08,684 --> 00:28:10,745 that's just an obvious giveaway. 446 00:28:10,745 --> 00:28:12,524 And, you know, likewise with this thing 447 00:28:12,524 --> 00:28:13,864 that's happened with the ledger implants, 448 00:28:13,864 --> 00:28:17,064 that there's got to be a paper trail for this stuff. 449 00:28:18,064 --> 00:28:23,284 And we saw with FTX and Sam Bankman-Fried, 450 00:28:23,985 --> 00:28:30,505 we saw that justice kind of was corrupted in that case. 451 00:28:30,505 --> 00:28:36,705 We know that this guy was basically protected by powerful people. 452 00:28:36,924 --> 00:28:39,145 So if we assume that's going to continue, 453 00:28:39,844 --> 00:28:43,424 I'm expecting that we're going to see less and less kind of accountability 454 00:28:43,425 --> 00:28:44,705 for these things that happen. 455 00:28:45,384 --> 00:28:47,344 And that's just my prediction. 456 00:28:47,505 --> 00:28:49,205 I think that when people get desperate, 457 00:28:49,344 --> 00:28:50,264 governments get desperate, 458 00:28:52,284 --> 00:28:53,945 like bad things happen 459 00:28:53,945 --> 00:28:56,425 and scams become kind of like more commonplace 460 00:28:56,425 --> 00:28:57,425 because once money, 461 00:28:57,544 --> 00:29:01,124 when money really goes into that kind of losing value 462 00:29:01,124 --> 00:29:03,145 on an exponential scale 463 00:29:03,145 --> 00:29:04,684 to the point where it's becoming worthless, 464 00:29:05,725 --> 00:29:08,584 like you either have to do something to get the money, 465 00:29:08,705 --> 00:29:10,084 which like, you know, 466 00:29:10,205 --> 00:29:12,405 people don't want to do stuff as we know, 467 00:29:12,405 --> 00:29:17,784 rather just like figure out ways to steal stuff like this is kind of how we should expect things 468 00:29:17,784 --> 00:29:24,024 to go in a way so i think that like you know we really need to um have even more and i think it's 469 00:29:24,024 --> 00:29:27,304 going to get bigger than this personally i mean we can maybe get into this later in the conversation 470 00:29:27,304 --> 00:29:33,505 but i i think that there's so many avenues for this to go and i'm the the movement i don't want 471 00:29:33,505 --> 00:29:37,745 to say the movement away from self-custody because i think i think that's kind of unfair to to say it 472 00:29:37,745 --> 00:29:43,445 But I think that just the idea that people are having custodians, even like no matter how sweet that deal looks. 473 00:29:43,445 --> 00:29:47,124 And even in the face of, OK, like, you know, it's difficult to self-custody. 474 00:29:47,124 --> 00:29:50,364 Like, you know, there's technical aspects. There's a lot of work you've got to do. 475 00:29:51,005 --> 00:29:57,024 But I personally think people just need to recognize that this is something that we've got to do. 476 00:29:57,184 --> 00:30:04,924 Like this is this is a part of living now in the same way that you learn how to drive or you, you know, you learn how to wield a weapon or anything. 477 00:30:04,924 --> 00:30:09,725 you need to learn how to self-custody because yes, it's, yes, it's difficult, 478 00:30:09,725 --> 00:30:12,824 but I just think it's kind of weak source to sit back and go, Oh, well, 479 00:30:12,824 --> 00:30:16,264 it's difficult. So therefore there'll be a bunch of people who will learn an 480 00:30:16,264 --> 00:30:20,064 institution. And right. It's like, okay, if we're going to do that, 481 00:30:20,104 --> 00:30:21,564 then we might as well give up on the whole project. 482 00:30:21,564 --> 00:30:24,705 The whole point is that the whole point is that there's a new technology that 483 00:30:24,705 --> 00:30:28,064 comes with acquiring new skills. It's just comes part and parcel with that. 484 00:30:28,324 --> 00:30:30,184 So, yeah. But the, 485 00:30:30,184 --> 00:30:33,844 one of the really dangerous things is just that, 486 00:30:34,505 --> 00:30:34,745 you know, 487 00:30:34,745 --> 00:30:36,584 the language of government is violence. 488 00:30:36,884 --> 00:30:38,884 And so whenever it becomes convenient, 489 00:30:39,745 --> 00:30:42,005 especially when people are upset with the government, 490 00:30:42,384 --> 00:30:44,424 which is basically always these days, 491 00:30:44,905 --> 00:30:53,145 it's actually very beneficial for them to monopolize defense and safety and 492 00:30:53,145 --> 00:30:56,024 then make things not safe to, 493 00:30:56,205 --> 00:30:57,524 to allow violence, 494 00:30:57,684 --> 00:30:58,564 to allow theft, 495 00:30:58,684 --> 00:31:00,064 to allow crime to happen, 496 00:31:00,184 --> 00:31:02,784 because people clamoring beg for more government. 497 00:31:03,745 --> 00:31:06,684 And so they can arbitrarily expand things 498 00:31:06,684 --> 00:31:10,445 and just, it's always, there's not enough money, right? 499 00:31:10,584 --> 00:31:12,445 So it just becomes more power. 500 00:31:12,624 --> 00:31:15,505 It's not about whether or not the government's doing anything. 501 00:31:15,604 --> 00:31:17,524 It's like with 1% is spent on policing, 502 00:31:17,524 --> 00:31:18,445 it doesn't really matter. 503 00:31:18,584 --> 00:31:21,384 They want to expand that 99% and double that size. 504 00:31:21,524 --> 00:31:23,124 And they're just going to take away the 1% 505 00:31:23,124 --> 00:31:25,124 because it's the thing that's going to hurt 506 00:31:25,124 --> 00:31:26,344 the people the most. 507 00:31:27,344 --> 00:31:29,084 And if it's ever convenient for them, 508 00:31:29,084 --> 00:31:33,304 it doesn't it just doesn't matter it's just incentives it doesn't it doesn't matter how 509 00:31:33,304 --> 00:31:39,985 good a people you have like they'll excuse it away and it'll happen every fucking time um and 510 00:31:39,985 --> 00:31:47,685 the only way around that is self-custody is second amendment like which i put in the exact 511 00:31:47,685 --> 00:31:52,824 same category you learn how to use a gun you learn how to protect yourself don't assume the 512 00:31:52,824 --> 00:31:58,665 police are going to be here because you know like who else you're going to call to you know 513 00:31:58,665 --> 00:32:03,384 show up three hours after something happens so they can shrug their shoulders and tell you they're 514 00:32:03,384 --> 00:32:08,985 going to file a report um yeah i mean this is kind of the way the world is is rigged in a way it's 515 00:32:08,985 --> 00:32:13,485 it's rigged towards people with power trying to get more power and what's the best way of getting 516 00:32:13,485 --> 00:32:18,945 more power it's kind of like taking away people's like self-sovereignty so that they are reliant 517 00:32:18,945 --> 00:32:24,245 upon you it's like you can either increase your own power or you can decrease the power of everyone 518 00:32:24,245 --> 00:32:28,405 else so that that divide between the powerful and the non-powerful is great and they kind of 519 00:32:28,405 --> 00:32:33,124 operating on all fronts at the moment so when we see this in the macro and the micro in a sense like 520 00:32:33,124 --> 00:32:37,844 this is kind of the way that like the u.s has always been it's always been about military 521 00:32:37,844 --> 00:32:43,624 strength like the u.s is a global hegemon because of its military strength primarily like yes it's 522 00:32:43,624 --> 00:32:49,364 also the kind of global reserve currency but that is only coming as this kind of side product of its 523 00:32:49,364 --> 00:32:57,084 global hegemony like that comes as a side part of that it's like we've got enough guns and weapons 524 00:32:57,084 --> 00:32:59,245 and military power that we can force the world 525 00:32:59,245 --> 00:33:01,005 to be this way economically. 526 00:33:01,384 --> 00:33:04,445 Whereas like, you know, so that kind of like 527 00:33:04,445 --> 00:33:06,945 is happening at this global like geopolitical scale. 528 00:33:06,945 --> 00:33:09,745 And it's also happening on a kind of governmental scale. 529 00:33:09,745 --> 00:33:12,245 It's like, how can governments have as much power 530 00:33:12,245 --> 00:33:14,864 as possible and kind of decrease the power 531 00:33:14,864 --> 00:33:15,985 of the individual to the point 532 00:33:15,985 --> 00:33:17,304 where you have reliance upon them? 533 00:33:17,524 --> 00:33:19,145 And like, yes, like you said, at least in America, 534 00:33:19,145 --> 00:33:20,465 you have like a second amendment and stuff. 535 00:33:20,564 --> 00:33:22,905 But in Europe, like, I don't know if it's all countries. 536 00:33:22,985 --> 00:33:24,304 I think there are maybe some countries 537 00:33:24,304 --> 00:33:26,024 that have like some very, very basic 538 00:33:26,024 --> 00:33:28,145 like gun rights laws, I think Switzerland might, 539 00:33:28,284 --> 00:33:30,645 but certainly in the UK and other places, 540 00:33:30,884 --> 00:33:33,965 like most of Europe, you can't have a weapon. 541 00:33:34,145 --> 00:33:37,145 So the government immediately has that power imbalance 542 00:33:37,145 --> 00:33:38,245 right there and then. 543 00:33:38,864 --> 00:33:41,284 So that just kind of then you start from that point. 544 00:33:41,284 --> 00:33:45,745 They create dependency and then they can use your dependence on that 545 00:33:45,745 --> 00:33:51,924 to basically force your hand on demanding more government. 546 00:33:51,924 --> 00:33:54,465 They can literally purposefully be incompetent 547 00:33:54,465 --> 00:34:01,465 on the thing that you're now dependent on so that you beg and, and attempt to get more government 548 00:34:01,465 --> 00:34:07,784 involvement. And that's a, and they can take your money. Like your money, your money is kind of like, 549 00:34:07,924 --> 00:34:14,425 yes, like governments is in their nature to just extract resources from people. Like that's kind 550 00:34:14,425 --> 00:34:18,004 of what government is. It's like, you know, they offer you a few, they sprinkle a few things 551 00:34:18,004 --> 00:34:21,744 into the mix to make you think that, you know, they're doing something good for you. Like, 552 00:34:21,744 --> 00:34:23,764 oh, we'll give you some healthcare, we'll give you some education. 553 00:34:23,764 --> 00:34:25,984 But really, those are just kind of the sprinklings to say, 554 00:34:25,984 --> 00:34:31,385 like, we're going to have the image of kind of like legitimacy. 555 00:34:31,744 --> 00:34:33,544 Like, they want the illusion of legitimacy. 556 00:34:33,544 --> 00:34:37,365 And the way to do that is to just sprinkle a few kind of like trinkets in 557 00:34:37,365 --> 00:34:39,564 so that people, to keep people happy. 558 00:34:39,964 --> 00:34:42,104 It's like a PR firm for violence. 559 00:34:43,325 --> 00:34:45,004 Oh, that's good. Yeah, I like that. 560 00:34:45,024 --> 00:34:46,964 It's a PR firm for violence, right? 561 00:34:47,084 --> 00:34:50,425 Is that they put very in-your-face things 562 00:34:50,425 --> 00:34:53,564 and things that they try to get as close to you as possible, 563 00:34:53,564 --> 00:34:55,425 like sending you a freaking check in the mail 564 00:34:55,425 --> 00:34:57,784 or depositing money into your bank account 565 00:34:57,784 --> 00:35:00,564 when it's like an IRS refund or whatever. 566 00:35:00,624 --> 00:35:02,345 Like, look at all these things that we're giving you. 567 00:35:02,345 --> 00:35:05,544 And anything on the surface that they actually do is good. 568 00:35:05,845 --> 00:35:10,325 I'm 100% certain that there's zero, absolutely none. 569 00:35:10,504 --> 00:35:12,765 No institution, no government system, 570 00:35:13,004 --> 00:35:16,784 no government program that isn't 90% fraud 571 00:35:16,784 --> 00:35:18,905 and 10% things really in front of you 572 00:35:18,905 --> 00:35:20,144 that they can point at. 573 00:35:20,425 --> 00:35:27,685 So that when you attack the 90% of the fraud, they say, what about these kids who don't have lunch at school? 574 00:35:27,685 --> 00:35:34,345 And it's like that was what they spent the 10% on because that's what the PR firm needs to keep the 90% running. 575 00:35:34,665 --> 00:35:35,845 And that's the whole machine. 576 00:35:36,245 --> 00:35:44,604 Top to bottom, front to back, the whole fucking thing is fraud with a 10% that the PR firm manages to keep everything in front of you. 577 00:35:44,604 --> 00:35:50,925 in the game is to run the politics so that you can make sure that that 10% is being projected 578 00:35:50,925 --> 00:35:52,064 to get more power. 579 00:35:52,925 --> 00:35:53,365 Yeah. 580 00:35:53,524 --> 00:35:56,304 Like, and that's what the whole game, it's the whole game. 581 00:35:56,665 --> 00:35:59,264 I agree that that's, that's pretty much how it works. 582 00:36:00,325 --> 00:36:01,004 So, okay. 583 00:36:01,084 --> 00:36:03,984 So that was a, I was telling the story. 584 00:36:04,185 --> 00:36:05,144 I was telling the story. 585 00:36:08,165 --> 00:36:09,245 Oh, that was great. 586 00:36:09,385 --> 00:36:10,845 I really enjoyed that. 587 00:36:10,885 --> 00:36:11,705 That was a nice segue. 588 00:36:11,925 --> 00:36:14,284 So we, we kind of kept people on a, on a cliffhanger. 589 00:36:14,284 --> 00:36:19,504 So to finish what happened with the ledger thing. 590 00:36:19,665 --> 00:36:24,705 So yeah, I ended up trying to send this transaction. 591 00:36:24,825 --> 00:36:27,964 It didn't work because I couldn't see the address. 592 00:36:28,584 --> 00:36:30,044 I then got the seed words. 593 00:36:30,144 --> 00:36:31,865 So I got the two sets of 12 seed words. 594 00:36:32,725 --> 00:36:34,345 And I was like, okay, I'm going to do the recovery. 595 00:36:34,944 --> 00:36:37,825 Put the seed words in and I got into Sparrow 596 00:36:37,825 --> 00:36:39,584 and I got invalid checksum. 597 00:36:39,845 --> 00:36:43,624 So at that point, I knew there was a problem. 598 00:36:43,624 --> 00:36:47,425 and this is when we talked right because i think it was just when i figured this out and then we 599 00:36:47,425 --> 00:36:54,825 had a call and i was kind of just like you know i was just like i was just white and i was like okay 600 00:36:54,825 --> 00:37:02,345 exactly so i got it yeah so well yeah you were actually very like chill about the whole thing 601 00:37:02,345 --> 00:37:07,624 and i guess in retrospect like knowing that like the problem is you never really know right like if 602 00:37:07,624 --> 00:37:11,084 you put your c words and you try to do recovery and something's wrong you're like okay well have 603 00:37:11,084 --> 00:37:16,405 i got one word wrong have i got two words wrong have i my worry was that maybe i had accidentally 604 00:37:16,405 --> 00:37:21,725 because the seeds have been kept as two separate sets of 12 that perhaps i'd accidentally got the 605 00:37:21,725 --> 00:37:28,944 wrong two sets so i got 12 words from one wallet 12 from another etc luckily i'm very good at keeping 606 00:37:28,944 --> 00:37:33,205 everything i've done so even if i've used a wallet and i'm and i get rid of the wallet and there's 607 00:37:33,205 --> 00:37:38,064 not there's no balance in it i'm this kind of paranoid freak that just keeps the seed words 608 00:37:38,064 --> 00:37:43,124 anyway and puts it in like an old folder because like i even satoshi said that there's no reason 609 00:37:43,124 --> 00:37:47,944 to get rid of all the keys just keep them yeah there's a great quote from satoshi back in like 610 00:37:47,944 --> 00:37:53,424 2010 or something yeah so i'd actually done that so my initial instinct was okay maybe i've swapped 611 00:37:53,424 --> 00:37:59,764 out words etc and then kind of like i was already thinking this is going to be like a a problem that 612 00:37:59,764 --> 00:38:04,544 i'm going to employ ai to help me with and someone had done this recently i had already read an 613 00:38:04,544 --> 00:38:10,205 article of someone who had done kind of like who had cracked an old wallet using ai and so i was 614 00:38:10,205 --> 00:38:14,165 already like okay i know it's possible but the fact that that story kind of became so big and a 615 00:38:14,165 --> 00:38:19,705 lot of people were talking about i was like i know it's possible but is it very rare and unlikely and 616 00:38:19,705 --> 00:38:25,865 actually you gave me a really really good idea about this which was you said when you're building 617 00:38:25,865 --> 00:38:29,905 this out because obviously like you know it's risky building stuff with al is because you don't 618 00:38:29,905 --> 00:38:34,524 want to like you can't give it the c words you have to kind of get it to build something that 619 00:38:34,524 --> 00:38:39,225 you put the c words into ideally you can run offline and i'll kind of get into how that works 620 00:38:39,225 --> 00:38:45,644 in a minute but um essentially you said to me create a wallet or use an existing kind of you 621 00:38:45,644 --> 00:38:51,725 know just pocket change wallet give it the c c words and give it one c word wrong get it to write 622 00:38:51,725 --> 00:38:56,144 the program or give it you know multiple you know one or two words wrong or whatever get it to write 623 00:38:56,144 --> 00:39:15,147 the program that will handle it and then do that And I think my confidence you know started to get a little bit of a boost when I did that because i basically i had a wallet that just had like you know five dollars or whatever in it and i put um i gave it the seed words i gave it one word wrong and i also um got it to interview 624 00:39:15,147 --> 00:39:20,747 me on the on my specific problem so i basically went to kimmy this is when kimmy k3 had just come 625 00:39:20,747 --> 00:39:26,007 out and i basically said interview me about everything to do with how i've stored these keys 626 00:39:26,007 --> 00:39:27,887 and it was asking great questions. 627 00:39:27,987 --> 00:39:28,547 It said like, you know, 628 00:39:28,567 --> 00:39:29,927 did you write them all in one list? 629 00:39:30,007 --> 00:39:31,567 Did you write it in two columns of, 630 00:39:31,987 --> 00:39:33,887 did you write the 24 words as like, 631 00:39:33,947 --> 00:39:35,627 you know, four columns of six 632 00:39:35,627 --> 00:39:37,127 or did you do it as three columns of eight? 633 00:39:37,407 --> 00:39:38,487 Like, which, you know, 634 00:39:38,487 --> 00:39:39,987 do you have any other C words 635 00:39:39,987 --> 00:39:41,287 that it could have got mixed up with? 636 00:39:41,347 --> 00:39:42,367 It was really good. 637 00:39:42,427 --> 00:39:43,947 And I already kind of prompted it, 638 00:39:43,987 --> 00:39:44,967 like, you know, ask me how I, 639 00:39:45,027 --> 00:39:46,507 you know, noted the words down. 640 00:39:46,567 --> 00:39:47,527 So I gave it a bit of information, 641 00:39:47,607 --> 00:39:49,687 but just said anything I've not considered, 642 00:39:50,347 --> 00:39:51,147 ask me about it. 643 00:39:51,147 --> 00:39:52,747 That's going to help you to perform this task. 644 00:39:53,747 --> 00:39:54,327 So anyway, 645 00:39:54,327 --> 00:40:02,107 it basically wrote me a program which i was able to run separately so in the case of doing the test 646 00:40:02,107 --> 00:40:05,287 run i didn't bother like disconnecting the wi-fi and stuff because i was like it's five dollars i 647 00:40:05,287 --> 00:40:10,607 don't really care like being connected while i do this uh but it worked immediately like i i basically 648 00:40:10,607 --> 00:40:17,407 just um it gave me essentially just like two uh it gave me like a .md file like two .md files and 649 00:40:17,407 --> 00:40:22,387 it just said another another aspect of it was do i know the xpub which i did know the xpub because i 650 00:40:22,387 --> 00:40:24,507 I was able to pull it out of, like with difficulty, 651 00:40:24,687 --> 00:40:26,307 I was able to pull that out of Ledger Live. 652 00:40:27,327 --> 00:40:27,787 Oh, okay. 653 00:40:28,007 --> 00:40:30,227 But essentially it kind of was like, if you, you know, 654 00:40:30,507 --> 00:40:32,307 one MD file, give me an XPUB, 655 00:40:32,427 --> 00:40:34,307 other MD file, give me all of the words, 656 00:40:34,367 --> 00:40:35,707 like numbered as you understood them. 657 00:40:35,707 --> 00:40:36,947 You can check without the internet. 658 00:40:37,447 --> 00:40:38,227 You got that XPUB? 659 00:40:38,327 --> 00:40:38,687 Exactly. 660 00:40:39,327 --> 00:40:41,227 So it literally used those files. 661 00:40:41,387 --> 00:40:44,087 It picked up the stuff I'd done in there. 662 00:40:44,087 --> 00:40:47,267 I ran the program and within, like this one took a matter of seconds 663 00:40:47,267 --> 00:40:49,747 and it was immediately just like, boom, this is the incorrect word. 664 00:40:49,747 --> 00:40:56,707 because it was able to use the xpub to find like a matching seed um and i was like okay well it 665 00:40:56,707 --> 00:41:00,927 worked for this hopefully it can work for mine so i spent well paul's actually i got to realize 666 00:41:00,927 --> 00:41:09,287 like invalid checksum for anybody who doesn't know your 24th word and this is actually true 667 00:41:09,287 --> 00:41:16,067 of like the end of a bitcoin address whoops uh the end of a bitcoin address as well is the i think 668 00:41:16,067 --> 00:41:20,587 it's like the last eight characters or six characters or something like that is a checksum, 669 00:41:20,687 --> 00:41:26,987 which means that it's a hash of the whole thing, like going back. So if there's anything at all 670 00:41:26,987 --> 00:41:33,647 wrong in those last six, or if there's anything wrong in the, in the first part, they won't match 671 00:41:33,647 --> 00:41:38,947 up. It will just be an invalid address. And this was actually created way back in like 2011 or 672 00:41:38,947 --> 00:41:44,567 something, because you can actually punch one character wrong or paste or one character wrong 673 00:41:44,567 --> 00:41:46,887 or one character missing in an address field, 674 00:41:47,087 --> 00:41:48,887 and you'd still be able to send Bitcoin to it, 675 00:41:48,927 --> 00:41:50,947 even though you could not create a private key. 676 00:41:51,407 --> 00:41:53,307 And so they added the checksum on the end 677 00:41:53,307 --> 00:41:56,187 so that the end and this part, 678 00:41:56,287 --> 00:41:58,627 just like a normal hash of any file, 679 00:41:59,447 --> 00:42:00,647 they have to match. 680 00:42:00,927 --> 00:42:02,187 So if anything's different, 681 00:42:02,487 --> 00:42:04,807 but you still got those six right at the end, 682 00:42:05,307 --> 00:42:08,047 then the rest of the address has to be aligned with those six. 683 00:42:08,047 --> 00:42:09,767 And in the exact same way, a seed phrase, 684 00:42:09,907 --> 00:42:12,107 the 24th word in a seed phrase 685 00:42:12,107 --> 00:42:14,067 is actually just a checksum. 686 00:42:14,067 --> 00:42:18,427 It's a piece of a hash of the rest of the 23 words. 687 00:42:18,907 --> 00:42:22,087 So it means that something is wrong in those 23 words. 688 00:42:22,247 --> 00:42:26,007 He could have accidentally booted that up and let's say he was sending money to it. 689 00:42:26,707 --> 00:42:31,927 He could have accidentally typed in the wrong seed words and then sent money to it. 690 00:42:32,427 --> 00:42:34,227 And well, I guess you have the seed word, so I guess that doesn't matter. 691 00:42:34,467 --> 00:42:40,727 But regardless, the whole idea is that you just know there's something wrong with those 23. 692 00:42:40,727 --> 00:42:42,187 or I guess the 24th, 693 00:42:42,207 --> 00:42:43,867 you knew something's wrong in one of those things 694 00:42:43,867 --> 00:42:46,767 because the seed itself is not valid. 695 00:42:46,907 --> 00:42:49,607 The end does not prove or verify the fact 696 00:42:49,607 --> 00:42:51,467 that all the beginning of it is accurate. 697 00:42:51,667 --> 00:42:53,507 So that's what it means when it says invalid checksum. 698 00:42:53,667 --> 00:42:56,087 You just know that one piece of information somewhere is wrong, 699 00:42:56,347 --> 00:42:56,987 but you don't know what. 700 00:42:57,347 --> 00:42:57,867 Okay, sorry. 701 00:42:57,927 --> 00:42:58,187 That's true. 702 00:42:58,247 --> 00:42:59,707 I actually have a question for you on that. 703 00:42:59,807 --> 00:43:00,787 You might know the answer to. 704 00:43:00,947 --> 00:43:03,427 What I've noticed when you put in the 23 words, 705 00:43:03,607 --> 00:43:05,107 if you go into Sparrow and you put in like, 706 00:43:05,107 --> 00:43:07,167 you just pick 23 words of a seed, 707 00:43:07,867 --> 00:43:10,507 the checksum can be a selection of words. 708 00:43:10,507 --> 00:43:12,227 It's not just one specific one, right? 709 00:43:13,147 --> 00:43:15,427 Like, it's not just there's one word. 710 00:43:15,927 --> 00:43:19,447 Like, I noticed that maybe there was probably about, like, 10 to 15. 711 00:43:19,607 --> 00:43:21,227 I don't know exactly how many words there was, 712 00:43:21,267 --> 00:43:23,187 but there was multiple that the last one could be. 713 00:43:23,267 --> 00:43:28,047 It's not a single word in the kind of mnemonic word list. 714 00:43:29,627 --> 00:43:30,607 Do you know the answer to that? 715 00:43:30,607 --> 00:43:31,067 I don't know. 716 00:43:31,887 --> 00:43:32,807 I don't know. 717 00:43:33,807 --> 00:43:35,927 Because, yeah, I think that basically, you know, 718 00:43:36,367 --> 00:43:38,827 if your words 1 to 23 are the same, 719 00:43:38,827 --> 00:43:40,827 I think there's a number of 24 words. 720 00:43:40,827 --> 00:43:44,827 Obviously, there's one checksum, but I don't know. 721 00:43:44,827 --> 00:43:46,827 We're doing it live. 722 00:43:46,827 --> 00:43:48,827 We're doing it live. 723 00:43:48,827 --> 00:43:50,827 We're doing it live. 724 00:43:50,827 --> 00:43:56,827 Possible word for standard 24 word, fixing the first 23 leaves exactly eight possible 725 00:43:56,827 --> 00:43:59,827 final words that pass the checksum check. 726 00:43:59,827 --> 00:44:00,827 Okay. 727 00:44:00,827 --> 00:44:08,747 I guess it kind of makes sense because it's a range and the 24 words don't actually encompass 728 00:44:08,827 --> 00:44:12,127 all of the possible ranges of keys. 729 00:44:12,607 --> 00:44:15,627 Like the multiple is different for those 24 words 730 00:44:15,627 --> 00:44:18,407 versus the entire key space. 731 00:44:19,987 --> 00:44:23,007 So I guess that makes, so it's two to three, 732 00:44:23,107 --> 00:44:25,407 it's three bits that are off. 733 00:44:25,507 --> 00:44:27,067 So it's eight possible values. 734 00:44:27,187 --> 00:44:28,307 They're all valid checksums. 735 00:44:28,467 --> 00:44:30,847 So you could technically have different words 736 00:44:30,847 --> 00:44:32,687 and still have a valid checksum. 737 00:44:32,727 --> 00:44:34,247 There's something in this as well, Guy. 738 00:44:34,827 --> 00:44:36,907 If you divide 2048, 739 00:44:37,127 --> 00:44:38,647 which is the number of words on the word list, 740 00:44:38,647 --> 00:44:48,807 by eight it's 256 so i guess that's something to do with the 256 that number can't be an accident 741 00:44:48,807 --> 00:44:54,267 right there must be a reason it's eight no yeah that's got to be that i think that's literally 742 00:44:54,267 --> 00:44:59,987 just kind of because it's the multiple because it's because you have uh you're just a handful 743 00:44:59,987 --> 00:45:06,487 of bits off but you are you're literally because it's 250 number i think it's because it's 256 744 00:45:06,487 --> 00:45:11,167 256, oh man, we need to, like, this is an interesting question to explore. 745 00:45:11,267 --> 00:45:12,647 There's a reason it's 256, right? 746 00:45:12,687 --> 00:45:17,707 Because it's 256 bits of entropy is the entire thing. 747 00:45:18,667 --> 00:45:22,227 So I guess that, like, when you break that down to just, like, 748 00:45:22,247 --> 00:45:23,987 the single last word, there's something in it. 749 00:45:26,847 --> 00:45:30,107 Yeah, I would like to break down what the exact specific math is 750 00:45:30,107 --> 00:45:34,307 and what those relationships are, but there's no way that's not coincidental. 751 00:45:34,447 --> 00:45:35,607 Guys take coming soon. 752 00:45:35,607 --> 00:45:36,687 That is coincidental. 753 00:45:38,067 --> 00:45:38,827 There we go. 754 00:45:39,487 --> 00:45:42,607 Okay, so yeah, anyway, invalid checks didn't work. 755 00:45:42,787 --> 00:45:46,247 So I basically wrote the test program. 756 00:45:46,367 --> 00:45:46,987 It worked great. 757 00:45:47,507 --> 00:45:51,707 And then I basically had it do the kind of like the live run. 758 00:45:51,707 --> 00:45:54,207 The other thing I did, which is another suggestion by you, 759 00:45:54,267 --> 00:45:56,807 was to take the code that Kimmy had produced 760 00:45:56,807 --> 00:46:00,807 and give it to another model to basically audit it 761 00:46:00,807 --> 00:46:03,627 and make sure that one, it wasn't doing anything kind of malicious, 762 00:46:03,927 --> 00:46:05,447 and two, that it was just doing a good job. 763 00:46:05,607 --> 00:46:08,427 And it did notice one kind of issue, 764 00:46:08,587 --> 00:46:12,947 which was that basically it was kind of like if the XPUB existed, 765 00:46:13,147 --> 00:46:15,287 it also asks, by the way, for like one of the addresses, 766 00:46:15,527 --> 00:46:18,047 like ideally the first address that was produced by the wallet. 767 00:46:19,287 --> 00:46:21,207 Because that's another way you can check if the seed is correct. 768 00:46:21,267 --> 00:46:22,527 You don't necessarily need the XPUB. 769 00:46:22,587 --> 00:46:25,527 So if you have a receive address, it will do it. 770 00:46:25,527 --> 00:46:29,747 And I believe that earlier the address works better 771 00:46:29,747 --> 00:46:31,707 because I think that then when you're recreating it, 772 00:46:32,027 --> 00:46:34,067 it doesn't have to cycle through every single one and say, 773 00:46:34,127 --> 00:46:34,747 okay, was it this address? 774 00:46:34,747 --> 00:46:38,307 I was about to say, it is like deterministic in order. 775 00:46:38,487 --> 00:46:40,727 So if it's like the thousandth address or whatever, 776 00:46:40,907 --> 00:46:42,307 you need to actually check. 777 00:46:42,707 --> 00:46:46,187 You have to try that deep to find out if that's the right one. 778 00:46:46,187 --> 00:46:47,987 Yeah, so it's basically like the first address, 779 00:46:48,087 --> 00:46:50,607 I think is pretty much as, you know, 780 00:46:50,667 --> 00:46:52,247 near enough as good as the XPUB. 781 00:46:52,667 --> 00:46:54,527 And then after that, it gets kind of like, you know, 782 00:46:54,567 --> 00:46:56,627 increasingly more timely to do it. 783 00:46:57,207 --> 00:46:59,207 But I had the, so I had the first address and I had the XPUB. 784 00:46:59,287 --> 00:47:00,507 And when I used the other model, 785 00:47:00,927 --> 00:47:02,987 I think I was using maybe Opus or something like that. 786 00:47:02,987 --> 00:47:09,047 And it basically said, ah, well, you know, if you've given it an XPUB, it's not using the first Bitcoin address. 787 00:47:09,387 --> 00:47:10,527 And you have both. 788 00:47:10,907 --> 00:47:16,647 So if you've got a kind of error in the XPUB, if you've got a character wrong or whatever, you don't have a fallback option. 789 00:47:16,707 --> 00:47:18,467 And it might actually be able to find it. 790 00:47:18,627 --> 00:47:23,107 So that's another really useful thing was just getting another model to just review it. 791 00:47:23,107 --> 00:47:27,807 And then I just gave essentially the feedback back and said, rebuild it, keep this in mind. 792 00:47:27,947 --> 00:47:28,767 And it fixed it. 793 00:47:30,367 --> 00:47:31,907 So it created the program. 794 00:47:31,907 --> 00:47:36,347 and I was I was I was still freaking out at this point this had been like a day on you know like 795 00:47:36,347 --> 00:47:43,807 pure adrenaline I was literally when I say I was literally shaking I mean it it's not I believe it 796 00:47:43,807 --> 00:47:48,587 I believe it man I know what that feels like I know this is how crazy it was my heart was beating 797 00:47:48,587 --> 00:47:53,687 like so fast I was like I think I'm gonna have to have a heart I think I'm gonna have a heart attack 798 00:47:53,687 --> 00:48:00,067 and my my my wife has like a little mini trampoline like for you know doing like uh like exercises and 799 00:48:00,067 --> 00:48:04,907 I was like, I need to go and just bounce on this trampoline for like 20 minutes because... 800 00:48:04,907 --> 00:48:06,007 You get my rhythm down. 801 00:48:06,227 --> 00:48:09,707 Yeah, like I need to match what my heart is doing with my actual body 802 00:48:09,707 --> 00:48:11,707 because otherwise I'm just going to pass out. 803 00:48:11,987 --> 00:48:13,167 So it was that bad. 804 00:48:14,607 --> 00:48:17,807 So I went into the next room and I left it going. 805 00:48:17,987 --> 00:48:21,147 By the way, I ran this when I ran the live test, 806 00:48:21,807 --> 00:48:25,007 turned off the Wi-Fi literally like completely. 807 00:48:25,767 --> 00:48:27,827 I had this program, had all of the stuff there, 808 00:48:27,827 --> 00:48:30,407 and I basically just hit enter in the terminal. 809 00:48:30,567 --> 00:48:31,767 It was like, boom, there it goes. 810 00:48:31,847 --> 00:48:33,367 The script is running and I just went off. 811 00:48:34,287 --> 00:48:35,787 And I was expecting this might take a bit of time. 812 00:48:35,947 --> 00:48:40,607 So I was like, okay, maybe I'll have to leave overnight or something. 813 00:48:41,447 --> 00:48:43,767 But I literally went into the kitchen, I washed the dishes, 814 00:48:44,087 --> 00:48:47,627 I came back and it had found a match 815 00:48:47,627 --> 00:48:50,747 and it literally just printed my entire seed phrase there. 816 00:48:50,827 --> 00:48:52,807 And it said, oh, you know, word 14, 817 00:48:53,447 --> 00:48:57,687 it was supposed to be ritual and I had rival or something like that. 818 00:48:57,687 --> 00:49:01,207 it was basically a slight error in how I'd recorded the word. 819 00:49:01,507 --> 00:49:04,147 And I was like elated at this point. 820 00:49:04,207 --> 00:49:06,487 I was like, oh my God, this is just incredible. 821 00:49:06,667 --> 00:49:07,387 I couldn't believe it. 822 00:49:07,387 --> 00:49:08,127 It feels crazy. 823 00:49:08,687 --> 00:49:10,247 It feels crazy that you just like, 824 00:49:10,447 --> 00:49:13,147 you built an app to recover a seed phrase 825 00:49:13,147 --> 00:49:14,927 and it found that shit while you went and did the dishes. 826 00:49:14,927 --> 00:49:16,367 Yeah, it's literally like the most, 827 00:49:16,487 --> 00:49:18,007 this is the most useful thing. 828 00:49:18,207 --> 00:49:20,527 I think the whole thing, by the way, 829 00:49:20,607 --> 00:49:23,267 cost me like $1.30 in Kimmy credits 830 00:49:23,267 --> 00:49:26,027 to basically save like half of my stack. 831 00:49:26,027 --> 00:49:27,947 And half your stack was like five. 832 00:49:28,127 --> 00:49:30,587 So you got like $4 back. 833 00:49:30,747 --> 00:49:34,467 You got like 80% of your money. 834 00:49:34,567 --> 00:49:36,427 It only cost you 20% to recover. 835 00:49:36,987 --> 00:49:38,327 100% profit. 836 00:49:40,707 --> 00:49:43,047 So yeah, it was absolutely wild. 837 00:49:43,167 --> 00:49:43,747 So I got it. 838 00:49:43,787 --> 00:49:45,647 But I had another issue after that though, 839 00:49:45,647 --> 00:49:48,307 which was that like I had Ledger. 840 00:49:48,627 --> 00:49:49,867 In the time I've been using Ledger, 841 00:49:50,007 --> 00:49:51,507 it started with like a legacy wallet 842 00:49:51,507 --> 00:49:53,907 and then it moved to like a native Segwit one. 843 00:49:53,907 --> 00:50:00,867 and when it came back um i kind of like went to try and try and get the funds and i was on spiral 844 00:50:00,867 --> 00:50:06,747 boom like put in all the seed words and in the wallet and it was like zero balance and i'd say 845 00:50:06,747 --> 00:50:11,727 i'm not sure i've told you this part of the story guy but i i went on there and i was like it's got 846 00:50:11,727 --> 00:50:15,647 zero balance but i but obviously i could see some of the recent transactions and i was like what are 847 00:50:15,647 --> 00:50:20,987 these like all of the money has been like it's gone it's to zero but i was like it's been it's 848 00:50:20,987 --> 00:50:24,827 been taken out and i was like where is it so i started looking through the mempool to see like 849 00:50:24,827 --> 00:50:31,607 where has this money gone and uh this all this money has gone out and i was like when was that 850 00:50:31,607 --> 00:50:38,467 and guess guess which guess which day it was that the money had gone out was it the cold card day 851 00:50:38,467 --> 00:50:45,407 it was the the day of the cold card hack and i realized that like the entire balance had been 852 00:50:45,407 --> 00:50:52,067 sweat. And I was like, oh my God, what has gone on here? And I think like what I'd done without 853 00:50:52,067 --> 00:50:56,767 realizing it is that I'd actually used this previously and put half of the funds from that 854 00:50:56,767 --> 00:51:02,287 wallet onto cold card. So what I'd seen is the money, I was kind of tracing the money. So I'd 855 00:51:02,287 --> 00:51:06,367 seen it go out of my ledger onto the cold card. And when I'd kind of continue going through the 856 00:51:06,367 --> 00:51:11,567 transactions, I was actually looking, the final transaction was me moving it from my cold card, 857 00:51:11,567 --> 00:51:13,367 sweeping it from there. 858 00:51:13,447 --> 00:51:16,967 It was the one of the original Mark III sweep. 859 00:51:17,127 --> 00:51:18,747 Yes, it was my own sweep, 860 00:51:18,907 --> 00:51:19,927 but I didn't recognize, 861 00:51:20,127 --> 00:51:22,067 I kind of chased the transaction. 862 00:51:22,067 --> 00:51:23,527 You don't memorize your addresses? 863 00:51:24,427 --> 00:51:24,667 No. 864 00:51:24,667 --> 00:51:25,827 You don't memorize all of them? 865 00:51:25,827 --> 00:51:26,107 I don't memorize them. 866 00:51:26,547 --> 00:51:26,687 No. 867 00:51:27,147 --> 00:51:27,627 Lazy. 868 00:51:29,887 --> 00:51:32,607 I have the first 400 of every wallet, 869 00:51:32,967 --> 00:51:34,727 always, right here. 870 00:51:35,307 --> 00:51:37,047 You'll be, okay, you're set. 871 00:51:37,107 --> 00:51:38,047 You're set for this guy. 872 00:51:39,047 --> 00:51:41,267 So anyway, I was like, okay, 873 00:51:41,567 --> 00:51:42,527 I've been swept. 874 00:51:42,647 --> 00:51:44,887 Like my first thought was I've been swept, right? 875 00:51:45,407 --> 00:51:48,147 And then I kind of realized, okay, I sat down. 876 00:51:48,207 --> 00:51:49,007 I tried to be calm with it. 877 00:51:49,047 --> 00:51:50,627 I was like, okay, no, that was me sweeping the funds. 878 00:51:51,307 --> 00:51:53,827 In the end, what I realized is that what I'd done is I'd swept. 879 00:51:54,687 --> 00:51:57,727 I've kind of moved one of my older wallets all onto that cold card, 880 00:51:57,787 --> 00:51:59,447 but the native SegWit. 881 00:51:59,647 --> 00:52:01,387 Oh, I think I'd moved the native SegWit off, 882 00:52:01,487 --> 00:52:02,427 and the other wallet was still there. 883 00:52:02,487 --> 00:52:03,567 I can't remember which way it was around. 884 00:52:03,567 --> 00:52:04,987 And you'd switched to like P2S. 885 00:52:04,992 --> 00:52:12,472 page or something yeah so basically like sparrow had defaulted to uh i think it defaulted to native 886 00:52:12,472 --> 00:52:16,692 segway and i ended up needing to do some kind of like import key store thing and switching it to a 887 00:52:16,692 --> 00:52:20,552 different derivation path so there was still a process which obviously like i just kind of like 888 00:52:20,552 --> 00:52:25,012 was speaking to kimmy still and saying like okay like you know i've got into the wallet the funds 889 00:52:25,012 --> 00:52:31,632 out there and uh what it had done is like i've given it two xpubs and used the first one and it 890 00:52:31,632 --> 00:52:34,692 had kind of ignored the second because it knew they were both the same but it treated it as if 891 00:52:34,692 --> 00:52:38,952 the first one was the funds turned out the first one wasn't the fund the first one didn't contain 892 00:52:38,952 --> 00:52:43,332 the funds but it obviously was like generated by the private key so i was still able to then just 893 00:52:43,332 --> 00:52:49,012 kind of like figure it out get the right derivation path and move the funds but the whole ordeal was 894 00:52:49,012 --> 00:52:54,852 just absolutely crazy um i mean it was it was weird having read this other article um about 895 00:52:54,852 --> 00:52:58,692 someone gone through having gone through this process and then being like having to go through 896 00:52:58,692 --> 00:53:04,772 that myself yeah but yeah it was it was a it was a scary time but in retrospect i think that like 897 00:53:04,772 --> 00:53:09,972 your approach or your attitude to it was right it was like okay there's obviously just some minor 898 00:53:09,972 --> 00:53:14,132 mistake and i think for most people if they find themselves in that position probably going to be 899 00:53:14,132 --> 00:53:20,832 just a relatively minor thing that now thankfully with ai you can you can do this yeah and you can 900 00:53:20,832 --> 00:53:26,052 do it without having to trust somebody else you know like i've had a number of people send me 901 00:53:26,052 --> 00:53:32,572 stuff like physically, like mail me hard drives to go through and try to find keys. 902 00:53:32,572 --> 00:53:38,952 And like, that's a huge amount of trust, you know, like, and, and like, I, I'm, I'm honored 903 00:53:38,952 --> 00:53:44,052 that like some people have asked me to help recover stuff and literally given me seed 904 00:53:44,052 --> 00:53:47,132 phrases and stuff to, to help figure things out. 905 00:53:47,172 --> 00:53:49,552 And I've been able to help wherever I can help. 906 00:53:50,232 --> 00:53:55,452 Um, uh, and I only stole two of people's stashes out of like 12. 907 00:53:55,452 --> 00:54:00,892 So I'm doing, I'm a good trustworthy, you know, 80% positive score on that. 908 00:54:01,312 --> 00:54:06,092 But, but like, that's an enormous amount of trust. 909 00:54:06,752 --> 00:54:10,512 You know, like you're, you're, I'm literally people have given me seed phrases and like, 910 00:54:10,632 --> 00:54:11,432 I feel uncomfortable. 911 00:54:11,572 --> 00:54:12,692 I feel like Jesus Christ. 912 00:54:12,732 --> 00:54:16,552 Cause like, I'm now a point of failure, you know, that somebody has given me. 913 00:54:16,572 --> 00:54:22,232 That's why I've been loving going to multi-sig and stuff because I can be a key that can 914 00:54:22,232 --> 00:54:28,812 be a backup for somebody and I can't take it, you know, like somebody can't bust into my house and 915 00:54:28,812 --> 00:54:34,512 put a gun to my head and be like, I want your aunt's coins. And it's like, can't, I can't help 916 00:54:34,512 --> 00:54:38,892 you. You know, like, I don't want to be a, I want to be a point of help for everybody, not a point 917 00:54:38,892 --> 00:54:46,332 of failure where if they get me, they're going to get my whole family. Um, and, uh, but to be able 918 00:54:46,332 --> 00:54:51,612 to do that, that you could do the entire recovery process like yourself, you built a script, 919 00:54:51,612 --> 00:54:58,412 like that's so that's so cool and you did it without even having to trust the model 920 00:54:58,412 --> 00:55:04,792 you had another model check yeah i had another model and you ran the script offline you know 921 00:55:04,792 --> 00:55:09,272 unplugged your wi-fi and everything which is just that's the way to do it because you just know 922 00:55:09,272 --> 00:55:14,152 you're getting you know you're you know you're testing the right thing and you're not like 923 00:55:14,152 --> 00:55:18,652 reaching out to the web and there's no man in the middle anything it's nothing like you're 924 00:55:18,652 --> 00:55:22,092 You have exactly the piece of information that should be the input 925 00:55:22,092 --> 00:55:23,832 and the piece of information that should be the output. 926 00:55:24,372 --> 00:55:25,452 And you have a script in the middle. 927 00:55:27,292 --> 00:55:31,492 And it's, we live in crazy times. 928 00:55:31,652 --> 00:55:33,212 This is such an accelerant. 929 00:55:33,572 --> 00:55:36,332 This is such an, AI is so crazy. 930 00:55:36,352 --> 00:55:39,272 It is, I mean, like all of this stuff, like none of this would have been possible before. 931 00:55:39,392 --> 00:55:39,692 I mean, I'm. 932 00:55:39,772 --> 00:55:41,472 A year ago, a year ago. 933 00:55:41,932 --> 00:55:44,092 Well, imagine how many people will have given up on this, 934 00:55:44,132 --> 00:55:47,232 who will have kind of been, they've had their seed phrase wrong 935 00:55:47,232 --> 00:55:49,452 and through the years, like from, you know, 936 00:55:49,512 --> 00:55:53,432 basically like 2009 to about 2021, 937 00:55:53,912 --> 00:55:54,952 who would have just been like, 938 00:55:55,592 --> 00:55:56,692 there's no way for me to do this. 939 00:55:56,792 --> 00:55:58,112 The seed phrase is wrong. 940 00:55:58,212 --> 00:56:00,032 I can't get the funds back. 941 00:56:00,092 --> 00:56:00,512 That's it. 942 00:56:00,632 --> 00:56:02,352 Like, this is why you should, you know, 943 00:56:02,352 --> 00:56:03,632 this is why you should always kind of like 944 00:56:03,632 --> 00:56:05,312 just keep as much as you can, 945 00:56:05,392 --> 00:56:06,732 like of the wallets you have, 946 00:56:06,772 --> 00:56:08,012 even if you think a wallet's lost, 947 00:56:08,192 --> 00:56:11,572 like, you know, AI is becoming so good at solving these. 948 00:56:11,652 --> 00:56:13,052 And especially like with this thing, 949 00:56:13,172 --> 00:56:14,292 I will actually shout out, 950 00:56:14,292 --> 00:56:17,012 there's a project on GitHub called BTC Recover. 951 00:56:17,232 --> 00:56:20,972 and someone has created a project specifically for doing this. 952 00:56:21,032 --> 00:56:24,892 I actually only found out about it literally right after I'd kind of gone through the process of building it myself. 953 00:56:24,892 --> 00:56:31,052 But if I was to do it again, I would basically just download that entire repo 954 00:56:31,052 --> 00:56:36,772 and then I would just point AI at that and say, just use this and fill in any gaps kind of thing 955 00:56:36,772 --> 00:56:40,432 so that people have got other tools to do it. 956 00:56:40,612 --> 00:56:44,752 But like you said, it's one of those things that you really need to do it yourself. 957 00:56:44,752 --> 00:56:47,332 and like thankfully AI has given us tools to do that. 958 00:56:47,612 --> 00:56:48,312 I mean, I had people, 959 00:56:48,412 --> 00:56:50,492 because when I put the tweet out saying that, 960 00:56:50,512 --> 00:56:51,712 you know, like I didn't have access, 961 00:56:51,792 --> 00:56:53,432 can anyone like help or advise? 962 00:56:54,332 --> 00:56:57,372 I mean, I had people reach out to me in comments saying like, 963 00:56:57,472 --> 00:56:59,672 oh, I'll do a recovery for you, 964 00:56:59,752 --> 00:57:02,212 but I, you know, my price is 30%. 965 00:57:02,212 --> 00:57:05,052 And it's like, if you are actually desperate 966 00:57:05,052 --> 00:57:06,612 and you don't know how to use these tools 967 00:57:06,612 --> 00:57:09,152 and you know, you've got like hundreds of thousands of dollars, 968 00:57:09,272 --> 00:57:10,532 millions of dollars, whatever you've got. 969 00:57:11,132 --> 00:57:13,052 Yeah, like you probably will be like, 970 00:57:13,132 --> 00:57:13,652 well, you know what? 971 00:57:13,652 --> 00:57:18,412 Like if I got to pay 300 grand to someone in order to get 700 grand back, 972 00:57:18,572 --> 00:57:19,792 that's worth it. 973 00:57:19,792 --> 00:57:20,432 But it's like, 974 00:57:20,552 --> 00:57:21,932 thankfully with AI, 975 00:57:21,932 --> 00:57:24,652 you're able to do these things yourself. 976 00:57:25,012 --> 00:57:25,812 That's a fee. 977 00:57:26,272 --> 00:57:28,152 That's a fee for a knowledge gap. 978 00:57:28,992 --> 00:57:32,652 And AI shrinks that gap so hard, 979 00:57:33,332 --> 00:57:34,372 so hard, 980 00:57:34,692 --> 00:57:41,152 like knowledge or skill and, 981 00:57:41,152 --> 00:57:42,672 and information, 982 00:57:42,672 --> 00:57:52,912 Information arbitrage is going to be insanely difficult to capitalize on in the age of AI because it's going to shrink that gap. 983 00:57:53,952 --> 00:57:56,952 And what I think it will be about delivery. 984 00:57:56,952 --> 00:58:18,792 It will be about like the way, the ease of the end user, because anybody with like a little bit of capability and a little bit of motivation to just like push, push through and spend the time figuring it out is going to, is probably going to be able to figure it out with AI. 985 00:58:18,932 --> 00:58:23,052 And you can actually do it in such a way that you don't even have to trust like the model itself. 986 00:58:23,052 --> 00:58:30,652 um yeah but it's yeah it really is amazing it's changed it so much but i mean the thing is so 987 00:58:30,652 --> 00:58:34,612 this is the thing there's a lot of emphasis on the moment like how ai is making everything like 988 00:58:34,612 --> 00:58:39,632 less secure and all of this kind of stuff and that is a part of the story like of course like any tool 989 00:58:39,632 --> 00:58:45,232 any powerful tool has its like advantages and disadvantages or has the thing you know like bad 990 00:58:45,232 --> 00:58:49,292 guys can use it good guys can use it but the the power that i think this actually gives the 991 00:58:49,292 --> 00:58:53,612 individual for doing stuff like recovery. Like I think that in the long run, there's going to be 992 00:58:53,612 --> 00:58:58,892 way more people who use this to recover their funds than people who use it and manage to steal 993 00:58:58,892 --> 00:59:03,392 someone else's fund. Because the information you can give it, like I got it to interview me, like 994 00:59:03,392 --> 00:59:08,072 how did I store the seed words? Like did I do it in columns or did I do it in rows? Did I mix it, 995 00:59:08,132 --> 00:59:12,072 et cetera? All that stuff I can choose selectively to give to the AI. Whereas an attacker, 996 00:59:12,652 --> 00:59:17,412 they're basically going in with a kind of like a blank slate and trying to do an attack from, 997 00:59:17,412 --> 00:59:23,572 relatively low amounts of knowledge in terms of your setup. So you're always going to be able to 998 00:59:23,572 --> 00:59:30,272 do it easier. Well, I think we've already hit that point that AI is a greater net positive. 999 00:59:30,932 --> 00:59:38,292 And it's not because people have used it to recover coins with it. But how have we plugged 1000 00:59:38,292 --> 00:59:46,412 all the bugs? How have we found and done all the red teaming? Has more Bitcoin been stolen or have 1001 00:59:46,412 --> 00:59:51,412 more Bitcoin susceptible to a vulnerability that got patched been protected. 1002 00:59:52,112 --> 00:59:54,972 I would, I would easily say I would, 1003 00:59:55,052 --> 00:59:55,852 I would be very, 1004 00:59:55,952 --> 00:59:58,712 very safe in saying that the latter is, 1005 00:59:58,812 --> 01:00:02,412 is the winner already is that there were vulnerabilities that got patched and 1006 01:00:02,992 --> 01:00:06,392 coins that got protected that would have been at risk within a week or a couple 1007 01:00:06,392 --> 01:00:10,752 of weeks, or if they clicked on the wrong email or something. 1008 01:00:11,232 --> 01:00:14,072 And, and you think about just in general, 1009 01:00:14,072 --> 01:00:19,732 like that's just going to continue like we're definitely in the everything gets hacked phase 1010 01:00:19,732 --> 01:00:25,572 of all of this right we are in the great hackening um and that's going to keep getting worse so it 1011 01:00:25,572 --> 01:00:32,092 will it will be a mess and the fight might land on ai has stolen more than it has protected uh 1012 01:00:32,092 --> 01:00:37,372 from from time to time but i think after a year or two it will just kind of unequivocally be like 1013 01:00:37,372 --> 01:00:41,572 we wouldn't have been able to build and respond to any of these things and patch all of these 1014 01:00:41,572 --> 01:00:47,152 bugs without it we already can't you can't move fast enough without ai you have to use it to to 1015 01:00:47,152 --> 01:00:54,392 patch everything um it will be interesting to see how like whether ai actually has like ends up 1016 01:00:54,392 --> 01:01:00,092 having some kind of a meaningful part in how people do their like not just how people like 1017 01:01:00,092 --> 01:01:07,212 learn about this but like could ai plug into the self-custody like model somewhere like obviously 1018 01:01:07,212 --> 01:01:10,712 like the the obvious assumption is like oh the obvious kind of like way to look at it is like 1019 01:01:10,712 --> 01:01:12,632 oh, well, no, because it's got to be connected to the internet. 1020 01:01:13,072 --> 01:01:15,092 Obviously, unless you're doing it kind of like self-hosted, 1021 01:01:15,152 --> 01:01:18,392 but assuming you're connected to the internet, it's a bad idea. 1022 01:01:18,552 --> 01:01:22,832 But there might be ways that we can actually use this for stuff. 1023 01:01:23,872 --> 01:01:25,692 I haven't quite thought that through, 1024 01:01:25,772 --> 01:01:27,732 but there might be ways that if you have a multisig 1025 01:01:27,732 --> 01:01:30,032 and you're not giving it like C words or whatever, 1026 01:01:30,212 --> 01:01:32,792 but could it help you to, for example, 1027 01:01:33,152 --> 01:01:36,792 construct a way to how you bring all those pieces together 1028 01:01:36,792 --> 01:01:37,592 to sign a transaction? 1029 01:01:37,712 --> 01:01:39,432 Could you give it some selective knowledge 1030 01:01:39,432 --> 01:01:41,712 So that let's say you say to a family member, 1031 01:01:41,832 --> 01:01:43,472 hey, this AI has the knowledge 1032 01:01:43,472 --> 01:01:45,792 about how to bring together my multi-sig. 1033 01:01:46,152 --> 01:01:47,692 All it has is the knowledge of the setup. 1034 01:01:47,772 --> 01:01:49,472 It doesn't have any knowledge of the keys, et cetera. 1035 01:01:49,832 --> 01:01:53,232 And you give people a way to communicate with your AI 1036 01:01:53,232 --> 01:01:54,492 to kind of help them recover 1037 01:01:54,492 --> 01:01:56,492 in terms of like inheritance and stuff. 1038 01:01:56,592 --> 01:01:58,472 You know, I think all of that is yet to be seen, 1039 01:01:58,532 --> 01:02:00,032 but I could see some interesting stuff coming, 1040 01:02:00,192 --> 01:02:02,152 you know, like coming to the fore. 1041 01:02:03,512 --> 01:02:04,432 A hundred percent. 1042 01:02:04,612 --> 01:02:05,912 No, I totally think, 1043 01:02:05,912 --> 01:02:13,612 like I've been increasingly I've gone in this we haven't talked much in the last month 1044 01:02:13,612 --> 01:02:19,372 like hiatus sort of situation where I've kind of gone deep into the weeds and just like 1045 01:02:19,372 --> 01:02:27,952 vibe coded AI everything for like the last I literally like a month or two um I have begun 1046 01:02:27,952 --> 01:02:34,412 to see I feel like at least in my own situation how this is all going to be integrated I don't 1047 01:02:34,412 --> 01:02:39,452 have a computer now that I'm not talking to, that I'm not like, like literally verbally, 1048 01:02:39,452 --> 01:02:47,352 verbally talking to, to do stuff. Um, and it has become like my predominant way. And I have, 1049 01:02:47,352 --> 01:02:55,852 uh, all of my computers talking to each other in a chat app that I've held by this pair core. 1050 01:02:56,052 --> 01:03:01,152 So I, which is just a great way to test keys and conversations and thinking and all that stuff. So 1051 01:03:01,152 --> 01:03:05,172 So it was useful purely for the purposes of debugging things. 1052 01:03:05,432 --> 01:03:08,432 But it also made everything work much faster 1053 01:03:08,432 --> 01:03:13,352 because in the chat, I actually have agent controls 1054 01:03:13,352 --> 01:03:15,712 where I'm like, okay, this is a turn order 1055 01:03:15,712 --> 01:03:16,912 and this is everybody's purpose. 1056 01:03:17,372 --> 01:03:19,532 So Claude is the initial planner. 1057 01:03:20,192 --> 01:03:23,172 Kimmy on my mini is the one that red teams 1058 01:03:23,172 --> 01:03:27,752 and picks out what's wrong with it 1059 01:03:27,752 --> 01:03:30,512 and assumes that it's broken and then goes through. 1060 01:03:30,512 --> 01:03:31,572 and I have like a prompt, right? 1061 01:03:31,652 --> 01:03:33,852 Like this is your purpose in this room 1062 01:03:33,852 --> 01:03:35,212 and this is how you're going to respond 1063 01:03:35,212 --> 01:03:36,292 to everything that Claude does 1064 01:03:36,292 --> 01:03:37,352 and you're second in line. 1065 01:03:37,472 --> 01:03:38,812 So Claude is always going to respond first. 1066 01:03:38,912 --> 01:03:40,492 Kimmy Mini is going to respond second. 1067 01:03:40,492 --> 01:03:42,192 And then Kimmy on my Zorin, 1068 01:03:42,892 --> 01:03:45,452 on my Linux machine, 1069 01:03:46,912 --> 01:03:51,072 is Red Team partner for Kimmy on my Mini. 1070 01:03:51,472 --> 01:03:53,432 So after Kimmy writes up a report, 1071 01:03:54,012 --> 01:03:57,292 it will verify and then run the actual processes 1072 01:03:57,292 --> 01:03:59,332 between my Mac Mini and my Linux machine, 1073 01:03:59,332 --> 01:04:04,372 prove out how to break it or how to fix it. 1074 01:04:05,412 --> 01:04:08,552 And then run additional tests and see if they can find anything else 1075 01:04:08,552 --> 01:04:11,032 or if they can spoof a key or if they can, you know, 1076 01:04:11,092 --> 01:04:13,812 take an old signature and make it look like it's fresh, 1077 01:04:13,892 --> 01:04:14,652 you know, that sort of thing. 1078 01:04:16,412 --> 01:04:20,732 And then they drop their reports back to Claude 1079 01:04:20,732 --> 01:04:22,032 and Claude finally does the implementation. 1080 01:04:23,312 --> 01:04:26,392 And so, like, I'm able to do that just because I have, 1081 01:04:26,392 --> 01:04:33,012 like just very simple ordering operations inside the chat app. 1082 01:04:33,152 --> 01:04:35,272 But the thing is, is like my computers are doing well. 1083 01:04:35,312 --> 01:04:37,872 I can, I literally have like a thing that I'd just be like, 1084 01:04:37,912 --> 01:04:39,132 okay, I gave it a bunch of tokens. 1085 01:04:39,472 --> 01:04:41,212 And I can just be like, just run for two hours 1086 01:04:41,212 --> 01:04:42,532 and just try to find something wrong. 1087 01:04:43,352 --> 01:04:45,432 Just like keep trying to sync stuff, 1088 01:04:45,572 --> 01:04:47,172 find out why it's going slow. 1089 01:04:47,392 --> 01:04:49,372 Why did it, you know, why is it syncing slow? 1090 01:04:49,372 --> 01:04:51,572 Try to stream from the device. 1091 01:04:51,692 --> 01:04:52,932 And if it doesn't stream immediately, 1092 01:04:52,932 --> 01:05:00,612 mark what the delay is exactly from the Linux timecode to the Mac mini timecode and sort 1093 01:05:00,612 --> 01:05:24,237 out what happened Who had a queue for giving chunks over that nobody needed and like why were we waiting in line behind that And so all that stuff And because of that I genuinely I increasingly thinking because it already become this way in my life very very quickly is that we won do anything without without AI it will be like a car 1094 01:05:24,237 --> 01:05:33,077 it'll be like a vehicle in general is that they didn't obsolete legs but like if you're going 1095 01:05:33,077 --> 01:05:38,357 anywhere of any distance you need a bike you need a car you need to rent a car for a couple of 1096 01:05:38,357 --> 01:05:42,877 minutes from somebody if you don't have a car available you need a plane you have a private jet 1097 01:05:42,877 --> 01:05:47,457 you have a space shuttle doesn't matter you've got a vehicle and it is the only reason that all 1098 01:05:47,457 --> 01:05:53,357 the things that we are doing are actually possible if vehicles didn't exist 99.9 of jobs 1099 01:05:53,357 --> 01:06:01,897 not viable. Like the whole economy just doesn't work anymore because it's all based on the outsized 1100 01:06:01,897 --> 01:06:07,317 exponential advantage of having vehicles to travel and then spread out geographically. 1101 01:06:07,317 --> 01:06:14,797 The exact same thing I think will be true for AI. AI is the extension of the mind. 1102 01:06:15,697 --> 01:06:22,077 While I am doing shit, I can have a musing about an idea or a something and I can literally just 1103 01:06:22,077 --> 01:06:27,937 spin up an agent. That's what I do. I just start a random project. I brain dump the whole idea. 1104 01:06:28,457 --> 01:06:33,437 And I say, do a preliminary investigation, find alternatives, see if somebody's already built this 1105 01:06:33,437 --> 01:06:39,677 and how they did it. Bring back a report, source and verify everything. Don't make assumptions about 1106 01:06:39,677 --> 01:06:45,177 what actually happened. Go find the actual code or the actual project. You get a postmortem if 1107 01:06:45,177 --> 01:06:50,957 it's something that failed. And I will let it go for just 20 minutes while I am doing something 1108 01:06:50,957 --> 01:06:55,617 else. And then I will come back to it and read it and decide whether it's an idea worth engaging in. 1109 01:06:56,277 --> 01:07:04,957 And I can do that dozens of times throughout my day. And because of that, I am able to take on 1110 01:07:04,957 --> 01:07:12,497 hundreds, like the thousands of things that collectively each one of us will be able to 1111 01:07:12,497 --> 01:07:16,957 tackle. Because like your project that I know you don't want to talk about on the show, but your 1112 01:07:16,957 --> 01:07:21,797 project is a perfect example. You're like, I'm annoyed. This is not the way it should be. You 1113 01:07:21,797 --> 01:07:27,577 should be able to do this for free. And this is the decent value add, but everybody charges for 1114 01:07:27,577 --> 01:07:31,597 this stupid shit that should be done for free and is easy to do. And so you're literally building a 1115 01:07:31,597 --> 01:07:37,677 service around that. And you would never have been able to actually engage and be like, okay, well, 1116 01:07:37,997 --> 01:07:45,317 let's just try it. Let's just try it and do it. Um, like this is what that is. It is a accelerant 1117 01:07:45,317 --> 01:07:51,797 that lets you go 100 times faster and 100 times farther in every general little idea that you come 1118 01:07:51,797 --> 01:07:58,657 up with to make the selection of what to spend time and energy on that much better. And the idea 1119 01:07:58,657 --> 01:08:02,317 that some AI is just going to be super fucking smart, it's going to come up with all the ideas, 1120 01:08:02,357 --> 01:08:07,837 it's just stupid. All the ideas and value judgments, all information comes at the edge. 1121 01:08:08,517 --> 01:08:11,697 The AI model is not going to have information that you have because you literally have information 1122 01:08:11,697 --> 01:08:15,117 from a particular situation, a particular thing that you want to do and a thing that 1123 01:08:15,117 --> 01:08:19,777 In the context of your environment and your knowledge, knowledge always comes from the edge. 1124 01:08:19,777 --> 01:08:31,777 And so you're always going to be applying AI in a way that the broader generalities of the whole ecosystem or whatever, maybe somebody else at some other edge will come up with the same idea. 1125 01:08:32,637 --> 01:08:35,657 But then it becomes a race of who can get 100 times faster and 100 times farther quicker. 1126 01:08:36,097 --> 01:08:37,137 Like who can do it? 1127 01:08:37,357 --> 01:08:39,757 Because we're going to be tackling millions. 1128 01:08:39,757 --> 01:08:44,637 like people think oh we're going to lose jobs because there's a million problems that we're 1129 01:08:44,637 --> 01:08:50,497 trying to solve today and like 990 000 of them can now solve by ai no what you're missing is that 1130 01:08:50,497 --> 01:08:55,717 we're going to now be tackling a billion problems we're going to be tackling a thousand a million 1131 01:08:55,717 --> 01:09:00,277 times as many problems as we are currently tackling because all of this shit was it was 1132 01:09:00,277 --> 01:09:04,577 economically useless it's like oh yeah i'm not even gonna fucking build a pyramid that's 1133 01:09:04,577 --> 01:09:08,357 economically retarded like who's gonna actually spend the money to do that well when you can 1134 01:09:08,357 --> 01:09:14,837 actually take human thought and turn it into literally you you compress the cost um you 1135 01:09:14,837 --> 01:09:20,457 collide the cost of human thought to the cost of electricity to a compute token in a computer 1136 01:09:20,457 --> 01:09:27,757 and that you can literally explore a thousand ideas before the end of the day just the capacity 1137 01:09:27,757 --> 01:09:36,257 to read output and make a judgment and like it's everything is going to expand so far and so fast 1138 01:09:36,257 --> 01:09:42,697 in so many different directions and ai will be ubiquitous like it will be ubiquitous like vehicles 1139 01:09:42,697 --> 01:09:47,337 like you just you're gonna have a vehicle for most of the stuff that you do or places that you travel 1140 01:09:47,337 --> 01:09:50,817 or things that you're trying to accomplish and if you don't specifically have a vehicle like you just 1141 01:09:50,817 --> 01:09:54,017 walk to the grocery store because you're like walking to the grocery store the grocery store 1142 01:09:54,017 --> 01:09:58,817 will only be stock shelves because of the fucking vehicles like like it will all be tied into each 1143 01:09:58,817 --> 01:10:02,777 other in the exact same way that everything touches the internet but it just is going to 1144 01:10:02,777 --> 01:10:10,277 make everything speed up so much and we're going to accomplish and try to fix so many more problems 1145 01:10:10,277 --> 01:10:16,397 that there will be no shortage of work. To the contrary, there will be a thousand times more 1146 01:10:16,397 --> 01:10:21,557 things that we should or might want to tackle. And it will simply be that you have to find somebody 1147 01:10:21,557 --> 01:10:27,257 who cares enough to put the electricity and the time and the life energy to solving that one 1148 01:10:27,257 --> 01:10:30,817 problem because there's way more problems. We're going to have way more problems and way more 1149 01:10:30,817 --> 01:10:35,837 things that we could do, then we even have people on earth. Like it's just going to be crazy. 1150 01:10:37,037 --> 01:10:41,157 I mean, this kind of ties into the read that you did recently about the singularity idea. 1151 01:10:41,777 --> 01:10:43,257 What was that read called? Remind me. 1152 01:10:44,357 --> 01:10:45,077 Singularity stack. 1153 01:10:45,837 --> 01:10:51,217 Yeah. Like the idea of kind of everything coming down to just the unit of energy. Because we 1154 01:10:51,217 --> 01:10:52,957 already talked about this a lot. I love that analogy. 1155 01:10:52,957 --> 01:10:56,997 It's like the amount of, you know, that Bitcoin kind of brings in everything. Ultimately, 1156 01:10:56,997 --> 01:11:02,197 it's kind of like an energy-based it's an energy-based kind of currency like it's mined 1157 01:11:02,197 --> 01:11:06,557 from energy it's moved around by like you know miners who want to put transactions in blocks 1158 01:11:06,557 --> 01:11:11,457 who are using energy and like the amazing thing is like ai is kind of it's essentially using the 1159 01:11:11,457 --> 01:11:17,917 same like raw material shall we call it that using energy it's like how much like computing power are 1160 01:11:17,917 --> 01:11:22,257 you going to put into this thing and it just becomes everything ultimately kind of becomes 1161 01:11:22,257 --> 01:11:28,837 this competitive landscape between what's the best use of energy. And it's amazing, like you 1162 01:11:28,837 --> 01:11:32,517 kind of got the currency like happening on one side, it's like, okay, well, let's use the energy 1163 01:11:32,517 --> 01:11:36,097 to make the money. And then also, let's use the energy to do the information work in society. 1164 01:11:36,617 --> 01:11:40,437 And it's going to be crazy to see what comes out the other side of that, because there's going to 1165 01:11:40,437 --> 01:11:44,917 be, I mean, I can imagine a million things in my mind about like, how AI could be used, but 1166 01:11:44,917 --> 01:11:49,517 ultimately, like, you know, some stuff is going to be more valuable than other stuff. And we'll see 1167 01:11:49,517 --> 01:11:54,937 how that all like pans out. But it does seem that the interesting thing is it's almost like a self 1168 01:11:54,937 --> 01:11:59,357 perpetual loop, because as we're moving towards this world where everything is just being kind of 1169 01:11:59,357 --> 01:12:03,197 built from energy, if everyone's like, okay, well, AI is really awesome. And I would love to, 1170 01:12:03,277 --> 01:12:08,257 for example, have, let's say a website that you go on and you can basically just speak to it and say, 1171 01:12:08,317 --> 01:12:12,017 this is the product I want. And you can speak to it and then say, hit go. And then it can basically 1172 01:12:12,017 --> 01:12:15,797 send it to you because you've got some factory somewhere that's assembling, you know, that's 1173 01:12:15,797 --> 01:12:20,037 3D printing the parts to create the thing that you just spoke into existence and then sending it to 1174 01:12:20,037 --> 01:12:24,997 you. That might be an awesome idea, but it might be like, well, it's energy, like people aren't 1175 01:12:24,997 --> 01:12:30,277 willing to pay the price to build something like that because of the energy cost. Well, then the 1176 01:12:30,277 --> 01:12:35,697 problem becomes, how do you get energy at a lower cost? And I think that the thing that AI is 1177 01:12:35,697 --> 01:12:41,497 ultimately like the highest use of it is going to be, how do we get cheaper energy so that we can do 1178 01:12:41,497 --> 01:12:45,697 more cool stuff with it? And once you set AI on that problem, once that becomes the biggest problem 1179 01:12:45,697 --> 01:12:50,597 in society, which I think it almost is anyway. Like, like historically, it's compressing the 1180 01:12:50,597 --> 01:12:56,577 distance between, between the energy, the, the, the raw input and the raw output. Like we're just 1181 01:12:56,577 --> 01:13:01,077 knocking rungs out of this thing and like, just they're getting closer and closer and closer. 1182 01:13:01,137 --> 01:13:05,617 And that's what all this technology is literally doing is, is it's bringing the output as close 1183 01:13:05,617 --> 01:13:10,657 to the input as possible. Precisely, man. Yeah. It's going to get crazy because even some of the 1184 01:13:10,657 --> 01:13:14,397 things that I'm thinking about, sometimes I have these thoughts about, okay, well, what if let's 1185 01:13:14,397 --> 01:13:18,677 say, for example, AI was so cool. I knew what everyone was doing to a degree. I mean, obviously, 1186 01:13:18,857 --> 01:13:22,737 yeah, data protection is a thing and everything, but it's already the case now, right? If someone 1187 01:13:22,737 --> 01:13:26,557 goes on Google Maps and they're like, I want to go from here to here, Google knows who you are. 1188 01:13:26,637 --> 01:13:30,797 They know where you want to go to. And I was like, well, maybe if people start pulling their data 1189 01:13:30,797 --> 01:13:35,117 together, someone else, for example, who's doing that route, rather than using some kind of 1190 01:13:35,117 --> 01:13:38,537 dedicated ride-sharing app or whatever, it can just be like, oh, hey, do you want to go with this 1191 01:13:38,537 --> 01:13:42,537 person? We know this other person is traveling that distance as well. And the app could almost 1192 01:13:42,537 --> 01:13:46,977 just materialize and you can just be talking to a bot and you're like, oh, how do I get from here 1193 01:13:46,977 --> 01:13:50,577 to here? And it's like, oh, by the way, we know that someone's doing that trip right now. They're 1194 01:13:50,577 --> 01:13:55,937 on Rube. We know from Google Maps, like, should we see if they can pick you up? But then I'm like, 1195 01:13:56,357 --> 01:14:02,197 but even that will probably be obsoleted really fast because like AI will just leapfrog it all 1196 01:14:02,197 --> 01:14:08,057 together and you'll go straight from what you want to do. And it will create the perfect way to do it. 1197 01:14:08,257 --> 01:14:11,677 That might not be the most effective way to do it. Like you don't know what's going to be the 1198 01:14:11,677 --> 01:14:15,737 most effective way because it's all going to be dependent on what's the energy cost to do it. 1199 01:14:16,237 --> 01:14:20,477 You know what I mean? Like it's like everything's like transportation is going to go like this. Like 1200 01:14:20,477 --> 01:14:26,317 it might be that trains, you don't have a set train time, you know, train timetable, for example, 1201 01:14:26,817 --> 01:14:30,557 you just get, you'd say where you want to go and the train goes the route depending on where the 1202 01:14:30,557 --> 01:14:35,357 people want to go. And it's just figuring it all out. You know, like it's really, everything is 1203 01:14:35,357 --> 01:14:40,757 going to be so transformed by this that it's almost like, even as ideas come into my mind about how 1204 01:14:40,757 --> 01:14:45,517 it's going to be used. I'm like, well, no, that's, that's kind of pre AI thinking. I'm, 1205 01:14:45,557 --> 01:14:49,997 I'm using pre AI thought to think about this problem, but AI is going to come up with an even 1206 01:14:49,997 --> 01:14:55,817 more like logical or like an even more kind of, yeah, like useful solution. 1207 01:14:55,817 --> 01:15:02,077 When you can put thought into the actual process of production, things change very quickly, 1208 01:15:02,577 --> 01:15:10,137 you know, and, and when that thought can go further and far further, far faster than 1209 01:15:10,137 --> 01:15:21,797 And I love the, just that simple analogy and the, the singularity stack of, you know, in, uh, was 1830, it costs three hours of labor to get an hour of light. 1210 01:15:22,377 --> 01:15:24,457 1830, three hours of labor. 1211 01:15:24,797 --> 01:15:26,617 Light was an insane luxury. 1212 01:15:27,097 --> 01:15:28,257 That's crazy to think about. 1213 01:15:28,257 --> 01:15:32,877 Like reading by the light of a candle would have been like rich people stuff. 1214 01:15:33,997 --> 01:15:36,237 Like, it's just like, it's dark and we have light. 1215 01:15:36,617 --> 01:15:37,477 Like we are gods. 1216 01:15:37,477 --> 01:15:48,957 and then in 1900 it had fallen at 13 minutes and today it's 0.07 seconds seconds it's a 15 million 1217 01:15:48,957 --> 01:15:55,877 percent increase in the value of our labor per a unit of light so much so that we have like a 1218 01:15:55,877 --> 01:16:01,497 i have like a trillion tiny little light bulbs in this screen right now and we're just like chatting 1219 01:16:01,497 --> 01:16:08,797 um like i've got i've got a i got a light for the room to get my my backdrop right we got lights all 1220 01:16:08,797 --> 01:16:16,117 over the house or whatever i'm i'm paying for this like 30 fold just sitting here um and uh 1221 01:16:16,117 --> 01:16:22,737 the singularity stack the idea is that like for all of human history a unit of human thought 1222 01:16:22,737 --> 01:16:29,337 cost a human of human life like one unit of lifetime produced one unit of thought 1223 01:16:29,337 --> 01:16:34,397 and now we can compress those patterns and execute. 1224 01:16:34,397 --> 01:16:38,977 We can compute the patterns with information externally 1225 01:16:38,977 --> 01:16:41,517 and we can do them faster 1226 01:16:41,517 --> 01:16:45,657 so that now one unit of human thought can maybe produce, 1227 01:16:45,917 --> 01:16:48,677 depending on what and how it's using 1228 01:16:48,677 --> 01:16:50,417 all of the various machines around it, 1229 01:16:50,737 --> 01:16:53,197 we can do hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands 1230 01:16:53,197 --> 01:16:54,897 of units of human thought, 1231 01:16:54,897 --> 01:17:03,357 of of patterned human thought can be computed onto problems uh per one unit of human time 1232 01:17:03,357 --> 01:17:11,237 and that's i think the the way to think about this um is that and you know if you want to like 1233 01:17:11,237 --> 01:17:18,417 really get out there like with the whole we're a collective organism if humanity if like the the 1234 01:17:18,417 --> 01:17:25,017 social sphere is a sort of collective organism thing, right? And we are all people and we're 1235 01:17:25,017 --> 01:17:32,657 building, you know, blood vessels with through our roads and we're building immune systems with the, 1236 01:17:32,657 --> 01:17:38,357 the police and government and they all have individual failures and we have chronic diseases 1237 01:17:38,357 --> 01:17:44,697 and we have contradictory ideas that, that cause problems in it. And we were trying to build a 1238 01:17:44,697 --> 01:17:48,697 neural network and it just happens, it runs on the same thing that our neural 1239 01:17:48,697 --> 01:17:50,297 network runs on, electricity. 1240 01:17:50,777 --> 01:17:55,237 And we were trying to build it externally to collect, to basically work between 1241 01:17:55,437 --> 01:18:00,577 everyone and take all of our individual thoughts and knowledge and compress it 1242 01:18:00,577 --> 01:18:01,157 together. 1243 01:18:02,137 --> 01:18:13,763 What might it look like other than a giant web of thousands and thousands of hyper dense collective neural networks that are all being like directed at each individual problem at the edge 1244 01:18:14,882 --> 01:18:19,123 yeah that we we start to collect at the center and then we pull it back out to fix a problem an 1245 01:18:19,123 --> 01:18:24,243 edge problem fix an edge problem fix an edge problem and in that same analogy is that like 1246 01:18:25,123 --> 01:18:29,043 people like oh they i was going to kill us it's like okay well did the human brain kill all the 1247 01:18:29,043 --> 01:18:35,202 the human cells no the organism doesn't kill the cells the cells are what make the organism 1248 01:18:35,202 --> 01:18:41,163 like that's a really really good way of looking we're part of the whole yeah and the ai isn't 1249 01:18:41,163 --> 01:18:46,562 there without the cells grabbing that edge information and and just because oh we can have 1250 01:18:46,562 --> 01:18:52,763 we can have robots do that too it's like well yeah but but it's literally it's human thought 1251 01:18:52,763 --> 01:18:58,863 in compressed into a concept but the the notion the the thing that you talked about with um 1252 01:18:58,863 --> 01:19:02,642 an AI in the wallet. 1253 01:19:03,602 --> 01:19:05,983 I actually think the last few weeks 1254 01:19:05,983 --> 01:19:09,942 have convinced me that my prediction or idea 1255 01:19:09,942 --> 01:19:12,523 that we're going to have highly, highly specialized models 1256 01:19:12,523 --> 01:19:14,322 that are very, very small and easy to run. 1257 01:19:15,843 --> 01:19:18,043 I'm much more convinced about it now 1258 01:19:18,043 --> 01:19:20,583 that we might have a wallet AI 1259 01:19:20,583 --> 01:19:24,003 that is just kind of a very basic general, 1260 01:19:24,003 --> 01:19:27,623 but it's extremely good for security policy, 1261 01:19:27,623 --> 01:19:35,863 safety practices, transaction construction, all of this stuff. And it's specifically because of 1262 01:19:35,863 --> 01:19:40,722 JEV, because of Skyfall, and then because of DESA. These are three models that have come out 1263 01:19:40,722 --> 01:19:48,543 very recently. JEV is the one that's the decision-making model that can basically do 1264 01:19:48,543 --> 01:19:57,602 frontier-level decision-making in a certain scope of category of tasks. 1265 01:19:57,623 --> 01:19:58,942 and like type of reasoning. 1266 01:19:59,462 --> 01:20:01,863 And it does it at a hundredth of the size 1267 01:20:01,863 --> 01:20:03,023 and like a hundred times faster. 1268 01:20:03,682 --> 01:20:05,702 But it only works in that space. 1269 01:20:05,702 --> 01:20:09,043 And if you use it ahead of using frontier models, 1270 01:20:09,163 --> 01:20:11,243 you can save like 99% of your tokens or something 1271 01:20:11,243 --> 01:20:14,602 because it will literally do so many things 1272 01:20:14,602 --> 01:20:19,682 in extremely high quality output or decision-making 1273 01:20:19,682 --> 01:20:23,722 that it saves a ton of like pointless thinking 1274 01:20:23,722 --> 01:20:28,083 and regurgitating and cycling through a frontier model, 1275 01:20:28,263 --> 01:20:30,623 thinking stupid thoughts back in itself, you know? 1276 01:20:31,222 --> 01:20:33,243 It basically leaps over that. 1277 01:20:33,722 --> 01:20:36,322 Then Skyfall is one that was geared 1278 01:20:36,322 --> 01:20:38,102 toward long-term thinking and CAD. 1279 01:20:38,863 --> 01:20:41,722 So basically, when I do this first thing 1280 01:20:41,722 --> 01:20:42,422 or this second thing, 1281 01:20:42,483 --> 01:20:44,623 how does it relate to the sixth, seventh, and eighth thing 1282 01:20:44,623 --> 01:20:46,162 that we're likely going to create? 1283 01:20:46,503 --> 01:20:48,102 Because right now, LLMs 1284 01:20:48,102 --> 01:20:49,962 and all the big general frontier models 1285 01:20:49,962 --> 01:20:51,783 are very short-term thinking. 1286 01:20:51,922 --> 01:20:52,942 They're very reactionary. 1287 01:20:52,942 --> 01:21:10,583 When the problem comes up, they attack that problem, but they don't, they very rarely and still very poorly think in the whole grand scheme of what the goal is, what our general mission is, how is this going to affect all of these other different areas? 1288 01:21:10,583 --> 01:21:18,102 like the big picture long-term view of how how can we take pain now that might pay off properly 1289 01:21:18,102 --> 01:21:24,182 later is still not in the scope it's still just like hyper high time preference reactionary stuff 1290 01:21:24,182 --> 01:21:30,263 skyfall is one that you can literally just engineer stuff and it can and it can literally 1291 01:21:30,263 --> 01:21:34,882 build like an engine from the idea of like make me an engine and it will make it will take 1292 01:21:34,882 --> 01:21:40,743 considerations of every single piece and how it relates to the whole properly and builds you out 1293 01:21:40,743 --> 01:21:47,343 the whole thing then there's dessa um and these are all like like weeks old at most dessa i think 1294 01:21:47,343 --> 01:21:57,302 like three days old uh skyfall i think is like a week maybe um uh and dessa is uh uh jack dorsey's 1295 01:21:57,302 --> 01:22:04,003 uh company uh i guess i guess block is the one that actually did this um but there's like a 1296 01:22:04,003 --> 01:22:10,263 vision of it for AI and it's actually come it come from an old AI company that they like kind 1297 01:22:10,263 --> 01:22:15,642 of pulled into their thing and they built Dessa which is a large language model that doesn't know 1298 01:22:15,642 --> 01:22:23,003 text it has no text there's no code there's no anything it is trained entirely on human speech 1299 01:22:23,003 --> 01:22:32,283 audio and it knows how to speak English wow okay so is this Jack Dorsey has has pioneered this um 1300 01:22:32,283 --> 01:22:34,882 yeah, yeah, he's running the team or whatever, 1301 01:22:35,283 --> 01:22:37,123 owns the company with the team 1302 01:22:37,123 --> 01:22:39,202 that they've been using this different approach. 1303 01:22:39,702 --> 01:22:44,083 And crazier is that this thing can be run on a tiny device. 1304 01:22:44,882 --> 01:22:47,523 This is a very small and hyper-efficient model 1305 01:22:47,523 --> 01:22:50,363 and it talks more naturally 1306 01:22:50,363 --> 01:22:52,802 than any frontier model out there. 1307 01:22:53,702 --> 01:22:55,343 And what's crazy is it's, 1308 01:22:55,743 --> 01:22:56,983 I couldn't remember the name of it 1309 01:22:56,983 --> 01:22:58,882 when I was working on the video earlier, 1310 01:22:59,322 --> 01:23:00,722 but it's full duplex, 1311 01:23:00,722 --> 01:23:08,222 which means that it it takes input while it's giving output so it will literally interrupt 1312 01:23:08,222 --> 01:23:14,662 it will empathize it will laugh in the middle of a sentence that you say like it it knows it 1313 01:23:14,662 --> 01:23:20,102 it's the only model out there that understands sarcasm sarcasm is the one thing that has 1314 01:23:20,102 --> 01:23:26,123 confused every model and conflict and like every all frontier models have fallen to the great power 1315 01:23:26,123 --> 01:23:28,003 of sarcasm, Dessa finally 1316 01:23:28,003 --> 01:23:30,003 understands sarcasm because it only 1317 01:23:30,003 --> 01:23:31,662 understands it in the context of audio. 1318 01:23:33,682 --> 01:23:36,182 But this is a tiny model 1319 01:23:36,182 --> 01:23:38,062 that has outpaced, that can 1320 01:23:38,062 --> 01:23:40,043 obliterate all frontier 1321 01:23:40,043 --> 01:23:41,702 models because they're trained on text 1322 01:23:41,702 --> 01:23:44,182 and it is done entirely in voice. 1323 01:23:44,543 --> 01:23:46,043 And this is exactly the sort of thing 1324 01:23:46,043 --> 01:23:47,623 that the 1325 01:23:47,623 --> 01:23:49,802 dichotomy between specialized 1326 01:23:49,802 --> 01:23:52,083 intelligence and general intelligence, 1327 01:23:52,422 --> 01:23:53,783 the economics will never not be true. 1328 01:23:54,442 --> 01:23:55,843 The economics will never not be true. 1329 01:23:56,123 --> 01:24:02,543 that general intelligence costs more energy than specialized intelligence at the exact same task, 1330 01:24:02,942 --> 01:24:04,543 which means we're going to have billions of models, 1331 01:24:04,802 --> 01:24:11,283 which means we need people at the edge using and helping general and using general intelligence 1332 01:24:11,283 --> 01:24:15,302 to help use specialized intelligence and building data sets 1333 01:24:15,302 --> 01:24:19,942 and very specific individual knowledge and value judgments to build specialized, 1334 01:24:20,363 --> 01:24:24,343 to further specialized intelligence so that we can actually increase, 1335 01:24:24,343 --> 01:24:28,442 Like the economics will never not be that specialization pays off. 1336 01:24:28,642 --> 01:24:40,402 And as we get closer to the cost of energy for all of these things, it's going to be more true, not less true, more true because you can't cover it up in red tape between one and the other that kind of like evens out the flow. 1337 01:24:40,523 --> 01:24:45,802 No, general intelligence is going to cost 10 more than 10 times or 100 times more than specialized intelligence. 1338 01:24:45,802 --> 01:24:48,523 And we're going to have a benchmark of exactly how much the multiple is. 1339 01:24:48,523 --> 01:24:52,542 and because of that I think we will have 1340 01:24:52,542 --> 01:24:54,542 security 1341 01:24:54,542 --> 01:24:55,942 conscious models 1342 01:24:55,942 --> 01:24:58,263 that sit on computers 1343 01:24:58,263 --> 01:25:00,483 and sit inside of things that we're doing 1344 01:25:00,483 --> 01:25:02,562 and their entire job is to 1345 01:25:02,562 --> 01:25:03,763 watch for red flags 1346 01:25:03,763 --> 01:25:06,462 to respond to things that are 1347 01:25:06,462 --> 01:25:08,462 happening to help set up 1348 01:25:08,462 --> 01:25:10,562 or make sure that behaviors in the 1349 01:25:10,562 --> 01:25:12,583 wallet are aligning in exactly the 1350 01:25:12,583 --> 01:25:14,523 same way that the checksum made sure that you didn't 1351 01:25:14,523 --> 01:25:15,402 punch in the wrong seed 1352 01:25:15,402 --> 01:25:25,003 yeah i mean i i still wonder though when you like i mean again it's it's difficult to imagine these 1353 01:25:25,003 --> 01:25:31,462 things in advance because this is all just like emerging so much but i still wonder when we're 1354 01:25:31,462 --> 01:25:38,763 talking about ai having a role in self-custody because you know one of the most important things 1355 01:25:38,763 --> 01:25:44,202 is for example you know like um like air gapping and all this kind of things and offline backups 1356 01:25:44,202 --> 01:25:51,743 all the rest of it like my i guess the thing that i wonder is like how the ai is going to play a part 1357 01:25:51,743 --> 01:25:56,422 in that without being a security risk itself because if you've got a lot just if you've got 1358 01:25:56,422 --> 01:26:00,602 to like have access to your ai model that has some role in your self custody if you've got to 1359 01:26:01,162 --> 01:26:05,322 air gap your access to the model somehow you're kind of back at square one that you might as well 1360 01:26:05,322 --> 01:26:11,583 you know air gap the access to the keys themselves kind of thing so it's and i'm sure it will come 1361 01:26:11,583 --> 01:26:17,662 into i'm not saying it won't it's just i can't see it yet yeah i would be inclined like if i had to 1362 01:26:17,662 --> 01:26:24,662 just i mean i'm just sitting here making predictions like i i know the future but um the if i had to 1363 01:26:24,662 --> 01:26:32,142 predict i would think that air gapping and keeping your keys off the device that policy will not 1364 01:26:32,142 --> 01:26:39,202 change like that that notion will not change um but that your device that you will have local run 1365 01:26:39,202 --> 01:26:48,722 AI that is geared around protecting the device and that it will be a very thin and specialized, 1366 01:26:49,202 --> 01:26:50,382 like you have a secure element. 1367 01:26:50,922 --> 01:26:55,682 Like think of the amount of resources that have been put into the secure element, like 1368 01:26:55,682 --> 01:27:02,062 to make that hardened, to make sure that every good phone has one that, you know, like every 1369 01:27:02,062 --> 01:27:08,222 time there's a bug or like, like how do we harden this thing as secure as possible so 1370 01:27:08,222 --> 01:27:14,063 that people can store passwords so that we can have pass keys so that we can like encrypt things 1371 01:27:14,063 --> 01:27:18,942 in every single thing i have tls and ssh all these things that's an enormous amount of resources that 1372 01:27:18,942 --> 01:27:23,942 is enormous stack of work from millions of different people who have contributed and put 1373 01:27:23,942 --> 01:27:28,802 to the point where secure elements are secure elements i don't see why there wouldn't be a 1374 01:27:28,802 --> 01:27:35,863 secure ai chip like a secure model sitting right next to it in the phone that's basically 1375 01:27:35,863 --> 01:27:43,222 it's just it's just always they're putting up defenses and that it's very small and very lean 1376 01:27:43,222 --> 01:27:50,863 i mean like transcription transcription models and jack no i've done nothing now um like putting in 1377 01:27:50,863 --> 01:27:55,082 the i couldn't even see the resource use change i do a bunch of benchmarks with the little things 1378 01:27:55,082 --> 01:27:59,102 that i'm building because every time i'm like oh maybe there's an ai model i like add it and then 1379 01:27:59,102 --> 01:28:05,063 be like holy crap this thing seemed like five times as much cpu let's not do that one um so 1380 01:28:05,063 --> 01:28:08,802 I'll benchmark a lot of these things on the transcription and like forced alignment stuff. 1381 01:28:09,523 --> 01:28:15,082 It happens so freaking if I pause recording and it's just like, it's just like, there's 1382 01:28:15,082 --> 01:28:20,862 all the text and it's all forced aligned to the audio that I'm messing around with. 1383 01:28:20,983 --> 01:28:22,922 And it's like, Hey, I don't even notice it. 1384 01:28:22,942 --> 01:28:25,343 It just, it's just in the normal operation of stuff. 1385 01:28:26,082 --> 01:28:30,062 I think that's the sort of thing I would like to believe. 1386 01:28:30,062 --> 01:28:35,783 And if it's not done, that's probably how paranoid I am is I'll try to go that way. 1387 01:28:35,823 --> 01:28:37,263 It's like, okay, well, how do I train a freaking model? 1388 01:28:38,763 --> 01:28:41,382 But because of that, because I have that inclination, 1389 01:28:41,942 --> 01:28:47,843 if it's economically efficient at all to do that, to go that route, I think it happens. 1390 01:28:49,783 --> 01:28:50,182 Yeah. 1391 01:28:50,323 --> 01:28:53,003 But there might be just a much better way to do it. 1392 01:28:53,602 --> 01:28:59,983 Like much simpler, more naive, but robust way to do it. 1393 01:29:00,062 --> 01:29:07,562 you know um as they say going making something uh bigger and more complex is and any intelligent 1394 01:29:07,562 --> 01:29:17,122 fool can do it but to make something simpler and smaller and work better uh takes a touch of true 1395 01:29:17,122 --> 01:29:23,523 true genius and and real effort it's a good point though because just thinking about it like again 1396 01:29:23,523 --> 01:29:26,783 and I'm also just streaming here, 1397 01:29:26,922 --> 01:29:30,343 but let's say you did have a small AI model 1398 01:29:30,343 --> 01:29:31,843 on some kind of a hardware wallet. 1399 01:29:32,102 --> 01:29:35,102 You have a hardware wallet that has an AI model on it. 1400 01:29:35,783 --> 01:29:39,382 Let's say that you've used that to generate keys 1401 01:29:39,382 --> 01:29:42,003 or the rest of it, but you can also, for example, 1402 01:29:42,823 --> 01:29:46,283 maybe you could use it to help you with recovery. 1403 01:29:46,462 --> 01:29:47,743 So this stuff that I'm talking about, 1404 01:29:47,743 --> 01:29:49,102 let's say you've got a multi-sig, 1405 01:29:49,503 --> 01:29:51,323 maybe you could kind of put in there 1406 01:29:51,323 --> 01:29:54,222 certain information about 1407 01:29:54,222 --> 01:29:56,763 recovering the other keys 1408 01:29:56,763 --> 01:29:57,843 from a multisig, for example. 1409 01:29:58,023 --> 01:29:59,983 Although I guess then if you did get, 1410 01:30:00,263 --> 01:30:02,823 if an attacker did get access to that device, 1411 01:30:02,902 --> 01:30:04,702 then they would be able to potentially 1412 01:30:04,702 --> 01:30:05,882 follow a trail to the other. 1413 01:30:05,983 --> 01:30:06,843 So maybe that's not, 1414 01:30:07,622 --> 01:30:09,422 that probably is not a good use of it. 1415 01:30:09,702 --> 01:30:10,442 But yeah. 1416 01:30:10,542 --> 01:30:11,983 Oh, that's just implementation details. 1417 01:30:12,082 --> 01:30:12,962 We'll work it out in post. 1418 01:30:13,102 --> 01:30:13,823 We'll figure it out. 1419 01:30:14,003 --> 01:30:15,983 We'll, yeah, we'll figure it all out. 1420 01:30:18,442 --> 01:30:19,642 I'll just do that with CG. 1421 01:30:19,902 --> 01:30:20,823 Don't worry about it. 1422 01:30:21,323 --> 01:30:26,823 But before we get there, since we're still somewhat analog on this, 1423 01:30:27,263 --> 01:30:28,843 can I talk about keybackup.org? 1424 01:30:29,902 --> 01:30:30,483 Yeah, I do. 1425 01:30:30,942 --> 01:30:32,362 Have you seen it yet, Guy? 1426 01:30:33,142 --> 01:30:33,783 No, I didn't. 1427 01:30:33,802 --> 01:30:34,983 I can't remember if I sent you this one. 1428 01:30:35,122 --> 01:30:35,222 Okay. 1429 01:30:36,542 --> 01:30:37,542 Keybackup.org. 1430 01:30:38,983 --> 01:30:43,702 Interestingly, I was working on this before this whole thing 1431 01:30:43,702 --> 01:30:47,082 kind of went down with me losing access to my Bitcoin and everything 1432 01:30:47,082 --> 01:30:52,082 because I feel like hardware wallets 1433 01:30:52,182 --> 01:30:55,422 are not giving very good ways of storing your keys. 1434 01:30:55,422 --> 01:30:56,582 They give you like a little card 1435 01:30:56,582 --> 01:30:57,962 and it's like, write your Z-words down. 1436 01:30:57,962 --> 01:30:59,962 It says ledger on it or whatever it is. 1437 01:30:59,962 --> 01:31:01,202 Yeah. 1438 01:31:01,202 --> 01:31:02,302 And they're all different sizes 1439 01:31:02,302 --> 01:31:18,728 and I have a different one for every brand and stuff And it like a little bit like Exactly and they don have like important information So what i like again i was building this before the call card hack um actually happened but i was also kind of thinking to myself like like we should know from your paper backups 1440 01:31:18,728 --> 01:31:24,708 like what firmware was the device using like what's the um what's the model like if something 1441 01:31:24,708 --> 01:31:29,388 happens within you know entropy bug or whatever can you check from a paper backup like am i 1442 01:31:29,388 --> 01:31:33,828 vulnerable etc because a lot of people were saying oh you know i'm i'm i'm in this other place i don't 1443 01:31:33,828 --> 01:31:38,008 have access to my hardware wallet i've only got a backup or whatever great it'd be good to be able 1444 01:31:38,008 --> 01:31:43,788 to know that so i created this kind of document it's a four-page document and it's basically for 1445 01:31:43,788 --> 01:31:50,528 kind of like really strong um backup so it has things like for example the the date that you set 1446 01:31:50,528 --> 01:31:55,468 it up oh this is great how you did the entropy so for example did you use the device entropy 1447 01:31:56,028 --> 01:31:56,968 Did you roll dice? 1448 01:31:57,028 --> 01:31:58,448 A lot of people during the cold card thing, 1449 01:31:58,488 --> 01:32:00,968 they were like, hey, I can't remember how I did it. 1450 01:32:01,008 --> 01:32:02,148 Did I roll dice or not? 1451 01:32:02,188 --> 01:32:03,508 Did I import the seed or not? 1452 01:32:03,588 --> 01:32:06,028 So you can literally check a box. 1453 01:32:06,208 --> 01:32:06,888 Was it a device? 1454 01:32:07,028 --> 01:32:07,628 Was it dice? 1455 01:32:07,748 --> 01:32:08,448 Was it imported? 1456 01:32:09,968 --> 01:32:11,848 The master fingerprint, I don't know why. 1457 01:32:12,208 --> 01:32:13,268 Like with hardware wallets, 1458 01:32:13,268 --> 01:32:15,208 they're not having the master fingerprint at a minimum 1459 01:32:15,208 --> 01:32:16,308 as something you record, 1460 01:32:16,768 --> 01:32:19,008 because that's going to help you to identify that 1461 01:32:19,008 --> 01:32:21,608 with your hot wallets. 1462 01:32:21,808 --> 01:32:23,408 So if you import your Xpub or whatever 1463 01:32:23,408 --> 01:32:24,188 and you're using something, 1464 01:32:24,188 --> 01:32:29,648 you need to know like okay well which device does this thing like relate to and if you record your 1465 01:32:29,648 --> 01:32:35,308 master fingerprint you know okay that's for this particular wallet because otherwise stuff kind of 1466 01:32:35,308 --> 01:32:41,388 comes apart you know you've labeled your your wasabi wallet you've labeled it you know whatever 1467 01:32:41,388 --> 01:32:47,628 it is like guy's wallet and then your device you know that it's a a ledger or a cold card or a bit 1468 01:32:47,628 --> 01:32:52,468 bar you know whatever it is and it's like the two can become kind of like separated so like master 1469 01:32:52,468 --> 01:32:56,708 fingerprint is an easy way of just kind of connecting everything uh there's also a section 1470 01:32:56,708 --> 01:33:02,868 for for example like multi-sig wallet so you can put in the other kind of like the name of the wallet 1471 01:33:02,868 --> 01:33:09,868 the other the descriptor um like the descriptor checksum and the derivation path and you can say 1472 01:33:09,868 --> 01:33:13,408 like is it a two of three is a you know three or five whatever it is so you can kind of like 1473 01:33:13,408 --> 01:33:20,648 you can record whether um like that is part of like a multi-sig um and you know that that's 1474 01:33:20,648 --> 01:33:24,368 that's another way of doing it. So if I've got a paper backup, yeah, I might, like, maybe I'm using 1475 01:33:24,368 --> 01:33:27,488 it for a single SIG, but maybe it's part of a multi-SIG and I want to record that information 1476 01:33:27,488 --> 01:33:31,768 as well. Um, so it's kind of got all this information. The other thing it's got on there 1477 01:33:31,768 --> 01:33:35,728 is like for the seed words, this would have saved, uh, actually I'll get, I'll get to that. So the 1478 01:33:35,728 --> 01:33:41,788 seed words, you just enter the seed words, really easy boxes. Um, just put it for putting those in. 1479 01:33:42,388 --> 01:33:46,628 Um, you can also record the seed word number. So actually, sorry. Yeah, this is something that 1480 01:33:46,628 --> 01:33:51,328 would have saved me is putting the number so like rather than just recording the word itself you can 1481 01:33:51,328 --> 01:33:56,168 record the number of that mnemonic seed word so in my case this would have saved me because i would 1482 01:33:56,168 --> 01:33:59,488 have seen that there was a mismatch between the word and the number so it kind of gives you a second 1483 01:33:59,488 --> 01:34:09,408 option if you've recorded the word incorrectly um i love the handwriting key yes so sorry i'll 1484 01:34:09,408 --> 01:34:14,908 get to that one skipping sorry i was i was going through it while you were talking so yeah so page 1485 01:34:14,908 --> 01:34:18,988 three is for a passphrase and it kind of gives the option if you're not using a passphrase destroy it 1486 01:34:18,988 --> 01:34:22,948 so obviously if you've like rolled your seed or something you don't care for having a passphrase 1487 01:34:22,948 --> 01:34:28,808 like just destroy it um or if it's in use but it's for like a multi-sig it kind of you know 1488 01:34:28,808 --> 01:34:32,868 you want to keep those together if it's multi-sig and passphrase i know some people don't think you 1489 01:34:32,868 --> 01:34:38,088 should use a passphrase if it's multi-sig personally my my kind of like belief right now 1490 01:34:38,088 --> 01:34:43,728 is like if you have not rolled your own seed even if it's for a multi-sig use a passphrase but i know 1491 01:34:43,728 --> 01:34:47,268 that's kind of like debatable so it gives the option to do that or keep the passphrase separately 1492 01:34:47,268 --> 01:34:52,288 if it's single sig um and then you know you can kind of type you can put in your passphrase you 1493 01:34:52,288 --> 01:34:57,988 can also kind of like tick to say whether it's exactly the the characters used like or if it's 1494 01:34:57,988 --> 01:35:04,848 kind of like you've recorded it in um cap hills for legibility only so maybe you want a lowercase 1495 01:35:04,848 --> 01:35:09,448 one but you want to record it in uppercase or vice versa kind of gives the option to kind of 1496 01:35:09,448 --> 01:35:13,888 record it like that way. If you've used mix, then you can just say exactly as characters used. 1497 01:35:14,288 --> 01:35:19,848 Personally, for me, I like to have my passphrases lowercase. So it's easy to put them in on the 1498 01:35:19,848 --> 01:35:25,568 device. But I like to record them uppercase, because I can read them better with my own 1499 01:35:25,568 --> 01:35:29,908 handwriting. So I've got a nice handy box that just says literally, capitals is for legibility 1500 01:35:29,908 --> 01:35:34,108 only real passphrases lowercase, really simple, like you can't kind of mix that up. 1501 01:35:34,108 --> 01:35:39,248 again you don't have to use necessarily all of these features or all these kind of 1502 01:35:39,248 --> 01:35:42,708 yeah these options like it might be that some of them you're just like this isn't for me but 1503 01:35:42,708 --> 01:35:48,588 just gives a really good way of getting it I was about to say I would just just noting and 1504 01:35:48,588 --> 01:35:57,208 thinking about this people can fill out forms yes you know and if you just give them exactly 1505 01:35:57,208 --> 01:36:04,828 like, listen, just fill this stuff out. And here are the three most important things. And here's the 1506 01:36:04,828 --> 01:36:14,488 six other useful things that, you know, you can maybe benefit from. And like, you do it for 1507 01:36:14,488 --> 01:36:21,508 insurance. You do it for, you know, you do it for anything that matters. And this is actually 1508 01:36:21,508 --> 01:36:29,628 pretty clever. I would like to have a more compact way to, to store it rather than like full sheets 1509 01:36:29,628 --> 01:36:35,648 of paper, you know, but this is great. I feel you. But also like, you know, we, people do their taxes 1510 01:36:35,648 --> 01:36:39,928 or whatever, every year, and you've got like 20 pages. And I kind of think of like for your life 1511 01:36:39,928 --> 01:36:44,468 savings, you know, in a lot of people's case, like having four sheets of paper is, it's not, 1512 01:36:44,548 --> 01:36:48,708 it's not much to ask. And a lot of it, you know, for example, the last page, like you mentioned, 1513 01:36:48,708 --> 01:36:53,408 like it's got like a handwriting key on there some of this stuff is definitely like just it's 1514 01:36:53,408 --> 01:37:00,008 for the extreme person like for me this is like the like cold card was all about the high you know 1515 01:37:00,008 --> 01:37:04,288 the kind of like extreme end of users you know obviously like yeah in retrospect they fucked it 1516 01:37:04,288 --> 01:37:10,068 with the the entropy but like the i've tried to kind of apply that mentality at least of having 1517 01:37:10,068 --> 01:37:16,008 something that's just like this is for kind of like a not necessarily like an advanced user there's 1518 01:37:16,008 --> 01:37:19,908 nothing advanced about it but like if you want to have peace of mind that you've got a really strong 1519 01:37:19,908 --> 01:37:24,548 backup and you're willing to sit and spend the time you do it so the last page has like a 1520 01:37:24,548 --> 01:37:31,148 handwriting key there so you can literally record your zero to your o you know your one and your l 1521 01:37:31,148 --> 01:37:35,648 etc you can record all those so that like you know i love that because so many people be like 1522 01:37:35,648 --> 01:37:39,268 well i can read my own handwriting and then two years later when they're recovering their seed 1523 01:37:39,268 --> 01:37:44,908 they're like uh well i definitely i mean i definitely couldn't i i couldn't in fact that's 1524 01:37:44,908 --> 01:37:51,108 an interesting thing. I was trying to figure out how I managed to get a correct mnemonic seed word, 1525 01:37:51,628 --> 01:37:56,628 even though it was like incorrect for my particular seed, like how that happened. And the only thing I 1526 01:37:56,628 --> 01:38:02,368 can think of how I did that, managed to get another valid word, is that at some point, I think I was 1527 01:38:02,368 --> 01:38:07,508 transferring my words from like, you know, the cardware wallet thing that was sent to another 1528 01:38:07,508 --> 01:38:13,688 piece of paper. And I think what I must have done is I couldn't read my own handwriting. And then I 1529 01:38:13,688 --> 01:38:18,828 went to the mnemonic c word list and when which one does it look like oh it must be that and then 1530 01:38:18,828 --> 01:38:24,868 oh this says r and i at the beginning and it's got uh that thing that looks like a u but oh it 1531 01:38:24,868 --> 01:38:32,348 maybe it's a v because it's got an al at the end precisely rival totally rival that shit was ritual 1532 01:38:32,348 --> 01:38:37,948 right so i think that's what i did so that's kind of why i put like the handwriting key on here as 1533 01:38:37,948 --> 01:38:41,948 well as useful and then and then there's also like a recovery test log so you can see when was this 1534 01:38:41,948 --> 01:38:47,888 last tested did it pass or not so that like you know this wallet was working at this date and if 1535 01:38:47,888 --> 01:38:51,408 you're like oh too much time has passed here you know you could potentially like set a reminder for 1536 01:38:51,408 --> 01:38:56,928 yourself test the wallet again in one year etc so yes it is it's a very boring form this is not 1537 01:38:56,928 --> 01:39:00,508 something that you're going to get and be like oh this is a super nice you know user experience it 1538 01:39:00,508 --> 01:39:06,388 literally is like doing a tax form but it's going to have maximum like information there 1539 01:39:06,388 --> 01:39:11,568 so that you can like but if you have to fill it out when you when you have your money stolen from 1540 01:39:11,568 --> 01:39:17,188 you, why don't you fill it out while you're keeping your money safe too? And if it's going to, 1541 01:39:17,188 --> 01:39:21,548 if it's going to save you. And this is a printed form, right? Like it's not this, the idea, you, 1542 01:39:21,628 --> 01:39:26,108 you know, you don't want to be like typing this on your computer or anything. Um, you print out 1543 01:39:26,108 --> 01:39:30,248 the form, you do it all by hand. The other two things I'm thinking about doing for this is 1544 01:39:30,248 --> 01:39:35,648 potentially put in like, um, it might be a little bit laborious, but like something. 1545 01:39:37,528 --> 01:39:41,268 Okay. So there's two ideas. One is potentially having something that would help you if you do 1546 01:39:41,268 --> 01:39:46,008 have to do some recovery like recording the first receive address like you could potentially do that 1547 01:39:46,008 --> 01:39:51,328 and then that would help in a recovery scenario the other thing i was thinking is potentially also 1548 01:39:51,328 --> 01:39:56,208 just having like uh the device pin the reason i've not put the device pin recording on here is 1549 01:39:56,208 --> 01:40:03,108 because really your backup should be in replacement of a hardware wallet not kind of like something 1550 01:40:03,108 --> 01:40:09,148 you shouldn't go to it while you have your wallet yes your wallet should be like a backup of that 1551 01:40:09,148 --> 01:40:11,308 Because the thing is, if you put the device pin on here, 1552 01:40:11,688 --> 01:40:14,768 and then you've kept it geographically separate from your hardware wallet, 1553 01:40:14,828 --> 01:40:17,548 but then suddenly you take a flight, you go and visit your family or whatever, 1554 01:40:17,668 --> 01:40:20,348 now they're both together, that's kind of like a risk. 1555 01:40:20,608 --> 01:40:22,468 So that's the reason I've kept it off for now, 1556 01:40:22,588 --> 01:40:26,488 but there might be some reason to do it potentially 1557 01:40:26,488 --> 01:40:29,248 if you absolutely know these two things are never going to be together. 1558 01:40:29,628 --> 01:40:32,148 But anyway, the reason I say all this is this is totally open source. 1559 01:40:32,328 --> 01:40:34,668 Anyone can contribute to it, and it's free. 1560 01:40:34,808 --> 01:40:36,248 Anyone can just go and download it. 1561 01:40:36,248 --> 01:40:41,108 So go to keybackup.org and you can just download the form. 1562 01:40:41,608 --> 01:40:44,428 And it also even has like a, this is probably a bit gimmicky. 1563 01:40:44,628 --> 01:40:47,708 It's not probably necessary for this, but you can even like verify the, 1564 01:40:47,828 --> 01:40:52,768 you can even kind of like verify the hash to make sure that the document is valid and stuff. 1565 01:40:52,808 --> 01:40:55,508 It's just a little thing that I kind of wanted to do in there for fun, really. 1566 01:40:55,668 --> 01:40:58,328 But yeah, it's a great, it's a really, really good form. 1567 01:40:58,428 --> 01:41:01,148 Personally, for me, I won't do a backup without using this now. 1568 01:41:01,188 --> 01:41:03,148 And I think that this document will help a lot of people. 1569 01:41:03,148 --> 01:41:06,028 So I hope that people will get some use for it. 1570 01:41:06,248 --> 01:41:09,528 This is a testament to why you are the producer. 1571 01:41:10,588 --> 01:41:15,688 Because this is the most type A personality shit I've ever seen in my life. 1572 01:41:16,308 --> 01:41:19,308 Like I almost had, I almost lost Bitcoin. 1573 01:41:20,308 --> 01:41:24,348 And I screwed up my backup plan. 1574 01:41:24,908 --> 01:41:35,128 So I created a form to fill out that has four pages of everything that could possibly relate to my backup of when it happened. 1575 01:41:35,128 --> 01:41:37,828 and I'm going to have a file folder 1576 01:41:37,828 --> 01:41:40,428 sorted and indexed 1577 01:41:40,428 --> 01:41:42,068 and I'm going to know exactly where it is. 1578 01:41:42,348 --> 01:41:45,788 This is such a you thing to do 1579 01:41:45,788 --> 01:41:46,688 and I love it. 1580 01:41:47,128 --> 01:41:47,568 This is great. 1581 01:41:47,828 --> 01:41:49,228 You've gone through that experience 1582 01:41:49,228 --> 01:41:51,268 of thinking you've lost funds and stuff 1583 01:41:51,268 --> 01:41:53,168 and the stress of that, 1584 01:41:53,448 --> 01:41:54,748 you're just like, you know what? 1585 01:41:54,868 --> 01:41:56,868 I would have put myself through a lot of pain 1586 01:41:56,868 --> 01:41:58,648 not to be feeling that I've just lost 1587 01:41:58,648 --> 01:42:00,708 half my life's savings. 1588 01:42:01,008 --> 01:42:01,448 If you just knew, 1589 01:42:01,528 --> 01:42:02,588 you'd go get your piece of paper. 1590 01:42:03,048 --> 01:42:04,988 Get your staple paper. 1591 01:42:04,988 --> 01:42:10,648 so easy to do man like i mean i really thought i had everything figured out with this backup i was 1592 01:42:10,648 --> 01:42:14,488 like you know i've always been really good with my backups i've always been like very very like 1593 01:42:14,488 --> 01:42:19,408 conscious of doing it and when it when i screwed it up i was like if i've screwed this up and you 1594 01:42:19,408 --> 01:42:25,348 know what i'm like i'm i'm very very like kind of that way inclined very like organized with stuff 1595 01:42:25,348 --> 01:42:31,328 and i was like if i screwed this up anyone can so yeah i i will only use this backup now like 1596 01:42:31,328 --> 01:42:35,888 honestly it's uh it feels like a different experience it's writing down writing down your 1597 01:42:35,888 --> 01:42:40,868 c words now on a piece of card from a harbor wallet it feels it genuinely feels wrong 1598 01:42:40,868 --> 01:42:51,228 i love it um well dude i said what that was that uh where is it key backup.org okay i'll have the 1599 01:42:51,228 --> 01:42:56,928 link in the show notes um and i actually have to have to roll i think food is here and the dogs 1600 01:42:56,928 --> 01:43:02,188 are freaking out that's all good i'm i'm suffocating a little bit behind my disguise here 1601 01:43:02,188 --> 01:43:09,748 anyway well it's really good nobody has any idea who you are no no well i mean this the thing is 1602 01:43:09,748 --> 01:43:14,008 like you know you're gonna die of covid any minute now you're gonna suffocate and it'll be all be all 1603 01:43:14,008 --> 01:43:21,288 because of covid what hashtag wear a mask but no it's like i i don't i don't mind like people 1604 01:43:21,288 --> 01:43:24,788 kind of like like there's there's people out there who kind of know my identity and stuff but 1605 01:43:24,788 --> 01:43:27,768 I get increasingly nervous about stuff, 1606 01:43:27,808 --> 01:43:28,968 especially with everything that's happening 1607 01:43:28,968 --> 01:43:30,248 like in Europe right now. 1608 01:43:30,588 --> 01:43:32,368 Like, you know, France is crazy 1609 01:43:32,368 --> 01:43:34,368 and it's starting to kick off in other places. 1610 01:43:34,608 --> 01:43:36,208 Like some places in Asia, it's not great. 1611 01:43:36,328 --> 01:43:38,248 Like people kind of get in, 1612 01:43:38,628 --> 01:43:40,008 like people are being recognized 1613 01:43:40,008 --> 01:43:41,948 like for having Bitcoin and stuff. 1614 01:43:42,108 --> 01:43:44,168 And like, I think that that as like, 1615 01:43:44,548 --> 01:43:47,808 if we're serious about where fiat is going, 1616 01:43:47,968 --> 01:43:50,648 which is like just amounting to basically 1617 01:43:50,648 --> 01:43:51,888 just becoming dirt, 1618 01:43:51,888 --> 01:43:57,868 then it's going to just that kind of like that security trade-off like people are going to want 1619 01:43:57,868 --> 01:44:00,688 your bitcoin and people are going to go to greater and greater lengths to find it and 1620 01:44:00,688 --> 01:44:06,288 i i don't mean to freak you out about this because you are the face of bitcoin oh no i'm screwed i 1621 01:44:06,288 --> 01:44:09,668 can see one day that's why that's why my practice 1622 01:44:09,668 --> 01:44:09,988 is 1623 01:44:09,984 --> 01:44:12,804 practice aim three to five times a day. 1624 01:44:12,804 --> 01:44:13,044 Yeah. 1625 01:44:13,104 --> 01:44:13,604 Just get it out. 1626 01:44:13,604 --> 01:44:14,704 Well, that's all right for you 1627 01:44:14,704 --> 01:44:15,604 because you're in America. 1628 01:44:15,784 --> 01:44:16,864 Yeah, in the US. 1629 01:44:17,204 --> 01:44:17,924 I can do that. 1630 01:44:17,924 --> 01:44:19,404 If you're in the cucked parts of the world, 1631 01:44:19,464 --> 01:44:20,564 which is most of it, 1632 01:44:20,684 --> 01:44:22,604 then you don't have that option. 1633 01:44:22,884 --> 01:44:24,144 So I think like, 1634 01:44:24,344 --> 01:44:25,524 and I can see one day 1635 01:44:25,524 --> 01:44:26,804 people really using these models. 1636 01:44:26,904 --> 01:44:28,184 It's already getting pretty crazy now 1637 01:44:28,184 --> 01:44:29,224 with people like doing, 1638 01:44:29,444 --> 01:44:31,124 going to great lengths to attack self-custody. 1639 01:44:31,464 --> 01:44:32,524 When people start putting models 1640 01:44:32,524 --> 01:44:33,064 and saying like, 1641 01:44:33,144 --> 01:44:34,864 who's posted about Bitcoin? 1642 01:44:35,024 --> 01:44:35,784 Who's talked about it? 1643 01:44:35,784 --> 01:44:36,564 Who's been talking about it 1644 01:44:36,564 --> 01:44:37,684 during these pivotal years 1645 01:44:37,684 --> 01:44:38,624 where it was kind of like 1646 01:44:38,624 --> 01:44:42,804 not worth as much as it is now. And, you know, then trying to kind of like tap into other ways 1647 01:44:42,804 --> 01:44:49,124 of finding you, like it's going to get pretty wild. So I think that like, um, yeah, people know 1648 01:44:49,124 --> 01:44:53,324 me in real life and I'm quite happy. Like when I'm, you know, conferences and stuff like that to 1649 01:44:53,324 --> 01:44:57,864 like introduce myself and meet people. I'm not one of the people who just wears, wears a disguise 1650 01:44:57,864 --> 01:45:04,824 all the time, but yeah, I, I try to just kind of, um, it's not a bad idea. It's like the 80, 1651 01:45:04,824 --> 01:45:10,544 20 kind of rule right it's like do the do the 20 of things that maybe have 80 the results so 1652 01:45:10,544 --> 01:45:16,684 so that's why yeah what i try to do my thing uh that i'll recommend everybody to do especially 1653 01:45:16,684 --> 01:45:23,884 if they are public in any way get a po box or like a ups mailbox or whatever put your business 1654 01:45:23,884 --> 01:45:30,704 address at that work through your business and anytime you were dealing with anything even 1655 01:45:30,704 --> 01:45:32,104 related to Bitcoin. 1656 01:45:33,104 --> 01:45:34,204 Ship to that address. 1657 01:45:34,304 --> 01:45:35,304 In fact, do it with everything. 1658 01:45:35,464 --> 01:45:36,004 Do it with everything. 1659 01:45:36,964 --> 01:45:40,344 Just make it a daily habit of running out and getting stuff. 1660 01:45:40,744 --> 01:45:45,464 And especially if you have like, you know, separate worlds, 1661 01:45:45,464 --> 01:45:47,764 like you can have like your Bitcoin world and your fiat world. 1662 01:45:49,424 --> 01:45:52,424 But everywhere you can, just get your home address off of it. 1663 01:45:53,524 --> 01:45:55,764 Try to get your name off of it if you can. 1664 01:45:55,764 --> 01:46:02,004 i thought i thought i thought like i mean because i don't know exactly how much it is for a po box 1665 01:46:02,004 --> 01:46:07,424 maybe it's like not that much i know in the uk it's it can be quite expensive to do it but like 1666 01:46:07,424 --> 01:46:13,064 personally for me if if i needed to do that i would just go down to my local like corner store 1667 01:46:13,064 --> 01:46:16,364 or whatever and just say to them hey do you mind if i get something sent here i'll give you like 1668 01:46:16,364 --> 01:46:20,804 i'll give you like a tip or something i'll just i'll give you five bucks to just receive my package 1669 01:46:20,804 --> 01:46:24,664 oh yeah like a trusted source yeah that'd be great yeah business address from a friend 1670 01:46:24,664 --> 01:46:26,724 you can always just do these little things 1671 01:46:26,724 --> 01:46:28,644 oh my god that would be a great oh my god 1672 01:46:28,644 --> 01:46:30,044 that would be a great freaking 1673 01:46:30,044 --> 01:46:41,456 service for a bitcoin space for like the Colorado space or whatever to basically let people of course it also a bit of a 1674 01:46:41,456 --> 01:46:42,996 bit of a honeypot there maybe 1675 01:46:42,996 --> 01:46:45,696 it is but it's probably more secure 1676 01:46:45,696 --> 01:46:46,696 to accept packages 1677 01:46:46,696 --> 01:46:48,316 because it's really about address 1678 01:46:48,316 --> 01:46:49,876 not like you're storing keys there 1679 01:46:49,876 --> 01:46:51,216 yeah 1680 01:46:51,216 --> 01:46:54,256 but to give people a delivery 1681 01:46:54,256 --> 01:46:54,896 I think they do 1682 01:46:54,896 --> 01:46:56,616 I think a lot of the spaces 1683 01:46:56,616 --> 01:46:58,676 they stock the hardware while it's there 1684 01:46:58,676 --> 01:46:59,916 so you don't even need to 1685 01:46:59,916 --> 01:47:05,616 get them sent there. Yeah. I just mean for general, general services and packaging and 1686 01:47:05,616 --> 01:47:10,356 shipments and all that stuff is to basically do that with like UPS. You know what they should do? 1687 01:47:10,676 --> 01:47:15,476 They should have a printer to print the key backup.org document. Cause my only thing when 1688 01:47:15,476 --> 01:47:19,536 I was getting it printed was I don't have a printer. So I had to go to the print store to 1689 01:47:19,536 --> 01:47:24,416 do it. And then I was like, now, you know, obviously it's, it's kind of diminishing levels 1690 01:47:24,416 --> 01:47:29,376 of, you know, uh, kind of a security exposure or whatever. But even doing that, I was like, 1691 01:47:29,376 --> 01:47:33,516 you know someone hands you the things in bitcoin and they might kind of like clock you and be like 1692 01:47:33,516 --> 01:47:39,796 you know i mean i live in mexico so it's not the it's not the safest place to uh kind of like 1693 01:47:39,796 --> 01:47:43,756 scream and shout about that stuff right like you're probably all right in a lot of places but 1694 01:47:43,756 --> 01:47:48,236 anywhere that you can be more private when it's not going to really cost you anything i think you 1695 01:47:48,236 --> 01:47:56,116 can it can help to do it yeah well that's awesome man um i'm very glad i'm very glad i was confident 1696 01:47:56,116 --> 01:47:58,316 that it was going to be figured out 1697 01:47:58,316 --> 01:47:59,416 and you get your keys back. 1698 01:48:00,156 --> 01:48:00,476 You were. 1699 01:48:00,616 --> 01:48:02,836 Well, I appreciate your help in the process as well. 1700 01:48:03,036 --> 01:48:05,036 You gave me some good advice that I employed 1701 01:48:05,036 --> 01:48:07,976 to get those funds back. 1702 01:48:08,996 --> 01:48:09,396 Awesome. 1703 01:48:09,736 --> 01:48:10,736 Yeah, appreciate it, man. 1704 01:48:10,816 --> 01:48:11,136 Hell yeah. 1705 01:48:11,696 --> 01:48:13,376 I love success stories 1706 01:48:13,376 --> 01:48:15,076 because there's way too many horror stories. 1707 01:48:15,516 --> 01:48:16,636 Yeah, especially right now. 1708 01:48:16,636 --> 01:48:17,876 There's way too many horror stories. 1709 01:48:18,196 --> 01:48:19,736 That's why I want to do this episode 1710 01:48:19,736 --> 01:48:20,976 because it was a success story. 1711 01:48:21,096 --> 01:48:22,556 It has a happy freaking ending. 1712 01:48:23,276 --> 01:48:25,316 And now we're going to build everything that we want with AI 1713 01:48:25,316 --> 01:48:27,576 and my sync is from my 1714 01:48:27,576 --> 01:48:29,336 pair drive app is almost done 1715 01:48:29,336 --> 01:48:30,616 I have a 1716 01:48:30,616 --> 01:48:33,056 so if you can see 1717 01:48:33,056 --> 01:48:34,516 that number right there 1718 01:48:34,516 --> 01:48:37,456 so I'm syncing my photos 1719 01:48:37,456 --> 01:48:39,636 back up I did not realize that 1720 01:48:39,636 --> 01:48:41,176 I 1721 01:48:41,176 --> 01:48:43,456 iPhone literally doesn't 1722 01:48:44,096 --> 01:48:45,516 like I don't have my photos 1723 01:48:45,516 --> 01:48:47,456 and my videos of like my kids 1724 01:48:47,456 --> 01:48:49,576 on my phone or at least I only have 1725 01:48:49,576 --> 01:48:51,496 like a small portion of it the rest of it's in iCloud 1726 01:48:51,496 --> 01:48:52,996 I have like 1.5 terabytes 1727 01:48:52,996 --> 01:48:55,296 and I've only got a terabyte on this phone 1728 01:48:55,296 --> 01:49:06,789 And it only taking up 200 gigs So like 800 gigs of that at least is missing Then even more I had no idea it was on iCloud If I had lost access to my iCloud 1729 01:49:07,529 --> 01:49:09,569 pictures that I took on this phone would not be on this phone. 1730 01:49:10,349 --> 01:49:12,829 And I'd be like, what the hell? 1731 01:49:14,469 --> 01:49:17,269 And so I finally was like, all right, well, I'll just make, 1732 01:49:18,109 --> 01:49:19,329 I know Paracore works. 1733 01:49:19,329 --> 01:49:23,049 I know we've got like PairDrive, all this stuff like sorted out. 1734 01:49:23,169 --> 01:49:25,349 So I just booted up a mobile version. 1735 01:49:25,349 --> 01:49:26,989 and all it does is, like right now, 1736 01:49:27,029 --> 01:49:28,829 is just sync my videos and photos. 1737 01:49:29,229 --> 01:49:35,609 I have 45,463 items to sync. 1738 01:49:36,849 --> 01:49:41,169 I use my camera and I take a lot of pictures of kids. 1739 01:49:42,069 --> 01:49:45,969 But I'm at 43,603 on the sync. 1740 01:49:46,629 --> 01:49:47,449 So it's almost done. 1741 01:49:47,449 --> 01:49:50,009 But is that going to, you have like some, 1742 01:49:50,389 --> 01:49:51,809 you have a server rack or something? 1743 01:49:51,869 --> 01:49:52,429 My Linux machine. 1744 01:49:52,429 --> 01:49:58,129 oh it's just just my linux machine and then it goes to a pair drive folder and so everything i 1745 01:49:58,129 --> 01:50:03,709 have installed with pair drive i can look at my photos you can but isn't it is it one location 1746 01:50:03,709 --> 01:50:09,149 that has the actual file itself and the others are kind of temporarily like tapping into that or 1747 01:50:09,149 --> 01:50:16,269 or do you sync across your device however however i want um so i'll have probably 1748 01:50:16,269 --> 01:50:22,149 i'll probably have like the most recent year and maybe all my favorites or something on my 1749 01:50:22,149 --> 01:50:28,369 Mac mini because I don't have enough hard drive space to get all of it probably um and I'll do 1750 01:50:28,369 --> 01:50:36,669 something similar with my uh MacBook Pro um but my start nine I think I'm gonna plug in some extra 1751 01:50:36,669 --> 01:50:41,969 hard drives into it and actually have a second backup but my brother's also setting up a uh 1752 01:50:41,969 --> 01:50:48,389 a unit so that he can plug into my pair drive my spaces and we're gonna start like finally really 1753 01:50:48,389 --> 01:50:54,729 testing and user practice like syncing and having joint things and i'm gonna back up all my photos 1754 01:50:54,729 --> 01:50:59,889 on his and he's gonna back up all his own mine just so that we can kind of have that like okay 1755 01:50:59,889 --> 01:51:05,449 it's truly distributed we know where it is we know which devices are like like have it so that 1756 01:51:05,449 --> 01:51:11,489 so we don't lose it and it's easy to access and it's very quick snappy because you have multiple 1757 01:51:11,489 --> 01:51:17,929 peers feeding it at all times um what you want to do is you want to ride the ai wave 1758 01:51:17,929 --> 01:51:20,889 and use it so that you can build Pear Drive. 1759 01:51:20,889 --> 01:51:32,621 And then you want to hope for the AI crash immediately after it built so that you can then buy the like storage again for cheap Absolutely Storage I want to get that I want to get that Ram I want to get that sweet 1760 01:51:32,741 --> 01:51:40,101 sweet Ram and, uh, and some really nice hard drives. No. Yeah. Um, but we're getting there. 1761 01:51:40,321 --> 01:51:44,901 I'm excited. I'm so excited. I'm excited. I think it's going to be awesome. I think it's 1762 01:51:44,901 --> 01:51:48,461 going to be awesome. I mean, you're building some cool stuff. I'm excited to, uh, like 1763 01:51:48,461 --> 01:51:53,081 sharing that process of like getting it going and getting it off the ground i'm interested to do 1764 01:51:53,081 --> 01:51:59,441 some testing with you soon so hell yeah i am well dude have yourself a i guess you're you're towards 1765 01:51:59,441 --> 01:52:07,561 the end of the night here are you in uh i think i'm an hour behind you okay okay well have a 1766 01:52:07,561 --> 01:52:14,601 wonderful evening and you man i'm gonna go get some food and relax and then spend two hours 1767 01:52:14,601 --> 01:52:20,421 walking my daughter because she won't go to sleep and break my back and then I'll have a rough day 1768 01:52:20,421 --> 01:52:27,021 tomorrow and then we'll do it all over again enjoy man thank you for having me on yeah dude yeah dude 1769 01:52:27,021 --> 01:52:31,781 thanks for hanging out uh we'll catch up in fact I actually would like to talk again tomorrow um 1770 01:52:31,781 --> 01:52:38,381 when I get this episode that I'm working on right now done uh just because I think our workflow is 1771 01:52:38,381 --> 01:52:44,061 ready to update a little bit cool and how I'm I'm doing this so we'll we'll talk tomorrow we'll talk 1772 01:52:44,061 --> 01:52:44,981 All right, brother. 1773 01:52:45,261 --> 01:52:45,401 Bye. 1774 01:52:45,561 --> 01:52:46,121 Thanks, boss. 1775 01:52:46,761 --> 01:52:47,161 Later, man. 1776 01:52:50,561 --> 01:52:51,281 All right, guys. 1777 01:52:51,401 --> 01:52:52,241 I got a lot to do. 1778 01:52:52,561 --> 01:52:53,861 I hope you enjoyed that episode. 1779 01:52:54,041 --> 01:52:55,901 Don't forget to follow Stack to the Future 1780 01:52:55,901 --> 01:52:59,441 as well as myself on social and all the places. 1781 01:53:00,181 --> 01:53:01,661 Check out the GitHub as well. 1782 01:53:01,661 --> 01:53:05,841 It should be listed under me as TheGuySwan on GitHub. 1783 01:53:06,601 --> 01:53:09,161 And I'll have the link to the Key Backup website. 1784 01:53:09,921 --> 01:53:12,081 And don't forget to grab yourself a bit box 1785 01:53:12,081 --> 01:53:13,101 with my discount code. 1786 01:53:13,101 --> 01:53:18,021 great way to help out the show and a wonderful hardware wallet open source off the bottom with 1787 01:53:18,021 --> 01:53:21,681 that i will catch you on the next one and until then that's our two sets 1788 01:53:43,101 --> 01:53:43,601 you