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They don't actually have to throw you in jail anymore.

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They just turn off all your money.

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We are now in an arms race,

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and we're on the losing side by default, for sure.

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We do not have as much money as them.

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We do not have as much resources as them.

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We might be ideologically correct

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and morally have the high ground,

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but since when did that mean you won?

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You must play their game by their rules.

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As soon as people stop doing that,

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then yeah, they get scared for good reason.

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Unless we just say no,

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we will end up like China,

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where shit works and it's really cheap

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been pretty effective and efficient and all the rest, but like don't step out of line.

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We need to get out of this trap of thinking that we have to be building Nostra specific

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things.

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A handful of curious people will realize that like, hey, wait, what's this thing built on?

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And like, how can I'm seeing all this other content from other places?

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And how are people paying me Bitcoin?

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This is crazy.

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When people talk about freedom tech, like that's, that's literally what it is.

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You're like helping people that for them could be a life without situation.

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Greetings and salutations, my fellow plebs. My name is Walker and this is the Bitcoin podcast.

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Bitcoin continues to make new blocks every 10 minutes and the value of one Bitcoin is still

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one Bitcoin. If you are listening to this right now, remember you're still early.

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This episode is brought to you by Blockware. What if you could lower your tax bill and stack

29
00:01:17,800 --> 00:01:23,000
Bitcoin at the same time? Well, with Blockware, you can. New U.S. tax rules let miners write off

30
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100% of their mining hardware in a single year. So earn Bitcoin daily while saving big come tax

31
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season. Get started at mining.blockwarsolutions.com slash titcoin. Use the code titcoin to get $100

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off your first miner when using the Blockware marketplace. This is not tax advice, so go speak

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to the team at Blockware to learn more. That's mining.blockwarsolutions.com slash titcoin.

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Head to the show notes for links to find the show on centralized social media platforms and

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on Noster or just go directly to BitcoinPodcast.net, you'll find it all there. And kind reminder

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that you can support this show by becoming a paid subscriber on Fountain. Or don't,

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Bitcoin doesn't care, but I sure do appreciate it. Without further ado, let's get into this Bitcoin

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talk. This is all kind of like still very much emerging. I'm always very pleasantly surprised

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when things work out as they should it's like oh okay sick like we're totally wild i mean it is

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kind of wild yeah yeah you're like looking at something like oh yeah it just the message just

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arrives oh cool okay yeah right the thing decrypted properly wow okay wow look at that we are we are

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doing this without the need for uh youtube or uh rumble you know rumble is not too bad at least

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they like run all of their own servers and have a i would say a more favorable attitude towards

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free speech people saying things yeah but you know towards like just saying stuff uh right

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problem being of course that it's still like well there's still a throat to choke there

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you know and and like that's where i think i hope that we see more live streaming services kind of

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pop up in and around noster because it is such like it's such a massive culture generally just

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like streamer culture i didn't even know that until i started kind of like looking at some

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this stuff and it's like holy shit it's wild some of these twitch streamers it's just insane and

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people just watch them just like i don't just like hang out all day i'm like it's television

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you guys aren't even talking about bitcoin yeah yeah yeah like what do you do it's crazy um like

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i worked at a startup that did video streaming it was like an api for video streaming so um you know

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other platforms would use their products or whatever and like just the amount of tech that

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goes into you know transcoding on the fly being able to do live streams of really really low

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latency you know they specialized in like you know tv broadcast type things and so it was like

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latency of under two seconds is like what they were aiming for and like to get that is just insane

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it's like how do we even have the tech to do this like you can beam something across the world in

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you know just a handful of seconds but you know right after it happened and it can show up on

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someone's screen like insane it is just wild like and i think it's got to be i feel like we're

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probably of this, we're the interesting like, uh, age group where we're not full digital natives.

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Like we, we remember, well, I'm actually not sure of exactly how old you are, but I'm guessing.

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We grew up with it basically. Yeah. We grew up with it. It sort of like came about while we were

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kids and it was like, Oh, exactly. This is a thing now. Yeah. It's like, you know, we remember like,

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you know, there was a time before wifi kids, you won't believe it. You know, like, you know,

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it's crazy. You know what that sounds like too. You know what that sounds like. That sound is

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seared into our brains, right? The dial up. I mean, totally. But then there's this whole new

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generation where it's like, they, this, this is just the air they breathe. It's the water they

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swim in. This is all totally normal. I mean, the idea of buffering, like anything buffering

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is just like, what do you mean? What does that, what does that even mean? I don't even know what

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that word is. Is that an insult? Is that a racial slur? It feels like it is. It's wild. Like shit,

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just like shit works really well. It's also though, like a lot of it works so well because

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so much the infrastructure is so centralized right like because you've got massive aws instances

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all over the place and then you see what happens when you know what was it aw one of the aw east

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it's always east one it's always us east one is that yeah and like like half the internet

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seemingly was just not working right which is just right or cloud wire like that's another one

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like i saw the cloud fire thing was literally somebody just wrote a bug like it was just a

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memory overflow issue um you know standard run-of-the-mill software bug uh and actually

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no it wasn't it was an unwrap it was it was in rust and there's this method that you calls unwrap

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and it sort of like opens up this object that you get back from most methods but they always say like

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you know one of the very first things you learn when you're learning rust is like don't use unwrap

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in production like you're only allowed to use it in like tests and things like that because if it

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fails okay it just errors and crashes the whole program and somebody did this in production on

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cloud flare and the thing just it started up again and it was a crash startup crash startup crash and

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so like until they found that they weren't able to like turn the thing back on basically um so

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hilarious though like one small software yeah yeah and in the meantime like shit breaks like like

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potentially very vital infrastructure shit breaks right and it's like oops sorry like fat fingered

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that one you know like i mean that's basically it though right like that's you know when you think

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about that like we have built this crazy you know it started out as a decentralized network and it's

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slowly become more and more centralized and it's um you know in the past when we had something that

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was so infrastructure mission critical we had like proper protocols and like people that were

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you know looking at this and they were very careful about how they changed like think about

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nuclear power plants right they had like big notebooks full of like this is what happens if

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error code four sets off and like these are the four or five things you're supposed to do next

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and like no one cares they're just like i don't know merge it looks good code's good let's go

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yeah and then the internet falls off it is just kind of nuts yeah yeah and i've just rated myself

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on on noster boom nice look at that how refreshing man jeff i'm i'm stoked we're we're doing this

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right now and hello to everybody who's already joined on noster what i love about live streaming

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these things on noster because this was never meant to be a live streaming show but then zap

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stream came about and i thought well well neat i could just live stream this just why not no stir

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why not why not just do it but it's amazing like thank you to uh to manny oh and thank you to brian

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who just sent zaps uh that's just awesome like it's still it does not get old it doesn't matter

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i i give i give a lot of grief for one sat zaps uh but you know as a fun joke but a zap of any

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amount is still worth more than than just a like right it's that's totally a beautiful thing that

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we're able to do here. So it's great to be doing this beautiful thing with you here, man. It's a,

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thank you. We saw each other in Lugano and we were like, we, we need to rip a fucking pod together.

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We need to do a podcast. Yeah. We've been trying to do it for a while. And I feel like it's just

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been like ships passing in the night. We see each other every, you know, couple of conferences and

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it's like, bro, we got to do the thing. Yeah. We got to do the thing. Okay. And then we're doing it

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now. Life, life intervenes. Well, you've been building, right? You've been doing a lot of

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building. You've been busy. You just got, you just got back from, just got back from Africa,

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right yeah from the africa bitcoin conference down in mauritius and i say it's my first time

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to africa and technically yes mauritius is africa but it's like 2 000 kilometers off the coast of

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southern africa out in the indian ocean so it doesn't really feel like my idea of what africa

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should be like right right but it's amazing like it's tropical paradise that's for sure

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i saw some pictures i think that btc sessions and gladstein posted i was like dear lord this is

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insanely beautiful. Yeah. I've heard also very high signal conference. Yeah.

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Very high signal conference. Yeah. Very interesting. Very different. Um, you know,

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just being able to hang out with a bunch of the African Bitcoiners that, I mean,

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they've just got to build stuff in such a completely different way. Uh, you know,

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because of lack of internet or lack of electricity in some cases, um, certainly the lack of like

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coordinated governments that make any sense whatsoever. Um, and there's just, you know,

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there's a ton of countries and a ton of languages. It's like 54 countries and 42 languages. Um,

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and like a large portion of those are dictatorships or author, you know, authoritarians. So like

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they've got a different problem set than we have. Uh, and so it's really cool to be able to hang

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out with builders there and see what they're doing and like understand how they've gotten

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around all these weird constraints and stuff like that. So yeah, it was a really good conference.

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Well, you see so many just really novel solutions, whether it be around, around Bitcoin or,

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or whatever, but you know, I'm more aware of the stuff on the Bitcoin side,

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just like even like, like much on Kura is one great example, uh,

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which is just like not even something I would have thought of or anyone in the

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U S would have thought of because we don't have an issue where most, you know,

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people have a lot of feature phones,

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but still want to be able to interact with money in that way. Like,

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it's just incredible. Like you, it just goes to show,

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it's like people developing novel solutions for their individual problems,

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their local problems and creating stuff that is just like,

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that's not going to be created in the USA, right?

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Cause there's no need for it.

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Nobody needs that product in the USA or, you know,

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maybe they will in the future.

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I don't know if we go back to future phones, but like for now, no, you know,

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and like, that's just amazing.

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Everything stops working. Yeah.

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Well, right.

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I'm curious too, was,

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was there a pretty large focus on Noster and just general,

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like let's say decentralized communication protocol stuff there,

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or was it, was it still, I mean, heavily, mostly Bitcoin?

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It was quite a lot of Bitcoin, but to be honest, there was a lot of focus on both just communications in general and very specifically how to do private communications and how to do communications safely.

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So it was really cool.

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We had a couple of the engineers from the White Noise team gave a talk at the BeTrust Dev Day, which was sort of just before the conference started.

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Max gave a really great talk on the main stage about what we're doing with Marmot and everything.

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Um, and yeah, I talked to a ton of people that were needing to build, you know, uh, encrypted

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communications and encrypted messaging into whatever their products were.

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And so it wasn't like, Hey, we're, we're doing this as the product.

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It was like, Hey, this is a part of our product and we need some way to do it.

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And like the thing looks like this is going to be perfect.

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You know, I think Noster was not, uh, new to anybody there.

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Um, you know, the, the most like new people were to, it was like, Oh, I didn't realize

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you could do all these other things with it.

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But like everybody knew about it.

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everybody knew what it was and like, you know, kind of what his general purpose was.

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They knew about the notes. Maybe they just didn't know about the other stuff yet.

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Exactly. And they knew that all of it was transmitted by relays though, regardless.

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Yeah. They did know about the relays. That's good. So there, there's a bunch of things I want to get

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into with you, Jeff. And I think maybe a good spot to start is actually just to talk about,

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to talk about white noise, to talk about Marmot. Uh, and then to kind of weave that into some of

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these, these larger themes, it just seems like it's kind of serendipitous, or maybe it's not

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serendipity at all. Maybe it's just a forcing function. But like all these incredible things

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that folks like you and a lot of people building on Noster and Bitcoin builders, freedom tech

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builders in general, are building right now at a time where it's like, Oh, yeah, actually, we

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really need that, like, right this second, that's really convenient. Okay, you know, again, but it's

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kind of like Africa, where it's like, these are the problems that are coming up and builders are

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building solutions that are going to address them. So can we can we start out by by saying,

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maybe just what is white noise? And then that can kind of lead us into a little bit of like

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talking about Marmot. Sure, absolutely. It's actually this will be an interesting one,

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because I usually do it the other way around. But let's start at this one. Okay. So white noise is

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the messaging app that we are building, that hopefully will feel just as easy to use and

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responsive and just generally amazing as an app like signal right um signal is a great product

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it's been around for i don't know 10 or 15 years at this point um it's a very mature product like

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there's no kind of gotchas you know exactly what you're getting like i talk to my friends

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like they get the messages i get their messages back it works um we're still very early i mean

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it's like incredibly early innings with white noise but um it's really encouraging that we've

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been able to, in a few months, get fully in an encrypted messaging running over a fully

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decentralized network.

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Um, you know, they're like the guys who created the signal protocol in the first place, you

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know, said publicly multiple times that like, there will never be decentralized in an encrypted

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messaging because it's just a problem.

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That you know really hard Um you know you you can be sure of who getting the messages when you can trust you know how you delivering these messages And if that the case then the whole thing falls apart in their mind Now I have heard them sort of retract that a little

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bit recently. But I, you know, I think that it has been a bit of a, not a holy grail, but like

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a very difficult problem in the kind of cryptography circles for a long time of like, how do we take

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something like this, where, you know, you and I have a conversation going, but no one in the

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middle has any chance of understanding what's in that conversation. How do you do that over not only,

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you know, servers in the middle, but like servers you don't control and you have no idea who does

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control them. And, you know, in a way that's resilient to the fact that one or more of those

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servers in the middle could fall over at any point and disappear. Yeah. So white noise, white noise

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has been basically that, right? Like we're trying to get to the point where we've got an app that's,

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everybody's good at signal. We can do video calls, audio calls, media, everything. It's fully

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encrypted and it doesn't leak any metadata about who's talking to who or when.

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Which sounds pretty great at a time when if there is metadata available, it can and will

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be associated with you.

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And I feel like especially with as more and more systems incorporate, let's just say AI

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to use the blanket term, it's like the aggregation and kind of like combination of all these

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different data sets becomes much easier, right? It becomes much more trivial, I think. And like,

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that's, that's not a good thing for just the average person who maybe just doesn't want every

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aspect of their life looped in with every other aspect, right? Like we have privacy is something

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that we should strive for. I think that you can't really have true free speech actually, unless you

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also have privacy, like speaking publicly freely is one thing, but you need to be able to speak

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privately freely as well and that's that's a huge thing and so i'm i'm i want to get into a bunch

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more things kind of on that tangent but maybe now we can just say okay that's the stage for white

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noise basically signal but with all that capabilities with all those those amazing features

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but without all the metadata potentially getting linked to you without any uh any reliance on like

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aws east for example which signal went down for a while we were talking about that outage earlier

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like that's another thing. What is Marmot? So Marmot is the protocol that white noise is built

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on top of, right? And, um, I guess a good way to think about this, um, for the kind of less

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technical folks, a protocol is just a set of instructions, right? It just says, do the thing

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this way so that it works in both places, right? So if I do it this way and you do it this way,

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we know that our two things are going to be able to work together. Um, so, you know, some obvious

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protocols that people will know TCP IP, that's how the internet works. It's how computers

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talk to each other. SMTP is email. It's just a very simple thing that says, you know, the format

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of the data looks like this, and then I can read it on the other computer. So Marmot is kind of a

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mashup. And I'd say most protocols at this point are mashups of a bunch of other protocols.

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And the two things that we are combining is something called MLS, messaging layer security,

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and NOSTER, obviously. MLS is sort of an evolution of the signal protocol. So the signal

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protocol for people that don't know is was the sort of thing that all of encrypted messaging is

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now kind of built on um except for telegram which isn't encrypted in the first place um but you know

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the signal protocol was the first double ratchet algorithm is the first thing that said okay you've

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got forward secrecy and post-compromised security for messages so if any single key leaks on a

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message the attacker only gets that one message by the next message there's a new key and you know

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they don't have it anymore. And so it's sort of a self-healing encrypted messaging system.

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And it was a really big evolution at the time. When that came out, it was a big deal.

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And WhatsApp started using it and Facebook Messenger started using it. And basically,

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almost everybody is using some version of the signal protocol at this point.

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What MLS tried to do was basically fix the one Achilles heel of the signal protocol, which was

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that it starts to get very inefficient with big groups.

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So if you have a really big group of people,

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you basically can't use the signal protocol

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because it just becomes too slow and too complicated.

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So MLS, they started working on this

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kind of in probably 2017, 2018,

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a bunch of like gigabrain cryptographers,

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people working at Cisco, people working in academia.

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And it went on and on and on

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because it was an internet standard,

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you know, I, uh, ITF, uh, the internet engineering task force, you know, project, and those things

246
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are very bureaucratic and they move very slowly, but, but they do a lot of work on them and they

247
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do a ton of auditing on them and they get lots and lots of people to be extremely excruciatingly

248
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detail oriented about the whole thing. Um, and so you end up in the end with something that is

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pretty well thought through, um, pretty well tested and, you know, has been audited, you know,

250
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up and down, left and right for all the security and, and, you know, features like that. So by the

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time this became an actual, okay, we've released this, uh, which happened in July, 2023. Um,

252
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it, it was like a pretty solid thing. Um, and its main feature is it helps you figure out, uh,

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a shared key between all the people in a group. And it helps you distribute the keys within a

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group in a way that allows you to set up this thing called a tree, a ratchet tree of all the

255
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keys you would need to talk to other people in the group. So that's one half of what we worked

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on with Marmot. The other half was how do we use, you know, Noster's identity system, Noster's

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delivery system relays and MLS's, you know, encryption and, and encryption and authentication.

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How do we put those two things together such that we get all the features of MLS

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through Nostra public relays, but also in a way that uses Nostra's identity.

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Because MLS fundamentally just cares about, you know, getting a shared key and sharing those keys

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around. It doesn't care. It doesn't have an opinion about where the, you know, identity of

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the person comes from or who vouches for an identity or how are you going to deliver the

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messages in the end? And, you know, funny enough, Nostra does those two things very, very well.

264
00:20:11,126 --> 00:20:16,626
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Now, back to the show.

305
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Okay, that was a – it's almost like you've explained this before.

306
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A handful of times.

307
00:23:51,106 --> 00:23:51,686
A handful of times.

308
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Yeah, just a handful.

309
00:23:53,006 --> 00:23:57,926
So maybe just kind of working backwards there, the identity piece is really interesting and I think kind of important.

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because obviously for anybody who's used signal and probably most people who are listening to this

311
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will have or you've at least heard of it uh you know that one of the difficulties is usually like

312
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if you don't actually have any prior communication with a person like you you need to basically

313
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exchange your your signal um your signal username through another channel right you need to go through

314
00:24:16,566 --> 00:24:20,966
some other channel and then of course like okay well has that channel been compromised with

315
00:24:20,966 --> 00:24:25,926
somebody is it actually some you know there's so many different i feel issues that come up when you

316
00:24:25,926 --> 00:24:29,986
And you talk about, well, how do I actually know that this person is the person that I'm meaning to communicate with?

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Like really, if for and for most people, maybe it's not maybe it's not an issue.

318
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Right. Nobody's trying to like a man in the middle attack your other communication.

319
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But that's not to say that it can't be.

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And so, yeah, I mean, I've seen a lot of I feel like there was a lot of I don't know if it's FUD or if it's justified criticism from some people building other distributed identity systems.

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when Noster was first kind of coming to prominence,

322
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saying like, well, Noster actually doesn't really,

323
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like, this isn't actually solving for this.

324
00:24:57,986 --> 00:24:59,186
It's not actually a good identity system,

325
00:24:59,206 --> 00:25:00,126
but you guys are using it.

326
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And obviously there's like the web of trust layer there

327
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from the social kind of the social graph.

328
00:25:04,706 --> 00:25:06,726
Is that all just kind of baked in it?

329
00:25:06,766 --> 00:25:08,286
And do you think that Noster is actually like,

330
00:25:08,686 --> 00:25:10,746
is this the best way that you can do this?

331
00:25:10,986 --> 00:25:13,106
I mean, presumably it is because you guys are doing it,

332
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but I'd love your perspective on that.

333
00:25:14,946 --> 00:25:16,626
Just like, are there drawbacks to it

334
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or have some of those just kind of like been solved?

335
00:25:19,606 --> 00:25:20,586
Where are you at with that?

336
00:25:21,246 --> 00:25:33,746
Yeah. So I actually think Nostra's identity system is probably the closest system that I've seen on the internet or in a digital realm. The closest thing that to like what we do naturally as humans.

337
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um you know i think most of the criticism that comes from people that want to build some gigantic

338
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blockchain of digital identity with you know whatever all these crazy systems of namespacing

339
00:25:46,626 --> 00:25:52,206
and stuff like that like that's an engineer's solution to a problem that is not an engineering

340
00:25:52,206 --> 00:25:57,086
you know realm right like humans are messy like we just don't function perfectly like computers

341
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and there's no way that you're going to be able to build an identity system in the digital world

342
00:26:01,006 --> 00:26:04,966
that doesn't sort of account and leave space for some of that messiness, right?

343
00:26:06,046 --> 00:26:09,766
So I actually think Nostra is kind of perfect in the sense that it's pretty simple.

344
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It's just this like one public key thing.

345
00:26:13,286 --> 00:26:14,466
Yeah, okay, you've got to look after it.

346
00:26:14,526 --> 00:26:15,486
Don't lose your private key.

347
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Things get weird when that happens.

348
00:26:17,526 --> 00:26:20,246
But again, there's actually ways to recover from that

349
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using normal human social interactions that we've used for 100,000 years.

350
00:26:25,826 --> 00:26:28,106
And yeah, the web of trust thing is,

351
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I think it's an underutilized part of Nostra still.

352
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We all know it's a big deal. We all know it's like, you know, going to be a massive part about how all this works. It's just literally like we haven't gotten there yet. But that's exactly how white noise, you know, is using identity and how the Marmot protocol sort of uses identity here is, you know, we're not using your Nostra keys to do any of the encryption, which is really important because if you were to lose your Nostra keys, you know, if your insect got leaked or whatever, we wanted to have a situation where that doesn't mean anybody gets access to any of your groups.

353
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that you had in white noise or in any other marmot protocol app right and right now that's

354
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the case like they won't even know your they won't even know what groups you're in because all that

355
00:27:09,426 --> 00:27:15,346
stuff was on your phone or on your computer and without being on your device they don't get access

356
00:27:15,346 --> 00:27:21,046
to anything um and so that's that's like the main benefit of like we embed the identity in there

357
00:27:21,046 --> 00:27:26,866
and it's cryptographically guaranteed by the way that mls works um but it's sort of your nostril

358
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pub key is buried inside of an envelope and that envelope is like you know the mls wrapper um and

359
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so we know who you are for sure but uh we you know if your key were to leak it actually is not a security issue at all for the group or for you know your communication with other people So that super interesting I actually did not understand that part yet because that kind of

360
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it's kind of huge.

361
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And I think that's one of the things that people rightly worry about with

362
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Noster is like when it comes to social media style, Noster clients, it's like,

363
00:27:59,112 --> 00:28:02,152
yeah, somebody could be basically posting from your, your end pub.

364
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If they were able to compromise your NSEC somehow,

365
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they could be posting from your end pub pretending to be you.

366
00:28:06,792 --> 00:28:10,692
but you're saying in this case, the way you guys have it architected, that all of the, like,

367
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everything is done and encrypted locally. It's like, it's device specific in that sense. And so

368
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basically, even if the worst should happen, you should somehow get your NSEC burned. That doesn't

369
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mean that you are exposed to any of that risk that would come from, you know, with all these

370
00:28:25,192 --> 00:28:29,092
other social protocols, like there would be that, that problem there, right? Like somebody else can

371
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post on your behalf, can send DMs on your behalf, like all of that. This is a step outside of that

372
00:28:35,552 --> 00:28:40,972
existing architecture, correct? Exactly. Exactly. And I mean, that's an important, like one of the

373
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most important things that I kind of set out to do when I started looking at the whole,

374
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you know, messaging thing was like, we all know Nipo4 is terrible. You know, it shares all the

375
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metadata with everybody in the network publicly. Nip 17 was an attempt to sort of fix the metadata

376
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problem, but it didn't fix the forward secrecy or post-compromise security, which is if my key

377
00:29:01,132 --> 00:29:05,772
leaks, can the attacker continue to read stuff into the future or go back into the past and read

378
00:29:05,772 --> 00:29:10,072
all my past messages? And so NIP 17 doesn't attempt to solve that at all. It just says,

379
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Hey, we're going to hide metadata. That's all we, that's all, that's the step we care about right

380
00:29:13,452 --> 00:29:20,532
now. Um, what we get with Marmot protocol is full forward secrecy, post-compromised security. Um,

381
00:29:20,612 --> 00:29:26,272
and because it's in and encrypted, like you said, it's bound basically to the device and client,

382
00:29:26,272 --> 00:29:33,232
you know the app on the device um that is uh that you're using and so it is still susceptible to

383
00:29:33,232 --> 00:29:38,032
things like pegasus um so if you're talking about like high-end you know mercenary spyware like

384
00:29:38,032 --> 00:29:42,692
that's still an issue um if your device gets compromised if you get stopped at a border and

385
00:29:42,692 --> 00:29:46,612
somehow they make you unlock your device like they're going to be able to get to whatever they

386
00:29:46,612 --> 00:29:51,272
want to at that point um but that's kind of the same with signal or any other app like this right

387
00:29:51,272 --> 00:29:55,852
it's and then encrypted doesn't mean it's totally impervious it just means you're dealing with a

388
00:29:55,852 --> 00:29:59,652
slightly different threat model. Yeah. I mean, that's, that's the thing. It's like,

389
00:29:59,652 --> 00:30:05,612
we're talking about defenses in cyberspace versus if you are physically compromised. And I think

390
00:30:05,612 --> 00:30:11,192
borders are just like, that is, that is in my opinion, like the highest, highest risk scenario,

391
00:30:11,192 --> 00:30:16,572
because you basically surrender all rights at the border, whether you realize it or not,

392
00:30:16,572 --> 00:30:20,652
like they can just put you in a box and like you're, you're as long as they like, they can

393
00:30:20,652 --> 00:30:26,512
hold you there. Yeah. As long as they want, uh, they can take your device devices. Uh, it's a good

394
00:30:26,512 --> 00:30:31,732
idea to cross a border with multiple devices. If, if you, uh, if you're so inclined, uh, some decoy

395
00:30:31,732 --> 00:30:36,172
devices, I would, I would recommend decoy devices. But also as soon as they see multiple devices,

396
00:30:36,172 --> 00:30:39,952
they're like, Ooh, this person's interesting. Let's see what they have. Okay. That's true too.

397
00:30:40,052 --> 00:30:45,452
That's like, it's, it's a trade-off. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No, no, no. It's, it's, it's true. Um,

398
00:30:45,672 --> 00:30:48,892
sorry. That's, that's my work phone. And the other one is my, you know, uh, organizing

399
00:30:48,892 --> 00:30:54,172
illicit activities phone don't worry right exactly yeah but but it's like yeah if they if if they and

400
00:30:54,172 --> 00:30:57,992
i've ever there's a lot of different uh tech out there too with like they can physically clone your

401
00:30:57,992 --> 00:31:01,892
device very very quickly if they have the physical device like they essentially you know like put it

402
00:31:01,892 --> 00:31:06,852
in a box and they clone it they strip everything off it and then they have an exact replica of of

403
00:31:06,852 --> 00:31:13,052
your entire system which is like terrifying uh but but again like that comes back to okay you know

404
00:31:13,052 --> 00:31:17,392
don't use face id when you're crossing a border because then they'll be able to unlock your device

405
00:31:17,392 --> 00:31:19,232
without you having to give them a password, right?

406
00:31:19,312 --> 00:31:20,652
Like simple things like that

407
00:31:20,652 --> 00:31:22,432
can at least add another layer of protection,

408
00:31:22,432 --> 00:31:26,092
depending on how long they want to keep you in that box, right?

409
00:31:26,352 --> 00:31:26,872
Yeah, yeah.

410
00:31:27,072 --> 00:31:29,092
I mean, look, all of this stuff comes down to

411
00:31:29,092 --> 00:31:30,412
what's your adversary?

412
00:31:30,612 --> 00:31:31,872
Like what's your situation, right?

413
00:31:32,892 --> 00:31:34,852
Most people, certainly in the West,

414
00:31:35,032 --> 00:31:36,832
are not in the position where they are

415
00:31:36,832 --> 00:31:37,952
against state-level actors.

416
00:31:38,152 --> 00:31:39,012
You know, they don't have to worry

417
00:31:39,012 --> 00:31:40,412
about getting Pegasus on their phone.

418
00:31:41,072 --> 00:31:43,532
Those things cost the governments

419
00:31:43,532 --> 00:31:44,992
that use them a lot of money.

420
00:31:44,992 --> 00:31:50,792
They have a very limited number of people they can go out and attack with them because that's just how the licensing works.

421
00:31:52,272 --> 00:31:56,292
And it's not easy to get that onto somebody's phone necessarily, right?

422
00:31:56,312 --> 00:32:04,292
Like you're usually trying to use a zero-day exploit, something that can cost millions of dollars, and you want to keep it in your back pocket as long as possible.

423
00:32:04,292 --> 00:32:06,592
Because once it's out in the open, it's not a zero-day anymore.

424
00:32:06,972 --> 00:32:08,352
Everybody's seen it and knows what it does.

425
00:32:09,052 --> 00:32:12,852
So I think most people really don't have to worry about these things, right?

426
00:32:12,852 --> 00:32:19,672
like end in encrypted messaging with a passcode or a pin, you know, to unlock the app is like a huge,

427
00:32:19,672 --> 00:32:25,092
you know, like miles, miles ahead of like, you know, Telegram or a lot of other systems you

428
00:32:25,092 --> 00:32:30,372
could use that are not really encrypted at all. So, um, you know, I think for most people,

429
00:32:30,372 --> 00:32:36,292
this is like already overkill by a long shot. Now, if you are a activist working in Africa

430
00:32:36,292 --> 00:32:41,372
under an authoritarian regime, these things start to become really important. Right. And like you

431
00:32:41,372 --> 00:32:45,212
said, like when you cross borders, you probably wipe your phone completely. You want to have

432
00:32:45,212 --> 00:32:49,232
distress pins that you can punch in when they ask you at the border and it can like nuke all the

433
00:32:49,232 --> 00:32:53,672
chats in your app. Like maybe it doesn't delete the app, but it just either hides all the chats or,

434
00:32:53,792 --> 00:32:58,752
you know, maybe it does delete all of them. Who knows? But you, you have to have options when

435
00:32:58,752 --> 00:33:04,312
you're in that situation. Um, and kind of back to white noise. Like I've, I started building white

436
00:33:04,312 --> 00:33:09,352
noise when I went to the first, um, the first time I went to the Oslo freedom forum a couple of years

437
00:33:09,352 --> 00:33:15,472
ago um hrf's like main event of the year and i just sat there for two days like bawling my eyes

438
00:33:15,472 --> 00:33:19,372
out like listening to these stories of these activists and you know people from you know

439
00:33:19,372 --> 00:33:25,812
really horrific situations and it was like like we can do something about this with technology

440
00:33:25,812 --> 00:33:29,152
and like when people talk about freedom tech like that's that's literally what it is you're like

441
00:33:29,152 --> 00:33:34,512
helping people that you know for them this could be a life or death situation which is fun but also

442
00:33:34,512 --> 00:33:40,252
totally terrifying because now that thing is like half built i'm like oh god oh no we better do this

443
00:33:40,252 --> 00:33:46,172
really really well right so so so speaking of half built can you give us kind of an update for where

444
00:33:46,172 --> 00:33:50,772
you are at right now with the with the app and then where you plan to go like just generally

445
00:33:50,772 --> 00:33:57,532
what's the broad roadmap yeah so i mean i think um i mean this time last year i mean maybe it's

446
00:33:57,532 --> 00:34:02,712
more like october of last year that like up until then i really wasn't sure that this whole marmot

447
00:34:02,712 --> 00:34:06,772
protocol thing was going to work at all. Um, we were still very much trying to research like how

448
00:34:06,772 --> 00:34:10,772
we were going to fit Nostra and MLS together. Were we even going to be able to get this to do

449
00:34:10,772 --> 00:34:16,332
anything on a consistent basis? Um, and about last October, I sort of hit the point where it was like,

450
00:34:16,512 --> 00:34:21,732
Oh no, it goes like, it's going to happen. Um, you know, I had done enough tests at that point.

451
00:34:21,812 --> 00:34:26,132
It played around with stuff enough at that point to, to kind of know, yeah, we can get a really

452
00:34:26,132 --> 00:34:32,032
work, uh, you know, well-working system here. Um, and then I built a kind of prototype version of

453
00:34:32,032 --> 00:34:38,072
the app um ahead of oslo the freedom forum this year and we did a bunch of user testing with that

454
00:34:38,072 --> 00:34:43,912
prototype app um while we were in oslo we talked to about 20 different people and some of them were

455
00:34:43,912 --> 00:34:49,132
bitcoiners some of them were activists some of them were just interested public um but we had

456
00:34:49,132 --> 00:34:52,992
like a you know kind of script we walked them through and we had them use the app a whole bunch

457
00:34:52,992 --> 00:34:57,092
and tell us about their situation and then we compiled all of that into kind of this big research

458
00:34:57,092 --> 00:35:02,472
report and went, okay, from all those learnings, what do we need to do now? And the answer is

459
00:35:02,472 --> 00:35:07,792
basically throw the app away and start fresh and start from a point of view of trying to address

460
00:35:07,792 --> 00:35:12,932
some of these like really big pieces at the beginning. So right now the app is, it works.

461
00:35:13,072 --> 00:35:19,352
I would call it beta software, early beta software. You know, some of the cool things it can do that

462
00:35:19,352 --> 00:35:24,752
Signal still can't is you can run multiple accounts on the same device. So you can sign in with as

463
00:35:24,752 --> 00:35:30,852
many, you know, in pubs as you want, uh, and then have conversations with people from any of those

464
00:35:30,852 --> 00:35:35,192
at any point, you know, while you're using the app, um, which I don't think there's any other,

465
00:35:35,192 --> 00:35:40,712
uh, encrypted messenger out there that allows you to do that yet. Um, we've got things like images,

466
00:35:40,712 --> 00:35:45,412
uh, in chats now reactions, replies. Um, the cool thing about the way white noise works is it's

467
00:35:45,412 --> 00:35:50,112
actually just a Noster event inside the chat. And so when you're sending these encrypted messages,

468
00:35:50,292 --> 00:35:54,372
you know, back and forth, all you're doing is sending Noster events, which, you know,

469
00:35:54,372 --> 00:35:56,292
we've already got a whole slew of Nostra events.

470
00:35:56,532 --> 00:35:58,512
So when you want to do a reaction, you know,

471
00:35:58,592 --> 00:36:00,592
you use the right kind and you send a Nostra event.

472
00:36:00,752 --> 00:36:02,772
When you want to reply, you do the exact same thing.

473
00:36:02,852 --> 00:36:07,412
And so we kind of already have access to whatever we want to show in the chat.

474
00:36:07,492 --> 00:36:08,892
It's just a matter of like, you know,

475
00:36:08,952 --> 00:36:10,592
designing the little thing to make it look right.

476
00:36:12,932 --> 00:36:14,412
So that's kind of where we're at.

477
00:36:14,872 --> 00:36:15,772
Yeah, that's kind of where we're at.

478
00:36:15,852 --> 00:36:19,772
Like one thing that we've been working on a bunch over the last month or so

479
00:36:19,772 --> 00:36:22,972
was to sort of figure out how we were going to do notifications

480
00:36:22,972 --> 00:36:24,652
in a really privacy-preserving way

481
00:36:24,652 --> 00:36:26,412
because that's the other place

482
00:36:26,412 --> 00:36:28,872
where you potentially leak a lot of metadata

483
00:36:28,872 --> 00:36:31,792
is how do you get a notification to somebody's device?

484
00:36:32,472 --> 00:36:34,252
And there was a study there recently

485
00:36:34,252 --> 00:36:36,252
that one of the team came across

486
00:36:36,252 --> 00:36:37,412
and we were sharing around

487
00:36:37,412 --> 00:36:38,972
and it was basically like a review

488
00:36:38,972 --> 00:36:41,272
of all these major messengers that are out there

489
00:36:41,272 --> 00:36:43,312
and how they do notifications

490
00:36:43,312 --> 00:36:46,872
and how badly they are leaking information

491
00:36:46,872 --> 00:36:47,632
all over the place.

492
00:36:48,112 --> 00:36:48,952
In the worst case,

493
00:36:49,072 --> 00:36:51,132
it's like they send all of your message content

494
00:36:51,132 --> 00:36:56,592
in plain text to apple or google because then they're exactly like there's tons of stuff like

495
00:36:56,592 --> 00:37:02,232
this right um you know lots of the notification servers can see who are all the members of the

496
00:37:02,232 --> 00:37:06,492
group and like when they're talking to each other and like you know they can very quickly form a

497
00:37:06,492 --> 00:37:12,032
pretty clear picture of what's going on um signal again is probably the best of the best in this

498
00:37:12,032 --> 00:37:18,492
area they do a lot of stuff to like blind who's sending what make sure that you can't see um you

499
00:37:18,492 --> 00:37:23,732
know who's in each of the groups um when they send a notification to apple and google it's blank

500
00:37:23,732 --> 00:37:28,172
it's basically just a notification to say hey device wake up and download the stuff from the

501
00:37:28,172 --> 00:37:33,932
server um and so we ended up with kind of a variant of what they're doing um but more suited

502
00:37:33,932 --> 00:37:39,072
to like how nostril relays work and so we will have to run a notification server um that's just

503
00:37:39,072 --> 00:37:43,792
a you can't get around that if you're gonna get notifications from apple or google um but the

504
00:37:43,792 --> 00:37:47,292
notification server we run will be basically stateless. It will have almost no database.

505
00:37:48,152 --> 00:37:53,432
It will just take in a list of encrypted tokens. It'll decrypt the tokens and it'll send it to

506
00:37:53,432 --> 00:37:58,292
Apple and Google again, blank so that, you know, this notification server doesn't know who's in

507
00:37:58,292 --> 00:38:02,852
the group. The notification server doesn't really have an idea of what the message was.

508
00:38:03,112 --> 00:38:07,052
It just knows, Hey, somebody told me to notify these people. I just turn around and hand the

509
00:38:07,052 --> 00:38:12,512
notifications over to Apple and Google and they do it. So that's kind of a, that was a big question

510
00:38:12,512 --> 00:38:17,752
mark in my mind. So I'm super happy that we figured out a way to do that. Well, nice question

511
00:38:17,752 --> 00:38:24,432
for you, just as it relates to Apple versus, uh, you know, Google Android, uh, do you, uh, just

512
00:38:24,432 --> 00:38:29,192
like personally, do you have a preference there? Cause I know some people like are like, Oh, you

513
00:38:29,192 --> 00:38:33,152
don't use Apple, apples, apples, crap. It's all, you know, whatever you should use, you know,

514
00:38:33,212 --> 00:38:36,972
graphene OS on, you know, your stripped down pixel or whatever. And that's the only way

515
00:38:36,972 --> 00:38:39,492
the other people are like, well, if you use that, you're actually opening yourself to all

516
00:38:39,492 --> 00:38:42,012
these other vulnerabilities. Like you should just use Apple. It is the most secure.

517
00:38:42,012 --> 00:38:45,972
Where do you fall on this from like an actual device security standpoint?

518
00:38:46,752 --> 00:38:50,772
So I think both can be pretty secure.

519
00:38:51,152 --> 00:38:55,012
I think if you're going to be on Android, you should probably be on graphene.

520
00:38:56,532 --> 00:39:06,172
That said, you know, I think the kind of pixel with the stock Android without any, you know, like not the Samsung flavor or whatever, you know, the device flavor is.

521
00:39:06,172 --> 00:39:12,392
I probably would never buy anything from, you know, like Huawei or Zomi or whatever they are, like the straight up Chinese.

522
00:39:12,592 --> 00:39:14,452
Like to me, those are just like straight spy tech.

523
00:39:14,572 --> 00:39:16,132
I mean, they have to have something in them.

524
00:39:17,352 --> 00:39:18,232
Apple and Google.

525
00:39:18,472 --> 00:39:20,352
Okay, probably, probably maybe do.

526
00:39:21,452 --> 00:39:24,872
I think Apple is quite good, especially if you turn on lockdown mode.

527
00:39:25,312 --> 00:39:28,572
If you turn lockdown mode on your phone, it's quite secure.

528
00:39:28,692 --> 00:39:31,752
And I've talked to some people who do a lot of really deep research in this area.

529
00:39:31,752 --> 00:39:36,952
and that's effectively where my opinion comes from is like people who are working in this all

530
00:39:36,952 --> 00:39:42,352
day every day trying to find you know how did pegasus get onto this person's phone and you know

531
00:39:42,352 --> 00:39:47,192
they work out what those zero days are i know that they're constantly feeding data back to apple and

532
00:39:47,192 --> 00:39:52,332
google about you know hey this is a bug this is a hole this is you know things and and they're

533
00:39:52,332 --> 00:39:56,232
pretty like positive they're like you know these guys take it seriously they do actually respond

534
00:39:56,232 --> 00:40:01,612
to us they want to know more and they very quickly will patch some of these things um so

535
00:40:01,612 --> 00:40:09,512
again it's a little bit of uh knowing what your situation is and what you need um and then you

536
00:40:09,512 --> 00:40:14,252
know doing simple things like lockdown mode it doesn't really actually cause that much of a pain

537
00:40:14,252 --> 00:40:19,272
to use the device like you know some stuff does stop working or starts to work a bit weirdly um

538
00:40:19,272 --> 00:40:23,792
but for the most part like you just go on using the phone and and you just know okay it's a whole

539
00:40:23,792 --> 00:40:30,272
lot safer this way okay somebody had uh just asked kind of generally in the noster chat as well

540
00:40:30,272 --> 00:40:35,392
about like sim swapping is that at all a vulnerability for for somebody who's using

541
00:40:35,392 --> 00:40:40,572
white noise if somebody does get sim swapped i mean we don't need your sim for anything i was

542
00:40:40,572 --> 00:40:44,652
gonna say just making sure somebody had asked but okay yeah there's there's no so again because

543
00:40:44,652 --> 00:40:48,672
again we're talking about the local device here so even if like we're not talking about you needing

544
00:40:48,672 --> 00:40:53,692
to do 2fa with your you know your phone number you know for it exactly because that's where the sim

545
00:40:53,692 --> 00:40:59,752
swap usually gets you right yes exactly the sim swap usually is to catch that uh sms coming in

546
00:40:59,752 --> 00:41:01,172
from the 2FA thing.

547
00:41:01,272 --> 00:41:04,172
So I don't think there would be any issue there at all.

548
00:41:04,672 --> 00:41:06,512
I guess one other thing that I'll say

549
00:41:06,512 --> 00:41:09,272
is that we are in the midst of a security audit

550
00:41:09,272 --> 00:41:11,372
on the whole stack.

551
00:41:11,592 --> 00:41:13,892
So the security auditors first started looking

552
00:41:13,892 --> 00:41:15,432
at the design of the Marmot protocol,

553
00:41:15,632 --> 00:41:16,932
just the specs that we've written.

554
00:41:17,412 --> 00:41:19,052
They're now looking at MDK,

555
00:41:19,172 --> 00:41:22,232
which is our Rust implementation of the whole protocol.

556
00:41:22,732 --> 00:41:25,332
And that's the implementation that we use in White Noise.

557
00:41:25,732 --> 00:41:27,492
And so they're slowly kind of stepping their way down

558
00:41:27,492 --> 00:41:28,692
into the application.

559
00:41:28,692 --> 00:41:40,418
and they haven really surprised me with anything that they found but there definitely a lot of little small details And I mean they going over with a fine tooth comb Like I get a couple of signal messages a day being like explain

560
00:41:40,698 --> 00:41:43,118
And I'm like, oh, okay, very fine grained.

561
00:41:43,398 --> 00:41:44,858
All right, let's go into this.

562
00:41:45,498 --> 00:41:48,298
But it's really good because that's exactly what you want those guys to do.

563
00:41:48,538 --> 00:41:49,078
Yeah, exactly.

564
00:41:49,398 --> 00:41:49,578
Exactly.

565
00:41:50,718 --> 00:41:52,578
So they're still communicating with you on Signal, though.

566
00:41:52,618 --> 00:41:53,778
They're not using white noise yet.

567
00:41:54,398 --> 00:41:54,798
Correct.

568
00:41:54,938 --> 00:41:55,498
Maybe that's correct.

569
00:41:55,498 --> 00:41:59,318
And I will say the white noise team doesn't even use white noise for stuff

570
00:41:59,318 --> 00:42:01,518
because we haven't gotten those notifications done yet.

571
00:42:02,118 --> 00:42:04,158
That's like the one piece that's sort of blocking us

572
00:42:04,158 --> 00:42:06,118
because otherwise you just have to keep opening the app

573
00:42:06,118 --> 00:42:07,058
to see if there's anything new.

574
00:42:07,718 --> 00:42:08,298
Yeah, yeah.

575
00:42:08,798 --> 00:42:09,198
Okay.

576
00:42:09,598 --> 00:42:11,498
No, I mean, it's super interesting.

577
00:42:11,678 --> 00:42:13,598
I do want to come back more to kind of like

578
00:42:13,598 --> 00:42:14,778
some of the technical stuff,

579
00:42:14,878 --> 00:42:16,298
but for a little while I want to just,

580
00:42:16,418 --> 00:42:18,418
I want to zoom out a tiny bit

581
00:42:18,418 --> 00:42:22,678
because again, we talked about how this all seems to be,

582
00:42:22,958 --> 00:42:24,298
builders are building freedom tech

583
00:42:24,298 --> 00:42:26,738
at a time when we really need freedom tech, right?

584
00:42:27,198 --> 00:42:28,438
I'm very grateful for it

585
00:42:28,438 --> 00:42:36,338
Because I look around right now and I see whether it's all of these new social media age requirements.

586
00:42:36,498 --> 00:42:39,238
You know, you submit an ID to prove you're over 16.

587
00:42:39,778 --> 00:42:43,158
And if you're under 16, we won't let you on.

588
00:42:43,238 --> 00:42:47,618
But I don't know why you would submit an ID if you're under 16, of course, because they're not going to let you on.

589
00:42:47,678 --> 00:42:50,078
So there's no reason for anyone under 16 to send their ID.

590
00:42:50,438 --> 00:42:57,398
So it's really just a way to tie your ID to your social media accounts, which will then be, of course, tied to the CBDCs they roll out,

591
00:42:57,398 --> 00:42:59,778
which will then be tied to their larger social credit system,

592
00:42:59,898 --> 00:43:03,298
which will just, you know, create this totalitarian panopticon,

593
00:43:03,578 --> 00:43:05,498
which is absolutely fucking terrifying.

594
00:43:06,098 --> 00:43:06,238
Yes.

595
00:43:07,058 --> 00:43:11,958
What are you most concerned about on that front?

596
00:43:11,958 --> 00:43:15,738
Like, is it from just like a personal level?

597
00:43:15,858 --> 00:43:21,098
Like, what is the most kind of glaringly horrific abuse

598
00:43:21,098 --> 00:43:24,798
of kind of the free and open internet that you're seeing right now?

599
00:43:26,258 --> 00:43:27,298
Christ, where to begin?

600
00:43:27,398 --> 00:43:30,018
Um, sorry, that's a big one.

601
00:43:30,298 --> 00:43:30,418
Dude.

602
00:43:30,558 --> 00:43:31,158
Yeah, it is.

603
00:43:31,198 --> 00:43:33,418
But it's, it is really top of mind for me right now.

604
00:43:33,418 --> 00:43:34,438
And it's, and it's terrifying.

605
00:43:34,738 --> 00:43:41,798
Um, I mean, all of these things, uh, all of these things are kind of the same thing,

606
00:43:41,798 --> 00:43:42,158
right.

607
00:43:42,478 --> 00:43:47,698
Um, in a lot of ways, like, you know, we have a society now and a, and a political system

608
00:43:47,698 --> 00:43:51,778
that, uh, isn't really effective at doing anything real.

609
00:43:52,198 --> 00:43:56,718
Um, they look at problems that, you know, society faces and they treat symptoms rather

610
00:43:56,718 --> 00:44:04,318
than trying to go what's maybe the root cause of this problem um you know and so their their

611
00:44:04,318 --> 00:44:10,078
ideas and their solutions are always going to be let's just put more control uh if we only had a

612
00:44:10,078 --> 00:44:15,558
little more control then we'd be able to fix the problem for good uh which we're going in the wrong

613
00:44:15,558 --> 00:44:19,798
direction basically you know we've seen this before this movie's played out many times over history

614
00:44:19,798 --> 00:44:26,038
we go 80 or 100 years and we forget it and we do it again um and right now we're living through this

615
00:44:26,038 --> 00:44:33,018
insane shift from everything is physical where it's like there's actually you know real costs

616
00:44:33,018 --> 00:44:37,838
to go and like do surveillance to now it's all digital and it's actually just plug into the back

617
00:44:37,838 --> 00:44:42,118
door of google's servers you know right into the you know into the pipe that's coming into one of

618
00:44:42,118 --> 00:44:48,078
their major data centers and you get everything um and you can just watch everything and it used

619
00:44:48,078 --> 00:44:52,558
to be even that was kind of okay because the amount of data coming through was so enormous

620
00:44:52,558 --> 00:44:58,138
that no one could sift through it right but now we have a solution to that problem you know we have

621
00:44:58,138 --> 00:45:04,078
these you know llms that are incredibly good at like parsing huge amounts of data and like trying

622
00:45:04,078 --> 00:45:08,238
to make some sense of it or just at least being able to point a human in the direction of like

623
00:45:08,238 --> 00:45:15,338
it's probably over there you know go look there um so i think we're sitting at this uh juncture

624
00:45:15,338 --> 00:45:20,858
and i think the thing that makes me most frightened is that like it's a race now like we are now in

625
00:45:20,858 --> 00:45:27,218
an arms race. Um, and we're on the losing side by default, for sure. We do not have as much money as

626
00:45:27,218 --> 00:45:32,398
them. We do not have as much resources as them. Um, you know, we might be ideologically correct

627
00:45:32,398 --> 00:45:39,218
and morally have the high ground, but like, since when did that mean you won, you know? So, you know,

628
00:45:39,218 --> 00:45:43,898
I think all of those things are, are problems, right? Like the chat control stuff here in Europe,

629
00:45:43,898 --> 00:45:49,418
the digital ID stuff that's being rolled out all over the place, all of these, uh, quote unquote,

630
00:45:49,418 --> 00:45:54,898
hate speech laws. Um, you know, like total bullshit. Like, you know, when I was growing up,

631
00:45:54,898 --> 00:45:59,518
it was like the thing that people called out in America was that landmark case where, uh,

632
00:45:59,518 --> 00:46:04,438
the Jewish attorney from the ACLU defended the Nazis' rights to march through a town.

633
00:46:04,438 --> 00:46:09,238
And you're like, you know, that's like a symbol of America to me, basically. I'm like, if anything,

634
00:46:09,378 --> 00:46:13,958
like no other country in the world would that happen. Um, and I think America's lost that,

635
00:46:14,098 --> 00:46:18,218
to be honest. Like, I don't think that would not happen today. Uh, there would be people screaming

636
00:46:18,218 --> 00:46:22,218
and you know there'd be a lot of name calling and there would be people calling for heads on

637
00:46:22,218 --> 00:46:27,838
twitter and like you know that's just how it would play out now um so yeah i don't know like

638
00:46:27,838 --> 00:46:33,278
it's a it's hard not to be blackpilled by all this and i think the only way that like i just

639
00:46:33,278 --> 00:46:36,778
try to not be blackpilled is like i just have to work harder and faster to like do the thing

640
00:46:36,778 --> 00:46:43,018
um and we need to get more people involved in doing the thing uh because unless unless we just

641
00:46:43,018 --> 00:46:47,858
say no, we will end up like China where, you know, shit works and it's really, you know,

642
00:46:48,058 --> 00:46:52,158
cheap and pretty effective and efficient and all the rest, but like, don't step out of

643
00:46:52,158 --> 00:46:52,378
line.

644
00:46:52,978 --> 00:46:56,438
Uh, you know, like, and, and I, you know, I don't want that.

645
00:46:56,518 --> 00:46:57,578
I don't want a world like that.

646
00:46:59,118 --> 00:47:06,078
I was talking to a German friend the other day and I was just remarking on the fact that

647
00:47:06,078 --> 00:47:11,138
video surveillance systems have gotten so incredibly, so incredibly good.

648
00:47:11,138 --> 00:47:13,278
and all of the data that they're able to parse now

649
00:47:13,278 --> 00:47:14,898
with the help of these LLMs as well,

650
00:47:15,538 --> 00:47:17,098
it's mind-blowing.

651
00:47:17,338 --> 00:47:18,278
It's terrifying.

652
00:47:19,938 --> 00:47:22,258
And he said, I like this guy a lot,

653
00:47:22,398 --> 00:47:23,858
a good guy and a good friend,

654
00:47:24,018 --> 00:47:24,698
but he's like, well, you know,

655
00:47:25,358 --> 00:47:27,638
Valka, it's just the price we must pay.

656
00:47:27,998 --> 00:47:30,458
And I was just like, no.

657
00:47:31,118 --> 00:47:31,938
No, we don't.

658
00:47:32,478 --> 00:47:34,258
No, no, I don't agree.

659
00:47:35,578 --> 00:47:37,038
But that's how a lot of people,

660
00:47:37,598 --> 00:47:40,738
a lot of very good, well-intentioned people think.

661
00:47:41,138 --> 00:47:54,018
Like, and that's the problem is that with those good, well-intentioned people thinking that that makes it way easier for the people who are not well-intentioned, who do want to just exert greater and greater control over the individual citizens.

662
00:47:54,178 --> 00:48:01,318
That makes their job way easier because there's actually very little real resistance to a lot of this stuff, which is right.

663
00:48:01,498 --> 00:48:06,158
That's what's troubling to me is like, it's just sleepwalking into totalitarianism.

664
00:48:06,158 --> 00:48:10,518
Not only is there not resistance to it, but like people are actively doing it for them.

665
00:48:10,518 --> 00:48:13,298
They're like, here's this nice doorbell camera, put it on your house.

666
00:48:13,578 --> 00:48:16,298
And somewhere in the fine print, it's like, we can do whatever we want with the video.

667
00:48:16,598 --> 00:48:18,778
And it's like, people are like, this is great.

668
00:48:18,818 --> 00:48:19,898
Let's put this technology here.

669
00:48:19,978 --> 00:48:20,498
This is great.

670
00:48:20,558 --> 00:48:24,558
Let me share everything about my life on the internet all the time with my like address

671
00:48:24,558 --> 00:48:26,198
and like everything else in public.

672
00:48:26,198 --> 00:48:29,858
And you're just like, okay, I understand.

673
00:48:29,958 --> 00:48:30,818
I understand how we got here.

674
00:48:30,818 --> 00:48:34,778
But at the same time, it's like, you're just bringing it on yourself.

675
00:48:34,778 --> 00:48:40,898
and and again like you know some of the things that like people always go back and forth about

676
00:48:40,898 --> 00:48:46,158
like oh you know we need these systems of control because if we didn't then like the capitalists

677
00:48:46,158 --> 00:48:50,998
destroy everything or you know if like if you don't like it like you should go somewhere else

678
00:48:50,998 --> 00:48:56,178
and it's like but i can't bro like you won't let us leave like this is not an a system that you can

679
00:48:56,178 --> 00:49:02,298
like opt in or out of like if you allowed me to opt out i would happily do that um but i can't

680
00:49:02,298 --> 00:49:11,978
You know, like you are telling me that I will go to jail if I don't pay the taxes and I don't follow your laws, but you also aren't allowing me to have any sort of say into like how that stuff happens.

681
00:49:12,538 --> 00:49:17,518
You know, we're well beyond the point of having a representative government, I think, in any of the major Western countries.

682
00:49:17,758 --> 00:49:21,158
Certainly, Europe has probably never had a real representative government.

683
00:49:21,258 --> 00:49:29,038
It's a bunch of like, you know, unelected bureaucrats that just decide whatever they want and then force all of the member countries to like implement the laws.

684
00:49:29,038 --> 00:49:31,638
America's a little behind that

685
00:49:31,638 --> 00:49:32,918
but like I don't know

686
00:49:32,918 --> 00:49:35,218
I'm not so bullish on that either

687
00:49:35,218 --> 00:49:37,258
that's I mean

688
00:49:37,258 --> 00:49:38,638
this whole saga with

689
00:49:38,638 --> 00:49:40,818
the EU levying this whatever

690
00:49:40,818 --> 00:49:43,098
120 or 140 million dollar fine

691
00:49:43,098 --> 00:49:44,658
against X and Elon Musk

692
00:49:44,658 --> 00:49:45,838
the number's not even important

693
00:49:45,838 --> 00:49:48,038
it's just a chump change to them

694
00:49:48,038 --> 00:49:49,198
they don't care they love that

695
00:49:49,198 --> 00:49:50,058
you know what it is

696
00:49:50,058 --> 00:49:51,158
that sort of thing actually

697
00:49:51,158 --> 00:49:52,278
is a regulatory capture

698
00:49:52,278 --> 00:49:53,298
they love it because

699
00:49:53,298 --> 00:49:55,098
no one else can afford those fines

700
00:49:55,098 --> 00:49:55,758
except for them

701
00:49:55,758 --> 00:49:57,018
so they're like keep it coming

702
00:49:57,018 --> 00:49:58,518
like we'll pay a billion dollars

703
00:49:58,518 --> 00:50:03,478
every single year because it's less than we'd pay in taxes to you guys like well funnily enough i

704
00:50:03,478 --> 00:50:09,158
did see that eu collects more in fine revenue than they do in tax revenue for these other companies

705
00:50:09,158 --> 00:50:14,598
which is hilarious but but like this this whole thing at least this saga i think the very positive

706
00:50:14,598 --> 00:50:20,278
thing that has come out of it is just a lot of these these eu bureaucrats basically outing

707
00:50:20,278 --> 00:50:25,958
themselves for the closeted totalitarian fetishists they are and basically you know because because

708
00:50:25,958 --> 00:50:28,618
Because that's what this comes down to.

709
00:50:28,698 --> 00:50:33,178
It's always done under the guise of safety or compliance or whatever else.

710
00:50:33,218 --> 00:50:33,958
But it's control.

711
00:50:34,318 --> 00:50:35,798
It's all about control.

712
00:50:36,738 --> 00:50:46,438
And Elon is, for better or worse, the guy is a much more productive human being than these EU bureaucrats, right?

713
00:50:46,798 --> 00:50:49,538
He has plenty of faults like we all do.

714
00:50:49,558 --> 00:50:50,358
Like all humans do.

715
00:50:50,358 --> 00:50:51,578
Like all humans.

716
00:50:51,578 --> 00:50:56,878
but at least he's actually building like cool shit like fucking reusable rockets man fucking

717
00:50:56,878 --> 00:51:03,198
cool just just like really really amazing science fiction stuff but like for this saga in particular

718
00:51:03,198 --> 00:51:09,818
it's just very clear that when you do see people who are very supportive of the eu's measures

719
00:51:09,818 --> 00:51:18,398
it's it's all i mean it's just like a lot of class warfare being used to justify surveillance

720
00:51:18,398 --> 00:51:23,198
crackdowns and free speech crackdowns under the guise of, well, we can't let these billionaires

721
00:51:23,198 --> 00:51:28,398
run amok with this. And it's like, it's all very clever positioning really, because it's,

722
00:51:28,458 --> 00:51:31,538
you're trying to say like, well, come on, do you think the billionaire should be in charge of this?

723
00:51:31,538 --> 00:51:35,998
We need to get them under check and we need to also know your name and address and have that

724
00:51:35,998 --> 00:51:39,158
associated with your account. And it's for your safety. It's actually for the kids' safety.

725
00:51:39,618 --> 00:51:43,498
This is really all just about protecting the kids because you can't just ask the parents to be good

726
00:51:43,498 --> 00:51:47,638
parents and take away their fucking phones. No, no, no. We have to actually just subject everyone.

727
00:51:47,638 --> 00:51:52,558
or don't even take away their phones just teach them how to like navigate the world right like

728
00:51:52,558 --> 00:51:58,578
as we always did you know like you know i i kind of have to put this a little bit on the millennials

729
00:51:58,578 --> 00:52:04,818
unfortunately because like i think you know gen x was raised without parents basically you know

730
00:52:04,818 --> 00:52:09,798
those are the eight-year-olds on the subway in new york when they were kids um and i think the flip

731
00:52:09,798 --> 00:52:16,778
was uh you know they ended up kind of being overprotective and then millennials had this like

732
00:52:16,778 --> 00:52:21,678
you know gold star for everything mentality and like everything must be perfectly fair and like

733
00:52:21,678 --> 00:52:26,938
yes perfect yay we're all we're all great and it's just not true like it's just not true people

734
00:52:26,938 --> 00:52:33,898
are different um amazingly enough uh and and i think that's there is a lot of like you know

735
00:52:33,898 --> 00:52:40,978
millennials kind of grew up in this like very protected space and because of that they're not

736
00:52:40,978 --> 00:52:46,438
very resilient to like shit going sideways um you know from the west at least um there's still

737
00:52:46,438 --> 00:52:49,638
plenty of places in the world where that's not the case but you know i think america and europe

738
00:52:49,638 --> 00:52:54,138
that's certainly the case and and they've just gotten this kind of delusional mentality that like

739
00:52:54,138 --> 00:52:59,398
it's you know all we have to do is make sure that the bad people don't have things and like we can

740
00:52:59,398 --> 00:53:04,318
stop them if we just have enough toys if we just have enough control we'll be able to fix it and

741
00:53:04,318 --> 00:53:08,218
it's just like no this is not how the world works like you're never going to be able to stop

742
00:53:08,218 --> 00:53:12,998
something like here's another random example you're never going to be able to beat drugs with

743
00:53:12,998 --> 00:53:13,978
the war on drugs.

744
00:53:14,458 --> 00:53:18,098
Like people will find a way to use them no matter what.

745
00:53:18,638 --> 00:53:20,058
There's just no way around it.

746
00:53:20,278 --> 00:53:24,578
So like, why don't you spend the money and the time on like educating people, telling

747
00:53:24,578 --> 00:53:29,158
people about the dangers, giving them a clear picture of like, what are they actually risking

748
00:53:29,158 --> 00:53:29,898
versus not?

749
00:53:30,918 --> 00:53:34,738
Because once you do that, people can kind of make it an educated guess for themselves.

750
00:53:34,738 --> 00:53:38,358
And like, you know, like, yeah, some people are going to die.

751
00:53:38,558 --> 00:53:39,458
Some people are going to get addicted.

752
00:53:39,638 --> 00:53:41,138
That's like par for the course.

753
00:53:41,138 --> 00:53:54,018
But having a war where you destroy entire governments, entire countries, entire like civilizations because you can't get your coke problem under, you know, under control in New York City, like that doesn't make any sense.

754
00:53:54,018 --> 00:54:03,238
it's you know a an example of just government trying to over regulate or trying to put in as

755
00:54:03,238 --> 00:54:07,478
many guardrails as possible and it's still just failing miserably that i always think of is in the

756
00:54:07,478 --> 00:54:11,718
uk where it's like they don't have guns right there's no guns but somehow people still kill

757
00:54:11,718 --> 00:54:16,418
people right they kill people with vans and they kill people with knives and like well they're not

758
00:54:16,418 --> 00:54:22,858
going to get rid of vans so but they they like i've there's a huge spat of different uh eu

759
00:54:22,858 --> 00:54:28,658
politicians and people campaigning for, we should blunt all the knives. You just shouldn't be able

760
00:54:28,658 --> 00:54:32,538
to buy a knife with a sharp tip on it. Like, because, and then if we just get rid of the tip

761
00:54:32,538 --> 00:54:37,198
on the knife, then people stop stabbing people. And it's like, well, they'll just slash them.

762
00:54:37,198 --> 00:54:42,178
Then what are you like? Are you fucking stupid? Like, have you ever seen a kid? They'll sit down

763
00:54:42,178 --> 00:54:45,938
on the ground and like sharpen the rock for like 20 hours. If they have to, they're like, look,

764
00:54:45,938 --> 00:54:49,698
I've made a knife from a rock. And you're like, yeah, let's blunt the knives. I'm sure that'll

765
00:54:49,698 --> 00:54:54,358
fix the problem yeah well we clearly just need to get rid of rocks too we just need to get rid of

766
00:54:54,358 --> 00:54:59,578
anything sharp so nobody can hurt themselves because a specific like it's just it's insane

767
00:54:59,578 --> 00:55:06,998
it's insane but like that's yeah that's when i think when you have a group or uh i it's not even

768
00:55:06,998 --> 00:55:12,618
i was not we can't even put it all on on millennials you know but because like the

769
00:55:12,618 --> 00:55:16,558
boomers are just as plenty of boomers yeah there's plenty of boomers i think it's overall just

770
00:55:16,558 --> 00:55:21,278
do you have a mentality that government is the solution to your problems or the

771
00:55:21,278 --> 00:55:22,258
cause of most of them?

772
00:55:22,998 --> 00:55:24,698
And that's kind of like the demarcation is like,

773
00:55:24,738 --> 00:55:26,878
do you think that if you give the government more power,

774
00:55:26,904 --> 00:55:31,584
they'll be able to fix stuff or if you give the government more power they'll make stuff worse

775
00:55:31,584 --> 00:55:35,364
i'm of the camp and i believe you are as well and probably most people listen to this that

776
00:55:35,364 --> 00:55:39,824
the more power you give the government the worse off you are like the government is best which

777
00:55:39,824 --> 00:55:45,424
governs least but so many people just honestly believe it's like if i just if i just vote harder

778
00:55:45,424 --> 00:55:50,444
and give the government more power and my colored team is in power especially that's that's extra

779
00:55:50,444 --> 00:55:56,064
that's an important one yeah then everything will be okay and all there won't be bad people and even

780
00:55:56,064 --> 00:55:57,284
and the bad people is actually,

781
00:55:57,384 --> 00:55:59,984
it's actually just the fault of white supremacy that bad people even exist at

782
00:55:59,984 --> 00:56:00,224
all.

783
00:56:00,364 --> 00:56:01,464
That's a whole different story,

784
00:56:01,544 --> 00:56:01,684
you know,

785
00:56:01,684 --> 00:56:01,984
but like,

786
00:56:02,164 --> 00:56:03,644
like all of it is just so absurdist.

787
00:56:03,704 --> 00:56:04,244
It's like you,

788
00:56:04,404 --> 00:56:09,184
you have to really try hard not to think deeply to believe any of this

789
00:56:09,184 --> 00:56:09,544
bullshit.

790
00:56:09,544 --> 00:56:12,684
But the problem is that thinking deeply takes a lot of energy,

791
00:56:12,744 --> 00:56:12,984
right?

792
00:56:13,084 --> 00:56:14,964
Like a lot of brain power involved.

793
00:56:15,404 --> 00:56:16,064
It's funny.

794
00:56:16,064 --> 00:56:18,324
Cause you don't even necessarily have to think deeply.

795
00:56:18,324 --> 00:56:23,064
You just have to look at some like basic things and like not allow the

796
00:56:23,064 --> 00:56:25,764
overcomplication that they try to sell you to sink in.

797
00:56:26,064 --> 00:56:31,884
Right. You know, like economics, like economics is not complicated. It's just like people

798
00:56:31,884 --> 00:56:36,624
transacting, but you know, in a situation where both people feel like they're better off at the

799
00:56:36,624 --> 00:56:41,244
end of the transaction, otherwise they wouldn't do it. And so it's really not that hard, you know,

800
00:56:41,264 --> 00:56:46,544
like if you just let that happen, it's going to happen and it's going to work. But, but if you

801
00:56:46,544 --> 00:56:49,864
start to put moral arguments on top of everything and you start to put a bunch of rules and

802
00:56:49,864 --> 00:56:54,184
regulations on top of everything, then all of a sudden that picture becomes a lot murkier and

803
00:56:54,184 --> 00:56:59,164
you're like, I don't actually know what's happening here. Um, and people can't figure it out. And then

804
00:56:59,164 --> 00:57:03,004
they have to think about like, okay, maybe since I can't figure this out, I'll just listen to what,

805
00:57:03,004 --> 00:57:08,904
you know, Powell has to say this month. Um, he'll tell me what to do with all my money. Um, it's,

806
00:57:09,004 --> 00:57:13,704
it is wild. Like, because people just, yeah, they do have to do a bit of thinking, but I actually

807
00:57:13,704 --> 00:57:17,004
wouldn't say that it's actually the harder part of thinking. It's actually the, you know, just the

808
00:57:17,004 --> 00:57:22,124
not believing the bullshit that they've been fed and then just going, yeah, based on my own common

809
00:57:22,124 --> 00:57:26,504
sense in my own experience of the world, like that's probably the right answer. Um, you know,

810
00:57:26,564 --> 00:57:32,824
you get by a long ways on that. It's, it's true. But, and again, you would think that more people

811
00:57:32,824 --> 00:57:41,844
would do this. I find that generally it's easier just to maintain the status quo for most people.

812
00:57:41,844 --> 00:57:46,784
And the status quo is being told what to do. The status quo is not thinking for yourself.

813
00:57:46,784 --> 00:57:54,724
inertia is very real you know this this totalitarian object wants in motion state it wants to stay in

814
00:57:54,724 --> 00:58:01,764
motion right and and this is what i i come back to all the time is that this is why privacy tools are

815
00:58:01,764 --> 00:58:08,004
so important this is why uh communication protocols are so important this is why separate money

816
00:58:08,004 --> 00:58:13,624
separated from state bitcoin is so important it's because for this totalitarian panopticon to

817
00:58:13,624 --> 00:58:18,544
continue spreading its tentacles across the world and across each nation.

818
00:58:18,544 --> 00:58:22,904
It requires that you do not have privacy.

819
00:58:22,904 --> 00:58:26,944
If you have privacy in a totalitarian system, then that totalitarian system is undermined

820
00:58:26,944 --> 00:58:30,024
because you can speak about how shitty it is privately with other people.

821
00:58:30,024 --> 00:58:31,104
And they're like, yeah, this is shitty.

822
00:58:31,104 --> 00:58:32,104
We should overthrow this bitch.

823
00:58:32,104 --> 00:58:33,304
We should do something about this.

824
00:58:33,304 --> 00:58:34,304
Yeah.

825
00:58:34,304 --> 00:58:35,304
We should do something about it.

826
00:58:35,304 --> 00:58:40,624
We should drag our dictator out in the street and Ceausescu him, Romania style.

827
00:58:40,624 --> 00:58:46,744
what we should do because we're sick of this. You also, you can't have any sort of true free

828
00:58:46,744 --> 00:58:50,124
speech in the public sector either because again, then people can speak about the things they were

829
00:58:50,124 --> 00:58:54,664
speaking about privately in public and even more people hear them. You also need to have control of

830
00:58:54,664 --> 00:58:59,464
the money because you like, that's first and foremost, you need to be able to cut people off

831
00:58:59,464 --> 00:59:04,824
from the money. And that's gotten so easy to do in the digital age. It was a lot harder when

832
00:59:04,824 --> 00:59:10,584
everything was just cash a lot harder now it is trivial i mean truly trivial you can if you can

833
00:59:10,584 --> 00:59:16,464
cut off an entire nation from the banking rails then cutting off a single individual is you know

834
00:59:16,464 --> 00:59:20,684
again trivially easy to debank somebody right and that was one of the things that tools now are so

835
00:59:20,684 --> 00:59:25,004
important yeah at the africa bitcoin conference that was one of the main themes that i kept hearing

836
00:59:25,004 --> 00:59:28,304
repeated over and over and over again it's like they don't actually have to throw you in jail

837
00:59:28,304 --> 00:59:31,824
anymore they just turn off all your money like they just turn off all your money and they turn

838
00:59:31,824 --> 00:59:36,084
off all your access to your, you know, way that you speak publicly, which is all social

839
00:59:36,084 --> 00:59:36,604
media now.

840
00:59:36,764 --> 00:59:40,004
So like, yeah, they can stop you from like standing on a street corner on a box.

841
00:59:40,544 --> 00:59:44,304
Um, you know, you could still do that, but like eventually the police will come and get

842
00:59:44,304 --> 00:59:48,444
you if a large enough crowd, you know, shows up, but they can, it's trivial for them.

843
00:59:48,504 --> 00:59:52,644
They just go, nope, X is gone and your bank account's gone.

844
00:59:53,124 --> 00:59:54,644
Uh, and now what are you going to do?

845
00:59:54,824 --> 00:59:58,244
Like you can't tell anybody about it and you don't have any money to do anything about

846
00:59:58,244 --> 00:59:58,424
it.

847
00:59:58,424 --> 01:00:10,144
And so like that's I think that's actually one of the most one of the most used and most effective tools of any authoritarian government right now is just that total control of the money.

848
01:00:11,884 --> 01:00:15,764
I mean, and the communication like you think about Venezuela, like WhatsApp is banned.

849
01:00:15,844 --> 01:00:17,404
If you have WhatsApp on your phone, you go to jail.

850
01:00:17,964 --> 01:00:19,444
X is banned in Venezuela.

851
01:00:19,564 --> 01:00:23,984
And so, you know, those are pretty much the most primary means of communication.

852
01:00:23,984 --> 01:00:28,864
Like we've got our public square type of thing and we have the group chat that most of the world uses most.

853
01:00:29,524 --> 01:00:31,724
WhatsApp is by far the biggest messenger out there.

854
01:00:33,204 --> 01:00:35,344
And it's now fully illegal in Venezuela.

855
01:00:35,684 --> 01:00:36,984
It has been for a good while.

856
01:00:39,944 --> 01:00:43,084
It's always crazy to me that WhatsApp is the biggest because I just think WhatsApp sucks.

857
01:00:43,804 --> 01:00:47,784
It does suck, but man, it works for a lot of people and it's been around for a long time.

858
01:00:47,924 --> 01:00:48,224
I know.

859
01:00:48,684 --> 01:00:49,084
Yeah.

860
01:00:49,664 --> 01:00:50,764
I mean, I don't like it either.

861
01:00:50,764 --> 01:00:53,924
Facebook of messaging apps, you know, like it's like, I don't know.

862
01:00:53,984 --> 01:00:57,444
But yeah, it's a great tool still, right?

863
01:00:57,564 --> 01:00:59,844
For a lot of people all over the world.

864
01:01:00,124 --> 01:01:00,824
Yeah, it does the thing.

865
01:01:00,824 --> 01:01:03,024
And to be honest, if you think about it,

866
01:01:03,184 --> 01:01:05,244
we were actually having a conversation about this last week.

867
01:01:05,404 --> 01:01:09,164
If you had to pick what was the single most important thing

868
01:01:09,164 --> 01:01:13,324
that gave the single most important win for privacy in the 2010s,

869
01:01:13,684 --> 01:01:14,664
what was it?

870
01:01:15,044 --> 01:01:18,464
It was probably when WhatsApp turned on encrypted messaging

871
01:01:18,464 --> 01:01:20,964
for every one of its users by default.

872
01:01:21,124 --> 01:01:22,544
It just went overnight, click,

873
01:01:22,544 --> 01:01:24,644
everybody's using Indian encrypted messaging now.

874
01:01:24,764 --> 01:01:28,204
Now you can argue whether or not Zuckerberg's got a, you know,

875
01:01:28,204 --> 01:01:31,344
a set of keys for the door in the back, but you know,

876
01:01:31,384 --> 01:01:34,084
like there is at least a minimal, uh,

877
01:01:34,084 --> 01:01:38,504
level of actual encryption that is based on the signal protocol that is in

878
01:01:38,504 --> 01:01:38,764
WhatsApp.

879
01:01:40,244 --> 01:01:41,844
It's better than nothing, right?

880
01:01:42,004 --> 01:01:43,564
It's way better than nothing.

881
01:01:43,744 --> 01:01:48,404
It's miles better than telegram. Like I know, you know, uh, you know,

882
01:01:48,404 --> 01:01:51,304
I know Pavaldorov likes to talk about how it's the most secure messenger and

883
01:01:51,304 --> 01:01:57,224
they've got the best encryption and stuff it's just not true like it's 100% not true by default

884
01:01:57,224 --> 01:02:01,884
it's just plain text it's just going to their servers it's readable by anybody in their team

885
01:02:01,884 --> 01:02:07,924
it's if you want to turn on secret messages in telegram both people have to be online at the

886
01:02:07,924 --> 01:02:14,204
same time what like who does that and it's buried like four layers deep in menus so there's it's

887
01:02:14,204 --> 01:02:19,224
no one uses it and so I think it's really disingenuine that he goes on these podcasts

888
01:02:19,224 --> 01:02:20,824
and talks about how it's so encrypted

889
01:02:20,824 --> 01:02:22,604
and it's the safest thing out there.

890
01:02:22,684 --> 01:02:23,904
It's like total fucking bullshit.

891
01:02:24,924 --> 01:02:26,884
WhatsApp is way safer than Telegram.

892
01:02:28,804 --> 01:02:29,904
So, I mean, that is interesting

893
01:02:29,904 --> 01:02:32,624
because he definitely touts that, right?

894
01:02:32,804 --> 01:02:34,224
Harps on it, harps on it.

895
01:02:34,744 --> 01:02:36,464
But for sure, I mean,

896
01:02:36,524 --> 01:02:38,824
the vast, vast, vast majority of Telegram users

897
01:02:38,824 --> 01:02:40,604
don't have Seer message.

898
01:02:40,604 --> 01:02:43,644
99.9% probably are totally unencrypted.

899
01:02:44,144 --> 01:02:44,284
Yeah.

900
01:02:44,884 --> 01:02:47,404
And this is the reason why Telegram groups are so fast

901
01:02:47,404 --> 01:02:48,404
and they work so well.

902
01:02:48,404 --> 01:02:51,384
And, you know, you can have 200,000 or a million people in a group.

903
01:02:51,484 --> 01:02:53,844
It works because it's just plain text using the internet.

904
01:02:53,844 --> 01:02:55,744
Like it's, there's nothing encrypted about it.

905
01:02:55,784 --> 01:02:56,604
There's no keys.

906
01:02:56,684 --> 01:02:57,324
There's, there's nothing.

907
01:02:57,604 --> 01:03:00,444
So it's, um, yeah, of course it's fast.

908
01:03:00,584 --> 01:03:01,764
Like there's a reason.

909
01:03:03,904 --> 01:03:07,524
So we've, we've been, uh, we've been maybe black pilling a little bit here.

910
01:03:07,904 --> 01:03:12,584
Um, but I think it's, it's important to, to black pill a little bit so that we can appreciate

911
01:03:12,584 --> 01:03:13,324
the white pill.

912
01:03:13,604 --> 01:03:14,464
I do want to know.

913
01:03:14,544 --> 01:03:14,784
Okay.

914
01:03:14,784 --> 01:03:20,784
what are you like what is what is your white pill right now i mean i obviously what what you're

915
01:03:20,784 --> 01:03:24,644
building is there other stuff that you're looking at outside of white noise that other people are

916
01:03:24,644 --> 01:03:28,184
building or that you've just heard about recently or that you're really excited about that you're

917
01:03:28,184 --> 01:03:35,244
like wow this is like fuck yeah this is a step in the right direction so yeah i said earlier like i

918
01:03:35,244 --> 01:03:40,324
do feel like this is a bit of an arms race at the moment um and it really does feel like uh the major

919
01:03:40,324 --> 01:03:45,604
Western governments are cracking down on privacy in specific. You know, they want to know, they want

920
01:03:45,604 --> 01:03:50,484
to have your identity tied to all of your online activity. They want to make sure that they have

921
01:03:50,484 --> 01:03:57,044
some way to see as much of it as possible. And it's really important that we actually stand up

922
01:03:57,044 --> 01:04:02,424
and fix that right now. You know, like make sure that we carve out, you know, even if it's not for

923
01:04:02,424 --> 01:04:07,124
everybody, even if not everybody's going to get on board with it, we need to keep the option and

924
01:04:07,124 --> 01:04:11,744
keep the door open. Um, cause it's a door that once it's closed, it's going to be almost impossible

925
01:04:11,744 --> 01:04:17,664
to get back open again. Um, so, uh, you know, to me, uh, obviously what we're working on,

926
01:04:17,704 --> 01:04:23,064
I'm super bullish on, um, we can't build it fast enough. Like I'm, uh, doing everything I possibly

927
01:04:23,064 --> 01:04:27,704
can trying to find people to help us in the team and contribute and things like that. Um, we'll get

928
01:04:27,704 --> 01:04:31,224
there. I think another thing that I'm just really excited about is I feel like Nostra is maturing

929
01:04:31,224 --> 01:04:36,424
a lot. Um, we're seeing like, you know, encrypted file sharing coming around and we're seeing,

930
01:04:36,424 --> 01:04:51,106
you know lots of these projects that are aimed towards not just the social media use case You know I think Odell is like spot on Like I think we used the social media thing to bootstrap the network in a way that was really unique

931
01:04:51,106 --> 01:04:53,586
and gave us a lot of runway

932
01:04:53,586 --> 01:04:54,986
to then do a lot of other stuff.

933
01:04:55,586 --> 01:04:57,146
And yeah, all this other stuff is hard.

934
01:04:57,306 --> 01:04:57,926
It takes time.

935
01:04:59,266 --> 01:05:00,826
But we're doing it and it's happening.

936
01:05:01,066 --> 01:05:03,066
And I'm seeing these apps coming out

937
01:05:03,066 --> 01:05:04,386
that's just like, okay, cool.

938
01:05:04,466 --> 01:05:05,586
We've now got encrypted calling.

939
01:05:05,846 --> 01:05:07,066
We've now got messaging.

940
01:05:07,346 --> 01:05:09,266
We've now got encrypted Dropbox.

941
01:05:09,826 --> 01:05:12,186
that runs on Noster and is like fully backed up.

942
01:05:12,966 --> 01:05:17,026
So we will have the tools for people that need them and want to use them.

943
01:05:18,046 --> 01:05:19,746
I think the other thing that I'm,

944
01:05:19,786 --> 01:05:23,326
I'm pretty bullish on is there's a lot of,

945
01:05:23,406 --> 01:05:26,926
I mean the coin join stuff has sort of gone a little bit quiet.

946
01:05:27,886 --> 01:05:29,686
I think partially because of,

947
01:05:29,686 --> 01:05:30,446
you know,

948
01:05:30,866 --> 01:05:34,106
certain legal action that was being taken by the American government.

949
01:05:35,726 --> 01:05:38,226
But there's still so much privacy stuff happening in Bitcoin.

950
01:05:38,226 --> 01:05:38,926
That's so cool.

951
01:05:38,926 --> 01:05:39,786
like silent payments.

952
01:05:39,786 --> 01:05:43,806
There's a bunch of things that are happening around that to make silent payments work well

953
01:05:43,806 --> 01:05:46,426
for normal users and be more adopted.

954
01:05:47,426 --> 01:05:50,546
I think things like pay join are also super important.

955
01:05:51,406 --> 01:05:56,206
And I think, again, like we're going to see a bunch of these just all of a sudden they're

956
01:05:56,206 --> 01:06:00,066
going to be everywhere in all the wallets and it's just going to be the default.

957
01:06:00,726 --> 01:06:01,686
You're not going to have to think about it.

958
01:06:01,746 --> 01:06:05,606
You're not going to have to like stress about worrying, you know, how this functions and

959
01:06:05,606 --> 01:06:05,946
works.

960
01:06:05,946 --> 01:06:10,046
you'll just be able to give people your silent payment address and it'll just work and no one

961
01:06:10,046 --> 01:06:14,506
will be able to look and see where those coins went or what address they went to or anything

962
01:06:14,506 --> 01:06:20,526
so it's a lot of these little things like that that i think keeps me hopeful and again we don't

963
01:06:20,526 --> 01:06:23,946
have to fix this for the entire planet we have to fix this for the people that care about it

964
01:06:23,946 --> 01:06:29,146
and we have to stop thinking that like we have to comply with everything they say

965
01:06:29,146 --> 01:06:35,006
that's the other piece is that you know you see our bitcoiners all the time like getting you know

966
01:06:35,006 --> 01:06:38,366
kind of freaked out like, oh, well, how am I going to like account for all the taxes on my lightning

967
01:06:38,366 --> 01:06:44,106
zaps? And you're like, bro, really? This is like peer to peer electronic money. We don't have to

968
01:06:44,106 --> 01:06:51,206
talk to anybody about it. Right. Um, so, you know, I just think it's like one of those things of

969
01:06:51,206 --> 01:06:58,306
you have to let go of the mindset of you must play their game by their rules. Um, they're,

970
01:06:58,366 --> 01:07:03,766
they are completely dependent on that being the system and that being the case. And as soon as

971
01:07:03,766 --> 01:07:09,066
people stop doing that, then yeah, they get scared for good reason. Um, like I just saw five minutes

972
01:07:09,066 --> 01:07:14,146
ago, like the, you know, president Bulgaria stepped down or prime minister or whatever he is, um,

973
01:07:14,146 --> 01:07:18,906
because the entire country just flooded the streets and they were like, no, this is not okay.

974
01:07:19,086 --> 01:07:24,146
Like you, you must leave now or everything's getting burned down. Um, and he, he left,

975
01:07:24,206 --> 01:07:30,246
he like was like, okay, I mean, I have to resign. That's it. End of story. Um, so, you know, I think

976
01:07:30,246 --> 01:07:34,606
people underestimate their power. Uh, but it really has to start with, like we were saying

977
01:07:34,606 --> 01:07:39,746
before private conversations that then spill over into public discourse. And then the public

978
01:07:39,746 --> 01:07:43,166
discourse gets hot enough where it's like, no, we're not going to take this anymore. You know,

979
01:07:43,226 --> 01:07:47,706
we're not going to listen to Nancy Pelosi about our insider trading, you know, for any longer,

980
01:07:47,706 --> 01:07:54,626
we're going to make this stop. I say amen to that. I mean, this is one of the reasons that I'm just

981
01:07:54,626 --> 01:08:01,826
still remain so bullish on Noster broadly, even just in the narrow social media implementation

982
01:08:01,826 --> 01:08:08,826
that we're seeing a lot of, you know, a lot of the uptick with today is just, it seems,

983
01:08:08,926 --> 01:08:12,106
and I'd love your opinion on this. You know, we've, we've kind of plot in terms of like

984
01:08:12,106 --> 01:08:16,306
Noster user growth. It's, it's, it's slowed down, right? There, there hasn't been like

985
01:08:16,306 --> 01:08:21,826
massive influxes. I don't know about that. So here's the cool thing. You tell me,

986
01:08:21,826 --> 01:08:23,086
here's the cool thing.

987
01:08:23,446 --> 01:08:28,266
A lot of the uses of Noster don't look like Noster anymore and you can't tell

988
01:08:28,266 --> 01:08:28,686
it's Noster.

989
01:08:29,146 --> 01:08:30,806
And so think about BitChat.

990
01:08:31,626 --> 01:08:35,486
There's a shitload of Noster users that don't know they're using Noster and

991
01:08:35,486 --> 01:08:36,446
that's the way it should be,

992
01:08:36,446 --> 01:08:36,946
right?

993
01:08:36,986 --> 01:08:39,406
It's a protocol that people don't go around being like,

994
01:08:39,486 --> 01:08:39,526
Oh,

995
01:08:39,526 --> 01:08:40,766
I'm using TCP IP today.

996
01:08:40,886 --> 01:08:42,886
I am using SMTP today.

997
01:08:43,006 --> 01:08:43,206
No,

998
01:08:43,266 --> 01:08:43,646
you're just like,

999
01:08:43,686 --> 01:08:44,146
I'm on the internet.

1000
01:08:44,246 --> 01:08:44,826
I sent an email.

1001
01:08:44,826 --> 01:08:46,506
Like you don't think about it,

1002
01:08:46,546 --> 01:08:46,966
those terms.

1003
01:08:47,226 --> 01:08:48,126
And you know,

1004
01:08:48,186 --> 01:08:50,446
everybody that uses BitChat is a Noster user.

1005
01:08:51,046 --> 01:08:51,446
Um,

1006
01:08:51,446 --> 01:08:54,906
And I think that is more and more the way we're going to go.

1007
01:08:55,266 --> 01:08:59,626
And we need to get out of this trap of thinking that we have to be building Noster-specific things.

1008
01:08:59,986 --> 01:09:03,546
We are building tools that provide value to users.

1009
01:09:03,706 --> 01:09:04,086
That's it.

1010
01:09:04,826 --> 01:09:07,386
And hopefully those users are our customers, right?

1011
01:09:07,386 --> 01:09:11,546
Because if they're just users and your customer is someone else, then we're just redoing the same thing that we had before.

1012
01:09:12,786 --> 01:09:17,586
But there's going to be plenty of products where people have zero idea they're using Noster.

1013
01:09:17,886 --> 01:09:20,206
And like Rabble's Divine app as well.

1014
01:09:20,206 --> 01:09:24,966
like this is another example you know instantaneously all 10 000 test flight uh

1015
01:09:24,966 --> 01:09:31,406
you know coupons were gone like three hours wild bang and then he had immediately in his dms all

1016
01:09:31,406 --> 01:09:36,466
the old like mega influencers from vine were like bro i can't believe you're bringing this back i

1017
01:09:36,466 --> 01:09:42,386
can't wait you know they're they're like freaking out because they loved it um and to them they don't

1018
01:09:42,386 --> 01:09:47,346
give a shit about noster they have no idea what it is um but a handful of curious people will

1019
01:09:47,346 --> 01:09:51,786
realize that like, hey, wait, what's this thing built on? And like, how can I'm seeing all this

1020
01:09:51,786 --> 01:09:56,306
other content from other places? And how are people paying me Bitcoin? This is crazy. And then

1021
01:09:56,306 --> 01:10:00,486
Rabble will just be like, yeah, and you can have your key. Now you're now yourself sovereign. See

1022
01:10:00,486 --> 01:10:06,826
you later. So again, I actually think that the network is growing really fast. We just don't

1023
01:10:06,826 --> 01:10:11,166
have the tools in place to see it. So that's actually another project I'm working on a little

1024
01:10:11,166 --> 01:10:17,066
bit of a side quest is like getting a bunch of Nostradata dumped into a very large analytics

1025
01:10:17,066 --> 01:10:20,646
database and building a dashboard so that we can see some of this stuff.

1026
01:10:21,246 --> 01:10:22,886
And some of it's just tricky because it's like,

1027
01:10:22,966 --> 01:10:24,566
how do you measure BitChat users?

1028
01:10:25,006 --> 01:10:26,646
You know, they're all technically ephemeral.

1029
01:10:26,826 --> 01:10:27,766
They don't have profiles,

1030
01:10:27,986 --> 01:10:30,766
but they are publishing good events and they are using the thing.

1031
01:10:32,806 --> 01:10:35,846
And I appreciate you calling that out there.

1032
01:10:35,986 --> 01:10:40,066
Jack had a note on Noster, of course, a week or two ago.

1033
01:10:40,806 --> 01:10:43,226
Noster wins if it stops trying to be a Twitter clone

1034
01:10:43,226 --> 01:10:46,066
and starts being the invisible layer underneath apps.

1035
01:10:46,066 --> 01:10:47,606
you actually want to use,

1036
01:10:47,686 --> 01:10:50,046
like BitChat for location-based messaging,

1037
01:10:50,186 --> 01:10:50,986
Divine for entertainment,

1038
01:10:51,386 --> 01:10:52,546
White Noise for private messaging,

1039
01:10:52,686 --> 01:10:54,626
Zap.stream, hey-o, what we're on right now,

1040
01:10:54,966 --> 01:10:57,206
for streaming, Shakespeare for vibe coding, et cetera.

1041
01:10:57,746 --> 01:11:00,226
He went on to say it wins by unbundling

1042
01:11:00,226 --> 01:11:04,126
into 50 different apps that all talk to each other

1043
01:11:04,126 --> 01:11:07,186
rather than one giant app slash corp that traps you.

1044
01:11:07,546 --> 01:11:08,806
It's all about the ecosystem.

1045
01:11:08,986 --> 01:11:10,646
I mean, safe to say you're in agreement

1046
01:11:10,646 --> 01:11:11,426
with that position.

1047
01:11:12,146 --> 01:11:12,886
Very, yeah.

1048
01:11:13,226 --> 01:11:14,706
Yeah, strongly in agreement with that position.

1049
01:11:14,706 --> 01:11:20,526
again like it's you know uh engineers fall into this trap all the time it's like i want to build

1050
01:11:20,526 --> 01:11:25,006
something cool because i want to build something cool versus i want to fix a problem for someone

1051
01:11:25,006 --> 01:11:29,866
um and i think we need to just keep focusing on fixing problems and watching what users are doing

1052
01:11:29,866 --> 01:11:37,366
with things um and adjusting accordingly to whatever that is no i definitely agree with that

1053
01:11:37,366 --> 01:11:43,986
and it is it is cool to see you i mean seeing the response to divine was really cool because it was

1054
01:11:43,986 --> 01:11:50,406
just, I think more, uh, more intense than anyone thought. I mean, especially even rabble thought

1055
01:11:50,406 --> 01:11:56,526
he's kind of like, Oh, wow. Wow. Like, but that's awesome. That's great. Like it's, it's striking

1056
01:11:56,526 --> 01:12:01,166
a nerve and it's great. And I also like the focus that it's filtering out the AI slop,

1057
01:12:01,166 --> 01:12:05,946
I think is really cool. Making things that are human centric experiences and finding out that,

1058
01:12:06,026 --> 01:12:10,866
Hey, people, yep. People still want that people resonate. Yeah. They want the, you know, just the,

1059
01:12:10,866 --> 01:12:16,486
the real, the authentic, the, the personality driven, the human driven versus just so much

1060
01:12:16,486 --> 01:12:21,966
more generative slop, like people are already tiring of it, you know, which is like, okay,

1061
01:12:21,966 --> 01:12:26,546
bullish on humanity then that that's the case. Right. Yeah. A hundred percent. Yeah. I mean,

1062
01:12:26,586 --> 01:12:31,086
yeah, that like the response to divine, you know, I remember rabble showing me like a very early

1063
01:12:31,086 --> 01:12:34,566
version of this and like telling me about it months ago. And I was like, this is really cool.

1064
01:12:34,566 --> 01:12:39,566
Like I remember divine or vine and it was a big deal. Like people really loved it. Um,

1065
01:12:39,566 --> 01:12:45,706
just because of the format was so fun. And, uh, and I remember I was in the car with him somewhere

1066
01:12:45,706 --> 01:12:48,986
going somewhere and I was just like, this is going to be cool, but like, it'll probably take,

1067
01:12:49,066 --> 01:12:53,646
you know, it'll probably be niche, whatever. And then it came out and it was just like, Oh wow.

1068
01:12:53,786 --> 01:13:00,546
Okay. What? Yeah. Yeah. I, I don't think, I mean, I lived through the whole vine era and thought it

1069
01:13:00,546 --> 01:13:05,926
was really cool. I still don't think I had any idea how much certain people like really were into

1070
01:13:05,926 --> 01:13:12,246
it. It was like a cult thing. I, I, I loved using Vine and it was, it was, it's interesting

1071
01:13:12,246 --> 01:13:18,866
because you remember too, Vine came around and only after Vine did Instagram add video to the

1072
01:13:18,866 --> 01:13:23,286
app. Yep. Yep. And like that, that was a definite, they've realized, oh shit, there's been a massive

1073
01:13:23,286 --> 01:13:28,906
response to this. You need to get on this. And now you look at, I mean, short form video is

1074
01:13:28,906 --> 01:13:34,786
everywhere. That's the, that's the thing everywhere you go is short form video. Vine was just like

1075
01:13:34,786 --> 01:13:38,066
short form video on steroids. It was like, you know, like seven seconds or whatever, like ultra

1076
01:13:38,066 --> 01:13:42,306
short form. But I also like love that because it made you be even more, you know, even more

1077
01:13:42,306 --> 01:13:46,986
creative, concise and creative. And yeah, it's, so it's, it's cool. That's coming back. And again,

1078
01:13:46,986 --> 01:13:51,546
this is the thing where to your point, people are going to use that without any idea what,

1079
01:13:51,546 --> 01:13:55,926
you know, no stir means what they're not going to know that it's notes and other stuff transmitted

1080
01:13:55,926 --> 01:14:10,408
by realize they not even going to know that it is the thing that is behind all of this They just they coming for the experience So I guess a broader question is cause I think you got kind of you got two sides of like what NOSTER enables

1081
01:14:10,408 --> 01:14:15,408
One is it enables truly superior experiences

1082
01:14:16,148 --> 01:14:17,788
because of the interconnectedness,

1083
01:14:17,788 --> 01:14:19,688
because of the ability to create this ecosystem

1084
01:14:19,688 --> 01:14:21,828
of applications that can all still speak

1085
01:14:21,828 --> 01:14:24,508
the common language of the NOSTER protocol.

1086
01:14:24,508 --> 01:14:26,528
The other side is the censorship resistant,

1087
01:14:26,528 --> 01:14:32,528
like, you know, being able to give the middle finger to the totalitarian fetishizers, like that's amazing too.

1088
01:14:32,528 --> 01:14:40,008
But realistically, the people who are going to come for the anti-censorship, anti-totalitarian freedom tech,

1089
01:14:40,588 --> 01:14:45,128
it's minuscule compared to the people who are going to come for, hey, sick new video app.

1090
01:14:45,688 --> 01:14:46,548
Like that's just the reality.

1091
01:14:46,648 --> 01:14:49,348
But like that's kind of the Trojan horse too, right?

1092
01:14:49,368 --> 01:14:49,848
Of course.

1093
01:14:50,048 --> 01:14:53,448
You get more and more people making this protocol bigger, more resilient.

1094
01:14:53,448 --> 01:15:00,068
and then it's all still interconnected if and when they need it for that fuck totalitarianism

1095
01:15:00,068 --> 01:15:04,568
side of things which is like kind of kind of it's this it's like the sly roundabout way for bitcoin

1096
01:15:04,568 --> 01:15:09,448
like it's a similar thing here you're bootstrapping with fun stuff so that the freedom tech kind of

1097
01:15:09,448 --> 01:15:15,808
slides in unbeknownst to the uh to the would-be totalitarians out there which is just it's kind

1098
01:15:15,808 --> 01:15:21,608
of beautiful to watch yeah i mean it is it really is that right like i said before we don't have to

1099
01:15:21,608 --> 01:15:27,528
save everyone or make everyone do the thing in the exact right way right we just have to keep

1100
01:15:27,528 --> 01:15:33,748
that option open um and you know if it's only a small percentage of people fine for that small

1101
01:15:33,748 --> 01:15:41,408
percentage it really really mattered um and so you know i think that to me is like full success

1102
01:15:41,408 --> 01:15:44,588
on the nostril side like if loads of people are using it they don't have any idea what nostril

1103
01:15:44,588 --> 01:15:52,448
is super i don't care um if you know we stop seeing uh you know aws us east one go down and

1104
01:15:52,448 --> 01:15:59,228
half the internet turns off even better uh if people are actually able to like topple you know

1105
01:15:59,228 --> 01:16:05,008
authoritarian governments in africa and like do it safely because of tools we've built like icing

1106
01:16:05,008 --> 01:16:09,208
on the cake you know we've like fully won it doesn't matter you know like europe can put in

1107
01:16:09,208 --> 01:16:14,488
chat control all they want like we don't care you know like fundamentally we have a github repo

1108
01:16:14,488 --> 01:16:15,708
and we have no servers.

1109
01:16:15,988 --> 01:16:18,128
So they can ask us to do things,

1110
01:16:18,228 --> 01:16:19,568
but we just will not do them

1111
01:16:19,568 --> 01:16:20,868
because we don't, we can't.

1112
01:16:20,868 --> 01:16:22,528
We're like, literally, look, there's the code.

1113
01:16:22,728 --> 01:16:23,908
Here, why don't you fork it

1114
01:16:23,908 --> 01:16:26,388
and you can add your client-side scanning nonsense to it.

1115
01:16:26,828 --> 01:16:28,068
See if people want to use it.

1116
01:16:29,728 --> 01:16:33,108
I think that's, this is the right attitude, Jeff,

1117
01:16:33,248 --> 01:16:36,008
is like, fuck you guys.

1118
01:16:36,508 --> 01:16:38,368
Look, we can't even do anything if we want to.

1119
01:16:38,888 --> 01:16:41,688
So like, you know, what do you want?

1120
01:16:41,968 --> 01:16:43,608
There's nothing you can do, right?

1121
01:16:43,608 --> 01:16:49,908
like you you need to make the tech so that it can't be stopped and that's the beauty of no

1122
01:16:49,908 --> 01:16:55,028
story is that there is no single throat to choke it's a protocol like it's there's you know nobody

1123
01:16:55,028 --> 01:17:00,748
is in charge of it and what people build on top of it is predominantly open source which is great

1124
01:17:00,748 --> 01:17:04,928
because that means anyone else can pick that up and run with it and that means that it just becomes

1125
01:17:04,928 --> 01:17:10,388
a game of like super intense whack-a-mole for any would-be totalitarians who want to crack down on

1126
01:17:10,388 --> 01:17:12,488
Like you're just not going to be able to do it.

1127
01:17:12,488 --> 01:17:13,188
And there's something,

1128
01:17:13,288 --> 01:17:13,388
you know,

1129
01:17:13,408 --> 01:17:17,308
it's an analogy I made very early on and getting on Noster was it's,

1130
01:17:17,308 --> 01:17:18,028
it's the Hydra,

1131
01:17:18,368 --> 01:17:18,608
right?

1132
01:17:18,888 --> 01:17:19,708
You cut off one head.

1133
01:17:19,788 --> 01:17:20,368
It doesn't matter.

1134
01:17:20,508 --> 01:17:21,588
Two more pop up in its place.

1135
01:17:21,588 --> 01:17:22,908
And that Hydra is open source,

1136
01:17:22,988 --> 01:17:23,228
baby.

1137
01:17:23,508 --> 01:17:26,728
Like it is an open source mythological creature and you cannot kill it.

1138
01:17:26,728 --> 01:17:28,168
And that is fucking amazing.

1139
01:17:28,488 --> 01:17:28,688
Do you know,

1140
01:17:28,708 --> 01:17:29,268
that's even cooler.

1141
01:17:29,268 --> 01:17:32,748
I was talking to somebody recently about some local first type stuff that a

1142
01:17:32,748 --> 01:17:35,068
lot of folks are working on with Noster things.

1143
01:17:35,768 --> 01:17:36,368
You know,

1144
01:17:36,408 --> 01:17:40,088
Will from Thomas is doing a version of this with note deck where he's got a

1145
01:17:40,088 --> 01:17:47,448
relay running in the app effectively um you can imagine a place like you know whatever central

1146
01:17:47,448 --> 01:17:54,528
african country uh you know they can easily just turn off the internet but then you've got something

1147
01:17:54,528 --> 01:18:00,268
like bluetooth mesh or long distance radio you've got relays that are in each device uh so that

1148
01:18:00,268 --> 01:18:05,468
you're basically running locally until you get internet somewhere whether it's from a satellite

1149
01:18:05,468 --> 01:18:11,548
or whatever it sinks down really fast and then can send all the things that you had sent while you

1150
01:18:11,548 --> 01:18:18,848
were offline um and you end up with this extremely resilient network like not only to um you know

1151
01:18:18,848 --> 01:18:23,428
people actually turning off relays but like the relays are everywhere then and the relays move

1152
01:18:23,428 --> 01:18:29,768
around and they're i mean basically everyone is a relay then and so it's like you know that's the

1153
01:18:29,768 --> 01:18:33,768
world i'm most interested in seeing is like us getting away from this like okay yeah we got fiber

1154
01:18:33,768 --> 01:18:37,848
up to cables that are really fast and that's really cool and unfortunately elon's the only

1155
01:18:37,848 --> 01:18:43,308
guy with satellites right now um but that you know elon having satellites is still better than

1156
01:18:43,308 --> 01:18:50,628
the nsa having all the cables um you know and google being everything so you know i want us to

1157
01:18:50,628 --> 01:18:55,928
go in a world where we've got radio and we've got bluetooth and we've got wi-fi mesh and we've got

1158
01:18:55,928 --> 01:18:59,708
like all these different options for how we connect to each other and how we do things like that

1159
01:18:59,708 --> 01:19:04,328
online. Um, we're still a really long way from that, by the way. Uh, and the government is not

1160
01:19:04,328 --> 01:19:09,768
going to let radio spectrum out of their hands anytime soon, but you know, these are things that,

1161
01:19:09,768 --> 01:19:13,668
uh, you know, squad goals, like we, we got some work to do, but like, I think we can be pushing

1162
01:19:13,668 --> 01:19:20,128
in that direction constantly. Yeah, it is amazing. And all these things ultimately come down to a

1163
01:19:20,128 --> 01:19:27,208
more fundamentally peer to peer experience, right? It's, it's removed, it's removing middlemen in,

1164
01:19:27,208 --> 01:19:29,428
in kind of all of these different situations,

1165
01:19:29,428 --> 01:19:30,808
whether it be money with Bitcoin or,

1166
01:19:31,208 --> 01:19:31,308
I mean,

1167
01:19:31,348 --> 01:19:32,588
like radio people,

1168
01:19:32,668 --> 01:19:33,168
people really,

1169
01:19:33,228 --> 01:19:33,548
I think,

1170
01:19:34,328 --> 01:19:36,608
think about radio as this antiquated thing.

1171
01:19:36,608 --> 01:19:37,188
If we talk about,

1172
01:19:37,228 --> 01:19:37,348
you know,

1173
01:19:37,348 --> 01:19:38,568
like HF radio even,

1174
01:19:38,968 --> 01:19:39,428
but it's like,

1175
01:19:40,008 --> 01:19:40,308
man,

1176
01:19:40,368 --> 01:19:42,468
the shit works and it's incredible.

1177
01:19:42,588 --> 01:19:42,988
Like,

1178
01:19:43,108 --> 01:19:45,808
and you can do a lot more with it than you realize.

1179
01:19:46,088 --> 01:19:46,328
Yeah.

1180
01:19:46,408 --> 01:19:48,908
They forget that there's like 17 radio antennas in their phone.

1181
01:19:49,108 --> 01:19:49,948
Like there were,

1182
01:19:50,168 --> 01:19:50,928
everything is radio.

1183
01:19:51,048 --> 01:19:52,328
Basically everything is radio.

1184
01:19:52,328 --> 01:19:52,608
And,

1185
01:19:52,708 --> 01:19:53,688
and this is like why,

1186
01:19:54,228 --> 01:19:54,428
yeah,

1187
01:19:54,448 --> 01:19:56,688
this is why it's so highly regulated is because it's,

1188
01:19:56,688 --> 01:20:02,408
so unbelievably powerful, you know, you can knock planes out of the sky with it. Um, so, uh, you

1189
01:20:02,408 --> 01:20:06,828
know, it is, uh, some of these things that we discovered a long time ago, like they are still

1190
01:20:06,828 --> 01:20:12,568
very, very powerful. Um, you know, we are just using them in, in wild ways now. Uh, and unfortunately

1191
01:20:12,568 --> 01:20:18,868
we don't have direct access to them as normal citizens. Um, so again, you know, I love the,

1192
01:20:18,868 --> 01:20:23,328
the little mesh tastics and things like that, where they're starting to play with some of these,

1193
01:20:23,328 --> 01:20:28,308
you know, shorter distance, um, you know, mesh networks and radio signals that way,

1194
01:20:28,628 --> 01:20:34,848
you know, I would love to see us get, you know, ultra long wave stuff where we're able to bounce,

1195
01:20:34,848 --> 01:20:38,988
uh, Bitcoin transactions off the stratosphere and stuff and, you know, have them received

1196
01:20:38,988 --> 01:20:42,928
somewhere else. You know, I know that NVK plays with that stuff and does it on a normal basis,

1197
01:20:42,928 --> 01:20:47,468
but you know, I think it's, it's still a bit of a pony, you know, party trick. Um,

1198
01:20:47,828 --> 01:20:51,428
I would love to see all that stuff become a little bit more normal and normalized.

1199
01:20:51,428 --> 01:20:56,428
I wrote a white paper for that a couple of years ago, actually, that I haven't published

1200
01:20:56,428 --> 01:21:03,688
specifically about using HF radio waves and bouncing them off the ionosphere and using

1201
01:21:03,688 --> 01:21:07,688
that to create basically a Bitcoin doomsday network that would always allow you to propagate

1202
01:21:07,688 --> 01:21:13,448
transactions, even in the event that you didn't have internet connectivity.

1203
01:21:13,948 --> 01:21:16,208
Because everybody's like, well, what happens if the internet goes out?

1204
01:21:16,268 --> 01:21:18,328
And it's like, well, you'd have this.

1205
01:21:18,548 --> 01:21:18,968
Use radio.

1206
01:21:19,488 --> 01:21:19,708
Yeah.

1207
01:21:19,708 --> 01:21:23,868
Yeah. You'd need a certain, uh, basically then your,

1208
01:21:23,868 --> 01:21:27,228
your question becomes physical security of those sites. If you're actually,

1209
01:21:27,228 --> 01:21:29,548
you know, like worried about that, but that's a, that's like, again,

1210
01:21:29,908 --> 01:21:33,628
just different problems. Yeah. Maybe I need to unearth that, uh, unearth that.

1211
01:21:34,688 --> 01:21:37,768
Get it out and send it to NVK. He'll, uh, spot check it for you.

1212
01:21:38,148 --> 01:21:41,528
Yeah. I had actually talked to him about it as I was writing it at this time.

1213
01:21:41,528 --> 01:21:44,188
And he was like, let's do it. And then, you know,

1214
01:21:44,448 --> 01:21:47,228
and then life comes at you and then life comes at you. You know what?

1215
01:21:47,228 --> 01:21:49,348
I'm going to have to unearth this. I'm going to pop this up.

1216
01:21:49,348 --> 01:21:52,188
I'm going to wait. And if I don't see it in the next like week or two, I'm going to start bothering

1217
01:21:52,188 --> 01:21:57,028
you every day on Noster. Good, good. I need to, I need to go revisit it and see how I did with it.

1218
01:21:57,068 --> 01:22:00,488
I'm pretty sure I was just about done with it too. I just didn't actually publish it. So I'm

1219
01:22:00,488 --> 01:22:03,888
going to have to, I'm gonna have to pick this thing up again. You've convinced me. Yeah. I

1220
01:22:03,888 --> 01:22:07,348
want to be conscious of your time here. One thing I just maybe like last thing to kind of

1221
01:22:08,028 --> 01:22:12,168
wrap up on a little bit, vibe coding and Shakespeare. I know you just like recently

1222
01:22:12,168 --> 01:22:16,088
gave a, gave a talk where you were just vibe coding live and like building an app

1223
01:22:16,088 --> 01:22:19,008
based on user or people's requests from the audience.

1224
01:22:19,468 --> 01:22:20,928
Can you talk about that a little bit?

1225
01:22:20,948 --> 01:22:24,868
And just like for folks maybe who don't know what Shakespeare is,

1226
01:22:24,908 --> 01:22:26,488
like it's really cool.

1227
01:22:26,528 --> 01:22:28,328
I talked to Derek about this recently too.

1228
01:22:28,408 --> 01:22:29,628
Like it's just, it's awesome, right?

1229
01:22:30,308 --> 01:22:31,068
Yeah, it's amazing.

1230
01:22:31,668 --> 01:22:35,628
So yeah, Shakespeare is Alex Gleason's AI tool.

1231
01:22:35,628 --> 01:22:38,208
If you're familiar with something like Lovable or Replit,

1232
01:22:38,608 --> 01:22:39,588
it's really similar.

1233
01:22:40,028 --> 01:22:42,588
It allows you just to go in and start vibing,

1234
01:22:42,728 --> 01:22:44,448
trying to one-shot basically an app.

1235
01:22:44,908 --> 01:22:49,268
The thing is that it's highly tuned for Nostra apps.

1236
01:22:49,708 --> 01:22:50,948
And so it knows all the NIPs.

1237
01:22:51,008 --> 01:22:52,268
It knows how to go read all the NIPs.

1238
01:22:52,348 --> 01:22:54,028
It knows how to look at other Nostra products.

1239
01:22:54,328 --> 01:23:01,248
It knows how to set up Nostra login with, you know, put in your Insec here or use an extension or, you know, use a remote signer.

1240
01:23:01,408 --> 01:23:04,828
So it's got all these, like, you know, shortcuts and things built into it.

1241
01:23:04,828 --> 01:23:11,308
And it knows a lot about things like, I mean, everything from cashew wallets to lightning wallets to Zaps, like everything's in there.

1242
01:23:11,308 --> 01:23:28,130
The other really cool thing which is I don think many people have talked about this but like Alex figured out a way to basically build a virtual file system in the browser And so when you do stuff with Shakespeare it actually creating a Git repository locally in the browser

1243
01:23:28,130 --> 01:23:30,730
and doing everything in an actual file system

1244
01:23:30,730 --> 01:23:33,550
rather than just like, you know, trying to spin something up.

1245
01:23:33,650 --> 01:23:34,850
And so when you're done with it,

1246
01:23:34,850 --> 01:23:36,270
you can actually just, you know,

1247
01:23:36,510 --> 01:23:38,450
Git clone and take it somewhere

1248
01:23:38,450 --> 01:23:39,670
and put it on GitHub if you want

1249
01:23:39,670 --> 01:23:42,850
and run your app, you know, wherever you'd like.

1250
01:23:42,850 --> 01:23:48,490
so it's a really approachable easy to use tool but at the same time there's actually a pathway

1251
01:23:48,490 --> 01:23:53,070
for like more advanced people to like you know break the thing out and actually go build on it

1252
01:23:53,070 --> 01:23:58,110
in a real way um but to be honest like most people have pretty good ideas and they can get jakespeare

1253
01:23:58,110 --> 01:24:02,810
to pop it out pretty fast you know like you can go in there and be like i want to have a thing that

1254
01:24:02,810 --> 01:24:07,770
kind of looks like primal but instead of being normal you know posts i want it to be video only

1255
01:24:07,770 --> 01:24:13,550
and it will almost certainly do it well um and yeah like the the african bitcoin conference they

1256
01:24:13,550 --> 01:24:17,790
gave me a workshop slot and i had a bunch of time and it's kind of a mixed thing you don't know who's

1257
01:24:17,790 --> 01:24:21,610
going to be at what technical level so i was like we're just going to wing this and we're going to

1258
01:24:21,610 --> 01:24:25,690
start from the point of just like somebody give me an idea and somebody was like you know uber eats

1259
01:24:25,690 --> 01:24:30,810
for uh uber eats on nostor that's it that's literally what i typed in and it pretty much

1260
01:24:30,810 --> 01:24:35,870
one-shotted the thing immediately now now funny scenario when you scroll down and you're like

1261
01:24:35,870 --> 01:24:39,770
seeing these things that look like restaurants and then there's like a picture of boobs and you're

1262
01:24:39,770 --> 01:24:46,590
like, Oh God, Noster. Thank you. No blur hashes obviously. Uh, but you know, this is Noster still.

1263
01:24:47,190 --> 01:24:51,450
Uh, so it was really cool. And, and it was a good jumping off point to just give people this,

1264
01:24:51,450 --> 01:24:56,570
you know, uh, a bit more context around like, yeah, there's lots of different models and lots

1265
01:24:56,570 --> 01:25:01,590
of different ways of using AI. And, um, you know, a lot of the models that are in Shakespeare

1266
01:25:01,590 --> 01:25:03,450
are available in Shakespeare are open source models.

1267
01:25:04,670 --> 01:25:07,210
They might not be quite as advanced as something like

1268
01:25:07,210 --> 01:25:11,190
Claude Opus 4.5, but they're free.

1269
01:25:11,550 --> 01:25:13,850
There's not a company behind them taking all the data

1270
01:25:13,850 --> 01:25:15,590
for the most part.

1271
01:25:17,250 --> 01:25:20,770
And so I think that's another area where I think

1272
01:25:20,770 --> 01:25:22,870
we really need to put a lot more energy and focus.

1273
01:25:23,190 --> 01:25:25,270
And this is very much not Nostra specific,

1274
01:25:25,590 --> 01:25:28,970
but it's a bad, bad world that we end up in

1275
01:25:28,970 --> 01:25:32,810
if we've got three or four gigantic AI companies and that's it.

1276
01:25:33,530 --> 01:25:36,670
And that's basically what we're at right now.

1277
01:25:36,670 --> 01:25:41,170
We are perpetuating this centralized internet because to run these things well,

1278
01:25:41,530 --> 01:25:46,090
you need football field-sized data centers running at full capacity.

1279
01:25:47,210 --> 01:25:51,410
And it's cost prohibitive for most things and most companies and most people.

1280
01:25:54,050 --> 01:25:57,410
I've been meaning to play around with Shakespeare a little bit more

1281
01:25:57,410 --> 01:26:01,970
Um, because I am not a developer, but it's like, I, I do like to vibe.

1282
01:26:02,170 --> 01:26:06,030
So, you know, it will, it will do a really good job.

1283
01:26:06,030 --> 01:26:08,150
Like it is like shockingly good at this point.

1284
01:26:08,350 --> 01:26:12,970
Um, like how, how fast it does it and like how it, you know, you get to see the feedback

1285
01:26:12,970 --> 01:26:13,650
in real time.

1286
01:26:13,650 --> 01:26:14,650
Like it's a split screen.

1287
01:26:14,650 --> 01:26:18,310
So it's like, you can see it thinking and sort of talking through all of its changes.

1288
01:26:18,550 --> 01:26:22,110
And then you just see this, you know, the browser page just keeps updating and you're

1289
01:26:22,110 --> 01:26:22,930
like, Oh, okay.

1290
01:26:22,930 --> 01:26:23,470
There's a header.

1291
01:26:23,570 --> 01:26:24,070
Okay, cool.

1292
01:26:24,130 --> 01:26:24,830
Now it's a sidebar.

1293
01:26:24,830 --> 01:26:27,270
And like, okay, now I can see the actual content of the app.

1294
01:26:27,270 --> 01:26:30,550
and it just appears before your eyes.

1295
01:26:30,850 --> 01:26:32,210
It's really, really fun to see.

1296
01:26:33,330 --> 01:26:33,870
It's wild.

1297
01:26:33,950 --> 01:26:37,410
I can finally make a Footster Noster client

1298
01:26:37,410 --> 01:26:38,650
specifically for Derek.

1299
01:26:39,150 --> 01:26:39,610
It's time.

1300
01:26:39,750 --> 01:26:40,290
Do it.

1301
01:26:40,430 --> 01:26:41,470
It's really just for Derek.

1302
01:26:42,470 --> 01:26:44,890
But I think it is time.

1303
01:26:45,150 --> 01:26:46,030
It's time for Footster Noster.

1304
01:26:46,030 --> 01:26:48,110
That could literally be your next podcast episode.

1305
01:26:48,310 --> 01:26:49,770
Instead of doing a podcast episode,

1306
01:26:49,890 --> 01:26:52,650
just live stream you building Footster with Shakespeare.

1307
01:26:52,990 --> 01:26:54,090
It would be amazing.

1308
01:26:54,790 --> 01:26:56,370
Honestly, I'm super into that.

1309
01:26:56,370 --> 01:26:59,350
I'm going to have to bring Derek on forward or he's going to feel left out.

1310
01:26:59,430 --> 01:27:01,710
He doesn't want, he never wants to miss out on the feet. You know, you know,

1311
01:27:01,750 --> 01:27:05,170
Derek never wants to miss out of the feet, man. But okay.

1312
01:27:05,850 --> 01:27:09,690
Yeah. This has been a blast. Uh, do you want anything else you want to close out

1313
01:27:09,690 --> 01:27:11,610
with anything else? We, we, you know,

1314
01:27:11,650 --> 01:27:14,070
we didn't get into like super technical stuff with white noise,

1315
01:27:14,090 --> 01:27:15,870
but I think it's, it's more important for people to like,

1316
01:27:15,930 --> 01:27:18,730
especially cause you guys are still building this out for people to get the

1317
01:27:18,730 --> 01:27:21,810
context behind it and to understand why this is so important right now,

1318
01:27:21,810 --> 01:27:25,690
why we need more of tools like this. Um,

1319
01:27:25,690 --> 01:27:31,130
maybe like uh your your beta is still open right i'm on the the test flight it's it's still yeah

1320
01:27:31,130 --> 01:27:34,970
you still have some thoughts yeah yeah yeah so if you go to whitenoise.chat that's the website

1321
01:27:34,970 --> 01:27:41,430
um and that's got the download links for everything um we're on zap store for android we're on um like

1322
01:27:41,430 --> 01:27:45,950
you can just get the android builds off of github as well um and then we're in test flight on on

1323
01:27:45,950 --> 01:27:51,030
ios um we'll probably try to just stay in test flight until we get to a point where we're sort

1324
01:27:51,030 --> 01:27:55,450
of like running out of spots because it's just easier the review process is just way easier to

1325
01:27:55,450 --> 01:28:02,490
get to run test flight um and yeah i think our next pieces that are going into the app now are

1326
01:28:02,490 --> 01:28:07,850
notifications um we're doing a bit of a re-architect of some of the ways we pass data around

1327
01:28:07,850 --> 01:28:13,570
it's an interesting way the app is built uh it's definitely a little non-standard um but yeah

1328
01:28:13,570 --> 01:28:19,450
notifications we'll have audio messages really soon we'll probably have uh a bunch more like

1329
01:28:19,450 --> 01:28:25,350
privacy and security features before too long and the goal really is to have sort of a one point

1330
01:28:25,350 --> 01:28:32,890
know before oslo in may of next year um so at that point i hope we can say credibly you know with a

1331
01:28:32,890 --> 01:28:37,170
straight face that like this is ready for light activism you know like if you're in real danger

1332
01:28:37,170 --> 01:28:42,270
please not yet quite but like you know we'd love more people to try this out that aren't

1333
01:28:42,270 --> 01:28:47,250
deep in the nostril world deep in the you know crypto world like we want when i say crypto i

1334
01:28:47,250 --> 01:28:52,890
don't mean like shit coins i mean cryptography um just make sure that's clear to everybody i got

1335
01:28:52,890 --> 01:29:00,050
Yeah, exactly. I hate it. Um, but yeah, like, you know, I hope the app is going to be very soon to

1336
01:29:00,050 --> 01:29:04,870
the point where, you know, you can do the basic stuff indistinguishable from the way it works in

1337
01:29:04,870 --> 01:29:08,250
signal. Um, it won't have all the bells and whistles and it won't have video calls quite

1338
01:29:08,250 --> 01:29:12,030
yet, but again, hopefully by mid next year, we will also have video calls and things.

1339
01:29:13,150 --> 01:29:17,570
That's amazing. I mean, I'm very grateful that you are building this out. How many,

1340
01:29:17,570 --> 01:29:20,910
how many people are now, uh, contributing to the development out of curiosity?

1341
01:29:20,910 --> 01:29:31,470
Oh gosh. Uh, kind of like very regular people. I'd say it's probably seven or so engineers and

1342
01:29:31,470 --> 01:29:36,150
maybe three other people like designers and people that help on the marketing side and stuff like

1343
01:29:36,150 --> 01:29:42,290
that. So yeah, it's probably like around 10. Dang. That's awesome. That's really cool. It's great.

1344
01:29:42,650 --> 01:29:47,390
It's great. Really, really helpful. Anything else you want to leave? Did we cover, cover things

1345
01:29:47,390 --> 01:29:50,270
pretty well? We're going to have to do this again, especially as you guys are rolling out

1346
01:29:50,270 --> 01:29:53,550
more features anything else though that we didn't cover that you were like damn it walker you should

1347
01:29:53,550 --> 01:29:58,450
have asked me about no the only other thing i'd say is like the marmot protocol like one of the

1348
01:29:58,450 --> 01:30:04,570
other really cool things about the way we've done this is um marmot is an open protocol right like

1349
01:30:04,570 --> 01:30:10,090
we want other apps to be using marmot to build secure messaging right and so we already know

1350
01:30:10,090 --> 01:30:13,850
like we've got bitcoin wallets they're going to use it to do multi-sig coordination so you can

1351
01:30:13,850 --> 01:30:19,450
talk to the other people in your wallet um in the app with you know marmot based messaging

1352
01:30:19,450 --> 01:30:24,550
we also there's like a bunch of really weird interesting use cases that people are using it

1353
01:30:24,550 --> 01:30:30,250
for but like fundamentally i'd love to see people be able to create groups across white noise and

1354
01:30:30,250 --> 01:30:34,970
primal or white noise and damas or white noise and amethyst and that this just becomes kind of

1355
01:30:34,970 --> 01:30:41,650
the de facto like way that we do secure messaging on both nostr and in bitcoin so i would say like

1356
01:30:41,650 --> 01:30:46,010
anybody that's got a project out there where that might be interesting or applicable like reach out

1357
01:30:46,010 --> 01:30:49,510
to me. I would love to talk you through it and like help you figure out whether it makes sense.

1358
01:30:50,030 --> 01:30:53,090
Um, and also, you know, help you implement it if it comes down to that.

1359
01:30:54,650 --> 01:30:59,710
I love it, man. It's a people helping people resist totalitarian overreach. That's a,

1360
01:30:59,870 --> 01:31:04,130
right. It's all we can do, right? One, one step at a time. We'll do exactly Jeff. This was a

1361
01:31:04,130 --> 01:31:07,670
pleasure. Thank you for coming on here. Appreciate you sharing your scarce time. Thank you to

1362
01:31:07,670 --> 01:31:13,570
everybody who joined and watched this on the Noster only live stream. I appreciate each and

1363
01:31:13,570 --> 01:31:17,550
one of you. And I appreciate the zaps. That is always appreciated, even if they are one sat,

1364
01:31:17,630 --> 01:31:20,910
but there were some larger than one sat. So thank you guys for those. Much appreciated.

1365
01:31:21,510 --> 01:31:26,930
Jeff, thank you for building Freedom Tech. It is awesome. Looking forward to seeing what happens

1366
01:31:26,930 --> 01:31:30,710
next. Thank you, man. It's always fun to hang out. Cheers.

1367
01:31:37,930 --> 01:31:42,530
And that's a wrap on this Bitcoin Talk episode of The Bitcoin Podcast.

1368
01:31:42,530 --> 01:31:51,450
Remember to subscribe to this podcast wherever you're watching or listening and share it with your friends, family, and strangers on the internet.

1369
01:31:51,830 --> 01:31:58,130
Find me on Noster at primal.net slash walker and this podcast at primal.net slash titcoin.

1370
01:31:58,570 --> 01:32:06,850
On X, YouTube, and Rumble, just search at Walker America and find this podcast on X and Instagram at titcoinpodcast.

1371
01:32:06,850 --> 01:32:13,290
head to the show notes to grab sponsor links head to substack.com slash at walker america to get

1372
01:32:13,290 --> 01:32:21,850
episodes emailed to you and head to bitcoinpodcast.net for everything else bitcoin is scarce but podcasts

1373
01:32:21,850 --> 01:32:28,310
are abundant so thank you for spending your scarce time listening to the bitcoin podcast

1374
01:32:28,310 --> 01:32:31,430
until next time stay free

1375
01:32:36,850 --> 01:32:37,350
Thank you.