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Bitcoin being resilient to changes is what gives people this feeling of trust, feeling of safety,

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that it's a safe harbor, it's nothing going to happen with it, and it's all going to be fine.

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The fact that somebody sold or somebody bought is nobody's business. And when it comes to the

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next wave of who's supposed to come to Bitcoin, who's left to come to Bitcoin, who's like,

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we have all of these conversations, right? It's governments. And imagine tomorrow you hear that

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the US government started putting Bitcoin on their balance sheet. Guess what happens next?

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Everybody tries to front round it. Everybody on their mother tries to front round it. There

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will be countries who will be trying to front round the US Treasury.

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So, welcome to the show. This is going to be, I'm not quite prepared for how hard this is going to

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be for me. I've read little bits about what you've done and I'm not going to lie, a lot of it went

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over my head. So I want to start from a very high level in terms of what you've built. But let's

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start off by just introducing the two of you. So Misha, do you want to start? Yeah, I mean, hey,

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I'm Misha. I'm kind of a co-founder of like the research lab, which basically published the

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Shildenbeckon research. So yeah, like, you want me to like, you want me to be more specific?

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However you want to introduce yourself is totally fine. Yeah, I mean, that's what it is, I guess.

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And I'm Clara Schickleman. I'm the head of protocol research at Allokinit.

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And Shielder Bitcoin is pretty much what I've been doing night and day for the past couple of months.

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Well, this looks very exciting. So the idea is here, you've come out with two announcements.

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There's pipes and then there's Shielder Bitcoin.

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Yes.

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And I want to get into the details of them because I want to understand it as best I possibly can.

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But can we start off with, in terms of for a normal Bitcoiner, someone like me out there who's listening to this show,

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What are you bringing with Shield of Bitcoin?

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I think in the heart of it is the ability to send Bitcoin, our regular good old Bitcoin, just without revealing the sender, the receiver and the amount.

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You can do it to parties of your choosing. You just don't have to broadcast it to the whole network.

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And so the idea here is you're bringing private Bitcoin transactions to Bitcoin and you're doing this without making any protocol changes.

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There's no fork required to do this.

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Yes, absolutely.

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Effectively, Zcash style privacy of Bitcoin.

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And when you say Zcash style privacy, is it taking stuff from the Zcash project?

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Let's talk about this, right?

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Like the initial design of like what became Zcash eventually, like currently, right, was born way before Zcash became Zcash.

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It was a zero cash as far as I remember the name, was it right?

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And initially it was supposed to be a thing to be deployed on Bitcoin.

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But unfortunately, like, you know, the collective of authors like Sean Bowie, like, you know, a bunch of other people, right?

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like Zuko, etc.

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They were not able to implement it on Bitcoin.

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And Ellie, also Ellie Bensasone, one of the founders,

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one of the co-founders of Zcash, kind of publicly admitted this.

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So effectively, they were not able to do this on Bitcoin back in the day.

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So they were kind of forced out to do their own L1.

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And now it became this thing.

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But indeed, we're kind of taking the design of how it evolved over time.

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As they say, you know, I kind of just said recently this morning,

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like everything is a testnet for Bitcoin.

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So like we're taking a design,

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like how this testnet has evolved effectively

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and we're bringing it back to Bitcoin

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so it could work via Bitcoin pipes

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on the Bitcoin as it is today.

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Well, I think that's the cool thing about this

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is that as Bitcoin,

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as we've always said for a long time,

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like we want experimentation to happen elsewhere

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and then anything cool,

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let's bring it to Bitcoin.

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And so privacy and Bitcoin

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are two things that have not gone hand in hand

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so far in Bitcoin's history.

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And the trade-off is obvious.

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it's that you want the verifiability of on the Bitcoin blockchain.

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Yes.

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So how do you bring privacy to Bitcoin without touching that?

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Okay, so let's talk about that, right?

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Maybe jump in and correct if I'm wrong, whether I need to.

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There was a bunch of proposals on how to bring privacy to Bitcoin just over time, right?

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Like initially, one of the first maybe proposals was a GMAX with like the coin join and everything.

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Yeah, yeah, yeah.

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It was one of the first ones, right?

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And that proposal kind of involved having somebody who would actually kind of do that for you, like who would actually join something with you and whatever.

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Right. So there is a party you need to do for like with this.

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There is a party you need to interact with.

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There is a party you might be required to even like give the Bitcoin like to control your Bitcoin to control.

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So and there was a bunch of proposals like this.

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Like there was a ton of them over the years.

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There were wallets which were implementing this.

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there were like more recent proposals which were doing something like you know if you lose the

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thing of a sidechain or like an l2 or whatever you lose your bitcoin this style this style stuff

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also doesn't like sound like something i mean it's cool but like you don't want to like lose

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your bitcoin because you lost your state of something or something right of course and those

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earlier things you're talking about when it whether it was like a centralized mixer or

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coin join with a coordinator like they were all workarounds they weren't privacy on bitcoin yes

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yes yes so effectively what's going on in here is indeed we were lacking uh verifiability on

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bitcoin we were lacking this way to get rid of this person whom you would trust whom you would

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get your custody whom you would get your bitcoin like you know kind of like into this custody like

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we don't need this person you like don't give your bitcoin into custody like at all right like

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self-custody is the king you just you know do it yourself so that's the thing and we were we hadn't

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have a way to replace this person, this operator, with something which would at least conceptually,

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at least on the protocol design level, right, would be able to just do that for you. And because

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of Bitcoin Pipes, because of, you know, witness encryption, Bitcoin Pipes V2 effectively, we

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do have this way, at least like on the design level, conceptually, it's there. And, you know,

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that's kind of what allows to make it happen. So Misha, was it you that started Alokinit?

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Yeah.

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Okay.

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And Clara, you joined later.

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I did.

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We'll start with you, Clara.

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But why did the two of you decide that Bitcoin privacy was the thing you wanted to dedicate this period of your life on?

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I think that it's very, very clear that people want it and need it.

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And it's privacy on demand.

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And the reason I can say that the reason I decided to jump in is when I talked to Misha and Scott and others there.

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it was just done right it's and this is something i really appreciate you don't

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slam in an operator you don't put in some unneeded like assumptions and so on you do things the right

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way and this is what really got me excited and i was like okay yeah i went in you were you work

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on privacy on other blockchains before this more like just cryptography research like i've done a

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of stuff all over crypto at this point, I guess, like starting from like the old bit message thing.

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Remember bit message that it was a 2013 project, bit message. It was a Bitcoin style messenger,

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with some proof of work for each message and whatever. It was like, you know, a project which

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still kind of is alive a little bit, but there is somewhere maybe a CPP implementation out there on

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the internet still, like, you know, just laying around there. Like it's these hands probably.

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So still there.

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So like starting from this, like there was a ton of stuff I've done.

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It was like, I don't know, like all the Stimit stuff, you know, kind of these experiments

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about how do you monetize the attention somehow besides the goddamn advertisement.

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Like there was a ton of stuff around Ethereum because, well, it's just kind of the cryptography

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research at a point in time was most applicable to trying to like expand the block space we

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had back in the day.

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And, you know, after that, it's obviously kind of we had this Kimber and explosion proof systems around kind of all the other kind of, you know, ones and projects, etc.

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And the obvious question came up with that.

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Can we take all of that and apply it to something which lacked technical attention, like the attention from the research side of things, just the academia side of things for so many years?

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Bitcoin, for some reason.

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Why?

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but i'm interested because clara you were obviously a chain code for a long time yeah

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you've been a bitcoiner for a long time but misha you've been in sort of crypto world

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why why come to bitcoin now because first of all we just had so much drama around bitcoin right i

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kind of stopped paying attention to bitcoin back in 2016 because of all this kind of block space

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that's when i started paying attention yeah yeah well it's like a journalist versus scientist a bit

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yeah because of all of this kind of block size drama and i was like okay well guys this is this

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I don't know, just decide, we'll see what's going on next.

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Like, whatever, I'm not participating in this.

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And so effectively, again, like, as I said, after that, everybody kind of, you felt it, right?

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Like, maybe you felt it, Clara, you do remember.

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Everybody kind of just got disappointed and, like, a lot of people left Bitcoin.

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Even, like, you know, Paola stopped trying to, like, make Tether work around Bitcoin, etc., etc., right?

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So a lot of people just stood up and left.

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And it kind of was dead for so many years.

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Like from a developer perspective.

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From a developer perspective.

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The asset itself, absolutely.

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Like, sure, absolutely.

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It's like, you know, you can't say anything.

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But from the developer perspective, from the research perspective,

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it was not really moving too fast.

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And now when we had all of this, as I said,

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like, you know, developments, game-bearing explosion

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of like all sorts of cryptography,

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all like all over crypto just in general,

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there was a question about, okay, well

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we have Bitcoin.

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Nobody's looking at it. Why nobody's

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looking at it? We have all of these

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things which already have happened

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elsewhere. Like for example, witness

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encryption, like it

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was invented

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like long after

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Bitcoin itself went live.

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It was like 2013.

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Proof systems, like we were talking

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about privacy on Bitcoin via ZKPs

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via proof systems since very beginning.

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like we hadn't had practical or like well defined well built proof systems until ethereum actually

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poured a ton of capital into that ethereum people poured a ton of capital into that because of it we

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got all of these developments we got all of this everything everything everything which now makes

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it possible to take all of that and bring it back to bitcoin and maybe maybe maybe make it better

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and we have seen that sort of explosion in bitcoin over the last few years with l2's like bitvm and

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citria and botanics all these projects that try to do this sort of stuff and I want to get into

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exactly what you're building what do we need to understand first do we need to start with pipes or

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do we start with shielded shielded bitcoin like where do we need to start to make this make sense

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for the audience we can start we can start with pipes I think and then we can get to shielded

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just to have the full chronology okay so so tell me what pipes are okay so bitcoin pipes effectively

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is a way to induce covenants and pessimistic zqp's verification on bitcoin without touching without

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changing bitcoin itself via well pretty you know pretty as i said like weird and novel but still

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primitives uh like with this encryption or like you know the v1 was more like a theoretical concept

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functional encryption so yeah like i need to try and break this down because you're a cryptographer

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you're saying a lot of words that okay i only understand because i've read about this in the

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last few days um so witness encryption is the big thing that this is kind of the the differentiator

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between how you're doing this and i was asking a few people i i called uh carla from chain code

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and asked her about this and i was trying to get to explain what witness encryption was yeah and

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she described it as like this is the the shangri-la of cryptography it's very hard we don't

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know if it necessarily we can do it yet but if it does it's it's brilliant is that a fair summation

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of it it is it is i don't know how much of an explanation it is but yeah but i think i think

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it's fair yes okay so so clara tell me what witness encryption is i think the easiest way to think

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about it is that you have it gives you the ability you have a utxo but nobody has the private key for

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it. And then we have a piece of code, the pipes, that if you show it some information, the witness,

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a proof that something is correct it will give you the private key for that utxo so this is this is what with description allows and then what can you show to the pipe to for it to release the private key

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there's this is where all of the options open up so i'm sorry i'm going to be really stupid here

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but i want to i want to just try and understand it as best i can so the the pipe is like a place

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where you can do different things like covenants or is that right yeah and the witness encryption

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is the way of like entering the pipe witness encryption is the general theoretical term and

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then pipes is an implementation or a real world solution that does witness encryption okay yeah

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okay so then what are people's concerns around the words encryption because i've seen a lot of

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people writing that this is i mean there's been a lot of pushback where it's like how have we got

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to this point where instead of just you know forking bitcoin if we want to have privacy added

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why are we doing this crazy novel thing that we don't necessarily definitely know it works

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i feel like this is a question for somebody that works in sociology but yeah but honestly

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for for me it's just it's a fact we're not forking we're not doing soft forks in bitcoin

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in very, very rare cases.

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And now this is what we can do

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without doing soft forks.

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The who and why,

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it's less of a mathematical question.

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Bitcoin is a hard asset.

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It took discipline to build your position

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and the platform you use for Bitcoin-backed loans

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00:14:35,802 --> 00:14:36,862
should have the same discipline.

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00:14:37,402 --> 00:14:39,562
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It's like, you know, there are always two things, you know, there are things which are nice to have and there are things which are must have, you know.

251
00:17:15,322 --> 00:17:23,322
So like, for example, you know, what would need to happen like with Bitcoin in terms of must have in like the coming years or whatever, right?

252
00:17:23,722 --> 00:17:24,402
Like PQ.

253
00:17:25,122 --> 00:17:34,622
PQ, like post-quantum resistance, like post-quantum signature scheme is something which we would need to have like for Bitcoin to push through,

254
00:17:34,622 --> 00:17:36,522
for Bitcoin Core to push through,

255
00:17:36,862 --> 00:17:38,602
like for us to come to a consensus

256
00:17:38,602 --> 00:17:41,602
and get that into like the core implementation.

257
00:17:41,882 --> 00:17:42,802
That's what we need to do.

258
00:17:42,862 --> 00:17:43,042
Why?

259
00:17:43,162 --> 00:17:45,262
Because this is a must have thing.

260
00:17:45,762 --> 00:17:47,182
If you don't do this,

261
00:17:47,382 --> 00:17:49,522
like the fundamental value prop of Bitcoin

262
00:17:49,522 --> 00:17:50,302
just disappears.

263
00:17:50,502 --> 00:17:51,682
Yeah, assuming quantum computing

264
00:17:51,682 --> 00:17:53,802
ends up being powerful enough to break the,

265
00:17:53,802 --> 00:17:54,762
yes, yeah, yeah.

266
00:17:55,002 --> 00:17:56,962
But there are things which are nice to have.

267
00:17:57,182 --> 00:17:59,342
It's like people whining on Twitter about,

268
00:17:59,482 --> 00:18:00,762
oh, why don't we do BIP this?

269
00:18:00,882 --> 00:18:01,842
Why don't we do BIP that?

270
00:18:01,962 --> 00:18:04,222
Why don't we do BIP number, whatever,

271
00:18:04,222 --> 00:18:11,022
like 228 or like whatever the hell, you know, 1448 or whatever for 420. Why don't we do BIP 420?

272
00:18:11,022 --> 00:18:17,102
What the hell? Like just random number 420 360, like, you know, kind of backflip on rates.

273
00:18:18,382 --> 00:18:24,782
So, I mean, because it's not necessary, because it doesn't, because it doesn't, it's like, if we

274
00:18:24,782 --> 00:18:29,982
don't do it, it doesn't destroy the basic value prop of Bitcoin, right? It doesn't destroy the

275
00:18:29,982 --> 00:18:31,442
why Bitcoin is interesting.

276
00:18:32,062 --> 00:18:33,562
Like, it's just a nice to have thing

277
00:18:33,562 --> 00:18:35,462
for some particular use case

278
00:18:35,462 --> 00:18:36,962
which might never materialize.

279
00:18:37,422 --> 00:18:38,482
So why are you trying to like

280
00:18:38,482 --> 00:18:40,222
change the core of like,

281
00:18:40,282 --> 00:18:42,522
I'm sorry, almost a $2 trillion asset

282
00:18:42,522 --> 00:18:43,282
at this point,

283
00:18:43,562 --> 00:18:44,682
why are you messing with this?

284
00:18:44,822 --> 00:18:44,942
Yeah.

285
00:18:45,342 --> 00:18:46,542
And also you then have to go

286
00:18:46,542 --> 00:18:47,862
through the nightmare of years and years

287
00:18:47,862 --> 00:18:49,062
trying to gain social consensus.

288
00:18:49,242 --> 00:18:51,742
And we've seen like with everything

289
00:18:51,742 --> 00:18:52,722
that Jeremy Rubens tries to do,

290
00:18:52,802 --> 00:18:54,282
like this stuff is hard,

291
00:18:54,382 --> 00:18:55,682
takes a long time and might never happen.

292
00:18:55,982 --> 00:18:57,522
So instead you just decided to build this.

293
00:18:57,522 --> 00:18:59,662
But when people say we don't know

294
00:18:59,662 --> 00:19:04,382
how sort of resilient the cryptography is in witness encryption what are they talking about

295
00:19:04,382 --> 00:19:12,182
okay so yeah do you want okay i'll take it yeah i'll just say that cryptography is always a leap

296
00:19:12,182 --> 00:19:21,502
of faith um and then and i think misha will elaborate on this but the way cryptography

297
00:19:21,502 --> 00:19:30,462
meets reality is by schemes being proposed and then attacks being found and then being edited

298
00:19:30,462 --> 00:19:36,622
and so on. It's a long and very scary process that at the end of it, we're sort of, okay,

299
00:19:36,982 --> 00:19:43,782
we're ready to jump and we jump. So it was, I don't know, it was true with music that became

300
00:19:43,782 --> 00:19:51,562
music 2 signal had their uh fair share of implementation here implementation there but

301
00:19:51,562 --> 00:19:56,182
this is just the name of the game this is how it works and so is the thing that really matters when

302
00:19:56,182 --> 00:20:01,202
it comes to cryptography the the amount of time it's basically been around like the longer it's

303
00:20:01,202 --> 00:20:06,062
around the more attacks you assume it's had to withstand and therefore the better it is i think

304
00:20:06,062 --> 00:20:12,222
it's more of a proof of work how much of work went into trying to attack it scrutinize it

305
00:20:12,222 --> 00:20:19,002
and then but yeah so and and i mean sorry do you have something to add that uh i also just wanted

306
00:20:19,002 --> 00:20:23,142
to say that it's a function it's a function of work it's true but there is also a little bit of

307
00:20:23,142 --> 00:20:28,962
thing that honestly it's not that many people in the world can actually kind of you know try to

308
00:20:28,962 --> 00:20:33,362
attack this and i'm not saying that this is a good factor no it just means that you know effectively

309
00:20:33,362 --> 00:20:35,802
it's a pretty small community

310
00:20:35,802 --> 00:20:37,522
which we basically just need to

311
00:20:37,522 --> 00:20:39,482
go around and present them

312
00:20:39,482 --> 00:20:41,222
enough of proof, enough of evidence that

313
00:20:41,222 --> 00:20:42,522
something's good enough.

314
00:20:43,162 --> 00:20:45,942
Also include a bunch of chatbots into this

315
00:20:45,942 --> 00:20:46,842
list now as well.

316
00:20:47,142 --> 00:20:49,202
We need to convince the chatbots.

317
00:20:50,122 --> 00:20:51,902
We're being very successful

318
00:20:51,902 --> 00:20:53,742
at this point for now, at least

319
00:20:53,742 --> 00:20:54,562
the chatbots. Anyway.

320
00:20:55,902 --> 00:20:57,282
So when you say good enough,

321
00:20:57,442 --> 00:20:59,702
I understand you're talking here as a cryptographer.

322
00:21:00,182 --> 00:21:01,762
I think that phrase might worry

323
00:21:01,762 --> 00:21:05,562
bitcoiners because like when you're talking about this thing securing potentially hundreds of

324
00:21:05,562 --> 00:21:10,322
millions billions of dollars like good enough sounds a little bit of a scary phrase like okay

325
00:21:10,322 --> 00:21:15,782
because you want we want to know something is secure can you ever know this is secure

326
00:21:15,782 --> 00:21:22,342
uh you can never know that any cryptography is secure cryptography relies on something being

327
00:21:22,342 --> 00:21:31,002
difficult like elliptic curves or back in the day rsa and so on you're just assuming that something

328
00:21:31,002 --> 00:21:38,282
is difficult and then you start building upon it but you never know you never know it's uh

329
00:21:38,282 --> 00:21:44,322
and so you said this has only been alive since did you say 2013 this was yeah yeah and and so

330
00:21:44,322 --> 00:21:50,902
it's had some track record not a huge amount how secure do you think it is today uh okay let's talk

331
00:21:50,902 --> 00:21:54,882
about this right like just a little bit of like historical perspective of what's going on there

332
00:21:54,882 --> 00:22:00,582
initially witness encryption was introduced by such a guard back in 2013 uh like effectively

333
00:22:00,582 --> 00:22:05,542
we're working with him as well on our side to, you know, kind of make sure that our stuff is secure,

334
00:22:05,682 --> 00:22:10,882
like the stuff we propose is secure, right? So there was a bunch of theoretical constructions.

335
00:22:11,102 --> 00:22:15,102
How do you, like, how do you instantiate with subscription for certain statements, for certain

336
00:22:15,102 --> 00:22:21,002
use cases, for certain, for just certain situations, right? But the thing is, until recent

337
00:22:21,002 --> 00:22:28,362
times, we never had even a chance, even a whiff on how to instantiate it for, on how to instantiate

338
00:22:28,362 --> 00:22:30,502
for something you could at least implement.

339
00:22:31,242 --> 00:22:33,242
Like it was all in the realms of that,

340
00:22:33,322 --> 00:22:35,282
like, you know, exabytes for ciphertext

341
00:22:35,282 --> 00:22:37,202
or like you needed a Dyson sphere

342
00:22:37,202 --> 00:22:39,302
to like even think or compute something, right?

343
00:22:39,322 --> 00:22:40,502
Like it's just, no, forget it.

344
00:22:40,862 --> 00:22:42,862
And because we had all of these kind of, again,

345
00:22:42,922 --> 00:22:44,622
as I said, proof system came by an explosion

346
00:22:44,622 --> 00:22:46,162
over the last several years,

347
00:22:46,162 --> 00:22:46,962
like just in general,

348
00:22:47,042 --> 00:22:47,662
because of crypto,

349
00:22:47,722 --> 00:22:49,242
crypto-funded academic research.

350
00:22:49,382 --> 00:22:49,702
There we go.

351
00:22:50,522 --> 00:22:52,482
Because the rest of like crypto-funded

352
00:22:52,482 --> 00:22:54,422
in this academic research around proof systems,

353
00:22:54,722 --> 00:22:57,362
now we have at least this with this,

354
00:22:57,362 --> 00:23:04,582
chance, this idea of where to push, how to at least potentially make witness encryption

355
00:23:04,582 --> 00:23:12,242
implementable, functional, and effectively secure. And that's what our kind of ADB witness

356
00:23:12,242 --> 00:23:19,322
encryption published also earlier this year. We've been working on it for a while. It's a proposal

357
00:23:19,322 --> 00:23:27,722
like hey you could actually do this and and so like you say like this is going to be it will be

358
00:23:27,722 --> 00:23:31,502
people will try and attack this and and the incentive is only going to grow as more and more

359
00:23:31,502 --> 00:23:37,622
money ends up on these protocols how like how do you prepare for that like obviously you could do

360
00:23:37,622 --> 00:23:41,162
things like bug bounties but you know if you're putting a bitcoin up if someone can attack it

361
00:23:41,162 --> 00:23:46,662
the incentive is relatively low like if we end up in a few years time with a billion dollars on this

362
00:23:46,662 --> 00:23:53,642
thing like the incentive becomes insanely high like how how do you try and protect this so beyond

363
00:23:53,642 --> 00:24:02,242
like bounties are you mentioned it it's the obvious because usually you if there is funds to be taken

364
00:24:02,242 --> 00:24:07,422
now you usually don't want to take the risk and wait for 10 years and somebody will beat you to

365
00:24:07,422 --> 00:24:14,262
the punch yeah um but beyond that there are more like contemporary tools like formal verifications

366
00:24:14,262 --> 00:24:22,762
that's definitely something that would like to check the circuits and so on but I think that

367
00:24:22,762 --> 00:24:28,922
the cryptography will have a lot of attention but in light of the recent breaks that we've seen

368
00:24:28,922 --> 00:24:36,442
around at the end it almost always boils down to the engineering and this is where we'll need to be

369
00:24:36,442 --> 00:24:41,222
even more careful than people were before.

370
00:24:41,222 --> 00:24:42,682
So yeah.

371
00:24:42,682 --> 00:24:45,022
I would also say regarding the cryptography itself,

372
00:24:45,022 --> 00:24:47,822
like the way you usually test out the cryptography, right?

373
00:24:47,822 --> 00:24:49,602
Like, well, A, you try to reduce it

374
00:24:49,602 --> 00:24:51,622
to some known hardness assumption.

375
00:24:51,622 --> 00:24:54,082
The problem these days is that D log, for example,

376
00:24:54,082 --> 00:24:55,562
is not anymore being considered

377
00:24:55,562 --> 00:24:57,262
as a good hardness assumption.

378
00:24:57,262 --> 00:24:59,962
Cause like everybody's panicking about quantum, right?

379
00:24:59,962 --> 00:25:02,222
So that's like, ow.

380
00:25:02,222 --> 00:25:04,362
So you're trying to reduce it to some known quantum,

381
00:25:04,362 --> 00:25:06,382
to some known hardness assumption.

382
00:25:06,782 --> 00:25:09,302
That's effectively what we're kind of, you know, going towards.

383
00:25:09,302 --> 00:25:12,162
And again, as I said, the whiff and like the smell,

384
00:25:12,662 --> 00:25:15,122
the kind of, you know, the spirit in the air

385
00:25:15,122 --> 00:25:17,702
that it's going to end up being something mid-rank-ish.

386
00:25:18,722 --> 00:25:20,942
Like Amit Zahai recently also published a paper

387
00:25:20,942 --> 00:25:24,562
where he explicitly says there exists a

388
00:25:24,562 --> 00:25:26,642
witness encryption from general group model

389
00:25:26,642 --> 00:25:28,362
for like mid-rank-ish,

390
00:25:28,842 --> 00:25:31,222
like some like mid-rank-ish witness encryption

391
00:25:31,222 --> 00:25:32,762
from general group model.

392
00:25:32,762 --> 00:25:35,062
So we're thinking we're going towards the right direction.

393
00:25:35,422 --> 00:25:36,122
It's a process.

394
00:25:36,462 --> 00:25:38,442
If we're not able to reduce it,

395
00:25:38,702 --> 00:25:40,322
then there is always another option,

396
00:25:40,402 --> 00:25:41,382
which is, you know,

397
00:25:41,682 --> 00:25:44,282
you just exhaust all the possible options

398
00:25:44,282 --> 00:25:45,362
of how do you attack this?

399
00:25:45,782 --> 00:25:48,282
And you construct all the distinguishers you can

400
00:25:48,282 --> 00:25:49,302
for like, you know,

401
00:25:49,322 --> 00:25:50,802
kind of the data inside of a circuit,

402
00:25:50,942 --> 00:25:51,822
hidden inside of the,

403
00:25:51,822 --> 00:25:54,882
inside of the ciphertext effectively.

404
00:25:55,282 --> 00:25:57,222
You try to like go through all the possible,

405
00:25:57,222 --> 00:26:08,005
through all the possible just theoretical ways of how do you how do you how do you break this Right And we kind and we dedicating a lot of resources to that We working with like just broader academia And like again this is an

406
00:26:08,584 --> 00:26:09,745
we're talking about this as well,

407
00:26:09,864 --> 00:26:11,924
but like a bunch of other people helping us with this.

408
00:26:12,784 --> 00:26:14,884
Different people submitted theoretical attacks

409
00:26:14,884 --> 00:26:15,864
to our open challenges,

410
00:26:15,864 --> 00:26:18,045
which we started hosting since EuroCrypt

411
00:26:18,045 --> 00:26:19,424
like back in May this year.

412
00:26:20,225 --> 00:26:21,864
So we had a ton of submissions.

413
00:26:22,045 --> 00:26:24,645
We had four or five submissions at least, right?

414
00:26:24,824 --> 00:26:26,505
Like one of them was actually valid.

415
00:26:26,505 --> 00:26:30,985
And now I kind of, you know, because of that submission, we actually got to like publish a new version.

416
00:26:31,745 --> 00:26:32,424
It's fine.

417
00:26:32,524 --> 00:26:33,764
You know, it's like a normal process.

418
00:26:33,965 --> 00:26:34,465
Well, that's what you want.

419
00:26:34,524 --> 00:26:35,624
You want people breaking it before.

420
00:26:35,924 --> 00:26:36,145
Yes.

421
00:26:36,324 --> 00:26:36,465
Yeah.

422
00:26:37,225 --> 00:26:43,044
And in terms of like the roadmap of where you're at, you obviously you announced pipes and shielded Bitcoin.

423
00:26:44,225 --> 00:26:45,985
What's what's real as of today?

424
00:26:47,684 --> 00:26:48,884
In terms of the implementation.

425
00:26:49,304 --> 00:26:51,665
In terms of rather than like a research piece, something that you can actually do.

426
00:26:52,184 --> 00:26:52,524
Okay.

427
00:26:52,745 --> 00:26:54,725
So what's going on in terms of real?

428
00:26:54,725 --> 00:27:07,124
So we did have, and we kind of do have, I would say, the implementation of like just ADP witness encryption, just, you know, kind of for us to test out that, okay, well, this is, we haven't made a mistake in theory.

429
00:27:07,284 --> 00:27:08,485
Like you can actually do this.

430
00:27:08,505 --> 00:27:10,064
You can actually do the code there, right?

431
00:27:10,245 --> 00:27:11,264
You can actually run it.

432
00:27:11,745 --> 00:27:14,044
So that's like, that's like what we have.

433
00:27:14,205 --> 00:27:15,884
Brent has it still, right?

434
00:27:16,024 --> 00:27:16,184
Yeah.

435
00:27:16,184 --> 00:27:16,245
Yeah.

436
00:27:16,245 --> 00:27:16,884
So good.

437
00:27:17,044 --> 00:27:22,624
And we're working on updating it according to the last effective state of how we see things.

438
00:27:22,624 --> 00:27:32,564
so that's what that's what's real uh there is a well like bare bones i would say for a for for

439
00:27:32,564 --> 00:27:38,005
for shield of bitcoin itself uh you know it's kind of bare bones as i said we still gotta grow

440
00:27:38,005 --> 00:27:44,784
veto that uh like uh yeah so that's what that's what's real kind of today okay but we've got no

441
00:27:44,784 --> 00:27:50,364
like no shield of bitcoin as of right now but how long does that take for you guys to build out like

442
00:27:50,364 --> 00:27:55,764
How long will it be until someone like me can just use a shield, do a shield of Bitcoin transaction relatively easily?

443
00:27:56,844 --> 00:28:01,884
Well, the current idea is, I mean, again, it's all the timelines are constantly moving.

444
00:28:01,884 --> 00:28:04,884
So like, you know, don't take this as like a hard promise or something.

445
00:28:05,124 --> 00:28:10,524
The current idea is that by the end of this year, we're going to be able to open source everything we have regarding pipes.

446
00:28:10,884 --> 00:28:14,925
Like so just people would be able to, you know, we will lock some Bitcoin behind it.

447
00:28:14,925 --> 00:28:17,064
We're going to be like, oh, if you break it, it's Bitcoin is yours.

448
00:28:17,064 --> 00:28:17,324
Right.

449
00:28:17,324 --> 00:28:21,324
And obviously it's going to be like on-chain challenges, as we call them.

450
00:28:21,324 --> 00:28:25,745
So it's going to run for half a year, a year, however long we need it.

451
00:28:25,745 --> 00:28:28,965
Like however long we need it until we're sure this is secure.

452
00:28:28,965 --> 00:28:34,064
Because we will not be recommending people to run any code of our authorship if we know

453
00:28:34,064 --> 00:28:35,725
there's something funky there.

454
00:28:35,725 --> 00:28:36,725
No.

455
00:28:36,725 --> 00:28:37,725
That's the thing.

456
00:28:37,725 --> 00:28:39,725
That's just the basic requirement.

457
00:28:39,725 --> 00:28:40,725
No.

458
00:28:40,725 --> 00:28:41,725
I mean, we see that in Bitcoin all the time.

459
00:28:41,725 --> 00:28:45,445
Even when Lightning was new, it always came with huge caveats of don't put too much Bitcoin

460
00:28:45,445 --> 00:28:46,445
on there for a long time.

461
00:28:46,445 --> 00:28:53,564
like reckless hats and all that yeah so so we'll go through that period but in in terms so that's

462
00:28:53,564 --> 00:28:57,564
the pipes part yeah that's the pipe and then is the shield of bitcoin an entirely separate thing

463
00:28:57,564 --> 00:29:04,124
that you're working on alongside this it's using pipes as a tool and then it has it's also its own

464
00:29:04,124 --> 00:29:12,284
infrastructure so to uh peg in and peg out of shielded you need pipes but then to transfer

465
00:29:12,284 --> 00:29:19,985
inside of shielded it's it's definitely there's no witness encryption um yeah it's it's much more

466
00:29:19,985 --> 00:29:28,465
standard and so on and i think there's we have like a toy thing yeah yeah but not not something

467
00:29:28,465 --> 00:29:33,005
that is ready to be out in the world okay i know we did this a little earlier but i want to go

468
00:29:33,005 --> 00:29:38,024
through in more detail tell me how a shielded bitcoin transaction would actually work in as

469
00:29:38,024 --> 00:29:47,784
playing a language as possible okay so um you use we talked about the pipes earlier so you lock funds

470
00:29:47,784 --> 00:29:55,665
to a utxo and then um can i be really pedantic here what do what do you mean when you say you

471
00:29:55,665 --> 00:30:03,544
lock funds to a utxo okay um let's talk about the transfer then first and then peg in peg out because

472
00:30:03,544 --> 00:30:09,864
transfer is a bit easier. Let's start at the point where you have some shielded Bitcoin. What does it

473
00:30:09,864 --> 00:30:15,784
mean to have shielded Bitcoin? It means that you have a private key associated with the note. This

474
00:30:15,784 --> 00:30:25,304
is the note nullifier kind of base structure that has been studied well and we're building upon.

475
00:30:26,185 --> 00:30:33,705
so what this allows you to do is and let's say you want to send it to me so what you need to do

476
00:30:33,705 --> 00:30:40,665
is first of all to prove and we'll say who are you proving to and where does this appear that

477
00:30:40,665 --> 00:30:46,905
you own this note that you're using it right now so you're adding it's like this should go into the

478
00:30:46,905 --> 00:30:53,784
nullifier tree and then that you're sending this note to me and maybe you're creating a new note

479
00:30:53,784 --> 00:31:01,864
sorry that is uh that is for me so i have the private key to use it later and maybe you have

480
00:31:01,864 --> 00:31:08,104
like a change note that you created that goes back to you now all of this together and then like you

481
00:31:08,104 --> 00:31:12,344
need to prove that the amount that came in the same amount that came out and all the standard

482
00:31:12,344 --> 00:31:25,064
things. So what you do is you actually put on Bitcoin's blockchain, you put everything that

483
00:31:25,064 --> 00:31:33,824
an outside person that has nothing to do with me and you needs to update the set of notes that were

484
00:31:33,824 --> 00:31:40,725
used or the null affairs set. So they should be able that if you'll try to use this note again,

485
00:31:40,725 --> 00:31:47,864
they should be able to tell you no it's already yeah and then there's there's the proof that can

486
00:31:47,864 --> 00:31:55,445
be checked and so on and then in there there is also information for me having the relevant

487
00:31:55,445 --> 00:32:03,485
private key to go like oh i got this lovely note i can go ahead and send it to misha and

488
00:32:03,485 --> 00:32:10,225
so on and so forth so where do those notes live because they're not on chain they're not on chain

489
00:32:10,225 --> 00:32:14,705
so they can live on your computer or so on,

490
00:32:14,745 --> 00:32:16,564
or you can just reconstruct them.

491
00:32:16,684 --> 00:32:18,405
You can always, if you lost...

492
00:32:18,405 --> 00:32:20,725
I think I know what your question is really doing

493
00:32:20,725 --> 00:32:22,524
in terms of if we are putting,

494
00:32:22,665 --> 00:32:26,304
if we are somehow putting these nodes onto Bitcoin itself.

495
00:32:26,544 --> 00:32:27,665
It's not even necessarily.

496
00:32:27,864 --> 00:32:28,965
What I'm trying to understand is,

497
00:32:28,965 --> 00:32:32,465
so if you're using cashew, for example,

498
00:32:32,965 --> 00:32:36,445
if I put Bitcoin into a cashew mint,

499
00:32:36,684 --> 00:32:40,005
I know that I have my cashew token that is within that mint.

500
00:32:40,225 --> 00:32:42,304
Is it the same kind of concept?

501
00:32:42,665 --> 00:32:43,005
No.

502
00:32:43,184 --> 00:32:50,725
If you have a public and private key pair, what you're able to do is just, and you lost everything.

503
00:32:51,024 --> 00:32:53,764
You're starting from point zero.

504
00:32:54,245 --> 00:32:58,905
You just read the blockchain and you're able to reconstruct all of the notes that are yours.

505
00:32:59,284 --> 00:33:01,245
Of course, you don't want to do this every time.

506
00:33:01,384 --> 00:33:03,624
You can keep some information and so on.

507
00:33:03,745 --> 00:33:07,064
So is that like a zero knowledge proof that gets written to the blockchain?

508
00:33:07,384 --> 00:33:08,384
How do you do that?

509
00:33:08,764 --> 00:33:09,064
Yes.

510
00:33:09,064 --> 00:33:09,505
Okay.

511
00:33:09,645 --> 00:33:09,764
Yeah.

512
00:33:09,764 --> 00:33:12,764
Yeah, this is I think it's the simplest way.

513
00:33:12,764 --> 00:33:23,764
Yeah, it's effectively a like a ciphertext which contains the data necessary for like, you know, kind of understanding what's the state, what's the state of your wallet, plus a proof of the correctness of this ciphertext information.

514
00:33:23,764 --> 00:33:25,764
And that's what that's all.

515
00:33:25,764 --> 00:33:28,764
But so and when I said like, where do the notes live?

516
00:33:28,764 --> 00:33:31,764
When I like lock that Bitcoin on chain?

517
00:33:31,764 --> 00:33:32,764
Yes.

518
00:33:32,764 --> 00:33:34,764
Is it going to like a separate protocol?

519
00:33:34,764 --> 00:33:35,764
No.

520
00:33:35,764 --> 00:33:41,124
When you lock it, what you do is you...

521
00:33:41,124 --> 00:33:45,745
There is an address that you send to, it creates a UTXO.

522
00:33:46,745 --> 00:33:50,965
And then what happens at that moment,

523
00:33:51,064 --> 00:33:52,225
like you locked one Bitcoin,

524
00:33:52,725 --> 00:33:56,364
and now you have a shielded note of one Bitcoin,

525
00:33:56,705 --> 00:33:58,205
and then you can transfer with it.

526
00:33:58,685 --> 00:34:00,804
And then when you're leaving,

527
00:34:00,804 --> 00:34:10,685
so you need to show that you nullified a bitcoin worth of notes so what if i lock one bitcoin yes

528
00:34:10,685 --> 00:34:16,464
send half a bitcoin to you like with these notes and then i only have half a bitcoin left in notes

529
00:34:16,464 --> 00:34:22,644
but i have one bitcoin locked on chain like oh you absolutely do not enter an exit through the

530
00:34:22,644 --> 00:34:28,644
same path i see okay yeah yeah yeah you can use any of the ciphertexts available out there to put

531
00:34:28,644 --> 00:34:34,405
to put the note which still exists, which still belongs to you through the verifier or decryptor

532
00:34:34,405 --> 00:34:39,604
and get your Bitcoin back. Get the amount of Bitcoin which this particular note is

533
00:34:39,604 --> 00:34:43,524
advanceable for back from any of the ciphertexts which kind of contains that.

534
00:34:44,644 --> 00:34:48,405
Recent hardware wallet vulnerabilities have definitely made me rethink my entire security

535
00:34:48,405 --> 00:34:52,484
setup as I'm sure it has for a lot of Bitcoiners. And the uncomfortable truth is that no single

536
00:34:52,484 --> 00:34:57,124
security product can promise there'll never be a problem, which is exactly why the design matters.

537
00:34:57,124 --> 00:35:02,325
BitKey is a self-custody hardware wallet that uses three keys created in three separate environments

538
00:35:02,325 --> 00:35:07,284
There's one on your phone, one on the BitKey hardware itself and one on a secure BitKey server

539
00:35:07,284 --> 00:35:10,445
Two of those three keys are required to sign any transaction

540
00:35:10,445 --> 00:35:14,205
So a problem isolated to just one key is never enough to move your Bitcoin

541
00:35:14,205 --> 00:35:17,584
So if you are rethinking your setup right now, as I'm sure a lot of people are

542
00:35:17,584 --> 00:35:19,104
You should really think about the BitKey

543
00:35:19,104 --> 00:35:22,765
The hardware looks great, the app and the user experience is second to none

544
00:35:22,765 --> 00:35:27,024
Backing up and restoring your wallet is seamless and they even have inheritance built in

545
00:35:27,024 --> 00:35:28,725
So I really don't think you'd be disappointed.

546
00:35:29,564 --> 00:35:30,804
So download BitKey today.

547
00:35:31,044 --> 00:35:34,284
Use the code WBD for 10% off the second generation BitKey,

548
00:35:34,385 --> 00:35:36,205
which is this device right here with the screen.

549
00:35:37,144 --> 00:35:38,685
Download the app, download BitKey,

550
00:35:38,944 --> 00:35:41,185
use code WBD and get 10% off.

551
00:35:42,044 --> 00:35:43,685
Bitcoiners hate single points of failure,

552
00:35:43,885 --> 00:35:45,044
but your phone has three of them.

553
00:35:45,325 --> 00:35:47,304
One network, one identifier for life

554
00:35:47,304 --> 00:35:49,104
and one carrier employee who could be taught

555
00:35:49,104 --> 00:35:50,084
into handing over your number.

556
00:35:50,405 --> 00:35:51,705
And that's where CAPE comes in.

557
00:35:52,064 --> 00:35:53,185
CAPE fixes all three.

558
00:35:53,705 --> 00:35:56,004
It's the only US carrier running two major networks

559
00:35:56,004 --> 00:35:56,744
on one SIM.

560
00:35:57,024 --> 00:35:58,444
So if one drops, you're on the other.

561
00:35:58,905 --> 00:36:00,944
Your identifier rotates every 24 hours.

562
00:36:01,124 --> 00:36:03,665
So to the network, you're a different person every single day.

563
00:36:03,825 --> 00:36:07,705
And the big one, your number only moves with a 24-word phrase that you control,

564
00:36:08,004 --> 00:36:08,964
just like a Bitcoin wallet.

565
00:36:09,284 --> 00:36:11,845
There's no call center worker, not even CAPE can move it.

566
00:36:12,604 --> 00:36:16,084
CAPE provides the same premium, reliable service you'd expect from any other carrier,

567
00:36:16,345 --> 00:36:19,024
but designed with privacy and security as its first principles.

568
00:36:19,524 --> 00:36:22,524
If you're a Bitcoiner in America, I don't know why you'd use any other carrier.

569
00:36:22,524 --> 00:36:29,165
Head over to cape.co forward slash WBD and use code WBD for 33% off your first six months.

570
00:36:29,604 --> 00:36:33,665
That's cape.co forward slash WBD and use code WBD.

571
00:36:34,604 --> 00:36:37,644
Every Bitcoiner eventually has to answer one question.

572
00:36:38,024 --> 00:36:40,484
If something happened to me, could my family access my Bitcoin?

573
00:36:40,964 --> 00:36:43,365
Would my children inherit what I've spent years stacking?

574
00:36:43,984 --> 00:36:48,405
That's why Anchor Watch builds Bitcoin custody solutions designed to protect you and your family

575
00:36:48,405 --> 00:36:52,345
against real life accidents, errors, kidnappings, and even death.

576
00:36:52,524 --> 00:36:58,144
every solution includes their inheritance protocol designed to help your bitcoin reach the people you intend it for

577
00:36:58,144 --> 00:37:02,925
and us-based customers can also add bitcoin insurance backed by lloyds of london

578
00:37:02,925 --> 00:37:06,464
whether you're a self-custody expert or want multi-institutional support

579
00:37:06,464 --> 00:37:08,944
your bitcoin estate plan should not be an afterthought

580
00:37:08,944 --> 00:37:12,144
bitcoin is only generational wealth if it can be passed down

581
00:37:12,144 --> 00:37:15,725
so make sure your family can access tomorrow what you've built today

582
00:37:15,725 --> 00:37:18,084
anchor watch is your custody your way

583
00:37:18,084 --> 00:37:22,484
so visit anchorwatch.com to get started that's anchorwatch.com

584
00:37:22,484 --> 00:37:26,365
Okay, I know I'm being silly here, but I'm just trying to understand.

585
00:37:26,365 --> 00:37:31,284
So I've locked one Bitcoin on chain, spent half a Bitcoin.

586
00:37:31,284 --> 00:37:34,925
Where does that half a Bitcoin that I now own come back to me from on chain?

587
00:37:34,925 --> 00:37:40,124
So let's assume there are enough denominations and something will make sure.

588
00:37:40,124 --> 00:37:44,464
You locked one Bitcoin, Misha locked half a Bitcoin.

589
00:37:44,464 --> 00:37:49,445
You spent the transaction, now you have a half Bitcoin note.

590
00:37:49,445 --> 00:37:57,385
So what you can do is go to the ciphertext that Misha originally interacted with and

591
00:37:57,385 --> 00:38:03,464
show that ciphertext that you burned half a Bitcoin and get the half Bitcoin that Misha

592
00:38:03,464 --> 00:38:04,464
put in.

593
00:38:04,464 --> 00:38:09,564
So in reality on chain, it would look like Misha and I have swapped private keys.

594
00:38:09,564 --> 00:38:13,444
I don't know that it does.

595
00:38:13,444 --> 00:38:20,885
like on chain what the chain will see is you went in with one bitcoin assuming you didn't use like a

596
00:38:20,885 --> 00:38:28,644
fresh address and so on yeah misha went in with and put in half a bitcoin and then you know the

597
00:38:29,284 --> 00:38:34,885
we need a good set of people out there for this to be and then the next thing that the chain will see

598
00:38:34,885 --> 00:38:44,644
in this context is somebody leaving the shielded bitcoin protocol with half a bitcoin back on chain

599
00:38:44,644 --> 00:38:54,225
okay there is no way to connect you like the entry and exit point yeah and so i do i do understand

600
00:38:54,225 --> 00:39:10,447
that part but does does it look like so if misha locked half a bitcoin and i leaving and you are gonna essentially unlock that half of Bitcoin for me Is that not a little bit like a private key swap Well first of all Misha is not involved there anymore

601
00:39:11,447 --> 00:39:23,887
But also, if you are the only two people in the system, then well, nobody knows that you

602
00:39:23,887 --> 00:39:26,407
swapped keys with Misha.

603
00:39:26,407 --> 00:39:34,347
yeah but but but do i get misha's half a bitcoin that she lost initially okay and so what happens

604
00:39:34,347 --> 00:39:39,047
if like this is not necessarily something i care about but it's something that people care about

605
00:39:39,047 --> 00:39:45,707
what if this is used by like terrorist organizations whatever okay um and they have bitcoin that gets

606
00:39:45,707 --> 00:39:51,567
locked to go into the encrypted bitcoin pool and then someone else ends up like leaving the

607
00:39:51,567 --> 00:39:56,107
encrypted Bitcoin thing and ends up with that? Like, are they having the entire history of their

608
00:39:56,107 --> 00:40:02,627
coin? No, they don't have the history. You don't have an, well, oh, the, when you exit, first of

609
00:40:02,627 --> 00:40:09,067
all, you know, you can choose the exit point. Okay. So if it's important for you, you can be careful

610
00:40:09,067 --> 00:40:14,107
about this, but honestly, you can choose any of the ciphertexts available out there. Just pick,

611
00:40:14,107 --> 00:40:18,807
pick one, whatever. Pick one that looks nice to you. Yeah. Yeah. But, but so, but that is a

612
00:40:18,807 --> 00:40:26,567
potential that that could happen yeah okay i see um and so once i've pegged into this system i've

613
00:40:26,567 --> 00:40:32,227
got my notes that are equivalent to my bitcoin i can obviously leave depending on if the

614
00:40:32,227 --> 00:40:37,507
denomination of the notes that i have left there's another person with the same amount who pegged in

615
00:40:37,507 --> 00:40:42,207
the same amount of bitcoin how do you make sure there's enough liquidity there then so that no one

616
00:40:42,207 --> 00:40:45,747
ever like you don't want to get like if someone doesn't want to get trapped there how do you know

617
00:40:45,747 --> 00:40:50,787
there's the right denomination for me to get out so there are two ways to go about it first of all

618
00:40:50,787 --> 00:40:58,527
as we work on the ways to enter we'll have a variety of denominations you will also you can

619
00:40:58,527 --> 00:41:05,807
always do an atomic swap this is something that the system absolutely allows and it's a very boring

620
00:41:05,807 --> 00:41:13,327
kind of thing it doesn't mean you need to involve a third party beyond that you also have the option

621
00:41:13,327 --> 00:41:18,547
of if you want to exit through specifically this

622
00:41:18,547 --> 00:41:21,967
and you have half a Bitcoin,

623
00:41:22,147 --> 00:41:22,987
you need a whole Bitcoin,

624
00:41:23,107 --> 00:41:24,987
you can always put another half

625
00:41:24,987 --> 00:41:26,527
and take out the whole one.

626
00:41:26,767 --> 00:41:31,027
But mostly it will put some statistical work

627
00:41:31,027 --> 00:41:33,967
on what do the denominations need to be.

628
00:41:34,667 --> 00:41:35,387
And yeah.

629
00:41:35,587 --> 00:41:36,607
Is that something though,

630
00:41:36,647 --> 00:41:38,447
that when this is like new and nascent,

631
00:41:38,567 --> 00:41:40,447
that that will be one of your bigger challenges?

632
00:41:40,447 --> 00:41:48,307
is honestly that's compared to other things i think there's plenty of big challenges yeah yeah

633
00:41:48,307 --> 00:41:55,487
and i think like especially we don't expect people to peg in and peg out very often especially using

634
00:41:55,487 --> 00:42:04,407
pipes if you just want to drop by for you know a transaction or two and head out probably atomic

635
00:42:04,407 --> 00:42:12,587
swaps is the way for you for you to go but if you want to do like the full carefully private way

636
00:42:12,587 --> 00:42:16,927
then then you need to do pipes and then you do need to be your bitcoin would just live in there

637
00:42:16,927 --> 00:42:24,887
potentially um and i imagine once this is at the point where people can use it a lot like we're

638
00:42:24,887 --> 00:42:28,427
getting into the details here but a lot of this will be stripped away with good ux hopefully where

639
00:42:28,427 --> 00:42:32,167
people can just do this and yeah within what they would expect a normal bitcoin world to look like

640
00:42:32,167 --> 00:42:35,227
and is it the kind of thing that you want to be in

641
00:42:35,227 --> 00:42:37,367
sort of the current major Bitcoin wallets

642
00:42:37,367 --> 00:42:38,687
or do you have to build your own thing there?

643
00:42:39,687 --> 00:42:40,487
I think we can

644
00:42:40,487 --> 00:42:42,927
embed this in like the currently

645
00:42:42,927 --> 00:42:43,947
existing wallets

646
00:42:43,947 --> 00:42:46,087
yeah

647
00:42:46,087 --> 00:42:49,007
at the heart of it it's really

648
00:42:49,007 --> 00:42:50,867
like the classical

649
00:42:50,867 --> 00:42:53,147
Bitcoin UTXO

650
00:42:53,147 --> 00:42:54,447
the classical

651
00:42:54,447 --> 00:42:57,027
your keys, your shielded Bitcoin

652
00:42:57,027 --> 00:42:58,167
it's

653
00:42:58,167 --> 00:43:00,927
I think that a lot of it's from a

654
00:43:00,927 --> 00:43:08,367
ux standpoint will feel very familiar to bitcoiners yeah okay because that's obviously going to be the

655
00:43:08,367 --> 00:43:12,707
most important part of this yeah people can actually use it relatively easily yeah um and so

656
00:43:12,707 --> 00:43:19,887
what will the cost be to do a and shield the bitcoin transaction because is that going to go

657
00:43:19,887 --> 00:43:26,687
up significantly from sort of current fees so for a transaction we're looking it's going to be uh

658
00:43:26,687 --> 00:43:28,927
the transaction is going to be bigger,

659
00:43:29,047 --> 00:43:30,967
but we're looking at the same orders of magnitude.

660
00:43:31,567 --> 00:43:33,767
So we don't have an exact number right now

661
00:43:33,767 --> 00:43:35,907
because there's some choices still to be made there.

662
00:43:36,547 --> 00:43:39,167
I don't know, five times, 10 times,

663
00:43:39,367 --> 00:43:42,027
not more than that.

664
00:43:42,027 --> 00:43:42,307
Okay.

665
00:43:43,527 --> 00:43:46,427
It's like, what was it?

666
00:43:46,627 --> 00:43:49,307
Like the, you know, kind of the size

667
00:43:49,307 --> 00:43:50,347
we published in the paper,

668
00:43:50,467 --> 00:43:52,147
what was it like three or four times larger

669
00:43:52,147 --> 00:43:53,207
than the regular transaction?

670
00:43:53,547 --> 00:43:55,707
But like, it also kind of depends on

671
00:43:55,707 --> 00:43:59,847
how fast we want to make Shielded Bitcoin to become kind of quantum resistant.

672
00:44:00,187 --> 00:44:04,467
If we want to make it quantum resistant as soon as possible,

673
00:44:05,027 --> 00:44:12,887
sure, like the design with quantum resistant Shielded Bitcoin is going to blow the size of the transaction a little bit up

674
00:44:12,887 --> 00:44:14,367
because of the choice of the proof system.

675
00:44:14,487 --> 00:44:17,127
We would need to choose a different proof system there.

676
00:44:17,127 --> 00:44:23,087
So you could make this quantum resistant before anything changed on the Bitcoin base layer?

677
00:44:23,207 --> 00:44:24,367
Some parts of it.

678
00:44:24,367 --> 00:44:30,607
So at the end of it, we have UTXOs that are living on Bitcoin.

679
00:44:30,827 --> 00:44:37,547
As long as Bitcoin is not quantum secure, we can't be quantum secure.

680
00:44:37,647 --> 00:44:38,087
Of course.

681
00:44:38,127 --> 00:44:39,307
But we can prepare for it.

682
00:44:39,567 --> 00:44:42,587
And if you had Bitcoin on chain where the public key had never been exposed,

683
00:44:42,987 --> 00:44:46,547
can you peg into this system without exposing your public key?

684
00:44:48,567 --> 00:44:49,047
Potentially.

685
00:44:50,527 --> 00:44:51,047
Hmm.

686
00:44:51,047 --> 00:44:58,167
it depends on the type of like we can use any hashtag oh yeah yeah oh yeah by the way yeah

687
00:44:58,167 --> 00:45:04,827
yeah we can't do that this could be our way of uh of making do while everything changes on bitcoin

688
00:45:04,827 --> 00:45:11,907
if there's a rush please do better okay and so you're you're working on shield of bitcoin

689
00:45:11,907 --> 00:45:17,527
transactions what else do pipes allow you to do it's not just this right i mean of course there

690
00:45:17,527 --> 00:45:20,127
There is a ton of cases one could have done with this.

691
00:45:20,127 --> 00:45:23,967
It's just all about what's the most interesting, what's the most pressing need, right?

692
00:45:24,587 --> 00:45:28,587
Like pipes actually, well, pipes actually allow you to induce, like pipes V2 specifically,

693
00:45:28,927 --> 00:45:30,947
allow you to induce binary covenants.

694
00:45:31,587 --> 00:45:36,227
It means that, you know, it's effectively covenants which predicate, which functionality

695
00:45:36,227 --> 00:45:38,227
always ends up in zero or one.

696
00:45:38,707 --> 00:45:42,527
So like, for example, CSFS, it's either the signature is valid or not.

697
00:45:42,587 --> 00:45:43,947
It's binary choice, right?

698
00:45:44,247 --> 00:45:45,447
Same like with OpVault.

699
00:45:45,447 --> 00:45:47,607
You can either take your Bitcoin or you cannot.

700
00:45:47,607 --> 00:45:48,087
That's it.

701
00:45:48,087 --> 00:45:49,447
Like it's kind of that.

702
00:45:49,447 --> 00:45:52,967
And basically any binary predicate can be used there.

703
00:45:52,967 --> 00:45:57,607
Like check CSS, check CTV, not CTV itself.

704
00:45:57,607 --> 00:46:01,447
CTV itself is not like probably directly possible to be expressed via

705
00:46:01,447 --> 00:46:03,927
with subscription, but check CTV.

706
00:46:03,927 --> 00:46:07,847
Like effectively, if certain transaction will choose a CTV or whatever was valid,

707
00:46:08,647 --> 00:46:10,407
maybe we could do something like this.

708
00:46:10,407 --> 00:46:14,087
So effectively, it's all about, it all comes down to what you could do with pipes.

709
00:46:14,087 --> 00:46:17,047
Like imagine you finally have some confidence of Bitcoin.

710
00:46:17,047 --> 00:46:18,007
What are you going to do with that?

711
00:46:18,007 --> 00:46:21,687
Like we spent so many times debating that.

712
00:46:21,687 --> 00:46:22,407
Sure, you have it.

713
00:46:22,407 --> 00:46:23,127
What are you going to do with it?

714
00:46:23,127 --> 00:46:23,847
What for?

715
00:46:23,847 --> 00:46:25,527
What for have you pushed for it?

716
00:46:26,167 --> 00:46:28,727
Take it, use it, show us, you know?

717
00:46:28,727 --> 00:46:30,727
And the answer actually like, you know,

718
00:46:30,727 --> 00:46:33,047
kind of all came down to just two choices,

719
00:46:33,047 --> 00:46:36,167
like which are, you know, which are there,

720
00:46:36,167 --> 00:46:38,167
like as, you know, kind of interesting things

721
00:46:38,167 --> 00:46:39,447
and what to do with your Bitcoin,

722
00:46:39,447 --> 00:46:42,647
regardless of how the market behaves.

723
00:46:42,647 --> 00:46:47,447
Like the first thing is obviously, as we spoke today, it's shielded Bitcoin, it's privacy,

724
00:46:47,447 --> 00:46:53,207
it's a never changing need. Like it's a never fading need. You always need this.

725
00:46:53,767 --> 00:47:00,087
And the second thing is you could create pools. You could create pools of Bitcoin. Like for example,

726
00:47:00,087 --> 00:47:05,687
pools with shared collateral for lending to get the rates down, right? Or you could create pools

727
00:47:05,687 --> 00:47:12,247
for something else. But so you said you wanted to work on like what was the pressing

728
00:47:12,247 --> 00:47:15,527
need and the pressing need for you is privacy. Why was that privacy?

729
00:47:16,487 --> 00:47:22,567
Well, because I think it all comes down to the fact that, you know, we had, we had several waves

730
00:47:22,567 --> 00:47:27,527
of people coming into Bitcoin, right? Like several major waves, like there was, you know, small time

731
00:47:27,527 --> 00:47:32,407
retail, retail, like small institutions, big institutions, like last cycle was specifically

732
00:47:32,407 --> 00:47:38,327
big institutions, right? Like, what's the next wave we have? Governments. And the thing is all

733
00:47:38,327 --> 00:47:42,247
all about that even currently existed, all of the people who currently kind of came and

734
00:47:42,247 --> 00:47:48,147
started doing something about Bitcoin, they all kind of also as well need privacy because

735
00:47:48,147 --> 00:47:51,407
like they don't want to get attacked by a $5 wrench attack, right?

736
00:47:51,447 --> 00:47:52,827
They don't want to like whatever.

737
00:47:53,527 --> 00:47:56,827
They don't want anybody to know the identities of the multisigners.

738
00:47:57,267 --> 00:48:02,687
They don't want to get front round if they're doing like a large bulk sale or buy or lend

739
00:48:02,687 --> 00:48:06,427
or something like this, you know, they don't want to anybody because it's not of their

740
00:48:06,427 --> 00:48:06,907
business.

741
00:48:06,907 --> 00:48:12,827
You know, like it's just the fact that somebody sold or somebody bought is like not nobody's business.

742
00:48:13,547 --> 00:48:14,387
So that's the thing.

743
00:48:14,827 --> 00:48:22,427
And when it comes to like the next wave of who is supposed to come like to Bitcoin, who is left to come to Bitcoin, who's like, you know, we have all of these conversations, right?

744
00:48:23,227 --> 00:48:23,967
It's governments.

745
00:48:24,407 --> 00:48:29,647
And imagine tomorrow you hear that the U.S. government started putting Bitcoin on their balance sheet.

746
00:48:30,007 --> 00:48:30,827
Guess what happens next?

747
00:48:30,887 --> 00:48:32,207
Everybody tries to front run it.

748
00:48:32,267 --> 00:48:34,067
Everybody on their mother tries to front run it.

749
00:48:34,067 --> 00:48:36,747
There will be countries who will be trying to front run the U.S. treasury.

750
00:48:36,907 --> 00:48:41,807
So this needs to happen in a more interesting, more discreet manner.

751
00:48:42,047 --> 00:48:46,327
It needs to happen without loud on-chain traces

752
00:48:46,327 --> 00:48:48,167
when the whole Twitter panic,

753
00:48:48,407 --> 00:48:51,747
when people are running around with eyes like apples.

754
00:48:53,967 --> 00:48:59,147
And if we look at Zcash as maybe the easiest example here,

755
00:48:59,267 --> 00:49:01,727
they obviously have their shielded and non-shielded transactions.

756
00:49:02,107 --> 00:49:05,167
What percentage of transactions on Zcash are in their shielded pool?

757
00:49:06,907 --> 00:49:07,627
Good question.

758
00:49:10,487 --> 00:49:11,447
It's a testnet.

759
00:49:11,587 --> 00:49:11,947
I don't know.

760
00:49:12,827 --> 00:49:13,087
30?

761
00:49:13,387 --> 00:49:13,687
30.

762
00:49:13,967 --> 00:49:14,527
30%.

763
00:49:14,527 --> 00:49:14,807
Yeah.

764
00:49:15,167 --> 00:49:15,447
Thank you.

765
00:49:15,447 --> 00:49:17,987
We got to help from the audience.

766
00:49:18,867 --> 00:49:19,127
Okay.

767
00:49:19,187 --> 00:49:21,147
So 30% are in the shielded pool.

768
00:49:21,327 --> 00:49:21,507
Yeah.

769
00:49:21,687 --> 00:49:24,307
And do you think, obviously, this will take time.

770
00:49:24,427 --> 00:49:25,867
People have to build trust in this new protocol.

771
00:49:25,987 --> 00:49:28,967
But do you think that's roughly what this will end up being?

772
00:49:29,327 --> 00:49:32,667
I actually wanted to say that we don't really pay attention to test nets.

773
00:49:32,847 --> 00:49:33,547
So we don't know.

774
00:49:33,887 --> 00:49:35,207
Who cares about test nets?

775
00:49:35,627 --> 00:49:36,267
But anyway.

776
00:49:36,907 --> 00:49:37,567
Let's go.

777
00:49:39,747 --> 00:49:40,327
Yeah, go on.

778
00:49:40,507 --> 00:49:42,527
So do you think that's the kind of,

779
00:49:42,687 --> 00:49:44,067
would that be winning for you, I guess?

780
00:49:44,187 --> 00:49:46,367
Is it that kind of scale that you're looking for?

781
00:49:47,407 --> 00:49:49,507
Well, I mean, if we get 30% of Bitcoin

782
00:49:49,507 --> 00:49:51,447
locked in a shield of Bitcoin, first of all,

783
00:49:51,707 --> 00:49:55,367
well, yeah, I mean,

784
00:49:56,127 --> 00:49:58,527
it means that the need is actually there.

785
00:49:58,647 --> 00:49:59,567
That's the first thing.

786
00:49:59,827 --> 00:50:00,727
And the second thing,

787
00:50:00,727 --> 00:50:03,247
it means that we would need to be

788
00:50:03,247 --> 00:50:05,087
really, really prepared for that.

789
00:50:05,087 --> 00:50:10,607
so that was going to be my follow-up question like you two obviously know the the ins and out

790
00:50:10,607 --> 00:50:15,067
of this better than anyone um would you be comfortable with that on the cryptography as

791
00:50:15,067 --> 00:50:22,187
it stands today would you be able to sleep at night today no like today no absolutely so and

792
00:50:22,187 --> 00:50:25,367
what would build your faith in it to get to the point where you would be comfortable with that

793
00:50:25,367 --> 00:50:30,987
uh we need to exhaust all the potential attack surfaces at least at least at least at least at

794
00:50:30,987 --> 00:50:35,187
the surface of all the potential attacks, at least, you know, from those ones which we know,

795
00:50:35,227 --> 00:50:40,287
or like people alive know, because we, I mean, as I said, we, I think we annoyed everybody in

796
00:50:40,287 --> 00:50:44,887
like the academia industry about this already at this point. And I guess we just need to annoy them

797
00:50:44,887 --> 00:50:49,267
a little bit more just to, whatever, make them try to like come up with some more attacks or

798
00:50:49,267 --> 00:50:54,667
something else. So we need to A, exhaust the surface of all the potential attacks. And that's

799
00:50:54,667 --> 00:50:58,727
kind of what we're on. That's our kind of mission for this year. The thing that I can't quite figure

800
00:50:58,727 --> 00:51:02,607
out is how you incentivize people to actually do this because obviously there's like the academic

801
00:51:02,607 --> 00:51:06,327
side where someone might want to try and break the cryptography but that's a very very small pool of

802
00:51:06,327 --> 00:51:10,927
people that are probably willing to do that putting money up creates an incentive but again you'd have

803
00:51:10,927 --> 00:51:15,267
to put a hell of a lot of money up to really drive an incentive is it really like this has to exist

804
00:51:15,267 --> 00:51:21,467
people have to take risk at first and as it's built out we'll see how secure it really is so there's a

805
00:51:21,467 --> 00:51:29,067
of a game theory there where you're putting up a prize and then the attacker has a choice right

806
00:51:29,067 --> 00:51:37,227
wait for more people to come in or take this prize yeah but especially in this day of age of llms

807
00:51:38,027 --> 00:51:43,627
you found an attack the risk of somebody beating you to the punch and taking the prize is higher

808
00:51:43,627 --> 00:51:48,107
and higher and higher so the longer you wait for actual people to get into the system

809
00:51:48,107 --> 00:51:51,907
the lower probability, you might as well take the price.

810
00:51:51,907 --> 00:51:56,827
But yeah, we're going to offer substantial amounts, I believe.

811
00:51:56,827 --> 00:52:01,827
I also hope that somebody from all of these,

812
00:52:01,827 --> 00:52:04,967
we had all of this panic from like kind of,

813
00:52:04,992 --> 00:52:08,492
OpenAI and everything about solving big math problems.

814
00:52:08,492 --> 00:52:10,872
So like OpenAI, if you're listening to this,

815
00:52:11,312 --> 00:52:13,832
please go solve it.

816
00:52:14,012 --> 00:52:16,692
Help us reduce it to something hard.

817
00:52:16,832 --> 00:52:19,192
Help us reduce it to min rank because we're close.

818
00:52:19,672 --> 00:52:22,472
And as Clara said, indeed, it is like,

819
00:52:22,652 --> 00:52:25,152
I guess maybe a function of the amount of work

820
00:52:25,152 --> 00:52:28,332
being put into proving things out.

821
00:52:29,012 --> 00:52:32,132
Because again, like the fact that there is a recent

822
00:52:32,132 --> 00:52:39,612
Amit Saha's paper, like with a second author, which kind of basically constructs a mid-rank-ish

823
00:52:39,612 --> 00:52:42,852
witness encryption from GGM, from just general group model.

824
00:52:43,172 --> 00:52:47,872
It gives us hope that we, instead of like just exhausting the potential attack surface,

825
00:52:48,232 --> 00:52:49,872
we'll be able to find the reduction.

826
00:52:50,332 --> 00:52:51,672
So this is what it is.

827
00:52:52,012 --> 00:52:55,252
And if we have that, it makes things so much easier.

828
00:52:55,832 --> 00:53:00,692
I want to maybe bring this back to a question you asked me in the beginning of

829
00:53:00,692 --> 00:53:02,772
why did I join?

830
00:53:03,252 --> 00:53:05,152
I really remember that first conversation

831
00:53:05,152 --> 00:53:10,512
where I was like, ah, this is the exact right amount of boring.

832
00:53:11,012 --> 00:53:14,112
These are people that are doing things so carefully,

833
00:53:14,392 --> 00:53:17,752
doing like the coolest things in the most boring way.

834
00:53:18,032 --> 00:53:19,932
And I was like, so I think-

835
00:53:19,932 --> 00:53:20,132
Sign me up.

836
00:53:20,292 --> 00:53:23,292
Yeah, sign me up because this is the way to do new cryptography,

837
00:53:23,412 --> 00:53:26,472
doing the most exciting things in the most boring,

838
00:53:26,752 --> 00:53:28,832
pedantic, step-by-step way.

839
00:53:29,112 --> 00:53:29,712
Annoyed way.

840
00:53:29,712 --> 00:53:34,692
when it comes to anything bitcoin security i love hearing boring that's that's what we need

841
00:53:34,692 --> 00:53:39,672
um so when you look at like everything that's happened in bitcoin over the last few months with

842
00:53:39,672 --> 00:53:44,132
after the cold card hack and all the bitcoin red team they found vulnerabilities in almost every

843
00:53:44,132 --> 00:53:49,772
code base they looked at to varying degrees of severity obviously yeah how worried does that make

844
00:53:49,772 --> 00:53:55,112
you when you're working on something that's quite novel uh well we didn't have this goal like with

845
00:53:55,112 --> 00:53:59,992
open challenges. Like we had, as I said, a bunch of submissions. Some of them were like just purely

846
00:53:59,992 --> 00:54:05,412
chatbot generated stuff. Like we ourselves started obviously kind of, you know, trying to

847
00:54:05,412 --> 00:54:10,572
harden and like trying to enforce all the approaches we're doing like with the subscription

848
00:54:10,572 --> 00:54:16,052
itself through all the possible help we can get. So that's why I'm kind of being like, yo, if you

849
00:54:16,052 --> 00:54:21,612
can get us more help on this, join us. Like join us, we'll do it. You know, it's so much easier than

850
00:54:21,612 --> 00:54:24,852
actually upgrading Bitcoin. So we will do it. Let's go for it.

851
00:54:25,972 --> 00:54:30,772
Is it a damning indictment of Bitcoin that this is so much easier than upgrading Bitcoin?

852
00:54:31,972 --> 00:54:36,132
I think it's actually what makes Bitcoin interesting. Bitcoin being resilient to

853
00:54:36,132 --> 00:54:43,852
changes is what gives people this feeling of trust, feeling of safety, that it's a safe harbor,

854
00:54:43,852 --> 00:54:48,812
it's nothing going to happen with it. And it's all going to be fine. There's going to be no,

855
00:54:48,812 --> 00:54:54,132
like you know some kind of like you know uh the leader or like some whatever like i'm sorry rob

856
00:54:54,132 --> 00:55:00,052
hamilton's a ceo now i don't know yeah okay well that's uh he's a he's a ceo he's a hiring manager

857
00:55:00,052 --> 00:55:07,292
he's a we can we can fire him you know the people are the power here the plebs are the power here

858
00:55:07,292 --> 00:55:13,172
anyway so uh like there's gonna be no like you know kind of the the leader who's gonna come and

859
00:55:13,172 --> 00:55:18,472
just upgrade everything and change everything like in like in a day and like somebody's gonna like

860
00:55:18,472 --> 00:55:20,792
how the rules of the game completely has completely changed.

861
00:55:21,112 --> 00:55:26,472
That's the value prop of Bitcoin, the trust, the fact that it's a thing which doesn't go anywhere,

862
00:55:26,652 --> 00:55:29,892
that's going to be with us like in 100, 200 years, like 500 years, whatever.

863
00:55:30,032 --> 00:55:32,372
Everybody's going to die and it's still going to be here, you know.

864
00:55:32,812 --> 00:55:34,992
And that's good, actually.

865
00:55:35,212 --> 00:55:39,892
Like resilience to changes, resilience to changes which are not absolutely necessary,

866
00:55:40,132 --> 00:55:43,052
which are not absolutely must have for the sake of security.

867
00:55:43,512 --> 00:55:45,252
Like that's what makes it interesting.

868
00:55:45,252 --> 00:55:50,492
So obviously, in the time I've been in Bitcoin, the big changes were SegWit and Taproot.

869
00:55:50,852 --> 00:55:54,292
And I mean, Taproot especially, you didn't need that for security.

870
00:55:54,752 --> 00:55:59,172
Do you think the idea of upgrading Bitcoin for wants rather than needs is now gone?

871
00:55:59,272 --> 00:56:03,012
Do you think, take aside a real imminent quantum threat where we need to make a change,

872
00:56:03,092 --> 00:56:06,452
do you think soft forks on Bitcoin might be over?

873
00:56:06,452 --> 00:56:16,412
like never say never but it's a slow and painful process

874
00:56:16,412 --> 00:56:21,512
and i don't know uh prophecy is given to the fools

875
00:56:21,512 --> 00:56:29,432
but i think like i wouldn't count on a soft fork on a nice to have soft fork

876
00:56:29,432 --> 00:56:33,752
in any definition of a near future.

877
00:56:34,912 --> 00:56:36,632
Yeah, like I think we're done there.

878
00:56:37,392 --> 00:56:39,052
I think we should be done there, honestly.

879
00:56:39,992 --> 00:56:41,352
We just need to build things differently.

880
00:56:42,432 --> 00:56:43,312
Can I ask you a question?

881
00:56:43,392 --> 00:56:45,812
I always hate asking anyone working on stuff like this

882
00:56:45,812 --> 00:56:47,432
because I don't want to speak something into existence.

883
00:56:47,432 --> 00:56:50,332
But with obviously like the Samurai case

884
00:56:50,332 --> 00:56:53,312
a couple of years or a year ago, whenever that was,

885
00:56:53,592 --> 00:56:55,652
and then obviously there was pressure on Wasabi Wallet.

886
00:56:55,732 --> 00:57:13,236
They removed themselves from the US got rid of the company How worried are you about working on privacy worried enough to talk with very serious people and understand how can we do this in a compliant way so it i like the

887
00:57:13,236 --> 00:57:23,496
information on a needs to know basis because the fact that everything is shielded doesn't mean you

888
00:57:23,496 --> 00:57:31,676
can't tell your accountant your partner somebody that really needs to know this you you can do that

889
00:57:31,676 --> 00:57:37,336
we have solutions for that but this is your information this is your choice so this is

890
00:57:37,336 --> 00:57:43,776
something we're very very careful about because we want people and institutions and so on to be able

891
00:57:43,776 --> 00:57:47,736
to use this i don't we don't want them to be worried that somebody will come knocking on the

892
00:57:47,736 --> 00:57:52,616
door it's not from from at least my perspective it's not i'm not worried about anyone knocking

893
00:57:52,616 --> 00:57:55,396
on their door i'm worried about them coming knocking on your door for building this yeah

894
00:57:55,396 --> 00:58:03,116
oh um i don't like we're building because yeah but i mean why why do they do it with samurai

895
00:58:03,116 --> 00:58:12,476
i think we this is a bit of a different time where there's more clarity about what can be done

896
00:58:12,476 --> 00:58:19,156
and should be done and we're following these guidelines we are being very very careful

897
00:58:19,156 --> 00:58:20,156
Yeah.

898
00:58:20,156 --> 00:58:21,156
Yeah.

899
00:58:21,156 --> 00:58:24,876
I would also say just kind of from the architecture perspective, right?

900
00:58:24,876 --> 00:58:28,996
Like it's, you know, it's actually kind of a very sad story like about what happened with

901
00:58:28,996 --> 00:58:33,176
Roma Simolov, with Samurai people, with, you know, kind of all of the people who are having

902
00:58:33,176 --> 00:58:38,516
a lot of trouble for like, whatever, dealing with these problems in a way which, you know,

903
00:58:38,516 --> 00:58:42,996
kind of without actually thinking beforehand how to do this properly.

904
00:58:42,996 --> 00:58:47,556
And it's bad that it happened that I hope it will be over for them soon.

905
00:58:47,556 --> 00:58:57,156
you know, just whatever, Free Samurai, whatever. Anyway, but the thing is all about the design of

906
00:58:57,156 --> 00:59:04,116
those products was always, you know, done the way that it violated some laws somewhere,

907
00:59:04,116 --> 00:59:10,116
unfortunately. And there was always somebody taking custody of users' funds, which requires

908
00:59:10,116 --> 00:59:14,196
licensing. There was always like a bunch of other stuff. Is that true, though? I don't think that is

909
00:59:14,196 --> 00:59:18,916
true with samurai's case like i i as far as i'm aware like they never touched any users funds

910
00:59:18,916 --> 00:59:23,796
and they believed they were inside the and i think they were inside the regulatory requirements but

911
00:59:23,796 --> 00:59:28,916
they still decided to come after them coin joint fundamental requires this what what does coin

912
00:59:28,916 --> 00:59:36,596
join require i mean it does i mean it it does it does require somebody it does require somebody

913
00:59:36,596 --> 00:59:41,316
kind of you know going to try to coordinate like these but the coordinator doesn't take

914
00:59:41,316 --> 00:59:43,816
possession of any funds in the coordination.

915
00:59:43,816 --> 00:59:47,616
Indeed, but they are facilitating something what's going on there.

916
00:59:47,616 --> 00:59:52,416
You know, it's you'd better not to have this kind of entity in the protocol.

917
00:59:52,416 --> 00:59:54,656
You don't want to do that in the protocol.

918
00:59:54,656 --> 01:00:01,016
So like we, you know, we think again, it's kind of one of the things why we think pipes

919
01:00:01,016 --> 01:00:05,836
is specifically valuable in here is because it's pipes and it's with the subscription,

920
01:00:05,836 --> 01:00:10,196
which allows to actually make these kind of, you know, private transfers on the Bitcoin

921
01:00:10,196 --> 01:00:15,796
one in the way which would be compliant, which would be legal, which would be, you know, kind of

922
01:00:15,796 --> 01:00:21,236
safe for everybody with their where there would be no coordinators, no operators, no people who

923
01:00:21,236 --> 01:00:25,716
would, you know, kind of could take heat for anything or like break any laws or something.

924
01:00:25,716 --> 01:00:30,436
Because I mean, as Clara said, like, we are explicitly working with, you know, kind of

925
01:00:31,236 --> 01:00:37,476
quite, quite some folks to make sure everything we do is, is, is, is not going to get anybody

926
01:00:37,476 --> 01:00:43,636
into trouble and at the end of the day you know it's just research no i mean i obviously in no way

927
01:00:43,636 --> 01:00:48,076
want anyone to get in trouble this i think it's awesome uh it's just it it would be a concern of

928
01:00:48,076 --> 01:00:53,656
mine not not because you're even doing anything wrong that doesn't even matter um so in terms of

929
01:00:53,656 --> 01:01:00,316
the data that goes on to bitcoin how much data is going there and where's it going is that going

930
01:01:00,316 --> 01:01:07,196
in up return it can go both in up return it can go interpret that access yeah that's also

931
01:01:07,196 --> 01:01:08,416
And is it a large amount of data?

932
01:01:10,556 --> 01:01:14,156
Well, as we said earlier, we're looking at, let's say,

933
01:01:14,976 --> 01:01:18,296
four or five the size of a usual transaction.

934
01:01:18,716 --> 01:01:21,856
So you have the usual what comes in, what comes out,

935
01:01:21,856 --> 01:01:26,176
and then you need to put either in the witness or in the op return.

936
01:01:27,436 --> 01:01:32,276
The whole nullifier, the extra things that have nothing to do with Bitcoin.

937
01:01:32,516 --> 01:01:34,116
So we're not talking crazy amounts?

938
01:01:34,276 --> 01:01:34,416
No.

939
01:01:34,416 --> 01:01:39,976
we're not we're not inscribing jpegs on bitcoin why what the hell you know whoever whoever did

940
01:01:39,976 --> 01:01:45,736
this guys like don't spam all right i think this sounds really cool i've obviously i am not

941
01:01:45,736 --> 01:01:50,136
technical i've tried to understand this as best i can what am i missing is there anything i'm

942
01:01:50,136 --> 01:02:07,021
missing that i not asked you about oh you asked even about the legal aspects which people usually check it out to ask about so i understand why i remember having this conversation um i won say with who but someone privately who working on

943
01:02:07,021 --> 01:02:15,341
a uh like a privacy protocol yeah and um like you you almost feel bad for asking because i don't

944
01:02:15,341 --> 01:02:19,321
want this to ever raise any flags that mean someone comes and knocks at your door like

945
01:02:19,321 --> 01:02:22,941
but but i think they're really important questions like because these have to be considerations when

946
01:02:22,941 --> 01:02:27,001
you're building stuff like this and the tricky thing with it is like with the you know the

947
01:02:27,001 --> 01:02:31,001
administration in the us now like it seems more favorable but who knows when that switches and

948
01:02:31,001 --> 01:02:37,221
what happens and i would also say it all comes down to the fact if kind of you know we as you

949
01:02:37,221 --> 01:02:41,761
know as people as a company or whatever are actually participating in a protocol or there

950
01:02:41,761 --> 01:02:46,661
is is there is there anybody who kind of needs to participate in a protocol which kind of you know

951
01:02:46,661 --> 01:02:51,561
the way which in the way which might require some additional regulation but like whatever

952
01:02:51,561 --> 01:02:54,921
and it all comes down to the fact that, you know,

953
01:02:55,241 --> 01:02:57,161
it's research, it's open source code

954
01:02:57,161 --> 01:03:00,501
and like nobody needs to run any kind of operator,

955
01:03:00,721 --> 01:03:03,441
not us, not any single company out there

956
01:03:03,441 --> 01:03:04,481
participating in this.

957
01:03:04,841 --> 01:03:06,061
It's all self-custodial.

958
01:03:06,321 --> 01:03:07,801
It's all on the user side.

959
01:03:08,261 --> 01:03:10,861
A user can do if you have enough storage at home

960
01:03:10,861 --> 01:03:14,121
and whatever, you can go through the whole flow process

961
01:03:14,121 --> 01:03:15,161
just yourself.

962
01:03:15,301 --> 01:03:16,201
You don't need anybody.

963
01:03:17,041 --> 01:03:18,381
So it's, yeah.

964
01:03:18,661 --> 01:03:20,941
The other thing I did want to try and understand better

965
01:03:20,941 --> 01:03:26,881
is what is this in the sense of like bit vm and all the things that we're building on on those

966
01:03:26,881 --> 01:03:32,521
kind of protocols we're like layer we would call them like a layer two what is this it's a meta

967
01:03:32,521 --> 01:03:39,281
protocol this is the i think the best the best term for that maybe it's the best term and what

968
01:03:39,281 --> 01:03:49,361
does that exactly mean it means that it's uh it uses bitcoin for ordering for publication

969
01:03:49,361 --> 01:04:00,581
just the reading and the interpretation is left to a separate software so it's a

970
01:04:00,581 --> 01:04:07,501
and i would say it's it's and i would say it's a metaprodicol maybe even even even if we call it

971
01:04:07,501 --> 01:04:12,961
a metaprodicol it's uh you know kind of interestingly different metaprodicol from

972
01:04:12,961 --> 01:04:16,461
what we've seen maybe like before because we've had a bunch of metaprodicols around

973
01:04:16,461 --> 01:04:20,461
Like we've had OmniLayer, like this master coin thing.

974
01:04:20,461 --> 01:04:23,461
We had a bunch of other stuff from like 2013 era.

975
01:04:23,461 --> 01:04:28,461
We had a lot of people building MetaProtocles.

976
01:04:28,461 --> 01:04:36,461
And there was always a thing that people kind of were not really happy about this MetaProtocles because it's a spam.

977
01:04:36,461 --> 01:04:38,461
Why? Because they don't contain Bitcoin in it.

978
01:04:38,461 --> 01:04:44,461
They don't have Bitcoin. They're not doing anything with Bitcoin, like interested in it, like interested in it, like interested in it not internally.

979
01:04:44,461 --> 01:04:50,621
right? And because of pipes, we think that there is a way to like kind of, you know, start trying

980
01:04:50,621 --> 01:04:55,541
to do something with Bitcoin inside of MetaProtocles without adding additional kind of, you know,

981
01:04:55,561 --> 01:04:59,701
operators or like some of the trust assumption or custody or anything like this, right? Like

982
01:04:59,701 --> 01:05:06,881
multi-sigs or goddamn. So yeah, like we think there will be a kind of a resurrection, I would say,

983
01:05:06,941 --> 01:05:13,461
maybe of MetaProtocles on Bitcoin because of pipes. And like, surely Bitcoin is just the first

984
01:05:13,461 --> 01:05:19,301
can be i would say the first the first birdie it's very cool and it's exciting to see some like

985
01:05:19,301 --> 01:05:22,661
this is the first time in a while where i've seen something new being built on bitcoin that i

986
01:05:22,661 --> 01:05:26,441
i didn't expect to see coming like this kind of took me by surprise and it looks really really

987
01:05:26,441 --> 01:05:31,681
interesting i think it's very cool um this is probably because i have such limited technical

988
01:05:31,681 --> 01:05:34,661
understanding like there's still some question marks for me and especially when it comes down

989
01:05:34,661 --> 01:05:39,901
to like the cryptography and the safety of this what since you announced this both pipes and um

990
01:05:39,901 --> 01:05:44,741
the shield of Bitcoin. What have been the best pieces of sort of pushback or criticism that

991
01:05:44,741 --> 01:05:54,001
you've had? Well, it's kind of interesting. It's kind of fun that, you know, but we actually had

992
01:05:54,001 --> 01:05:59,181
quite a ton of conversations with Zcash people because it's their design. And we're basically

993
01:05:59,181 --> 01:06:03,581
kind of, they were thinking about it for like 10 years. And we basically came to consult with them

994
01:06:03,581 --> 01:06:07,341
in terms of, okay, guys, you spent 10 years doing, you spent 10 years doing this. Like,

995
01:06:07,341 --> 01:06:09,521
can you give us any hints about what we're missing?

996
01:06:09,821 --> 01:06:13,081
Like anything, anything we, anything's wrong maybe or whatever, you know?

997
01:06:13,461 --> 01:06:15,661
So that was like a, that was like a good thing.

998
01:06:16,181 --> 01:06:20,461
And that's like, you know, in terms of, you know, some of, some of, some of,

999
01:06:20,501 --> 01:06:23,341
some of them kind of, you know, some of them pushed back on something,

1000
01:06:23,461 --> 01:06:24,361
we changed it.

1001
01:06:24,481 --> 01:06:28,601
Some of them, you know, were more endorsive, like just in general, right?

1002
01:06:29,121 --> 01:06:30,481
Even some of them were publicly.

1003
01:06:30,781 --> 01:06:32,841
So that, that, that was a good pushback.

1004
01:06:32,841 --> 01:06:42,841
On the cryptography side of things, we obviously had a lot of this process going with like,

1005
01:06:42,841 --> 01:06:44,041
hey, what if we do it this way?

1006
01:06:44,041 --> 01:06:45,041
What if we do it that way?

1007
01:06:45,041 --> 01:06:47,041
What if we do it one way or another way?

1008
01:06:47,041 --> 01:06:48,041
Right?

1009
01:06:48,041 --> 01:07:02,905
And obviously we received a lot of deception and also a lot of pushback for some of the versions of previous versions of with inscriptions subscription from our side which kind of induced us or like made us to like iterate forward on it so it like

1010
01:07:03,545 --> 01:07:08,105
yeah like even open challenges themselves you can think about them as like a little bit of a push

1011
01:07:08,105 --> 01:07:13,705
back in terms of hey guys this is broken fix it yeah you know you said you've obviously taken a

1012
01:07:13,705 --> 01:07:18,825
lot of this from from zcash the witness encryption is not from zcash though right this is yes yeah

1013
01:07:18,825 --> 01:07:21,785
So again, that's like the new thing that needs to be proven out.

1014
01:07:21,785 --> 01:07:26,325
Yeah, the transfers, I think, and this is the paper that we publish now.

1015
01:07:27,465 --> 01:07:32,745
It has some new and cool ideas, but I think people are pretty used to,

1016
01:07:33,225 --> 01:07:39,885
to like nullifiers, notes, like these are terms that people are comfortable with right now.

1017
01:07:40,065 --> 01:07:40,165
Yeah.

1018
01:07:40,545 --> 01:07:40,765
Yeah.

1019
01:07:41,105 --> 01:07:44,725
And nullifiers, remind me what this is.

1020
01:07:44,725 --> 01:07:51,205
null fire is the way what this is where you keep all the notes that you've used oh okay okay okay

1021
01:07:51,205 --> 01:07:57,525
got you yeah um is there anything that stood out to you in terms of i think for me because we have

1022
01:07:57,525 --> 01:08:04,005
so this paper has to do with a transfer but it doesn't take care of the boundaries so how you

1023
01:08:04,725 --> 01:08:12,725
peg in how you peg out things around it and so on and this paper is in the working we've put a lot

1024
01:08:12,725 --> 01:08:18,445
lot of time into that also. So just going through all of the interests and the replies,

1025
01:08:19,345 --> 01:08:24,545
there were such interesting questions, so many things. I was like, okay, I'm literally taking

1026
01:08:24,545 --> 01:08:31,905
notes. Make sure this is clear. Make sure this proof of sound. Make sure and so on. And it's,

1027
01:08:32,585 --> 01:08:36,125
yeah, it's really, really exciting to get this feedback and understand like

1028
01:08:36,125 --> 01:08:41,845
what's important to people before you, you know, throw another 60 pages in a PDF.

1029
01:08:42,725 --> 01:08:44,665
The same thing goes for witness encryption.

1030
01:08:45,005 --> 01:08:49,385
We will be publishing one more kind of updated AADP witness encryption paper later this year.

1031
01:08:49,805 --> 01:08:55,845
And we invite everybody to just whatever come try and kind of come look at it and try to criticize it.

1032
01:08:56,085 --> 01:08:57,845
Please criticize it because this is effective.

1033
01:08:58,145 --> 01:09:04,225
Getting Shield of Bitcoin arranged requires not just us pushing forward for that or us proposing something.

1034
01:09:04,745 --> 01:09:06,505
It would be great.

1035
01:09:06,605 --> 01:09:10,785
It would be cool if we were able to involve people just in general among Bitcoiners.

1036
01:09:10,785 --> 01:09:12,925
just for us to be able to understand

1037
01:09:12,925 --> 01:09:14,645
what do they think is good?

1038
01:09:14,885 --> 01:09:16,845
How do they think this would be accepted?

1039
01:09:17,185 --> 01:09:18,365
What do they think is needed?

1040
01:09:18,565 --> 01:09:19,725
What do they think is missing?

1041
01:09:20,185 --> 01:09:22,985
In general, eventually, we hope this will end up

1042
01:09:22,985 --> 01:09:26,785
being all over Bitcoin mission to make it private

1043
01:09:26,785 --> 01:09:29,885
because private Bitcoin should happen eventually.

1044
01:09:30,445 --> 01:09:31,465
I totally agree with that.

1045
01:09:31,625 --> 01:09:33,745
And in terms of for you guys now,

1046
01:09:34,005 --> 01:09:35,705
you've obviously done the work,

1047
01:09:35,765 --> 01:09:36,425
you've done the research.

1048
01:09:36,425 --> 01:09:38,305
Is it now just build it?

1049
01:09:39,545 --> 01:09:39,685
No.

1050
01:09:40,785 --> 01:09:40,985
Okay.

1051
01:09:41,405 --> 01:09:45,565
No, I think on the protocol end, we need to finish up the research.

1052
01:09:45,765 --> 01:09:46,925
We need to publish two more papers.

1053
01:09:46,925 --> 01:09:47,485
Go through the scrutiny.

1054
01:09:48,445 --> 01:09:51,365
Yeah, no, we have a road ahead of us.

1055
01:09:51,705 --> 01:09:51,825
Yeah.

1056
01:09:52,065 --> 01:09:53,925
And how many of you are actually working on this now?

1057
01:09:54,945 --> 01:09:55,705
What is it?

1058
01:09:56,325 --> 01:09:57,165
18, 19?

1059
01:09:57,825 --> 01:09:58,965
Okay, so it's a pretty big team.

1060
01:09:59,085 --> 01:09:59,245
Yeah.

1061
01:09:59,705 --> 01:10:00,485
There's a lot of us.

1062
01:10:00,565 --> 01:10:01,405
I'm excited to see it.

1063
01:10:01,405 --> 01:10:03,305
I hope to see it in the wild at some point soon.

1064
01:10:04,065 --> 01:10:04,645
Soonish.

1065
01:10:05,545 --> 01:10:06,945
It sounds very cool.

1066
01:10:07,165 --> 01:10:10,425
It's one of those things, like, if someone, straight after this interview,

1067
01:10:10,425 --> 01:10:14,165
if someone said can you explain it i might still say no but i think i have a better understanding

1068
01:10:14,165 --> 01:10:21,285
and if we get this to the point where using it is as simple as using bitcoin that will be incredible

1069
01:10:21,285 --> 01:10:26,645
that's what i'm looking forward to i mean we're pushing forward absolutely but thank you so much

1070
01:10:26,645 --> 01:10:31,185
for both of you coming on the show yeah um there'll be people that have listened to this they'll be in

1071
01:10:31,185 --> 01:10:35,885
the same boat as me where it's a lot of it may have gone over their head where do they go to find

1072
01:10:35,885 --> 01:10:41,905
out more about this and maybe they want to read the 60 page research pieces i mean we have twitter

1073
01:10:41,905 --> 01:10:47,745
we're publishing explanatory blog posts there like just today we kind of published a specific

1074
01:10:47,745 --> 01:10:53,705
like a specific blog post like clara did a little bit of a yak una about like frequently asked and

1075
01:10:53,705 --> 01:11:00,005
frequently answered things about like the protocol design so we kind of intend to publish more kind

1076
01:11:00,005 --> 01:11:04,685
of just simplified blog posts than you know instead of reading 60 page pages or whatever

1077
01:11:04,685 --> 01:11:08,805
because like actually one of the reasons why we separate why we've split the peg in and peg out

1078
01:11:08,805 --> 01:11:12,905
paper and like the shielded bitcoin paper is because if we slap them together it's a 150 page

1079
01:11:12,905 --> 01:11:21,125
thing you know very very few people are gonna be like you want me to read the book what it's uh

1080
01:11:21,125 --> 01:11:26,325
it's very cool though i i love that you work on something very new and exciting but thank you for

1081
01:11:26,325 --> 01:11:29,445
coming on the show of course yeah thanks for inviting i think there's gonna be a lot more

1082
01:11:29,445 --> 01:11:30,165
questions coming.

1083
01:11:30,525 --> 01:11:31,045
Absolutely.

1084
01:11:31,045 --> 01:11:31,825
We hope so.

1085
01:11:31,925 --> 01:11:32,365
We hope so.

1086
01:11:32,365 --> 01:11:32,885
We can't wait for that.

1087
01:11:32,885 --> 01:11:34,885
Please, please, please drag them our way.

1088
01:11:35,365 --> 01:11:35,765
Amazing.

1089
01:11:35,925 --> 01:11:36,425
Thank you, guys.

1090
01:11:36,665 --> 01:11:37,025
Yeah, thanks.

1091
01:11:37,025 --> 01:11:37,385
Thank you.
