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I think it's important to think of security as a journey and not a destination.

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With hardware wallets, there's this, because they've created the easy button,

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you don't really understand what is going on behind the curtain, so to speak.

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Be skeptical and go into that with your eyes open and think around the corner as to the

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implications of some of the information you're sharing or the trust you're putting in a firmware

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update. The nature of security seems to be the sort of cat and mouse thing. I wanted to put my

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trust into the math that underlies the Bitcoin protocol rather than a third-party device.

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It's just not quite the same. It's nice looking into your glasses.

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How are you doing, Mr. Seatiner?

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I am well today.

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Bitcoin's teasing all-time highs.

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I know. What are we at right now?

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Above 125, barely.

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And I'm here talking to you, so if I'm nervous as shit, it's still a good day.

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There's no need to be nervous.

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This is a safe space.

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But yeah, Bitcoin's absolutely flying.

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It's great to see.

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It is.

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I think we're in for a good end of the year.

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It's all the stars are aligning with the usual kind of, well, you probably follow this stuff

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more than me, but November and December are typically, October, November, and December

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are typically pretty bullish. So even the shutdown, I guess, is bullish at this point.

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100%. Bitcoin doesn't shut down, even if the US government does. No, I'm excited. October is real.

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I think cycles are broken, maybe. Maybe. But we don't need to talk about price. That's not why

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you're here. I mean, we can talk about price. The views will be better if we talk about price.

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I'll never turn down some, yeah, bull child. But no, I think October is definitely a thing. I'm

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excited to see where it goes. But anyhow. So let's start off by introducing you. You've not

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been on the show before, new or old. Who are you? So I am a NIM on the internet. I go by,

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Initially, I went by the NIMS SeedSigner. Now, a lot of people just refer to me as Seed when they see me in public.

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But I was, let's see, been a Bitcoiner for about 12 years.

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I was a police officer for 15 years, and I created this little open source software project called SeedSigner that's kind of been my introduction as a public Bitcoiner.

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So that's me.

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So we're going to get into the SeedSigner stuff today, but I do want to talk about your background because it's pretty interesting.

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You were a police officer, but not just a normal police officer by the end of your career, at least.

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So why don't we start with that whole journey?

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How did you go from being a police officer to working in forensics?

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Yeah, so my background, you know, bachelor's degree in English literature, minor in philosophy.

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Then I studied management information systems some during my undergraduate career and kind of bounced around between a lot of jobs when I was younger.

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I was actually a flight attendant for a year in 2001.

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So I was in the air on 9-11.

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And after that was laid off.

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I worked for an airline called TWA that no longer exists.

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What was it like being in the air in 9-11?

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So we were, it was as crazy as you would think it'd be.

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We were close enough to St. Louis,

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which was where I'm domiciled out of,

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that we got to land in St. Louis.

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So I didn't end up stranded in another city,

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but I flew out of Atlanta that morning

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on the busiest airport in the country.

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And then, you know, once we landed,

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I think one of the towers had been hit by the time we landed.

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And it was just more confusion after we got on the ground.

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You know, at first they wouldn't taxi to the gateway,

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and then we did taxi to the gateway,

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but you weren't permitted to leave the plane.

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And then you had to leave the plane,

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but you couldn't leave the terminal.

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And it was, you know, the same confusion

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that everyone else, I'm sure, experienced.

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That's insane. That must have been pretty wild.

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Where were you meant to be going or were you meant to be going to St. Louis?

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No, it was back to St. Louis.

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I probably had a turn to go somewhere else too that day, but yeah, it wasn't meant to be.

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That's pretty scary.

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Yeah.

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What a scary time to be in the air.

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I'm sorry, I interrupted you there though.

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No, not at all.

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So after laid off from TWA, I had worked some private security jobs when I was younger and

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ended up working at a university in St. Louis as a basically a campus security officer.

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and it occurred to me that it wasn't in a great neighborhood. It occurred to me I could make more

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money and have a safer working environment if I just went to the police academy. So I figured out

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how to do that and got admitted to the academy and got hired on by a local, I'm from St. Louis,

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so a small municipality in the county around St. Louis. And for the first three years, I was just

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a road cop, like writing tickets, answering calls, domestic fight in progress, that kind of stuff.

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and by virtue of my background in information systems,

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the chief of the department where I worked

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knew that I was a little bit of a geek

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and this would have been in what, like 2006, 2007?

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So digital forensics was still a young

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and growing part of law enforcement

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and there was a task force or a working group

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in the area that was looking to add people

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and they asked me if this is something

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that I would be interested in and looking into or potentially joining at the Digital Forensic Lab.

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So I worked over there part-time for a few months, just kind of learning the super basics about

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digital forensics and I guess perform well enough that they offered me a full-time,

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you know, a full-time assignment, I should say. I stayed with the same police department the whole

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time, but was assigned, you know, every day from nine to five during business hours. Instead of

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driving a police car, I'd go to the forensic lab and was assigned casework where I'd take apart

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computers or try to obtain data acquisitions from cell phones and data recovery from thumb drives

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and all sorts of digital media type stuff. Okay. So you're basically looking for information on a

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crime. What year was this? This would have been 2007. Okay. So you would have been working there.

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You did that for a few years, I assume. The next 12 years. So until 2019. So you would have been

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working there during like the Silk Road days where people were sending drugs around. Did you ever

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encounter any of those cases? So that was actually my introduction to Bitcoin was a case that I guess

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more than tangentially touched on the Silk Road. It wasn't actually my investigation. It was another

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examiner at the lab who I was talking to, I don't know, in the break room or water cooler talk or

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whatever. And he had been assigned a case that involved a local high school kid who had been

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given a nice gaming computer for Christmas

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that had two decent GPUs on it.

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And this, I don't remember if it was late 2012, early 2013,

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but you could still competitively mine Bitcoin with GPUs at that point.

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FPGAs were probably in play and ASICs were coming soon.

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But anyhow, this kid was mining a decent amount of Bitcoin

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and he would buy marijuana on the Silk Road.

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It'd be shipped to his house and then he'd break it down into dime bags

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or whatever smaller divisions.

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He'd take it to school and was making a nice little hustle as an entrepreneur selling weed at school.

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Of course, a teacher or somebody found out, and they called the police,

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and that's how his computer ended up at the forensic lab.

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But I had never heard of Bitcoin before talking to this coworker about it.

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So that's what sent me to Google and down the rabbit hole of just trying to figure out what was this thing,

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what did all the compute that was associated with it, what was that good for?

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Why did it need that? And, you know, the white paper. And I joined Bitcoin Talk and, yeah, just started learning about it.

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You know, when you have cases like that, it's like a young kid selling weed at school, like kids shouldn't do that because they're going to get in trouble.

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But do you also think like, kind of cool, he's a bit of an entrepreneur.

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Yeah, I mean, I definitely didn't have that kind of sense of opportunity when I was, you know, a kid mowing lawns at his age.

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Mo lawns is a better option, kids. No kids listen to this, but if you do, don't sell weed,

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mo lawns. So that's the first time you found Bitcoin. I think given the context, if I was you

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in that situation, police officer, find this through a guy who's selling weed at school,

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I would probably, especially back in 2012, whenever it was, I would jump to the assumption

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that this was just money for criminals. Like many people are even still falling into this pit trap.

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What did you think of it?

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No, that was probably becoming the predominant narrative at the time.

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I think Bitcoin was probably transitioning from quirky nerd money to a tool for money

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launderers and drug sellers on the darknet.

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But they say, I don't know if it was D++ or somebody else, I think it was her who said,

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Bitcoin kind of hits you where you're at at a given stage in your life.

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And at that point, I was a young father with a big mortgage.

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And I was trying to pick stocks and make investments in different things.

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And I was looking for a way to make the money that I earned through my employment work harder for me.

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And so I tended in the beginning to see Bitcoin as an investment.

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I saw the permissionlessness of it.

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And what really resonated with me was the scarcity of it, the hard cap on supply.

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And so as I started to think about the market cap of Bitcoin, it really seemed like it could potentially be significantly undervalued.

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So that was probably, you know, number go up in that day and age is what drew me into it.

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But at the same time, that was, you know, the original generation of altcoins, you know, Litecoin, Feathercoin, all that kind of stuff.

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And so it wasn't, Bitcoin was the top dog, but it wasn't, Bitcoin only wasn't a thing back then.

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And so it was this opportunity to speculate and make money that probably first brought me in.

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I mean, I think that gets everyone, right? It's number go up first. Everyone thinks it's a get

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rich quick scheme, and then you learn it's a don't get poor slowly scheme.

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Right. But I also had those misgivings given my role in law enforcement and stuff. And somebody,

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the majority of my work in forensics dealt with crimes against children. And so the possibility

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of Bitcoin being used to sell illicit material online and that sort of thing, like that was

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a part of how I viewed it. And there were like, I remember being a bit conflicted about it. There

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was a Bitcoin podcast at the time called Let's Talk Bitcoin. And it was, I think Adam B. Levine

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was the host. And it turned into like a network of podcasts, right? I think. It grew into a network,

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but originally it was that Adam B. Levine, Andreas Antonopoulos, and another person,

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Stephanie Murphy. And they were actually a daily Bitcoin podcast for a while. And I remember

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Andreas bringing up the whole boogeyman factor of child sexual assault material being sold for

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Bitcoin. And I really wrestled with that a lot early on because Bitcoin is permissionless and

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to a degree, depending on how you use it, private. And so it was something that you eventually

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realize cars are dangerous too, and cars kill a lot of people around the world. But the value we

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get from cars above people dying in car crashes dramatically exceeds the number of sad deaths

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that occur. So the possibility of it is just so much bigger than the people who misuse it or,

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you know. I think I actually saw this stat recently. I think it's 40,000 Americans die

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every year through traffic accidents.

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And as society, we've decided to accept

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that that's a worthwhile trade-off.

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Obviously, people are doing everything they can

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to bring that number down as much as possible.

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But it is a harsh reality that you have to face

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when you actually understand what Bitcoin is.

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Bitcoin is freedom money.

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It's permissionless.

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It's money for enemies.

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People are going to use it in ways you don't like,

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and you have no ability to stop that.

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You just have to come to terms with it.

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And again, weigh up the benefits against the negatives

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and realize that it's a worthwhile trade-off.

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Yeah, same story with firearms.

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Obviously, that's an analogy that people make a lot of the time.

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But yeah, guns are dangerous and they kill a lot of people,

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but they also protect a lot of people's homes and serve as a deterrent

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and help people defend themselves.

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So when you discovered Bitcoin, you saw it as an investment first.

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Obviously, I'm sure that's changed since then.

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Well, it is still an investment, but it means certainly more to me

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and I think more to you than that.

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Did you manage to hold on through all the hype mania phases?

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Yeah, I alluded to this briefly when we were talking the other day in preparation for this.

215
00:15:24,080 --> 00:15:27,900
So I had a severe weak hands incident in 2017.

216
00:15:28,580 --> 00:15:36,320
Not that I was a Bitcoin baron or anything by any means, but I had in early 2017,

217
00:15:36,760 --> 00:15:41,460
so the majority of the Bitcoin I acquired early on were like in 2013 and 2014.

218
00:15:41,460 --> 00:15:51,980
I remember buying Bitcoin for as little as like $65 on Coinbase in the summer of 2013 as they were kind of crashing before the run-up in the end of that year.

219
00:15:52,700 --> 00:16:05,520
But after the peak in 2013, the Mt. Gox incident happened, and there was just a long, brutal bear market through 2014 and 2015.

220
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and that was, I think everybody's first bear market

221
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is like the worst one.

222
00:16:12,120 --> 00:16:12,800
And that was a bad one.

223
00:16:13,000 --> 00:16:16,420
Yeah, and you don't have the experience

224
00:16:16,420 --> 00:16:20,520
of Bitcoin resurrecting itself after it falls.

225
00:16:20,800 --> 00:16:21,660
You know, it comes back up.

226
00:16:21,700 --> 00:16:23,780
So you think like maybe I'm the idiot

227
00:16:23,780 --> 00:16:25,500
and I bought close to the top

228
00:16:25,500 --> 00:16:27,740
and, you know, I'm the greater fool.

229
00:16:28,880 --> 00:16:31,860
So I'm dealing with all this kind of uncertainty

230
00:16:31,860 --> 00:16:34,280
through 2014, 2015, 2016.

231
00:16:34,280 --> 00:16:40,500
And in late 2016, I don't remember the timeline exactly, but the price started to perk up.

232
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And it got past the peak of $1,200 or in that neighborhood.

233
00:16:46,540 --> 00:16:51,180
And then the Bitcoin price is approaching like $2,000, between $2,000 and $2,500.

234
00:16:53,140 --> 00:17:01,040
And with the mortgage we had on our house, if at that particular moment, I sold all of

235
00:17:01,040 --> 00:17:08,660
the Bitcoin and legitimately paid the taxes, which were a gut punch, I was at a point where

236
00:17:08,660 --> 00:17:14,040
we could pay off the mortgage of our house and be completely out of debt and kind of have a fresh

237
00:17:14,040 --> 00:17:20,460
start financially in life. And at the same time, you know, in early 2017, what's going on is

238
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actually reminiscent of what we're going through now. There was the four cores were kind of in full

239
00:17:25,360 --> 00:17:31,540
swinger coming to it at that time. And I had this anxiety or worry or whatever you want to call it

240
00:17:31,540 --> 00:17:37,280
that, you know, the conventional wisdom is if Bitcoin forks, no big deal. You just hold all

241
00:17:37,280 --> 00:17:46,140
the forks. And eventually when everything sorts itself out, you know, you're not hurt.

242
00:17:46,640 --> 00:17:51,760
But I was concerned with the number of forks that were happening, that if the network fragmented too

243
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much, the whole concept would lose its perceived value.

244
00:17:58,700 --> 00:18:02,000
So people might actually not remember the history of that, but would that have been things

245
00:18:02,000 --> 00:18:03,520
like Bitcoin Unlimited and-

246
00:18:03,520 --> 00:18:04,320
Bitcoin Gold.

247
00:18:04,460 --> 00:18:05,200
Bitcoin Gold, yeah.

248
00:18:05,200 --> 00:18:06,080
And Bitcoin Cash.

249
00:18:06,380 --> 00:18:06,600
Yeah.

250
00:18:06,680 --> 00:18:08,420
And all those at the time.

251
00:18:09,580 --> 00:18:15,300
And another factor of it is like, I'm a modest means coming from the middle class kind of

252
00:18:15,300 --> 00:18:15,540
guy.

253
00:18:16,240 --> 00:18:20,880
And when you've put, I don't know what I put into my initial investment of Bitcoin, whether

254
00:18:20,880 --> 00:18:26,860
It was like probably between $10,000 and $20,000 of money that we had saved up when we were bringing in as revenue.

255
00:18:27,200 --> 00:18:32,060
My wife, God bless her, was very understanding about buying Bitcoin.

256
00:18:32,620 --> 00:18:39,160
And some of the, like, I was on the, like, early on when ASICs were just becoming available,

257
00:18:39,580 --> 00:18:43,060
if you wanted to buy one, it was never just like buy it off the shelf and they ship it to you.

258
00:18:43,140 --> 00:18:48,520
It was always some kind of like pre-release or funding campaign where you send in money

259
00:18:48,520 --> 00:18:51,520
and it was a pre-order for something that would hopefully come through a few months later.

260
00:18:51,700 --> 00:18:52,800
And then when you got it, it wasn't efficient.

261
00:18:53,200 --> 00:18:56,360
Yeah. And because so much new hash is coming online,

262
00:18:56,420 --> 00:19:00,640
it didn't produce maybe what you'd expected it to when you'd initially ordered it.

263
00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:03,040
So at one point I went to my wife and I was like,

264
00:19:03,060 --> 00:19:09,020
I'd like to buy this magic machine that makes Bitcoin for $3,000 or something like that.

265
00:19:09,080 --> 00:19:10,380
And she's like, oh, okay.

266
00:19:10,380 --> 00:19:26,740
So anyhow, so in 2017, given what the Bitcoin I was holding, what it was worth, and what it started from, I think people who are from modest financial means are just not mentally equipped for that kind of financial gain.

267
00:19:26,940 --> 00:19:29,900
In your mind, you start to second guess whether it's real.

268
00:19:30,160 --> 00:19:35,240
And there's this huge temptation to very binary thinking where you don't sell a little bit.

269
00:19:35,580 --> 00:19:37,580
If you're going to sell, you just get out and sell it all.

270
00:19:37,580 --> 00:19:44,040
And there's, I was, I guess the best way to say it is I was very financially unsophisticated at that point in my life.

271
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Not that I'm super sophisticated now, but even more so back then.

272
00:19:48,000 --> 00:19:58,620
And so one day I remember being in the forensic lab and it always seemed like I had on my computer that was connected to the internet, which was a separate computer.

273
00:19:58,700 --> 00:20:02,740
I always had like a price ticker or a exchange chart or something up.

274
00:20:02,740 --> 00:20:07,840
And I see the number kind of like fluttering around my magic number of like get out of debt.

275
00:20:08,500 --> 00:20:10,980
And I remember that day very clearly.

276
00:20:11,180 --> 00:20:14,220
Like I just got up, told my boss I was going home for the day.

277
00:20:14,320 --> 00:20:16,180
It was still like mid-morning.

278
00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:20,000
And I went home and I just started pulling out.

279
00:20:21,380 --> 00:20:23,160
I didn't have a hardware wallet at that point.

280
00:20:23,860 --> 00:20:25,160
We can talk more about that.

281
00:20:25,320 --> 00:20:26,400
Was that paper wallet era?

282
00:20:26,680 --> 00:20:28,160
It was still paper wallet.

283
00:20:28,520 --> 00:20:43,930
When I set it up initially it was definitely still the paper wallet era but Harder Wallets had subsequently come out but it was um yeah Trezor must been around then and Ledger probably wasn its early form I don know when um Trezor I think was like late 2013 early 2014 if

284
00:20:43,930 --> 00:20:53,270
my timeline's right. Um, but, uh, when I had set things up initially, um, uh, hopefully

285
00:20:53,270 --> 00:20:58,290
I don't blank on the, I had used a web wallet, but it wasn't, it was like a web paper wallet.

286
00:20:58,290 --> 00:21:00,010
So it was an open source project.

287
00:21:00,950 --> 00:21:02,870
And I'll think of the name of it.

288
00:21:02,990 --> 00:21:04,530
It wasn't like Electrum Wallet or something like that, was it?

289
00:21:04,550 --> 00:21:05,170
No, no, no.

290
00:21:05,250 --> 00:21:06,910
So it was basically a website.

291
00:21:08,710 --> 00:21:10,370
And it was a GitHub repo.

292
00:21:10,630 --> 00:21:13,490
All of the code that underlied the website was published in the repo.

293
00:21:14,070 --> 00:21:20,690
And what you would do is basically download the HTML associated code that makes up the website from the repo.

294
00:21:21,010 --> 00:21:23,010
And they provided an authentication hash.

295
00:21:23,010 --> 00:21:28,770
So if you're trusting the person who publishes that website, what the hash was supposed to be.

296
00:21:28,870 --> 00:21:32,010
And this was actually a forensically sound process.

297
00:21:32,230 --> 00:21:38,210
You would boot up a separate computer offline, not connected to the internet, with a fresh Linux installation.

298
00:21:38,690 --> 00:21:41,450
And you would use that to generate new private keys.

299
00:21:42,210 --> 00:21:44,150
And it's called bidaddress.org.

300
00:21:44,370 --> 00:21:47,610
People who have been around in Bitcoin, I'm sure, recognize it.

301
00:21:47,650 --> 00:21:50,710
The guy who created it, his first name is Peter.

302
00:21:50,710 --> 00:21:55,670
I won't say his last name because he's kind of private, but super great Bitcoiner.

303
00:21:56,410 --> 00:22:02,210
He's actually known as BTC Curacao, who's promoting Bitcoin adoption there.

304
00:22:02,270 --> 00:22:08,690
But anyhow, went through this very methodical process using an offline computer that was

305
00:22:08,690 --> 00:22:14,590
completely in line with my forensic training and bought an inkjet printer that I used to

306
00:22:14,590 --> 00:22:16,950
print out the private keys for the paper wallets.

307
00:22:17,210 --> 00:22:20,010
Never used that inkjet printer again for anything else.

308
00:22:20,010 --> 00:22:22,510
It was a USB connected one, so it never touched the internet.

309
00:22:22,990 --> 00:22:25,130
Went through this very carefully thought out process.

310
00:22:25,270 --> 00:22:27,330
But in the end, what am I doing?

311
00:22:27,410 --> 00:22:34,030
I have a list of private keys printed on eight and a half by 11 computer paper, you know, that's in my underwear drawer at home.

312
00:22:34,030 --> 00:22:34,210
Yeah.

313
00:22:34,470 --> 00:22:39,290
Because when I first put it in there, it was worth like a few thousand dollars, you know.

314
00:22:39,290 --> 00:23:02,910
And over time, as Bitcoin started to appreciate more, my security setup, I think, is eventually what was part of the genesis of SeedSigner because of all of the contributing factors to this weak hand experience, which I'm not in the league of Laszlo, the guy who bought pizza for Bitcoin way back when.

315
00:23:02,910 --> 00:23:08,530
But when you think about the amount of Bitcoin you previously owned before you sold everything, it's not an easy memory.

316
00:23:08,530 --> 00:23:16,650
and so to tell the story in 2017 like i and i awkwardly sold the bitcoin it wasn't even like

317
00:23:16,650 --> 00:23:21,730
set a sell order like it there's probably i was i was i had an account on gemini that day and

318
00:23:21,730 --> 00:23:26,850
there's probably this awkward like blip on the chart of gemini that day from me just market

319
00:23:26,850 --> 00:23:32,130
selling a bunch of bitcoin i didn't even know gemini was around by then uh 2017 yeah they were

320
00:23:32,130 --> 00:23:43,030
still pretty small. But yeah, it was on Gemini. And so went home, you know, started sweeping all

321
00:23:43,030 --> 00:23:49,230
of these paper wallets, awkwardly dumped everything on Gemini, and then had this big dollar balance,

322
00:23:49,350 --> 00:23:54,750
which I didn't really believe it was real until I'd moved it, you know, did the wire transfer into

323
00:23:54,750 --> 00:23:59,130
my personal bank account, and was making preparations to pay off the mortgage loan.

324
00:23:59,130 --> 00:24:03,570
But boy, did I not want to hear about Bitcoin for the rest of the year.

325
00:24:03,690 --> 00:24:04,070
I bet.

326
00:24:04,130 --> 00:24:05,110
Like in 2017.

327
00:24:05,730 --> 00:24:14,430
Because the price rise was pretty dramatic from $2,200 or whatever that I sold that up until $18,000 or $20,000.

328
00:24:14,730 --> 00:24:17,550
I mean, even in that year alone, you could have basically 10X'd it.

329
00:24:17,790 --> 00:24:18,010
Yeah.

330
00:24:18,270 --> 00:24:26,670
And it's like, even if I hadn't held on to the Bitcoin, if I had had better timing when I sold, it would have meant a much bigger.

331
00:24:26,670 --> 00:24:30,230
Well, like I said, I wasn't very financially sophisticated, so it is what it is.

332
00:24:31,350 --> 00:24:33,470
And for the rest of the year, I didn't want to hear about Bitcoin.

333
00:24:33,650 --> 00:24:43,510
Like, I decided me being able to pay off our mortgage was kind of the first step to me thinking about stepping away from my career in law enforcement.

334
00:24:43,990 --> 00:24:45,810
And so I started focusing on that.

335
00:24:46,690 --> 00:24:51,350
My wife has always been better at bringing money home than I had been as a cop.

336
00:24:51,750 --> 00:24:55,690
So we started to talk more about me being a stay-at-home dad with our kids.

337
00:24:55,690 --> 00:25:01,550
And I kind of went on this self-improvement spree.

338
00:25:01,690 --> 00:25:08,290
I started reading a lot of self-help books and trying to improve things about myself that I thought were suboptimal.

339
00:25:08,430 --> 00:25:10,370
So I deleted Twitter.

340
00:25:10,530 --> 00:25:15,190
I got off of Bitcoin Reddit and all the other ways I'd been following Bitcoin at the time.

341
00:25:15,190 --> 00:25:28,830
And I just started to focus on making sure that I was a good enough person to retire early from my job and not end up like Mr. Mom where I'm sitting on the couch, like watching TV and drinking wine at 2 p.m.

342
00:25:28,930 --> 00:25:30,190
Yeah, exactly.

343
00:25:30,970 --> 00:25:40,370
So for the rest of 2017, like I'm reading my self-help books, getting up in the morning and, you know, going through my miracle morning routine and stuff like that.

344
00:25:40,370 --> 00:25:44,370
And in 2018, I don't remember what the catalyst was,

345
00:25:44,370 --> 00:25:47,370
but as painful as it was sometimes,

346
00:25:47,370 --> 00:25:49,370
I started peeking at the Bitcoin price.

347
00:25:49,370 --> 00:25:51,370
And in 2018, it started to come down.

348
00:25:51,370 --> 00:25:53,370
I bet you were the only person happy to see it come down.

349
00:25:53,370 --> 00:25:55,370
One of the few.

350
00:25:55,370 --> 00:25:58,370
And Bitcoin gets its hooks in you.

351
00:25:58,370 --> 00:26:01,370
It's like the meme from The Godfather.

352
00:26:01,370 --> 00:26:04,370
Like, once you think you're out, they pull you back in.

353
00:26:04,370 --> 00:26:07,370
I don't know if that's Goodfellas or The Godfather.

354
00:26:07,370 --> 00:26:10,790
And so I started paying attention to the price again.

355
00:26:11,590 --> 00:26:14,770
I probably created a new Twitter account because I deleted the old one.

356
00:26:15,650 --> 00:26:23,150
And as the Bitcoin price got to like, I didn't catch the absolute bottom, but I was like kind of good.

357
00:26:23,730 --> 00:26:27,910
I started buying more around $4,000 as it had come down from 20.

358
00:26:27,950 --> 00:26:30,570
And this is like in 2018 and in 2019.

359
00:26:30,890 --> 00:26:32,850
So I started accumulating more Bitcoin.

360
00:26:34,250 --> 00:26:36,970
And this is like Bitcoin is different for me now.

361
00:26:36,970 --> 00:26:39,330
It's still an investment to some degree.

362
00:26:39,790 --> 00:26:47,730
But if you think about 2017, 2018, 2019, that is really the time when the U.S. national debt starts to ramp up.

363
00:26:48,050 --> 00:26:49,710
And my kids are getting a little bit older.

364
00:26:50,250 --> 00:26:51,790
And maybe I'm maturing a little bit.

365
00:26:51,830 --> 00:26:55,790
But I'm starting to think about, like, what world am I leaving for them?

366
00:26:56,330 --> 00:26:57,650
Where is this debt going?

367
00:26:57,830 --> 00:27:01,710
What kind of country are my kids going to be left with?

368
00:27:01,710 --> 00:27:09,490
And so Bitcoin took on additional significance beyond just being an investment for me as I was starting to rebuy it.

369
00:27:09,610 --> 00:27:15,870
Again, still love number go up, especially relative today to where it was then.

370
00:27:16,310 --> 00:27:18,910
But my Bitcoin journey was different at that time.

371
00:27:19,630 --> 00:27:23,670
And after I'd started buying more Bitcoin, I started to think about cold storage.

372
00:27:24,590 --> 00:27:27,090
And I was still at work in the forensic lab.

373
00:27:27,090 --> 00:27:31,190
and I started to think about the reasons

374
00:27:31,190 --> 00:27:35,390
why I just so awkwardly had the lettuce hands experience.

375
00:27:36,270 --> 00:27:37,610
Well, I understand it though.

376
00:27:38,570 --> 00:27:41,050
I think one thing that's probably true

377
00:27:41,050 --> 00:27:42,090
for almost all Bitcoin is,

378
00:27:42,310 --> 00:27:43,850
well, there's a few things in what you said that's true.

379
00:27:44,070 --> 00:27:45,350
One, that it gets its hooks in you.

380
00:27:45,970 --> 00:27:48,050
Probably from the first day I ever read about Bitcoin,

381
00:27:48,370 --> 00:27:50,390
there's likely not been a single day since

382
00:27:50,390 --> 00:27:51,910
that I've not read more about Bitcoin.

383
00:27:53,450 --> 00:27:56,030
But the thing that I think people aren't prepared for

384
00:27:56,030 --> 00:27:57,970
and never can be when you first buy Bitcoin

385
00:27:57,970 --> 00:28:00,050
is the fact that you have to consider

386
00:28:00,050 --> 00:28:02,470
what you will do when it 10Xs

387
00:28:02,470 --> 00:28:04,010
because at some point it's going to 10X on you.

388
00:28:04,550 --> 00:28:07,070
And that comes down to both psychologically

389
00:28:07,070 --> 00:28:09,810
what you do with getting that much wealthier,

390
00:28:10,450 --> 00:28:13,370
but also when you're thinking about

391
00:28:13,370 --> 00:28:14,490
how you secure your Bitcoin,

392
00:28:14,890 --> 00:28:17,650
you need to think about securing 10X the value of today.

393
00:28:18,870 --> 00:28:21,910
And luckily I've had no mistakes

394
00:28:21,910 --> 00:28:23,190
that have meant I've lost Bitcoin in that way,

395
00:28:23,270 --> 00:28:25,210
but I've had very janky setups

396
00:28:25,210 --> 00:28:26,310
compared to what I should have had.

397
00:28:26,750 --> 00:28:28,450
So I guess for you,

398
00:28:28,530 --> 00:28:30,190
going from using paper wallets back then,

399
00:28:30,270 --> 00:28:31,390
like it's interesting just to hear,

400
00:28:32,130 --> 00:28:36,130
it's easy to think since 2017 to now,

401
00:28:36,590 --> 00:28:37,850
not that much has changed.

402
00:28:37,850 --> 00:28:39,190
But when you actually think about

403
00:28:39,190 --> 00:28:40,890
the infrastructure side of Bitcoin,

404
00:28:41,070 --> 00:28:41,930
the hardware that's available,

405
00:28:42,710 --> 00:28:45,850
it's a world apart.

406
00:28:46,190 --> 00:28:47,870
So when you were thinking of like

407
00:28:47,870 --> 00:28:49,730
your initial paper wallet setup

408
00:28:49,730 --> 00:28:51,650
and you came back to Bitcoin,

409
00:28:51,650 --> 00:28:56,790
how did you view sort of the hardware wallet market at that time?

410
00:28:57,170 --> 00:29:01,490
Right. So I consciously avoided the hardware wallet market.

411
00:29:02,490 --> 00:29:05,410
And part of it, you know, to be candid,

412
00:29:05,530 --> 00:29:08,350
was that I already had a setup that I was reasonably comfortable with.

413
00:29:10,230 --> 00:29:15,590
It turned out, like, I think as I bought Bitcoin

414
00:29:15,590 --> 00:29:17,970
and started to think about what I could,

415
00:29:17,970 --> 00:29:21,130
what my preferred setup for long-term cold storage was,

416
00:29:21,650 --> 00:29:34,250
I started to think about my background in forensics and what about my background might inform an approach or a strategy that would make sense for me and kind of calm my unique sort of anxieties.

417
00:29:35,170 --> 00:29:50,690
One thing I can say about my time in forensics is I grew up in forensics during a very unique period in time where, you know, initially when I started doing forensics, it was all what's called dead box forensics,

418
00:29:50,690 --> 00:29:53,310
where you take a computer that's been powered down,

419
00:29:53,650 --> 00:29:55,390
you basically remove the hard drive from it,

420
00:29:55,450 --> 00:29:56,330
and that's your primary,

421
00:29:56,790 --> 00:29:58,950
almost your only exclusive source of information

422
00:29:58,950 --> 00:30:00,750
about that computer and what it was used for.

423
00:30:02,010 --> 00:30:03,830
But early on in my career,

424
00:30:04,750 --> 00:30:06,770
at first we started seeing flip phones,

425
00:30:07,370 --> 00:30:10,170
and then the rise of cell phones occurred.

426
00:30:10,670 --> 00:30:13,110
The iPhone, I think, came out in 2006 or 2007.

427
00:30:13,650 --> 00:30:15,130
Maybe it was a little bit before that.

428
00:30:15,130 --> 00:30:43,450
And so I got to watch mobile phones start from these awkward devices that you flip open and press the number three eight times to get a lowercase e or whatever it is, grow into these supercomputers that we all carry in our pocket and we rely on for not just being able to call people and not just browsing the internet, but personal authentication and accessing our bank accounts and all sorts of payments and other things.

429
00:30:43,450 --> 00:30:45,870
I mean, they've replaced computers for a massive amount of the population.

430
00:30:46,030 --> 00:30:52,450
Yeah, and over that time, like forensics, in terms of the workload that the average digital forensic examiner sees,

431
00:30:52,770 --> 00:30:59,110
it was actively transitioning from desktop computer to laptop and then to phones and tablets.

432
00:30:59,450 --> 00:31:01,370
Mostly phones, but you still see some tablets.

433
00:31:03,150 --> 00:31:11,370
And so the mobile phone industry, you know, the first kind of smartphone you can think of is a Blackberry.

434
00:31:11,370 --> 00:31:24,870
You can remember when President Obama took office, it was like he kind of said something effective, you can pry this BlackBerry out of my cold dead hands because iPhones were becoming more popular, but we're all creatures that have it.

435
00:31:25,030 --> 00:31:25,670
People like the buttons.

436
00:31:25,950 --> 00:31:27,090
He really liked his BlackBerry.

437
00:31:27,730 --> 00:31:37,790
And BlackBerry had some pretty crude security measures in terms of what's baked into the device.

438
00:31:37,790 --> 00:31:45,810
And so some of the earliest forensic challenges that we had in the forensic lab were getting a device like a BlackBerry and trying to figure out if it was pin enabled.

439
00:31:46,110 --> 00:31:48,250
How do we get into this to observe?

440
00:31:48,770 --> 00:31:50,950
At that point, there weren't apps per se.

441
00:31:51,130 --> 00:31:53,130
You're just trying to get into somebody's call history.

442
00:31:53,290 --> 00:31:55,750
In BlackBerry, you could get some emails off of it potentially.

443
00:31:56,930 --> 00:32:02,810
But shortly after BlackBerry came the iPhone and then Android not too long after that.

444
00:32:02,810 --> 00:32:12,770
And as the smartphones grew up, you know, Apple and Samsung and the other companies, they want to sell more smartphones.

445
00:32:12,770 --> 00:32:18,910
And they really wanted to get access to government and corporate markets.

446
00:32:18,910 --> 00:32:24,970
and government and corporate markets had a certain threshold of security requirement

447
00:32:24,970 --> 00:32:29,490
that they needed Apple to be at before Apple could, you know, before they would buy,

448
00:32:29,570 --> 00:32:34,090
you know, 5,000 iPhones for distribution to government employees or whatever it was.

449
00:32:34,610 --> 00:32:40,130
So Apple started adding security features that were basic and clumsy at first,

450
00:32:40,130 --> 00:32:42,250
but that got increasingly sophisticated.

451
00:32:43,090 --> 00:32:46,990
And what I observed as someone doing forensics over that time period

452
00:32:46,990 --> 00:32:50,230
was this ongoing cat and mouse game

453
00:32:50,230 --> 00:32:53,430
between Apple trying to up its security game

454
00:32:53,430 --> 00:32:57,170
and then an increasing number of researchers

455
00:32:57,170 --> 00:33:01,230
and then startups who would examine, you know,

456
00:33:01,270 --> 00:33:03,710
the underpinnings of iOS and Android

457
00:33:03,710 --> 00:33:06,690
and come up with security exploits that could be used

458
00:33:06,690 --> 00:33:10,070
to get around the gold standard,

459
00:33:10,250 --> 00:33:13,050
or what you really try for is being able to authenticate

460
00:33:13,050 --> 00:33:15,330
to log into the device, you know, whether that's,

461
00:33:15,330 --> 00:33:20,070
Now it's face ID, but at the time, you know, it was a lock pattern or a pin code or whatever

462
00:33:20,070 --> 00:33:20,450
it was.

463
00:33:20,970 --> 00:33:23,610
And so Apple would implement a new security feature.

464
00:33:24,410 --> 00:33:32,710
Six months later, an individual who's doing research or as it became more likely a company

465
00:33:32,710 --> 00:33:36,450
that contracts with the federal government and other local governments would develop

466
00:33:36,450 --> 00:33:38,310
an exploit to get around what Apple had done.

467
00:33:38,830 --> 00:33:43,050
Apple would do something new six or nine months later, you know, and it's this cat and mouse

468
00:33:43,050 --> 00:33:43,250
game.

469
00:33:43,250 --> 00:33:55,050
So with my experience with mobile phones, I got a lot of phones that were locked when they arrived to me at the forensic lab.

470
00:33:55,410 --> 00:34:10,590
And as a rule of thumb, if you could either turn the phone off or keep it powered and offline, for a lot of phones within 12 to 18 months, if you just waited it out, and court cases take a long time anyway.

471
00:34:10,590 --> 00:34:14,990
the criminal justice system isn't fast. So if you were willing to wait it out, a lot of times

472
00:34:16,510 --> 00:34:22,110
an exploit would be developed that could defeat a given security mechanism that was in place

473
00:34:22,110 --> 00:34:26,510
on a phone that you were starting to work with. So to circle back around to Bitcoin,

474
00:34:27,470 --> 00:34:32,910
harder wallets, as I saw them emerging with the mobile phone industry and then harder wallets,

475
00:34:32,910 --> 00:34:36,270
when I saw harder wallets, I thought I've seen this movie before. I kind of understand how this

476
00:34:36,270 --> 00:34:43,670
is going to work. And when you consider, you know, the Apple has, you know, it's a, I don't know,

477
00:34:43,730 --> 00:34:48,650
it's a trillion dollar company or whatever the market cap of Apple is, the amount of money that

478
00:34:48,650 --> 00:34:54,970
they spend on these security exploits, and they're still not practically able to keep government

479
00:34:54,970 --> 00:35:00,250
contractors out of their phones. I don't know if that's contrived, if that's a real thing or if it's,

480
00:35:00,250 --> 00:35:04,090
But the nature of security seems to be the sort of cat and mouse thing.

481
00:35:04,990 --> 00:35:13,810
And so, number one, I just had ambivalence about hardware wallets because of that cat and mouse game that I observed with mobile phone security.

482
00:35:14,290 --> 00:35:16,250
And then at the time, it's changed since then.

483
00:35:16,310 --> 00:35:21,430
But at the time, most hardware wallets required that you connect them to your laptop.

484
00:35:21,730 --> 00:35:21,930
Yeah.

485
00:35:22,390 --> 00:35:26,410
And those USB connections, I just never felt comfortable with that.

486
00:35:26,410 --> 00:35:30,390
because if you have the wrong software conditions in place,

487
00:35:30,730 --> 00:35:33,110
like, you know, bad things can happen over that wire.

488
00:35:33,290 --> 00:35:35,030
So never trusted USB.

489
00:35:36,090 --> 00:35:40,150
And so I just, during that period of my time as a Bitcoin

490
00:35:40,150 --> 00:35:41,690
and that's why I stuck with the paper wallets.

491
00:35:42,190 --> 00:35:43,870
If you're already self-custody of Bitcoin,

492
00:35:44,130 --> 00:35:45,630
you know the deal with hardware wallets.

493
00:35:45,890 --> 00:35:47,710
Complex setups, clumsy interfaces,

494
00:35:48,070 --> 00:35:50,610
and a seed phrase that can be lost, stolen, or forgotten.

495
00:35:51,230 --> 00:35:52,370
Well, BitKey fixes that.

496
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497
00:35:54,470 --> 00:35:56,690
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498
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499
00:35:58,930 --> 00:36:00,430
and built-in inheritance feature

500
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501
00:36:02,610 --> 00:36:04,330
with no seed phrase to sweat over.

502
00:36:04,990 --> 00:36:07,990
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503
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504
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506
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So what do you think then of the hardware wallet industry now?

538
00:38:39,930 --> 00:38:46,030
Because as far as I know, all the major companies don't require you to plug your hardware wallet into a device physically.

539
00:38:46,930 --> 00:38:50,410
And I wish I had someone who was more technical on this than me.

540
00:38:50,470 --> 00:38:51,250
Maybe you can explain.

541
00:38:51,350 --> 00:38:57,350
But I don't know the implications of the secure elements on all of these devices and what that means in terms of the cat and mouse's security.

542
00:38:57,970 --> 00:39:00,350
So this is, for me, this is disclaimer time.

543
00:39:01,650 --> 00:39:03,790
Yes, I was a forensic examiner for 15 years.

544
00:39:03,790 --> 00:39:14,490
But I am not super deep into security research where I'm the person who's evaluating secure platforms and a secure element platform in terms of being able to develop exploits for it.

545
00:39:14,830 --> 00:39:18,350
I was someone who learned and executed exploits that other people did.

546
00:39:18,570 --> 00:39:27,230
So in terms of the hardware wallet industry right now, I can't comment on specific modules that one company is using versus another one.

547
00:39:27,230 --> 00:39:31,190
It's more kind of the general adversarial landscape

548
00:39:31,190 --> 00:39:32,890
and my experience with mobile phones

549
00:39:32,890 --> 00:39:35,110
who are able to spend, even at this point,

550
00:39:35,110 --> 00:39:38,890
a lot more money on security audits and stuff

551
00:39:38,890 --> 00:39:43,610
than the hardware wallet makers are.

552
00:39:43,610 --> 00:39:46,770
So maybe then, just for context,

553
00:39:46,770 --> 00:39:49,470
I've used basically all the major hardware wallets.

554
00:39:49,470 --> 00:39:54,270
I feel very secure in my setup using them.

555
00:39:54,270 --> 00:39:59,770
Do you necessarily have an issue with the hardware wallets today?

556
00:39:59,850 --> 00:40:02,490
Because I can believe that this is going to be a cat and mouse game.

557
00:40:03,150 --> 00:40:05,790
There's no way that people aren't going to be trying to exploit these.

558
00:40:06,150 --> 00:40:10,670
And Ledger, for example, have their dungeon where they continually test all the devices,

559
00:40:10,790 --> 00:40:12,910
trying to find exploits and then disclose them.

560
00:40:13,150 --> 00:40:14,670
And they found a number of them.

561
00:40:15,550 --> 00:40:19,990
But even still, even with the cat and mouse game that will happen with this,

562
00:40:19,990 --> 00:40:22,130
that's the place that I feel comfortable storing my Bitcoin.

563
00:40:22,130 --> 00:40:24,130
Why do you not?

564
00:40:24,130 --> 00:40:27,130
Because you can assume that maybe you have to update

565
00:40:27,130 --> 00:40:28,130
your hardware every few years.

566
00:40:28,130 --> 00:40:30,130
There is going to be improvements and changes

567
00:40:30,130 --> 00:40:32,130
and things that need addressing.

568
00:40:32,130 --> 00:40:34,130
And when you say update, you mean refresh the hardware.

569
00:40:34,130 --> 00:40:35,130
It's not just a firmware.

570
00:40:35,130 --> 00:40:37,130
Yeah, maybe both.

571
00:40:37,130 --> 00:40:38,130
I mean, definitely the firmware.

572
00:40:38,130 --> 00:40:40,130
And I think at some point, hardware is going to get better,

573
00:40:40,130 --> 00:40:43,130
and you might want to upgrade to superior security.

574
00:40:43,130 --> 00:40:49,130
So part of it for me is, well, to tell a little bit

575
00:40:49,130 --> 00:40:51,130
about my time in forensics.

576
00:40:51,130 --> 00:41:00,130
So very frequently when you're dealing with people who are storing and accessing contraband information

577
00:41:00,130 --> 00:41:16,180
and they know that there is some possibility of them being caught by law enforcement their computers being seized like people take countermeasures whether it be you know activating BitLocker on their computer or using some kind of software encryption or whatever

578
00:41:16,400 --> 00:41:28,500
So when I think about the two sort of avenues you can go down, one is trusting a hardware

579
00:41:28,500 --> 00:41:35,100
device and physically some sort of access controls that are on a hardware device, like

580
00:41:35,100 --> 00:41:37,620
a pin code or like facial recognition or fingerprint or whatnot.

581
00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:40,940
I would call that you're putting more of your trust in the hardware.

582
00:41:41,980 --> 00:41:46,700
And in my experience in forensics, if I let that hardware sit there for 18 months, there's

583
00:41:46,700 --> 00:41:48,240
a good chance I may be able to get into it.

584
00:41:48,240 --> 00:41:57,040
However, I also had a number of cases where people, in an attempt to secure information

585
00:41:57,040 --> 00:42:03,420
that could have led to their indictment and prosecution,

586
00:42:04,140 --> 00:42:05,260
read child porn into that,

587
00:42:05,780 --> 00:42:09,380
they would use encryption,

588
00:42:09,380 --> 00:42:17,460
like some of the kind of gold standard encryption tools

589
00:42:17,460 --> 00:42:19,380
that are out there that are software encryption,

590
00:42:19,560 --> 00:42:20,060
but still.

591
00:42:20,660 --> 00:42:26,520
So I had certain cases that someone used TrueCrypt, say,

592
00:42:26,520 --> 00:42:32,640
just to throw one out. Someone using a good version of TrueCrypt with a sufficiently complicated

593
00:42:32,640 --> 00:42:44,140
password, unless something happens with quantum computing, it's going to be the heat death of

594
00:42:44,140 --> 00:42:49,680
the universe before I'll be able to guess the password that they set up with their particular

595
00:42:49,680 --> 00:42:55,680
version of TrueCrypt and the encryption algorithm they used, versus this iPhone that's totally

596
00:42:55,680 --> 00:43:00,120
you know, supposedly secure that if I wait 24 months, I'll probably be able to get into.

597
00:43:00,620 --> 00:43:05,240
So I can appreciate what you're saying about the harder wallet industry. I think a lot of that

598
00:43:05,240 --> 00:43:09,680
comes through as marketing. And I think there are absolutely, I don't want to be a complete

599
00:43:09,680 --> 00:43:14,640
naysayer. I think there are absolutely use cases and places where harder wallets can deliver value.

600
00:43:14,940 --> 00:43:22,640
But for me, I wanted to put my trust into the math that underlies the Bitcoin protocol rather than

601
00:43:22,640 --> 00:43:25,260
a third-party device.

602
00:43:25,620 --> 00:43:27,340
Okay. I do want to get into that

603
00:43:27,340 --> 00:43:28,620
because I have questions around that as well.

604
00:43:28,740 --> 00:43:31,180
But just to be fair here,

605
00:43:31,300 --> 00:43:34,620
you're talking about the most adversarial environment possible.

606
00:43:34,820 --> 00:43:38,120
This is like law enforcement having access to your devices.

607
00:43:38,720 --> 00:43:41,740
And you also, this is assuming there's a reason they want access.

608
00:43:41,740 --> 00:43:44,400
If you have just lawful Bitcoin on a hardware wallet,

609
00:43:44,740 --> 00:43:46,420
your risk isn't really that.

610
00:43:46,720 --> 00:43:47,780
It's a different risk.

611
00:43:48,300 --> 00:43:50,500
Well, to me, the number one risk

612
00:43:50,500 --> 00:43:52,380
is always you screwing yourself in terms of...

613
00:43:52,380 --> 00:43:54,020
Yes, I totally agree.

614
00:43:54,120 --> 00:43:56,660
I think I would imagine that's the most likely way

615
00:43:56,660 --> 00:43:58,060
that anyone ever loses their Bitcoin.

616
00:43:58,240 --> 00:43:59,580
So there's one part of it,

617
00:43:59,620 --> 00:44:01,140
which is you want to keep these things

618
00:44:01,140 --> 00:44:01,940
as simple as possible

619
00:44:01,940 --> 00:44:03,980
while retaining as much security as possible.

620
00:44:04,560 --> 00:44:07,620
But also like what's the real risk?

621
00:44:07,700 --> 00:44:09,020
It's that someone breaks into your house

622
00:44:09,020 --> 00:44:09,720
and steals a device

623
00:44:09,720 --> 00:44:11,000
if the device is at your house

624
00:44:11,000 --> 00:44:13,320
or breaks into wherever the device is and steals it.

625
00:44:13,840 --> 00:44:17,480
And it's not necessarily thinking about law enforcement

626
00:44:17,480 --> 00:44:18,340
having access to it.

627
00:44:18,420 --> 00:44:19,160
No, not law enforcement.

628
00:44:20,080 --> 00:44:21,120
Akin to law enforcement,

629
00:44:21,120 --> 00:44:29,940
We could also think of a dedicated adversary who knows how much Bitcoin you own and has some amount of resources to spend on that.

630
00:44:31,160 --> 00:44:33,700
Someone breaking into your house is definitely a concern.

631
00:44:33,700 --> 00:44:48,580
But what I worry more about is, let's say I set up a hardware wallet and I set it up using a private key that wasn't generated with sufficient entropy that was somehow guessable or predictable by someone else.

632
00:44:48,580 --> 00:44:51,940
and you think you've got X number of sats in your wallet,

633
00:44:52,060 --> 00:44:55,180
and then one day you wake up and go to check your balance,

634
00:44:55,300 --> 00:44:58,680
and because someone else owned your key before you did

635
00:44:58,680 --> 00:45:02,420
or was able to guess it somehow, your Bitcoin's gone.

636
00:45:02,420 --> 00:45:07,300
That is a nightmare scenario and something that some people have experienced.

637
00:45:07,820 --> 00:45:10,840
This is escaping me right now, but you may know.

638
00:45:10,980 --> 00:45:13,240
Isn't there a case of that happening right now with a wallet,

639
00:45:13,560 --> 00:45:17,100
like an old Bitcoin wallet that was generating stuff

640
00:45:17,100 --> 00:45:19,660
with poor entropy in Bitcoins being taken.

641
00:45:20,100 --> 00:45:25,700
Was it something bleed is the name of the exploit?

642
00:45:26,160 --> 00:45:28,620
I don't know if it was key bleed or something similar.

643
00:45:30,140 --> 00:45:31,160
I can't think of the name,

644
00:45:31,220 --> 00:45:33,480
but it was some sort of online software wallet

645
00:45:33,480 --> 00:45:36,860
where it wasn't anything malicious,

646
00:45:36,860 --> 00:45:38,900
just technically there was not enough entropy.

647
00:45:39,200 --> 00:45:41,020
It was using like a poor random number generator.

648
00:45:41,400 --> 00:45:44,360
The RNG was insufficient or who knows what,

649
00:45:44,860 --> 00:45:46,360
but that sort of thing.

650
00:45:46,360 --> 00:45:54,540
But it also, for someone who's not sophisticated, that problem can manifest itself with harder wallets.

651
00:45:54,660 --> 00:46:00,720
Like with some harder wallets, you can roll dice a number of times to create a private key.

652
00:46:00,920 --> 00:46:08,160
And there have been, sadly, instances where some of the platforms did not require enough dice rolls.

653
00:46:08,480 --> 00:46:16,200
And people not really understanding what they're doing, they might roll the dice, you know, a half dozen times and think that's great for a private key.

654
00:46:16,360 --> 00:46:18,720
only as soon as they make a deposit,

655
00:46:18,880 --> 00:46:21,040
there's some bot out there looking to sweep

656
00:46:21,040 --> 00:46:23,260
a particular number of known addresses,

657
00:46:23,560 --> 00:46:24,680
and poof, the money goes.

658
00:46:24,920 --> 00:46:27,280
I mean, this is one of the things that I think is really important

659
00:46:27,280 --> 00:46:29,860
for everyone to have a good understanding of.

660
00:46:30,860 --> 00:46:33,820
I love that these devices have products like that,

661
00:46:33,880 --> 00:46:36,220
and you can do 100 dice rolls to create your entropy,

662
00:46:36,640 --> 00:46:39,480
but done poorly, it's more dangerous than just not doing it at all.

663
00:46:39,720 --> 00:46:42,700
And I think people sometimes overcomplicate their setup

664
00:46:42,700 --> 00:46:44,000
when they don't really have to.

665
00:46:44,800 --> 00:46:46,660
And I know Odell's on this all the time,

666
00:46:46,720 --> 00:46:49,800
but the idea of multi-sig is great for people,

667
00:46:49,900 --> 00:46:52,880
especially if you're maybe a public figure in Bitcoin

668
00:46:52,880 --> 00:46:54,460
or you're a corporation or whatever.

669
00:46:54,600 --> 00:46:55,640
But for a lot of people,

670
00:46:55,780 --> 00:46:58,100
just a simple single-sig setup is okay.

671
00:46:58,920 --> 00:46:59,780
It's okay.

672
00:47:01,240 --> 00:47:03,740
But I think it's important to think of security

673
00:47:03,740 --> 00:47:05,660
as a journey and not a destination.

674
00:47:06,580 --> 00:47:08,040
So maybe we were talking before

675
00:47:08,040 --> 00:47:11,060
about your Bitcoin 10xing from where it is now.

676
00:47:11,060 --> 00:47:13,940
So maybe right now you're comfortable a single-sig

677
00:47:13,940 --> 00:47:23,300
but after a 3 or a 4x, it's like that meme where multi-sig is walking down the street looking pretty hot

678
00:47:23,300 --> 00:47:27,400
and single-sig's like, where are you checking him out?

679
00:47:29,980 --> 00:47:40,540
Yeah, I think of security as a journey, and I also think we need to be careful about addressing those nagging concerns

680
00:47:40,540 --> 00:47:43,620
in the back of our minds.

681
00:47:43,740 --> 00:47:46,960
Things that, you know, when you're laying in bed at night,

682
00:47:47,020 --> 00:47:50,060
you think about your sats and what you hope they're going to be worth

683
00:47:50,060 --> 00:47:51,160
and how you're storing them.

684
00:47:51,740 --> 00:47:54,680
What are the little things, if any, that make you a little uncomfortable

685
00:47:54,680 --> 00:47:56,600
that maybe you haven't thought through

686
00:47:56,600 --> 00:47:59,140
or maybe you don't understand completely about your setup?

687
00:47:59,520 --> 00:48:01,220
I think it's important to pay attention to those.

688
00:48:02,300 --> 00:48:05,940
And multi-sig, for me, so admittedly, my vantage point is a little bit different.

689
00:48:06,160 --> 00:48:09,820
Having been someone who's actually helped execute search warrants

690
00:48:09,820 --> 00:48:15,000
and gone into people's houses and businesses looking for things on behalf of government,

691
00:48:15,620 --> 00:48:19,680
I just naturally have a more adversarial take on things.

692
00:48:20,080 --> 00:48:23,880
But Multisig was like a through-the-looking-glass moment for me

693
00:48:23,880 --> 00:48:27,620
when it finally started to be available to everyday Bitcoin.

694
00:48:27,740 --> 00:48:30,960
Originally, it was like BitGo and some institutional service providers.

695
00:48:31,700 --> 00:48:34,960
But when SpecterWallet came out, it was really, to my knowledge,

696
00:48:34,960 --> 00:48:39,060
the first average Bitcoiner-facing tool that made Multisig possible.

697
00:48:39,060 --> 00:48:45,200
Because if you have a single say wallet, like you got to keep that wallet at your house.

698
00:48:45,460 --> 00:48:49,480
And then, of course, you have to, you know, back up your seed phrase, right?

699
00:48:49,920 --> 00:48:52,180
So you it wouldn't make sense to keep that with a wallet.

700
00:48:52,300 --> 00:48:59,440
So you got to find a second hiding place, whether that's a bank deposit box or your best friend's gun safe or under a tree in your grandma's backyard or wherever it is.

701
00:49:01,020 --> 00:49:06,520
And if someone finds the seed phrase, you know, if they know what it is, game over.

702
00:49:06,520 --> 00:49:12,100
If they find your harder wallet, like there's also the issue of people are really bad at choosing pins.

703
00:49:12,260 --> 00:49:22,260
Like I've gotten more mobile phones than I think I should have just by, you know, there's like five or 10 things that you go through.

704
00:49:22,340 --> 00:49:30,700
Last four of social security number, birthday, spouse's birthday, you know, the numerics of the street they live on and all this kind of stuff.

705
00:49:31,340 --> 00:49:33,300
People are just bad at choosing pin numbers.

706
00:49:33,300 --> 00:49:41,600
So if you can get into that person's house and either find their backup or their hardware wallet, I mean, they could be cooked.

707
00:49:42,420 --> 00:49:59,980
But with multi-sig, like even if you have a nation state level adversary who has significant resources and it turns it from just going to your house and finding that one thing and potentially trying to exploit that one thing to maybe.

708
00:49:59,980 --> 00:50:05,060
first of all, you don't know, is it a two of three? Is it a three of five? Is it a,

709
00:50:05,060 --> 00:50:09,680
you know, six of seven? Who knows? And then it becomes this

710
00:50:09,680 --> 00:50:14,900
treasure hunt of figuring out where the pieces to the puzzle are hidden

711
00:50:14,900 --> 00:50:19,660
and how many of them you need to be able to get access. So multi-stake was really

712
00:50:19,660 --> 00:50:25,740
when I was, had reaccumulated some Bitcoin, I was looking for that level up for my cold storage.

713
00:50:25,740 --> 00:50:32,080
multi-stake for me was where it was at. And that is a big part of the journey that I took

714
00:50:32,080 --> 00:50:37,520
eventually to SeedSigner, but just my initial journey in trying to re-secure the Bitcoin that

715
00:50:37,520 --> 00:50:42,440
I bought. Yeah. The thing that I would reiterate there is, we kind of touched on it already,

716
00:50:42,560 --> 00:50:47,300
is the fact that you're most likely to lose your Bitcoin, not have it stolen from you. And the

717
00:50:47,300 --> 00:50:52,940
thing that people need to be fully, fully confident in is that they can access that Bitcoin if

718
00:50:52,940 --> 00:50:57,400
anything goes wrong. And sometimes I think multi-sig maybe is a step too far for right now

719
00:50:57,400 --> 00:51:02,200
for some people. But like you say, this is a journey, not a destination. It's one of those,

720
00:51:02,440 --> 00:51:09,200
for me, with great power comes great responsibility. And it's the same with even

721
00:51:09,200 --> 00:51:15,800
with your single-sig hardware wallet, if you choose to add a BIP39 passphrase to it.

722
00:51:16,200 --> 00:51:20,700
So you're effectively, with that, creating a two of two multi-sig, because if you lose either the

723
00:51:20,700 --> 00:51:27,680
passphrase or the seed phrase, without the both of them, you don't have access to your funds.

724
00:51:28,060 --> 00:51:35,600
So same with multi-sig. And we talked about this a little bit beforehand as we were discussing

725
00:51:35,600 --> 00:51:45,560
this conversation, that there are tools like cars and firearms and knives that if you're going to

726
00:51:45,560 --> 00:51:51,700
use and you're not going to cut yourself or shoot yourself, you have to invest a basic level of

727
00:51:51,700 --> 00:51:58,140
training into understanding what is powerful about that tool and what's dangerous about that tool

728
00:51:58,140 --> 00:52:04,820
and how to properly use it. And multi-sig is definitely a level up from single-sig in terms of

729
00:52:05,740 --> 00:52:12,100
the information storage requirement because you have to, I don't want to get too technical, but

730
00:52:12,100 --> 00:52:17,260
you have to keep versions of all of the public versions of the private keys. You have to have

731
00:52:17,260 --> 00:52:21,860
those on hand to be able to make the threshold spend, unless you have all the private keys.

732
00:52:22,580 --> 00:52:27,760
But to dumb it down a little, there's some additional information you have to keep.

733
00:52:28,580 --> 00:52:33,080
That information, I think, can be classified as private but not secret, which is confusing

734
00:52:33,080 --> 00:52:39,400
because we say private keys and not secret keys. But if someone gets the information about your

735
00:52:39,400 --> 00:52:43,540
your wallet setup. They can see your money. They can see your balance in the transactions you made,

736
00:52:43,700 --> 00:52:49,080
but without the private keys, they can't steal your money. So enhanced information storage

737
00:52:49,080 --> 00:52:54,200
threshold, but it's a diminished requirement in terms of the private versus secret thing. So you

738
00:52:54,200 --> 00:52:58,580
can secure that a little differently. Like I think for a wallet descriptor, maybe we're getting a

739
00:52:58,580 --> 00:53:03,880
little technical here, but for a wallet descriptor, you know, encrypted and cloud storage is potentially

740
00:53:03,880 --> 00:53:09,560
okay if you're comfortable with the trade-offs or keeping multiple copies of it. But anyhow.

741
00:53:09,860 --> 00:53:13,240
But I think it obviously is getting a little technical there. I think the important thing

742
00:53:13,240 --> 00:53:18,260
for people to know, though, is that there are different products out there for people who have

743
00:53:18,260 --> 00:53:23,220
different needs. And so Bitkey responds to the show. But I think that's a perfect entry-level

744
00:53:23,220 --> 00:53:28,120
thing for people to be using who may not... This might all be going over their heads. But something

745
00:53:28,120 --> 00:53:31,860
like that is a great option. And then if you want to do multi-sig, you might... There's a ton of

746
00:53:31,860 --> 00:53:36,540
hardware out there, and obviously the SeedSigner, which we can talk about now. So when did you

747
00:53:36,540 --> 00:53:41,720
first come up with SeedSigner? Can I take a step back? Absolutely.

748
00:53:42,660 --> 00:53:47,820
So in terms of, I do think BitKey is potentially a great solution. And I think what people,

749
00:53:48,320 --> 00:53:55,400
kind of the paradigm is how much of the easy button do you want? If you, I keep going back

750
00:53:55,400 --> 00:54:01,680
to this knives metaphor, but if you want to dice an onion, you can use one of these auto dicing

751
00:54:01,680 --> 00:54:07,460
things that you just tap on it a few times, but you may not like the way it dices your onion. So

752
00:54:07,460 --> 00:54:11,560
you may want to invest in learning how to use a knife properly and how to dice an onion properly.

753
00:54:12,020 --> 00:54:17,240
And it's always this trade-off in security of, we'll probably keep coming back to this,

754
00:54:17,300 --> 00:54:22,520
but in security, it's always a trade-off. And so that easy button means that you're giving up a

755
00:54:22,520 --> 00:54:27,840
certain amount of trust with the people that create the easy button. So for people, yeah,

756
00:54:27,900 --> 00:54:34,060
or privacy. So for people who are comfortable with the increased trust or privacy threshold,

757
00:54:34,300 --> 00:54:40,100
those kinds of solutions may be, are great for them. But for people who aren't comfortable with

758
00:54:40,100 --> 00:54:47,120
the trade-off, there are other options for them as well. But to jump back to your question about

759
00:54:47,120 --> 00:54:51,260
SeedSigner. And just one, sorry, just one thing on that. It's like, I think the important thing as

760
00:54:51,260 --> 00:54:55,220
well is that like, in my opinion, at least everything's a step in the right direction,

761
00:54:55,220 --> 00:54:58,880
as opposed to just keeping it on an exchange or with an ETF or anything like that. At least,

762
00:54:58,920 --> 00:55:03,520
at least you're making a step in the chain. Yeah, no, a hundred, even, even, you know,

763
00:55:03,900 --> 00:55:07,200
you wouldn't want to put a huge amount of money on a hot wall, but even a hot wall is better than

764
00:55:07,200 --> 00:55:12,640
Coinbase or, uh, you know, BlackRock. Yeah. A hundred percent. Okay. Let's get on to SeedSigner.

765
00:55:12,640 --> 00:55:21,640
So SeedSigner came about as I was reestablishing my new cold storage setup.

766
00:55:22,380 --> 00:55:28,340
And like I said before, I became aware of a wallet called Spectra Desktop.

767
00:55:28,640 --> 00:55:30,860
And I don't know if you're familiar, if people listening would be familiar.

768
00:55:32,520 --> 00:55:36,460
It was very similar to what Sparrow is right now, if people are familiar with Sparrow.

769
00:55:36,460 --> 00:55:43,760
Sparrow is kind of the gold standard of wallet coordinators that you can use on a laptop or desktop computer.

770
00:55:43,760 --> 00:55:43,960
It's brilliant.

771
00:55:44,740 --> 00:55:53,500
So I discovered Spectre Desktop, and Spectre had kind of a companion project that is called the Spectre DIY,

772
00:55:53,900 --> 00:55:57,460
which is kind of a single board computer device.

773
00:55:58,220 --> 00:56:03,960
It's a handheld computer that's microcontroller based that you build from off-the-shelf parts.

774
00:56:03,960 --> 00:56:08,000
and with this one device,

775
00:56:08,000 --> 00:56:11,160
you can actually use it to create and manage multiple private keys.

776
00:56:11,940 --> 00:56:17,740
And so I was really enthusiastic about Spectre Desktop

777
00:56:17,740 --> 00:56:20,500
and Spectre Desktop supports multiple hardware wallets,

778
00:56:20,620 --> 00:56:23,220
even not at the very beginning, but after on.

779
00:56:23,780 --> 00:56:26,060
Keith McKay did a bunch of work to implement hardware wallets

780
00:56:26,060 --> 00:56:27,140
on Spectre Desktop.

781
00:56:27,140 --> 00:56:38,280
out. This Spectre DIY was this super powerful tool that resonated with me because it applied

782
00:56:38,280 --> 00:56:44,020
some of the foundational concepts that I'd learned about while using digital forensics. Like it was

783
00:56:44,020 --> 00:56:50,660
completely offline, you know, didn't connect to Wi-Fi, didn't connect to Bluetooth. And you could

784
00:56:50,660 --> 00:56:55,200
use it in such a fashion that it didn't store your private keys after you'd use it to create

785
00:56:55,200 --> 00:57:00,540
one or more private keys. It didn't persistently store them, which is a technique that we often

786
00:57:00,540 --> 00:57:09,140
use in forensics to conduct an examination of a computer. And so I'm enchanted with Spectre

787
00:57:09,140 --> 00:57:14,120
Desktop. I build one of these Spectre DIYs, and I'm getting my new multi-sig setup, and it's so

788
00:57:14,120 --> 00:57:22,060
awesome. I started interacting with the, his name's Stepan Snigarev, who was the primary architect

789
00:57:22,060 --> 00:57:28,560
of Spectre. And I also dabbled in 3D printing. And at the time, they didn't even have, like,

790
00:57:28,560 --> 00:57:32,400
it was just a circuit board that you bought and you held in your hands kind of awkwardly

791
00:57:32,400 --> 00:57:37,500
with a scanning module attached to it. So I had done a little bit of stuff with 3D printing. So

792
00:57:37,500 --> 00:57:42,500
I designed a very simple rudimentary enclosure for this thing and offered to send them one. And I

793
00:57:42,500 --> 00:57:47,340
started interacting with some of the people who were behind that project. And that also put me in

794
00:57:47,340 --> 00:57:55,020
touch with a Bitcoiner called Michael Flaxman, who's, I guess he would call himself a cryptographer.

795
00:57:55,460 --> 00:58:02,380
But he wrote this guide for Bitcoin cold storage called the, I believe it's called the 10x Bitcoin

796
00:58:02,380 --> 00:58:08,040
security guide. It's actually, it's hosted on GitHub. You can just Google that and it's evergreen.

797
00:58:08,140 --> 00:58:12,640
It's still completely applicable, but it's about making upgrades to your security posture in

798
00:58:12,640 --> 00:58:17,260
different ways where you get the most bang for your buck. And I started interacting with him and

799
00:58:17,260 --> 00:58:23,700
And he was telling me about an idea he had to use a Raspberry Pi, a specific version

800
00:58:23,700 --> 00:58:29,180
of a Raspberry Pi that didn't have Wi-Fi, didn't have Bluetooth, as basically a private

801
00:58:29,180 --> 00:58:30,180
key generator.

802
00:58:30,180 --> 00:58:36,140
It's this naturally very isolated environment where you could create private keys and then

803
00:58:36,140 --> 00:58:42,460
you'd write down the seed words and you wouldn't have concerns that the key was leaked or had

804
00:58:42,460 --> 00:58:44,460
a chance to be on any other device.

805
00:58:44,460 --> 00:58:47,100
So it's a very secure way to create private keys.

806
00:58:47,640 --> 00:58:50,300
And I stepped away from work.

807
00:58:50,360 --> 00:58:52,860
I don't have a background as a programmer, but I like projects.

808
00:58:52,980 --> 00:58:56,320
And so I bought this hardware that he had told me about, the Raspberry Pi,

809
00:58:56,520 --> 00:58:58,940
and just a simple screen and controls to put on it.

810
00:58:59,600 --> 00:59:03,840
And this was before AI or ChatGPT or anything.

811
00:59:03,960 --> 00:59:10,600
So I had Udemy Python videos for a week just to relearn enough programming to be able to do it.

812
00:59:10,600 --> 00:59:15,260
but I wrote this very simple proof of concept that showed with this Raspberry Pi setup,

813
00:59:15,360 --> 00:59:18,900
you could do basically what the Spectre DIY thing could do,

814
00:59:19,000 --> 00:59:22,000
but at a fifth of the cost or something.

815
00:59:22,080 --> 00:59:24,240
It was a super cheap thing, like less than 30 bucks.

816
00:59:25,020 --> 00:59:26,820
And I started sharing that on Twitter,

817
00:59:27,220 --> 00:59:30,120
and I realized if I attached a $5 camera to it,

818
00:59:30,360 --> 00:59:34,900
I could fully replicate all of the functionality, again, from the Spectre DIY.

819
00:59:35,860 --> 00:59:38,160
And so being a cheapskate, that was satisfying to me.

820
00:59:38,300 --> 00:59:40,060
And I started posting about it on Twitter,

821
00:59:40,060 --> 00:59:41,860
and people seem interested.

822
00:59:42,880 --> 00:59:49,540
And it was in, let's say, April or May, I guess,

823
00:59:49,660 --> 00:59:53,480
of 2021, Bitcoin conference in Miami.

824
00:59:55,420 --> 00:59:56,820
Not sure if that was the first year they had it.

825
00:59:56,940 --> 00:59:59,600
Anyhow, they had this Fostome in the tent

826
00:59:59,600 --> 01:00:02,380
that Matt Odell had done a great job of organizing.

827
01:00:03,120 --> 01:00:05,740
And I contacted them ahead of time

828
01:00:05,740 --> 01:00:07,300
and asked if I could have 20 or 30 minutes

829
01:00:07,300 --> 01:00:08,240
to talk about SeedsNider.

830
01:00:08,240 --> 01:00:14,560
and just as serendipity kind of happened um there were a few people in the audience that day

831
01:00:14,560 --> 01:00:21,720
who uh listened to my kind of high level explanation what seed center was and subsequently

832
01:00:21,720 --> 01:00:28,080
been began contributing to it so in the beginning it was just me with this horrible spaghetti code

833
01:00:28,080 --> 01:00:32,800
proof of concept thing um and then shortly thereafter other people started discovering

834
01:00:32,800 --> 01:00:40,640
the project, people who are much better programmers than me. And it just kind of started to take on a

835
01:00:40,640 --> 01:00:45,880
life of its own. It really started to improve rapidly, both in terms of the security assurances

836
01:00:45,880 --> 01:00:53,720
and the user interface and the usability of it. And so that was kind of, that's how SeedSigner

837
01:00:53,720 --> 01:00:58,820
came to be. So I've never actually used a SeedSigner. I was given one about six months ago,

838
01:00:58,820 --> 01:01:00,860
but I've never used it.

839
01:01:01,200 --> 01:01:03,240
So maybe it's worth explaining how they actually work.

840
01:01:03,580 --> 01:01:06,540
Because you're creating your private keys on there

841
01:01:06,540 --> 01:01:09,180
and then presumably incentivizing people

842
01:01:09,180 --> 01:01:11,440
or asking people to put them on steel

843
01:01:11,440 --> 01:01:14,180
and then you put them away safely somewhere.

844
01:01:14,480 --> 01:01:14,960
Right, right.

845
01:01:15,440 --> 01:01:19,780
And you can differentiate a seed signer as,

846
01:01:19,900 --> 01:01:21,420
I refer to it as a signing device

847
01:01:21,420 --> 01:01:23,580
rather than a wallet or a hardware wallet

848
01:01:23,580 --> 01:01:26,300
because it doesn't persistently store the private keys.

849
01:01:26,420 --> 01:01:27,680
You can use it to create keys.

850
01:01:27,680 --> 01:01:30,440
Once it's powered on, you can load keys onto it.

851
01:01:30,440 --> 01:01:32,220
But when you remove power from it,

852
01:01:32,220 --> 01:01:34,220
all of the software is running in RAM.

853
01:01:34,220 --> 01:01:36,220
And the nature of computer memory,

854
01:01:36,220 --> 01:01:37,640
at least random access memory,

855
01:01:37,640 --> 01:01:48,810
is that when you remove power from it it loses its state That where the term stateless comes from So it loses its state and it resets to its natural beginning point

856
01:01:49,450 --> 01:01:53,350
So that's kind of the basis of seed signers.

857
01:01:53,490 --> 01:02:01,310
Instead of obtaining a device that is used as kind of this mini digital Fort Knox

858
01:02:01,310 --> 01:02:04,450
that puts access restrictions around your private key

859
01:02:04,450 --> 01:02:08,010
and tries to keep it stored persistently over time,

860
01:02:08,050 --> 01:02:10,350
as well as tries to keep prying eyes away from it,

861
01:02:10,730 --> 01:02:12,810
we kind of flip that on its head with SeedSigner

862
01:02:12,810 --> 01:02:15,970
and intentionally operate the device in such a fashion

863
01:02:15,970 --> 01:02:18,090
that it doesn't store the keys at all.

864
01:02:18,270 --> 01:02:21,150
So that, as you allude, puts onus on the user

865
01:02:21,150 --> 01:02:24,870
to really take ownership of the analog copies of their keys

866
01:02:24,870 --> 01:02:27,230
and think very carefully about,

867
01:02:27,810 --> 01:02:33,830
do I use this in the context of a multi-sig?

868
01:02:34,250 --> 01:02:36,370
Is this a wallet that I'm going to be spending

869
01:02:36,370 --> 01:02:41,550
from multiple times a month or maybe a long-term savings wallet that I'm only going to visit

870
01:02:41,550 --> 01:02:43,610
once or twice a year, if that.

871
01:02:44,490 --> 01:02:47,670
Am I storing my keys in paper or metal?

872
01:02:47,870 --> 01:02:48,650
And am I keeping them?

873
01:02:49,330 --> 01:02:51,930
Where am I keeping them in terms of who has access to them?

874
01:02:52,250 --> 01:02:54,170
Am I going to use a Bit39 passphrase?

875
01:02:54,670 --> 01:03:00,370
And so it encourages you because you're not relying on the security assurances of the

876
01:03:00,370 --> 01:03:00,970
device.

877
01:03:00,970 --> 01:03:04,510
It really encourages you to lean into the game theory

878
01:03:04,510 --> 01:03:06,610
around your cold storage setup,

879
01:03:06,790 --> 01:03:08,530
especially, I can't say this enough,

880
01:03:08,610 --> 01:03:09,470
with multi-sig in mind,

881
01:03:09,550 --> 01:03:13,810
because that's a key part of the whole project.

882
01:03:14,190 --> 01:03:17,030
But so where my hesitation from that would come from

883
01:03:17,030 --> 01:03:19,310
and where a lot of the criticism at SeedSigner comes from

884
01:03:19,310 --> 01:03:20,990
is the fact that you do have to be able to

885
01:03:20,990 --> 01:03:23,290
constantly access your private keys if you want to spend.

886
01:03:24,410 --> 01:03:26,250
Like with a normal hardware wallet,

887
01:03:26,330 --> 01:03:29,570
you can put your backup in a safe in a different location

888
01:03:29,570 --> 01:03:32,290
in a safety deposit box, wherever it might be.

889
01:03:32,690 --> 01:03:34,150
And you don't have to access that

890
01:03:34,150 --> 01:03:36,110
unless you lose access to the wallet.

891
01:03:36,270 --> 01:03:36,470
Right.

892
01:03:36,850 --> 01:03:38,770
With this, you need to have them on hand to spend.

893
01:03:39,090 --> 01:03:39,270
Right.

894
01:03:39,370 --> 01:03:41,850
So why is that trade-off worthwhile to you?

895
01:03:42,310 --> 01:03:44,150
Because it allows you to forego

896
01:03:44,150 --> 01:03:46,090
all of the trust that's wrapped up

897
01:03:46,090 --> 01:03:48,670
in the commercial hardware wallet sort of space.

898
01:03:49,170 --> 01:03:51,690
Do you sell these devices whole built like this?

899
01:03:51,810 --> 01:03:52,130
I do.

900
01:03:52,510 --> 01:03:54,750
So how do people who buy it

901
01:03:54,750 --> 01:03:57,550
not know that you've not tampered with it?

902
01:03:57,550 --> 01:04:03,010
So there's this, again, we talked about trade-offs all the way down, and that's another trade-off.

903
01:04:03,390 --> 01:04:09,590
So all of the information to build a seed signer is published in the repo, all the software, even the designs for the 3D printable enclosures.

904
01:04:10,210 --> 01:04:15,070
If someone is going to purchase a seed signer, I always encourage them to buy it as a kit.

905
01:04:15,530 --> 01:04:20,310
And when they receive the devices, just compare them with photos online.

906
01:04:20,310 --> 01:04:26,470
A Raspberry Pi 1.3 has a small amount of firmware that's permanently etched into the board of the factory.

907
01:04:27,550 --> 01:04:40,010
But if you compare the device that I or someone else who resells seed signers has sent you with what you've seen online, you can get a pretty good degree of assurance that, you know, the device hasn't been tampered with.

908
01:04:40,110 --> 01:04:48,510
Because as we've yet to discover, anyone who has or can describe a way to change the firmware that's burned in at the factory on those Raspberry Pis.

909
01:04:49,070 --> 01:04:54,870
Now, what I think is in terms of we're kind of jumping forward to what if you bought a seed signer from somebody else.

910
01:04:54,870 --> 01:05:14,070
But what I think is more of a risk when you buy a seed signer, particularly from another person, is them steering you in a direction that would cause you to allow them to exploit your wallet in terms of pointing you to an unofficial software repo.

911
01:05:14,330 --> 01:05:18,910
Because that's another thing with the seed signer that is dangerous like a knife is dangerous.

912
01:05:18,910 --> 01:05:28,850
It's off-the-shelf hardware that does not have software authenticity assurance built into it so that you can run any code you want to on there.

913
01:05:28,850 --> 01:05:47,710
And so if someone tricks you into going to a counterfeit software repository that doesn't contain our sanctioned version of a given release that contains something potentially with malicious code in it, you can get hurt that way.

914
01:05:48,910 --> 01:06:03,610
And that's why this constant process of people who are interested in seed signers has to come with a good degree of education in terms of the risks and the parts of the process that you absolutely have to pay attention to.

915
01:06:03,710 --> 01:06:15,130
So I think somebody who buys a seed signer or buys a seed signer kit is more likely to be tricked via the documentation into doing something stupid rather than I'm sending you malicious hardware kind of a thing.

916
01:06:15,130 --> 01:06:18,390
obviously if someone's selling seed signers

917
01:06:18,390 --> 01:06:21,770
we never recommend that the software

918
01:06:21,770 --> 01:06:23,850
that gets loaded onto the micro SD card

919
01:06:23,850 --> 01:06:24,970
is shipped with the device

920
01:06:24,970 --> 01:06:28,090
people need to be absolutely comfortable

921
01:06:28,090 --> 01:06:30,590
sourcing software from the right place

922
01:06:30,590 --> 01:06:32,610
and then verifying cryptographically

923
01:06:32,610 --> 01:06:34,370
that it's a sanctioned release

924
01:06:34,370 --> 01:06:36,490
so they need to be going to your GitHub

925
01:06:36,490 --> 01:06:38,890
and getting the official open source release

926
01:06:38,890 --> 01:06:41,270
they either go to the seed signer GitHub repo

927
01:06:41,270 --> 01:06:45,210
or this is drifting into technical,

928
01:06:45,430 --> 01:06:49,330
but the seed center releases are what's referred to

929
01:06:49,330 --> 01:06:50,730
as reproducible software.

930
01:06:51,470 --> 01:06:53,050
So if you don't download it from us,

931
01:06:53,810 --> 01:06:57,730
it's actually a more simple process than you'd think.

932
01:06:57,830 --> 01:07:00,350
But you can build the software release yourself

933
01:07:00,350 --> 01:07:04,050
from source code and open source repositories

934
01:07:04,050 --> 01:07:06,870
within a few hours with a laptop computer.

935
01:07:07,550 --> 01:07:11,030
But again, because it will run any code

936
01:07:11,030 --> 01:07:15,390
that you load onto it, you just have to make sure that you're loading good code. And once you learn

937
01:07:15,390 --> 01:07:20,950
that process, you realize it's not that big of a deal. And anytime you want to deploy new software

938
01:07:20,950 --> 01:07:26,910
to it, you can, but it all comes back to that educational process. Okay. So that makes sense.

939
01:07:26,990 --> 01:07:33,290
And like you say, security in any capacity like this is trade-offs. But I kind of interrupted you

940
01:07:33,290 --> 01:07:40,490
on your point there about having the private keys in an easily accessible place and what the trade-off

941
01:07:40,490 --> 01:07:47,410
there is. So we know that there's going to be a backup with harder wallets. I won't say no matter

942
01:07:47,410 --> 01:07:51,170
what, but with most people with a harder wallet, either whether they're using it as single SIG

943
01:07:51,170 --> 01:07:56,870
or a multi-SIG, they're going to want to do a backup. CASA, I think, gets around this a little

944
01:07:56,870 --> 01:08:01,890
bit by doing health checks to make sure that the devices that are storing keys still have them.

945
01:08:02,210 --> 01:08:07,390
But most people are going to want to absolutely put their seed phrase, which for people who aren't

946
01:08:07,390 --> 01:08:10,390
where your seed phrase is just a human readable version of your private key.

947
01:08:10,790 --> 01:08:12,990
You're going to want to keep those in paper or metal.

948
01:08:14,070 --> 01:08:14,510
Metal.

949
01:08:15,170 --> 01:08:16,730
Yeah, metal.

950
01:08:16,930 --> 01:08:19,810
Although with multi-sig, you can make an argument for paper storage

951
01:08:19,810 --> 01:08:23,230
because they're in different geographically distributed locations,

952
01:08:23,430 --> 01:08:26,090
but we won't go too far down that road.

953
01:08:26,290 --> 01:08:28,890
So with a hardware wallet, you're going to be storing your key

954
01:08:28,890 --> 01:08:31,110
in an analog format somewhere else.

955
01:08:31,590 --> 01:08:35,030
So if this is a long-term cold storage use case,

956
01:08:35,030 --> 01:08:37,850
like this is the money I'm setting aside for my kids' tuition

957
01:08:37,850 --> 01:08:42,130
or to buy a house in 10 years or just to leave to my heirs.

958
01:08:42,890 --> 01:08:45,050
You're not going to be touching those private keys very often.

959
01:08:45,790 --> 01:08:49,710
You can get around the trust that's tied up in hardware wallets

960
01:08:49,710 --> 01:08:53,430
and all those copies of private keys that you have to keep around

961
01:08:53,430 --> 01:09:01,630
with instead of, so if you have a hardware wallet with a backup,

962
01:09:01,750 --> 01:09:03,350
you have two copies of your private keys.

963
01:09:03,350 --> 01:09:06,850
You have the analog version that's stored at the safe deposit box, we'll say.

964
01:09:06,950 --> 01:09:12,450
And then you have a digital version that is on the hardware wallet that's in your desk drawer or your gun safe at home or wherever it is.

965
01:09:12,590 --> 01:09:14,430
But you still have two copies of the private keys.

966
01:09:14,730 --> 01:09:21,070
So even with a simple two of three setup, you kind of have to come up with six hiding places, right?

967
01:09:21,630 --> 01:09:28,150
Because you have for each member of the quorum, you have the digital copy that's on the hardware wallet, and then you have the analog copy.

968
01:09:28,150 --> 01:09:34,150
For long-term cold storage, we're not going to be accessing the keys, especially in multi-sig.

969
01:09:34,150 --> 01:09:51,810
I think it makes sense to just forego the digital copy of the keys and just focus on those analog copies of the keys and keeping them private, safe, redundant, tamper-evident, protected in whatever ways you think are appropriate.

970
01:09:51,890 --> 01:09:55,850
Because you're going to have to store the backups anyway for your long-term savings.

971
01:09:55,850 --> 01:10:00,450
I think that got to your original question, did it not?

972
01:10:00,510 --> 01:10:01,410
Yeah, yeah. No, that makes sense.

973
01:10:01,430 --> 01:10:05,290
Because if you are putting Bitcoin away for 10, 20, 30, 40 years,

974
01:10:05,390 --> 01:10:07,570
who knows if the device is even going to turn on in that time?

975
01:10:08,250 --> 01:10:09,550
So that does make sense.

976
01:10:09,630 --> 01:10:14,070
But you do still have the additional redundancy,

977
01:10:14,110 --> 01:10:14,950
I don't know if that's the right word,

978
01:10:15,010 --> 01:10:17,450
of the actual physical hardware wallet.

979
01:10:17,790 --> 01:10:20,830
So if you're thinking of this as a multi-sig solution,

980
01:10:20,830 --> 01:10:23,550
do you still need six hiding places, essentially?

981
01:10:23,630 --> 01:10:24,650
You want a backup of a backup?

982
01:10:24,650 --> 01:10:30,770
up? Well, I mean, the alternative is, and like a lot of, this is another whole avenue that we can

983
01:10:30,770 --> 01:10:34,310
talk about, but a lot of people don't even understand what those seed words represent.

984
01:10:35,230 --> 01:10:40,810
Like when I do talks or, you know, individual walkthroughs of seed signer, I'll say,

985
01:10:41,050 --> 01:10:47,430
you know, most, not most people, but a lot of people end up keeping their, because when you

986
01:10:47,430 --> 01:10:51,070
set the device up, write down these 12 words, write down these 24 words or whatever it is,

987
01:10:51,070 --> 01:10:58,730
And most people end up writing them on the card and then storing that card with the hardware wallet, not even understanding that that's the holy grail.

988
01:10:58,930 --> 01:11:01,490
That's what the whole device exists to protect.

989
01:11:01,650 --> 01:11:04,030
So a lot of people don't even understand that anyway.

990
01:11:04,150 --> 01:11:16,930
But with what you allude to, so if we're going to store the analog version of the private keys, the seed words, with the device, and the devices over the long term, let's say, you know, two, five, ten years,

991
01:11:16,930 --> 01:11:22,470
the device, just by virtue of it being a digital storage medium, is more prone to failure anyway.

992
01:11:22,750 --> 01:11:24,090
Why are we even messing with it?

993
01:11:26,230 --> 01:11:33,830
There are some trade-offs that I'd like to talk about that a lot of people sign up for

994
01:11:33,830 --> 01:11:39,630
that maybe they don't realize they're signing up for when they decide to use a retail hardware wallet.

995
01:11:39,630 --> 01:11:52,510
So I'd probably break those down into three broad categories, like supply chain risk, trust, and then privacy.

996
01:11:53,610 --> 01:12:08,010
So when you use a retail hardware wallet, there's this issue of supply chain risk, meaning that from the earliest time that the subcomponents that are going to go into that thing, it becomes known that they're going to be used in a Bitcoin product.

997
01:12:08,010 --> 01:12:09,690
That is where risk begins.

998
01:12:10,050 --> 01:12:14,050
And risk lasts the entire time until that device is delivered to you in your home or

999
01:12:14,050 --> 01:12:17,470
you buy it from the store, wherever you take delivery of that device.

1000
01:12:17,950 --> 01:12:22,470
At each point in the journey, there's the potential for exploits to happen.

1001
01:12:23,070 --> 01:12:31,510
And I think exploits at the hardware level, they require a sophisticated actor.

1002
01:12:31,870 --> 01:12:35,970
But as Bitcoin 10Xs, I think we're going to see some wild stuff.

1003
01:12:35,970 --> 01:13:03,610
If presumably the Mossad can get into the supply chain of Hamas and make a bunch of pagers explode in someone's pocket all at once, all over different geographic locations, I think infiltrating the hardware wallet supply chain is well within the bounds of reason, given how much money that the hardware wallet ecosystem is intended to safeguard.

1004
01:13:03,610 --> 01:13:05,370
So there's this issue of supply chain risk.

1005
01:13:05,450 --> 01:13:08,610
There are ways that some hardware wallet companies have got,

1006
01:13:08,690 --> 01:13:10,210
at least in my knowledge, around that.

1007
01:13:10,290 --> 01:13:13,010
So with Coldcard, for example, it comes in a tamper-proof bag

1008
01:13:13,090 --> 01:13:16,690
which has a string of numbers and letters

1009
01:13:16,770 --> 01:13:17,930
that has to match the hardware wallet.

1010
01:13:18,010 --> 01:13:19,530
So you know that it's not been interfered with

1011
01:13:19,610 --> 01:13:21,010
between Coldcard and you.

1012
01:13:21,090 --> 01:13:24,090
Right. And what you're describing is

1013
01:13:24,170 --> 01:13:26,410
what some people refer to as the fake Rolex

1014
01:13:26,490 --> 01:13:29,610
sort of challenge with hardware wallets.

1015
01:13:29,610 --> 01:13:34,770
And there are some ways that you can authenticate the hardware.

1016
01:13:35,670 --> 01:13:47,190
But I would argue that if you've taken delivery of a box in the mail and you've opened this up and you're following the documentation that's come with the device, like the opportunity to capture you has already happened.

1017
01:13:47,410 --> 01:13:59,090
Because if you're reading the instructions that are packaged with a cold card, they can say, scan this QR and go to this website and now enter these digits and we'll help you determine that this is truly a genuine device.

1018
01:13:59,610 --> 01:14:06,090
um it that's obviously a social engineering attack but that's frankly like probably a more

1019
01:14:06,090 --> 01:14:12,430
likely attack than someone you know being able to infiltrate the supply chain i mean yeah you've

1020
01:14:12,430 --> 01:14:18,170
probably seen them on twitter the the trezor um devices that show up and they're completely fake

1021
01:14:18,170 --> 01:14:22,710
on the inside like they crack them open and compare them to a standard trezor and it's very obvious

1022
01:14:22,710 --> 01:14:26,790
that it's just different hardware components that's like the classic fake Rolex thing but i think

1023
01:14:26,790 --> 01:14:35,150
there are also nuanced exploits that like there are harder wallets that show up with a seed phrase,

1024
01:14:35,290 --> 01:14:39,530
you know, printed on a card and people don't understand what they're doing. And it says,

1025
01:14:39,530 --> 01:14:44,710
enter the seed phrase during the initiation process to set up your card. And of course,

1026
01:14:44,750 --> 01:14:48,850
someone else already owns that seed phrase. Yeah. I think though with things like that,

1027
01:14:48,930 --> 01:14:55,810
I don't mean to minimize it like, cause that is a risk, but people who are, as you said earlier,

1028
01:14:55,810 --> 01:14:59,590
an example, putting their seed words with the hardware wallet, or are going to fall for a trick

1029
01:14:59,590 --> 01:15:03,830
like there being a card in there with your 24 words ready for you. They're the people that should

1030
01:15:03,830 --> 01:15:09,110
be using Bitkey. And I don't mean this as a shill, but they've obviously pushed this seedless version

1031
01:15:09,110 --> 01:15:14,090
of their hardware. They don't want you to know your seed word. And I think for people who are that

1032
01:15:14,090 --> 01:15:19,130
early in their journey of learning about this, it's just a better option

1033
01:15:19,130 --> 01:15:24,070
than trying to overcomplicate it too quickly if you don't already understand the very basics like

1034
01:15:24,070 --> 01:15:29,970
that. It's a better option, but when you're just starting out, I would tend to agree with you it's

1035
01:15:29,970 --> 01:15:37,970
a better option. If you're that desirous or needing the easy button and the trust issues

1036
01:15:37,970 --> 01:15:45,210
aren't as important to you and you just want to get it done, that's fair. But Bitcoin works on you

1037
01:15:45,210 --> 01:15:52,470
as you own it. You probably experienced this too. There's a certain amount of cypherpunk ethos that's

1038
01:15:52,470 --> 01:15:57,310
embedded in Bitcoin. And so as you buy some Bitcoin, you put it on your BitKey,

1039
01:15:57,910 --> 01:16:03,250
you start to think about like, who has access to these different shards of my private key?

1040
01:16:04,070 --> 01:16:08,930
What if, or you see something online about what if the BitKey app no longer becomes available?

1041
01:16:09,410 --> 01:16:15,870
Am I going to be able to recover my funds? And I don't remember the circumstances exactly. I'm not

1042
01:16:15,870 --> 01:16:21,750
super versed in BitKey, but BitKey has acknowledged that at some point, the recovery process may

1043
01:16:21,750 --> 01:16:27,650
require an on-chain transaction. So for somebody like me, if the recovery process of me taking

1044
01:16:27,650 --> 01:16:32,470
custody of the coins requires an on-chain transaction, that's already a deal breaker.

1045
01:16:32,970 --> 01:16:41,370
But I'm someone who has a more advanced view of the environment, I guess. I won't argue with you

1046
01:16:41,370 --> 01:16:46,630
that for a beginner, it's a great onboarding tool and it's a first step, but I hope that it's a

1047
01:16:46,630 --> 01:16:54,130
first step in a larger journey. I don't want to get too far because of the three things I initially

1048
01:16:54,130 --> 01:17:00,630
brought up, there's the supply chain risk that Seed Center helps you get away from. Then there's

1049
01:17:00,630 --> 01:17:06,470
the overarching issue of trust. So when you purchase a retail hardware wallet, you're putting

1050
01:17:06,470 --> 01:17:13,010
a fair amount of trust that, say, BitKey has implemented their system in such a way that

1051
01:17:13,010 --> 01:17:19,470
sophisticated attackers won't be able to, when you get into keys being stored online

1052
01:17:19,470 --> 01:17:26,990
or remotely accessible, which as I understand it, they are with BitKey, that opens the doors up to

1053
01:17:26,990 --> 01:17:31,590
larger scale exploits where not just somebody coming into your house and stealing your hardware

1054
01:17:31,590 --> 01:17:38,690
wallet, but like lots of private keys could be potentially stolen all at once. Now the BitKey

1055
01:17:38,690 --> 01:17:43,410
people would argue that they have a belt and suspenders model and that this is not possible.

1056
01:17:43,410 --> 01:17:51,030
But I mean, unless you're super versed in the underlying mechanisms and have a thorough

1057
01:17:51,030 --> 01:17:55,070
understanding of them, we've heard that story before that it's just not possible until it

1058
01:17:55,070 --> 01:18:00,450
becomes possible. Yeah. I think this all comes down to like, it's come up over and over again,

1059
01:18:00,490 --> 01:18:06,570
but it's trade-offs. Because I think the, don't get me wrong. I'm not, I'm not trying to have a

1060
01:18:06,570 --> 01:18:07,810
Gerox E-Sign or Hero in the slightest.

1061
01:18:08,010 --> 01:18:09,710
But I think it's where you put your trust.

1062
01:18:09,770 --> 01:18:12,510
And do you trust Ledger and Trezor and CoinKite

1063
01:18:12,510 --> 01:18:16,390
or BitKey or whoever to build this in a more secure way

1064
01:18:16,390 --> 01:18:17,610
than you could yourself?

1065
01:18:17,930 --> 01:18:18,910
And there'll be a lot of people,

1066
01:18:19,050 --> 01:18:20,850
and I'd include myself in that, that would say, yeah.

1067
01:18:21,590 --> 01:18:25,370
But if you feel confident in yourself to go out,

1068
01:18:25,650 --> 01:18:27,090
verify everything, build this yourself,

1069
01:18:27,090 --> 01:18:30,810
then it seems like a worthwhile trade-off.

1070
01:18:30,930 --> 01:18:33,990
It's just the access to private keys,

1071
01:18:34,070 --> 01:18:36,070
it obviously can't be a spending wallet in that way.

1072
01:18:36,070 --> 01:18:36,870
I wouldn't imagine.

1073
01:18:37,550 --> 01:18:38,130
What do you mean?

1074
01:18:38,290 --> 01:18:40,650
You know, so I have a hardware wallet

1075
01:18:40,650 --> 01:18:42,050
that I use multiple times a month.

1076
01:18:42,130 --> 01:18:43,910
Like, I wouldn't want my private keys lying around

1077
01:18:43,910 --> 01:18:45,290
in the sense that I could access them

1078
01:18:45,290 --> 01:18:46,750
to send Bitcoin, you know,

1079
01:18:46,930 --> 01:18:48,150
10 times a month or whatever it is.

1080
01:18:48,190 --> 01:18:49,510
And in that particular use case,

1081
01:18:49,550 --> 01:18:51,490
I would argue that it's a fabulous use case

1082
01:18:51,490 --> 01:18:54,570
for a conventional retail hardware wallet

1083
01:18:54,570 --> 01:18:57,170
because you want the accessibility of the keys nearby.

1084
01:18:58,250 --> 01:19:00,250
You're not going to be storing your life savings on there.

1085
01:19:00,390 --> 01:19:03,570
So the trust trade-off makes sense

1086
01:19:03,570 --> 01:19:05,970
and you have the convenience of the access controls

1087
01:19:05,970 --> 01:19:10,490
in place on the device that are going to restrict, you know, if it does fall into someone's hands at

1088
01:19:10,490 --> 01:19:15,330
home, regardless of where you're keeping it, unless, you know, they have a knowledge of the

1089
01:19:15,330 --> 01:19:20,370
credentials that you put in place. I'm not going to argue with you that that's a perfectly valid

1090
01:19:20,370 --> 01:19:26,450
use case. Again, which is why we frame SeedSigner as this is for your long-term life savings,

1091
01:19:26,550 --> 01:19:31,510
the money you're going to hand down to your kids or that you're saving for something on the horizon.

1092
01:19:31,850 --> 01:19:34,530
That makes sense. Okay. So I interrupted you before you got to your third point there.

1093
01:19:34,530 --> 01:19:53,770
Yeah, yeah. So supply chain risk, trust. And I do want to say a little bit more about trust. You're trusting that they've implemented the secure modules or whatever's baked into their particular hardware device. You're trusting they've implemented that in a secure way, that there are no low-hanging fruit kind of exploits to it.

1094
01:19:53,770 --> 01:19:59,070
you're trusting that whatever firmware updates that they deliver are going to be authentic and

1095
01:19:59,070 --> 01:20:05,630
that no one has gotten access to the firmware signing keys that are associated with that company

1096
01:20:05,630 --> 01:20:11,230
because malicious firmware could be released and properly signed and it would still run on the

1097
01:20:11,230 --> 01:20:16,550
device and it could be released in such a way that no one knew it was compromised until months or

1098
01:20:16,550 --> 01:20:21,190
years later. Which is, I mean, then there's another reason to not necessarily rush to upgrade firmware

1099
01:20:21,190 --> 01:20:31,670
on any device. Yeah, 100%. And that's a good segue in terms of the trust that's baked into,

1100
01:20:35,090 --> 01:20:40,650
this trust is linked in with the third reason, privacy. So let's just say offhand,

1101
01:20:41,210 --> 01:20:45,130
most people who purchase a hard wallet probably do it the exact wrong way.

1102
01:20:45,450 --> 01:20:50,170
So they go to the manufacturer website or some sort of authorized reseller,

1103
01:20:50,170 --> 01:20:51,590
There's not a big problem with that.

1104
01:20:51,950 --> 01:20:56,190
But then when they order the device, they typically will enter.

1105
01:20:56,810 --> 01:20:57,930
A lot of people aren't sophisticated.

1106
01:20:58,170 --> 01:20:59,210
They'll use their real name.

1107
01:20:59,570 --> 01:21:00,950
They'll have it shipped to their home.

1108
01:21:01,510 --> 01:21:03,330
They'll enter payment information.

1109
01:21:04,450 --> 01:21:09,370
And they'll enter some sort of email address that's their regular email address.

1110
01:21:09,610 --> 01:21:20,150
And then when you give that information to the company, you're trusting that they'll behave responsibly with it and safeguard it, which we found not always the case.

1111
01:21:20,170 --> 01:21:25,430
especially with Ledger, but some of the other, not just hard to wallet companies,

1112
01:21:25,570 --> 01:21:28,590
but service providers have gotten themselves into trouble with this

1113
01:21:28,590 --> 01:21:33,690
because then the motivations of that company are to sell you as many devices

1114
01:21:33,690 --> 01:21:35,150
as they can sell you.

1115
01:21:35,290 --> 01:21:38,890
They're a for-profit company and that's just their natural inherent motivation.

1116
01:21:39,630 --> 01:21:41,970
So they're going to email you about firmware updates,

1117
01:21:42,150 --> 01:21:45,290
but they're also going to send you marketing emails about their latest products

1118
01:21:45,290 --> 01:21:51,830
and new features that they've implemented in the latest versions of their software

1119
01:21:51,830 --> 01:21:55,310
or trying to potentially point you to partners that they work with and this kind of stuff.

1120
01:21:55,710 --> 01:21:58,390
So you just don't know who that information is going to get handed off to.

1121
01:21:58,810 --> 01:22:04,890
And especially with the ledger disclosure that myself and a lot of others,

1122
01:22:05,490 --> 01:22:08,130
I mean, like people's real home addresses got out in there.

1123
01:22:08,130 --> 01:22:13,710
And there was trust in that company to keep your private details private.

1124
01:22:13,710 --> 01:22:17,390
So if you do buy a harder wallet, and I can acknowledge there are absolutely

1125
01:22:17,430 --> 01:22:20,130
some legitimate use cases for them, do it the right way.

1126
01:22:21,430 --> 01:22:26,870
Best case scenario is go to a Bitcoin conference or some other event and buy it from the vendor's booth.

1127
01:22:27,070 --> 01:22:33,850
So you can, in the easiest possible way, just hand cash over, buy it with Lightning and not have to provide any personal details whatsoever.

1128
01:22:34,210 --> 01:22:39,990
But if you do have to buy it through the mail, you know, consider using a disposal email address.

1129
01:22:40,670 --> 01:22:41,030
PO box.

1130
01:22:41,030 --> 01:22:48,370
right use a p.o box to have it shipped to buy with lightning or use some other enhanced you know

1131
01:22:48,370 --> 01:22:56,790
privacy with your wallet and um yeah do it in a more a more secure private way so

1132
01:22:56,790 --> 01:23:03,350
that's one element of the privacy issue the other aspect of harder wallets that i have

1133
01:23:03,350 --> 01:23:10,510
a challenge with is um a lot of them try to as the default if you get that device and you start

1134
01:23:10,510 --> 01:23:17,090
to set it up, a lot of them try to channel you into their companion app. So with Ledger, it's

1135
01:23:17,090 --> 01:23:24,150
Ledger Live. With Passport, I think it's Envoy. With Trezor, it's Trezor Suite. They all kind of

1136
01:23:24,150 --> 01:23:31,650
have their own thing. And first, from just a theoretical security perspective, that's just

1137
01:23:31,650 --> 01:23:36,170
bad practice because the company that makes the device and software that's interacting with your

1138
01:23:36,170 --> 01:23:40,510
private keys really shouldn't be the company that's also making the software that interacts

1139
01:23:40,510 --> 01:23:47,010
with the larger Bitcoin network and the internet itself. It's theoretical, but there is this

1140
01:23:47,010 --> 01:23:52,750
opportunity for collusion. If someone who has fingers in both of those different aspects of

1141
01:23:52,750 --> 01:23:58,930
the tech stack wanted to exploit something, enough said about that. But the other thing is,

1142
01:23:59,010 --> 01:24:02,430
and we've especially seen this with Ledger. The important thing to point out there, though,

1143
01:24:02,430 --> 01:24:05,090
is that you don't have to use Ledger Live or Trezor Suite

1144
01:24:05,090 --> 01:24:05,810
or any of these things.

1145
01:24:05,930 --> 01:24:07,890
You can go and use Wasabi Wallet or Sparrow

1146
01:24:07,890 --> 01:24:10,610
or any of the other completely separate desktop apps.

1147
01:24:10,690 --> 01:24:12,390
You don't have to, but as you've pointed out,

1148
01:24:12,430 --> 01:24:14,150
a lot of people are looking for that easy button.

1149
01:24:14,150 --> 01:24:16,890
They're going to do what the recommended workflow is.

1150
01:24:16,890 --> 01:24:19,610
I have no idea what the percentages would look like,

1151
01:24:19,670 --> 01:24:21,270
but I wouldn't be surprised if it was 90 plus percent.

1152
01:24:21,270 --> 01:24:25,250
Yeah, which is, you know, we as Bitcoiner should rail against that.

1153
01:24:25,890 --> 01:24:29,010
And then the other thing is, when you use something like Ledger Live,

1154
01:24:29,390 --> 01:24:30,870
and this is something that's been documented,

1155
01:24:30,870 --> 01:24:40,810
There's ways in which Ledger has sought to surveil balances and transactions, and they do the sharding thing with the private keys.

1156
01:24:42,050 --> 01:24:43,650
They don't do that by default, I don't think.

1157
01:24:44,510 --> 01:24:46,530
So I don't own a Ledger, so I can't.

1158
01:24:46,550 --> 01:24:56,810
But I have been told by multiple people that if you were using your Ledger with Ledger Live, you got to a point where you could not use the device anymore unless you updated the firmware.

1159
01:24:56,810 --> 01:25:02,830
and the update of the firmware included the new sharding feature.

1160
01:25:03,390 --> 01:25:05,830
Oh, interesting. I didn't think that was the case, but I actually don't know.

1161
01:25:05,830 --> 01:25:06,530
I apologize if I'm wrong.

1162
01:25:06,690 --> 01:25:08,250
I'll put something on screen if that's not correct.

1163
01:25:09,390 --> 01:25:09,990
Right, right, right.

1164
01:25:11,510 --> 01:25:18,290
But anyhow, I have to give props to CoinKite

1165
01:25:18,290 --> 01:25:21,870
in that they claim to delete customer information

1166
01:25:21,870 --> 01:25:26,030
even if people buy it the wrong way and give them personal information.

1167
01:25:26,030 --> 01:25:29,490
they claim to delete it. You're still trusting them to delete it, but at least they're-

1168
01:25:29,490 --> 01:25:33,390
You get the email saying it's been deleted, provably deleted things hard, but if you trust

1169
01:25:33,390 --> 01:25:37,410
the company, you can trust that. I don't hear any other companies making that noise. So I have to

1170
01:25:37,410 --> 01:25:42,110
give them props for that. And I also have to give CoinCut honestly props for they haven't to date

1171
01:25:42,110 --> 01:25:49,590
produced a companion app. Whereas all of the other big wallet companies appear to have. So

1172
01:25:49,590 --> 01:25:55,710
I always said for a long time, if I had to use a harder wallet, if SeedCenter wasn't a thing,

1173
01:25:56,030 --> 01:26:04,990
it would be a cold card or a CoinKite product. So yeah, props to them for those decisions.

1174
01:26:04,990 --> 01:26:10,510
Yeah, they, I mean, MBK is great. I know you guys don't necessarily get along, but

1175
01:26:10,510 --> 01:26:15,310
he's built some cool stuff. They've actually, they've just brought in a couple of new features.

1176
01:26:15,310 --> 01:26:21,150
I don't know if you've seen this, but you now can use like a traditional authenticator with your

1177
01:26:21,150 --> 01:26:25,790
cold card. Oh, like a YubiKey or something? Or yeah, or like an authenticator on your phone.

1178
01:26:25,790 --> 01:26:27,290
which I think is quite cool.

1179
01:26:28,110 --> 01:26:30,290
And as far as I know,

1180
01:26:30,350 --> 01:26:31,930
I actually don't 100% know how this works,

1181
01:26:32,010 --> 01:26:36,070
but I can only assume that if you lose access

1182
01:26:36,070 --> 01:26:36,770
to that authenticator,

1183
01:26:36,810 --> 01:26:38,550
you can just restore the wallet from the seed

1184
01:26:38,550 --> 01:26:39,770
and that won't be the case.

1185
01:26:39,850 --> 01:26:41,190
But I think that's kind of an interesting

1186
01:26:41,190 --> 01:26:42,730
additional security feature.

1187
01:26:43,830 --> 01:26:45,990
Yeah, I wouldn't argue with that.

1188
01:26:46,090 --> 01:26:49,930
I think if I'm going to critique Coldcard

1189
01:26:49,930 --> 01:26:51,170
where they get themselves into trouble

1190
01:26:51,170 --> 01:26:53,190
is sometimes that feature creep

1191
01:26:53,190 --> 01:26:56,410
that unless you're a sophisticated Bitcoin

1192
01:26:56,410 --> 01:27:00,210
and you truly understand the features that you're using.

1193
01:27:01,450 --> 01:27:05,130
Like there's a guy in our Telegram chat for SeedSigner

1194
01:27:05,130 --> 01:27:10,390
who was using, I think BIP85 is the one I'm thinking of

1195
01:27:10,390 --> 01:27:13,230
where you can create child keys from a parent key.

1196
01:27:13,810 --> 01:27:16,390
And they, you know, one night they were setting some,

1197
01:27:16,590 --> 01:27:18,390
working on their Bitcoin setup

1198
01:27:18,390 --> 01:27:25,150
and got two generations deep into BIP85 derivation

1199
01:27:25,150 --> 01:27:31,030
and they were doing not just the first child,

1200
01:27:31,190 --> 01:27:34,850
but some subsequent child derivation

1201
01:27:34,850 --> 01:27:37,130
and somehow locked themselves out of their Bitcoin.

1202
01:27:37,450 --> 01:27:42,130
So I think keeping it simple, yeah, there's...

1203
01:27:42,810 --> 01:27:43,750
I agree with that.

1204
01:27:43,830 --> 01:27:45,210
I don't think that's CoinKite's fault.

1205
01:27:45,210 --> 01:27:47,450
I think it's cool that they give you access

1206
01:27:47,450 --> 01:27:49,310
to as many advanced features as possible.

1207
01:27:50,110 --> 01:27:52,410
People just need to be aware of what they're actually doing.

1208
01:27:52,530 --> 01:27:53,790
And they do hide a lot of those features

1209
01:27:53,790 --> 01:27:54,850
in the advanced settings.

1210
01:27:55,090 --> 01:27:59,010
I think there's, like, you have to be careful with guardrails.

1211
01:27:59,250 --> 01:28:00,790
Like, where I was talking about before,

1212
01:28:01,330 --> 01:28:03,630
where someone, you know, rolled the dice five times

1213
01:28:03,630 --> 01:28:07,270
and set up a wallet with that, that was on a cold card.

1214
01:28:07,430 --> 01:28:07,590
Yeah.

1215
01:28:07,870 --> 01:28:10,130
And so you can give people a lot of power,

1216
01:28:10,190 --> 01:28:12,410
but I also think there's, you know, it would be,

1217
01:28:12,410 --> 01:28:15,250
It's very simple to require a minimum number of roles

1218
01:28:15,250 --> 01:28:16,670
that would prevent that from happening.

1219
01:28:17,210 --> 01:28:20,470
And you can say, the person has to know what they're doing.

1220
01:28:20,550 --> 01:28:25,110
But at the same time, as someone who is architecting that device,

1221
01:28:25,370 --> 01:28:28,590
you also can put some reasonable guardrails in place

1222
01:28:28,590 --> 01:28:32,370
to help people out if they come to own themselves.

1223
01:28:32,370 --> 01:28:33,590
I obviously can't speak for MVK,

1224
01:28:33,690 --> 01:28:36,910
but I'm pretty sure he's said numerous times

1225
01:28:36,910 --> 01:28:38,630
that these features aren't for everyone.

1226
01:28:38,990 --> 01:28:41,390
Maybe don't use them unless you absolutely know

1227
01:28:41,390 --> 01:28:42,310
what you're getting yourself into.

1228
01:28:43,470 --> 01:28:46,070
I mean, this is cypherpunk technology, right?

1229
01:28:46,070 --> 01:28:48,430
I think people should be able to do everything possible

1230
01:28:48,430 --> 01:28:49,230
if they want to.

1231
01:28:50,430 --> 01:28:53,630
And understand that, in general, for most people,

1232
01:28:53,730 --> 01:28:55,750
just keeping things simple is the best way of doing it.

1233
01:28:57,130 --> 01:29:12,528
Simple well we have different versions of simple Like simple in bitkey or simple in terms of I personally think I mean like if you using a cold card like just understand where your technical limits are You should know the consequence of every action you take on it And sometimes

1234
01:29:12,528 --> 01:29:16,688
like things like creating your own entropy with dice rolls might be to advance some people and

1235
01:29:16,688 --> 01:29:22,708
just know what you're getting yourself into. Right. Yeah. It's, there's a balance, I think.

1236
01:29:22,708 --> 01:29:33,728
there's a balance. Yeah, there's a balance. I don't want to get into too much nanny stuff

1237
01:29:33,728 --> 01:29:39,428
because I do believe that people should have the freedom to burn their hand on the stove.

1238
01:29:39,848 --> 01:29:43,148
Yeah. I mean, it's the best way of learning, that's for sure.

1239
01:29:43,148 --> 01:29:50,648
Yeah. Painful as it is sometimes. Okay. So with Seed Siner, what do you want people to know about

1240
01:29:50,648 --> 01:30:03,288
it. So SeedSigner, again, DIY cold storage. The kind of secret sauce of SeedSigner is that we take

1241
01:30:03,288 --> 01:30:11,608
a very careful selection of hardware components and then a very kind of thoughtful selection of

1242
01:30:11,608 --> 01:30:20,828
software features to create a highly secure system using very inexpensive off-the-shelf

1243
01:30:20,828 --> 01:30:21,828
components.

1244
01:30:21,828 --> 01:30:24,048
Do you have the components?

1245
01:30:24,048 --> 01:30:25,048
Can I see them?

1246
01:30:25,048 --> 01:30:26,048
I do.

1247
01:30:26,048 --> 01:30:33,848
So I have some assembled here and then I have the components I can kind of just show you.

1248
01:30:33,848 --> 01:30:36,548
The version I got looked nothing like the ones you have here.

1249
01:30:36,548 --> 01:30:49,308
Well, that's another part of the beauty of open source is that they're all kind of the same skin or the same core components with different skin around them.

1250
01:30:50,448 --> 01:30:53,968
So that is just the simple display screen and buttons.

1251
01:30:56,188 --> 01:30:56,808
It's funny.

1252
01:30:56,888 --> 01:30:59,668
The guy who gave me, I mean, first of all, shout out.

1253
01:30:59,948 --> 01:31:01,108
I don't know if he's private.

1254
01:31:01,108 --> 01:31:04,048
I'm curious to know who gifted you a seed sign.

1255
01:31:04,048 --> 01:31:06,848
I don't know if he's private, so I wouldn't want to necessarily say.

1256
01:31:07,468 --> 01:31:10,348
But the reason that I wouldn't use it, though,

1257
01:31:10,348 --> 01:31:12,448
is because it was the first time I'd met him.

1258
01:31:12,548 --> 01:31:13,608
I'm sure he's a lovely person.

1259
01:31:13,688 --> 01:31:16,128
I have no malintent, but it makes me a little bit nervous

1260
01:31:16,128 --> 01:31:17,148
to use anything like that.

1261
01:31:17,888 --> 01:31:19,588
Maybe I should just play around with it with a little bit.

1262
01:31:19,848 --> 01:31:22,648
I mean, just as a matter of, like, I'm curious

1263
01:31:22,648 --> 01:31:24,288
and open to learning about this.

1264
01:31:24,528 --> 01:31:25,208
It would be a good test.

1265
01:31:25,208 --> 01:31:26,928
I'll put some Bitcoin on there and see if he robs me.

1266
01:31:29,148 --> 01:31:31,468
But anyhow, the components you have there are,

1267
01:31:31,468 --> 01:31:35,428
That's just a simple Raspberry Pi compatible camera.

1268
01:31:36,228 --> 01:31:43,668
There's the Raspberry Pi, the green board that you're holding in your hands, which is a very specific version of Raspberry Pi called a 1.3.

1269
01:31:43,888 --> 01:31:49,008
And all that designation means is that it doesn't have wireless communication capability baked into it.

1270
01:31:49,188 --> 01:31:51,828
So no Wi-Fi, no Bluetooth, no NFC.

1271
01:31:52,308 --> 01:31:56,928
And then the display hat on it is just how you interact with the device.

1272
01:31:56,928 --> 01:32:03,288
the usb ports on there one of those ports which with most of the enclosures is the port that we

1273
01:32:03,288 --> 01:32:09,968
leave exposed is hardwired for power only so you could even plug it into your laptop and have

1274
01:32:09,968 --> 01:32:15,068
assurance that it's not leaking any information because data can't even travel through that port

1275
01:32:15,068 --> 01:32:24,048
um but so it's this very simple very isolated private little environment where the only way

1276
01:32:24,048 --> 01:32:27,928
that it can receive input from the outside world

1277
01:32:27,928 --> 01:32:31,088
is through the camera and then the buttons on the front of it.

1278
01:32:31,168 --> 01:32:33,888
And the only way it can output data to the world

1279
01:32:33,888 --> 01:32:34,688
is through the screen.

1280
01:32:35,168 --> 01:32:40,348
So it creates this very naturally constrained protocol

1281
01:32:40,348 --> 01:32:43,008
by which you can move data in and out of it,

1282
01:32:43,368 --> 01:32:44,968
which is intentionally so,

1283
01:32:45,288 --> 01:32:48,368
because it would be really challenging

1284
01:32:48,368 --> 01:32:52,088
to move enough data to execute some sort of exploit

1285
01:32:52,088 --> 01:32:53,388
if you're doing it with QR codes.

1286
01:32:53,388 --> 01:32:55,588
You just can't pack a lot of binary data into them.

1287
01:32:56,008 --> 01:33:00,088
So that's a natural part of the kind of almost friction of the device.

1288
01:33:00,528 --> 01:33:03,368
It forces you to slow down and think about what you're doing.

1289
01:33:04,848 --> 01:33:06,388
And if I received...

1290
01:33:06,388 --> 01:33:07,648
Okay, cool.

1291
01:33:07,788 --> 01:33:09,288
If I received this from you,

1292
01:33:09,488 --> 01:33:13,788
like looking at it, apart from comparing it to another one,

1293
01:33:14,208 --> 01:33:18,708
like the only way to know this hasn't been tampered with

1294
01:33:18,708 --> 01:33:19,728
is by comparing it to another one.

1295
01:33:19,768 --> 01:33:20,268
Is that correct?

1296
01:33:20,428 --> 01:33:20,748
Right.

1297
01:33:21,168 --> 01:33:22,028
For me, that's...

1298
01:33:22,028 --> 01:33:22,608
At least physically.

1299
01:33:22,608 --> 01:33:40,228
The bar is pretty high to add some sort of hidden or undesirable functionality on that device without changing the way it looks in some way, like adding an additional module or something would be out of place. And it's a very simple board with a minimal amount of firmware on it.

1300
01:33:40,708 --> 01:33:42,848
So that's relatively trivial.

1301
01:33:43,188 --> 01:33:43,368
Right.

1302
01:33:44,048 --> 01:33:47,648
And then this, I assume here, the SD card runs the firmware.

1303
01:33:47,968 --> 01:33:49,228
The SD card runs the firmware.

1304
01:33:49,368 --> 01:33:50,128
Which you load yourself.

1305
01:33:50,128 --> 01:33:57,048
To be precise with the language, it's a combination of firmware and software.

1306
01:33:57,248 --> 01:34:01,728
So running on that device, it's basically a small handheld single board computer.

1307
01:34:02,308 --> 01:34:12,008
You've heard how some core developers have talked about, people are initially going to think of Luke, of course,

1308
01:34:12,168 --> 01:34:14,888
but people talk about, I wouldn't use a hardware wallet.

1309
01:34:14,888 --> 01:34:23,628
I would just have a Linux laptop that I have removed the communications, the wireless communications capability from, and I would just keep that in a safe.

1310
01:34:24,208 --> 01:34:31,028
This is kind of a version of that because it's a simple handheld computer that we're using it in such a way that it doesn't remember anything.

1311
01:34:31,228 --> 01:34:34,448
So there's high-level firmware and software on the memory card.

1312
01:34:34,668 --> 01:34:39,228
When you apply power to it, you turn it on.

1313
01:34:39,228 --> 01:34:41,608
and then as soon as the user interface comes up,

1314
01:34:41,648 --> 01:34:43,808
you can actually remove the micro SD card

1315
01:34:43,808 --> 01:34:45,048
because as I said before,

1316
01:34:45,608 --> 01:34:47,488
all the software and firmware is running in RAM.

1317
01:34:48,108 --> 01:34:49,848
Okay, so everything's loaded as soon as you turn it on

1318
01:34:49,848 --> 01:34:50,488
and then you can take that out.

1319
01:34:50,528 --> 01:34:51,648
You remove the memory card

1320
01:34:51,648 --> 01:34:53,128
so you can have that additional assurance.

1321
01:34:53,728 --> 01:34:55,508
Of course, our software doesn't run anything

1322
01:34:55,508 --> 01:34:57,568
but settings information to the memory card.

1323
01:34:57,868 --> 01:34:59,268
But because you're physically removing it,

1324
01:34:59,288 --> 01:35:00,248
you're going to have that assurance

1325
01:35:00,248 --> 01:35:03,788
that my seeds aren't somehow being leaked onto this thing.

1326
01:35:05,388 --> 01:35:07,608
And at some point, I should probably talk about like,

1327
01:35:07,608 --> 01:35:14,688
there's probably four target audiences for seed signer in terms of the type of bitcoiners

1328
01:35:14,688 --> 01:35:21,268
who it makes sense for because i i'll grant you like it's not for everybody um and it's probably

1329
01:35:21,268 --> 01:35:28,868
not even for most people but um one group is just geeks like me people who like to build and tinker

1330
01:35:28,868 --> 01:35:34,628
with things people who might want to experiment with a new feature or a new you know aspect of

1331
01:35:34,628 --> 01:35:37,128
the protocol and they're savvy enough to be able,

1332
01:35:37,128 --> 01:35:39,708
our code is highly,

1333
01:35:41,248 --> 01:35:43,628
most of our app level code is written in Python

1334
01:35:43,628 --> 01:35:45,448
and it's a very simple language to work with.

1335
01:35:45,448 --> 01:36:00,945
So you can prototype things and there are there are other forks of our project that implement different features that we choose not to implement So it a device that you can play with if you a technologist kind of person

1336
01:36:02,705 --> 01:36:08,105
Second would be people who live in parts of the world that are less free.

1337
01:36:08,845 --> 01:36:14,065
And that for whatever reason, like in Russia right now because of the Ukraine war,

1338
01:36:14,065 --> 01:36:20,345
because most of the hardware wallets come from countries that are associated with the West

1339
01:36:20,345 --> 01:36:25,945
that are, you know, manufacture and ship them. It's really hard to get a hardware wallet in Russia

1340
01:36:25,945 --> 01:36:31,185
right now. But I'm in contact with people there who can get the parts to build a seed signer.

1341
01:36:31,685 --> 01:36:37,605
And there are some number of Bitcoiners who really like seed signer and use it because they

1342
01:36:37,605 --> 01:36:41,605
don't have access to commercial hardware wallets. In other parts of the world,

1343
01:36:43,245 --> 01:36:45,925
let's say, and I've been in contact

1344
01:36:45,925 --> 01:36:49,645
with Bitcoiners in Iran. There's a Bitcoiner called Zia Sadir,

1345
01:36:49,765 --> 01:36:53,645
who is in the custody of the Iranian regime, and he's, I think,

1346
01:36:53,685 --> 01:36:57,285
in exile now. Bitcoiners in that part of the world

1347
01:36:57,285 --> 01:37:01,565
may not even have access just because of commercial restrictions to hardware wallets. Or

1348
01:37:01,565 --> 01:37:04,705
if you wanted to get a hardware wallet, you'd have to buy it from a black market source.

1349
01:37:04,705 --> 01:37:06,985
And you really can't verify what you're getting.

1350
01:37:06,985 --> 01:37:10,745
Which is really not the way you want to buy a security-critical piece of hardware.

1351
01:37:11,405 --> 01:37:16,345
And then in some place like China, where hardware wallets are legal, you can get them.

1352
01:37:17,065 --> 01:37:21,705
But if you're going to buy one through the mail, it's like...

1353
01:37:22,925 --> 01:37:25,825
Mail is routinely searched, as I understand it, in China.

1354
01:37:25,965 --> 01:37:31,045
And you're not worried about the Chinese Communist Party coming and taking you to the gulag because you're using Bitcoin.

1355
01:37:31,045 --> 01:37:37,685
there you're more worried about um so i've been told local police departments that are

1356
01:37:37,685 --> 01:37:42,585
to some degrees corrupt yeah and might know that you're using bitcoin because you ordered

1357
01:37:42,585 --> 01:37:47,765
a trezor in the in the mail or something and with that information they would come to you and try to

1358
01:37:47,765 --> 01:37:52,205
invent some sort of crime that you committed to try and shake you down to seizure bitcoin so

1359
01:37:52,205 --> 01:37:58,925
seed center allows you to have you know secure bitcoin cold storage with parts that are not you

1360
01:37:58,925 --> 01:38:08,165
If you order these parts, you could be building a mini retro gaming console, or you could be doing any one of other sort of DIY software projects.

1361
01:38:08,965 --> 01:38:14,765
So it helps people who can't get access to hardware wallets or who, for whatever reason, are trying to fly under the radar.

1362
01:38:16,005 --> 01:38:17,545
So that's like group two.

1363
01:38:17,545 --> 01:38:33,145
And then group three, I would say, are people who are really concerned with, as I've already talked about, the amount of trust that goes into using a retail hardware wallet.

1364
01:38:33,705 --> 01:38:35,405
Maybe we're wired a little bit differently.

1365
01:38:35,565 --> 01:38:40,545
Maybe we're freedom and sovereignty maximalists or whatever, tinfoil hat types or whatever.

1366
01:38:40,545 --> 01:38:47,005
whatever, but the model of using a seed signer, the mental model of understanding what the

1367
01:38:47,005 --> 01:38:53,685
components do is something that once you've learned it, for whatever reason, it's very

1368
01:38:53,685 --> 01:38:59,065
grokkable for people. With hardware wallets, there's this, because they've created the easy

1369
01:38:59,065 --> 01:39:07,765
button, you don't really understand what is going on behind the curtain, so to speak. So I've heard

1370
01:39:07,765 --> 01:39:11,845
this from multiple people to where when they're looking to make a spend using their hardware wallet

1371
01:39:11,845 --> 01:39:16,945
and they set the transaction up, they've entered the recipient address in and the fee and the amount

1372
01:39:16,945 --> 01:39:21,505
they're going to send and everything. Right before they click the send button, there's this

1373
01:39:21,505 --> 01:39:25,445
apprehension because they don't know what they're going to do if it doesn't work.

1374
01:39:26,485 --> 01:39:30,185
Because they don't have confidence that they understand what's happening under the hood

1375
01:39:30,185 --> 01:39:35,745
or that they would be able to reconstitute their wallet and get access to their funds if they were

1376
01:39:35,745 --> 01:39:39,485
just had the source material, the seed words in their hands.

1377
01:39:40,065 --> 01:39:46,885
With SeedCenter, the way we take you through the process of setting up a Bitcoin wallet,

1378
01:39:47,605 --> 01:39:51,745
and because every time you make a spend, you are dealing with the seed material,

1379
01:39:52,105 --> 01:39:56,725
you have a much higher understanding of what the process looks like.

1380
01:39:56,725 --> 01:40:00,585
And if something were to go wrong with your laptop where you had Sparrow,

1381
01:40:01,145 --> 01:40:04,485
or if you're using Nunchuck or Blue Wallet on your phone,

1382
01:40:04,485 --> 01:40:06,805
and your phone, you dropped it in the pool

1383
01:40:06,805 --> 01:40:08,765
or it got stolen from you on the street or whatever,

1384
01:40:09,325 --> 01:40:11,245
you have just a higher degree of confidence

1385
01:40:11,245 --> 01:40:14,745
that with the key material and your wallet backup,

1386
01:40:15,425 --> 01:40:18,285
you'd have access to your funds much more quickly.

1387
01:40:18,985 --> 01:40:20,085
That makes sense.

1388
01:40:20,565 --> 01:40:21,245
I think this is cool.

1389
01:40:21,825 --> 01:40:23,965
I need to have a play around with the one I've got

1390
01:40:23,965 --> 01:40:26,265
and see what I think of it.

1391
01:40:26,945 --> 01:40:29,605
Like I say, what I don't want this to sound like

1392
01:40:29,605 --> 01:40:32,985
is an attack on hard all this.

1393
01:40:33,045 --> 01:40:34,445
Because I think, like you say,

1394
01:40:34,485 --> 01:40:36,525
I can understand why someone would want to use this.

1395
01:40:36,625 --> 01:40:37,485
I can understand the reasoning.

1396
01:40:38,045 --> 01:40:41,925
I think the audience is not everyone.

1397
01:40:42,085 --> 01:40:42,945
It's not every Bitcoiner.

1398
01:40:43,045 --> 01:40:44,725
And I think people should still feel confident

1399
01:40:44,725 --> 01:40:45,665
in using hardware wallets.

1400
01:40:45,725 --> 01:40:46,985
So I don't want anyone to go away from this,

1401
01:40:47,045 --> 01:40:48,785
like freaking out that their hardware wallet's compromised.

1402
01:40:50,085 --> 01:40:51,625
But it's a cool project.

1403
01:40:52,185 --> 01:40:54,965
And I would, just to push back on that a little bit,

1404
01:40:56,165 --> 01:40:59,405
because I don't want to deter people from solutions

1405
01:40:59,405 --> 01:41:01,085
that could potentially do them good.

1406
01:41:01,085 --> 01:41:08,405
But I would encourage people just to go into that relationship of purchasing a hardware wallet and using it because that's what it is.

1407
01:41:08,425 --> 01:41:09,065
It's a relationship.

1408
01:41:09,865 --> 01:41:21,725
Be skeptical and go into that with your eyes open and think around the corner as to the implications of some of the information you're sharing or the trust you're putting in a firmware update or any of that kind of stuff.

1409
01:41:23,005 --> 01:41:25,805
Just trust, don't verify.

1410
01:41:26,025 --> 01:41:27,665
We talk about that in Bitcoin, I think, right?

1411
01:41:28,205 --> 01:41:28,645
Absolutely.

1412
01:41:29,165 --> 01:41:29,725
Trust, don't.

1413
01:41:29,725 --> 01:41:29,905
No.

1414
01:41:29,905 --> 01:41:30,905
Don't trust, verify.

1415
01:41:31,085 --> 01:41:34,145
We do talk about that in Bitcoin.

1416
01:41:35,365 --> 01:41:39,305
I think the key theme of this interview is probably it's just all trade-offs.

1417
01:41:39,405 --> 01:41:40,565
Figure out what works for you best.

1418
01:41:40,925 --> 01:41:45,805
You should think adversarially and make your own decision on this stuff.

1419
01:41:46,065 --> 01:41:47,345
But this has been cool.

1420
01:41:47,405 --> 01:41:49,585
Anything we didn't talk about that you want to?

1421
01:41:49,585 --> 01:42:02,465
um i i one kind of aspect that's sort of squishy is uh just my experience with seed signer and

1422
01:42:02,465 --> 01:42:07,725
being the lead and the facilitator of an open source software project and experiencing

1423
01:42:07,725 --> 01:42:16,105
kind of this as a community driven uh project of how i referenced before as i started out

1424
01:42:16,105 --> 01:42:22,885
early on, not being a coder and writing this horrible code, but producing enough of a proof

1425
01:42:22,885 --> 01:42:29,825
of concept that other people stepped in and built it, it has just been, for me, super

1426
01:42:29,825 --> 01:42:45,763
satisfying to interact with Bitcoiners in that kind of way building something together that provides real value and something that because we have to have different strokes for different folks We have to have tools for

1427
01:42:45,763 --> 01:42:53,723
everybody. And we don't want to have a Bitcoin ecosystem where we only have just one thing,

1428
01:42:53,783 --> 01:42:57,883
not the other. We don't want everything to be a DIY. And we don't want everything to be just,

1429
01:42:57,883 --> 01:43:01,663
you know, commercial and retail solutions that are available. So we serve,

1430
01:43:01,663 --> 01:43:08,223
Seed Center serves as this ideological counterbalance to some of the other things, not just

1431
01:43:08,223 --> 01:43:12,623
hardware wallet boogeyman, but just in terms of what if there was some sort of

1432
01:43:13,503 --> 01:43:21,383
aggressive nation state maneuver to co-opt Bitcoiners and attempt to maybe not go full

1433
01:43:21,383 --> 01:43:27,203
out 6102 and seize Bitcoin, but to try to just start to encourage people to register

1434
01:43:27,203 --> 01:43:30,323
and declare whatever amount of Bitcoin that they own.

1435
01:43:31,163 --> 01:43:33,903
It's been important to me to be involved in something

1436
01:43:33,903 --> 01:43:38,023
that kind of is a bulwark to tyranny

1437
01:43:38,023 --> 01:43:39,843
and pushes back at all of that.

1438
01:43:39,923 --> 01:43:43,903
And just the camaraderie of, I would be remiss

1439
01:43:43,903 --> 01:43:46,023
if I did not give shout-outs to some of the people

1440
01:43:46,023 --> 01:43:49,303
that have helped build SeedSigner to what it is.

1441
01:43:49,623 --> 01:43:50,983
Like our lead maintainer,

1442
01:43:51,243 --> 01:43:54,283
who was the first external contributor to SeedSigner,

1443
01:43:54,403 --> 01:43:55,423
and I love how he found it.

1444
01:43:55,423 --> 01:44:08,983
Like I, when I made this proof of concept and I'm all on Twitter, like posting videos of how it works and, you know, the richness of the concept or whatever, like he just goes on to GitHub and searches Bitcoin wallet and is not active on social media.

1445
01:44:08,983 --> 01:44:24,343
And that's how he found our project and started contributing to it, to our lead software developer who's called Keith Mukai, who's a good friend of mine as well, who I mentioned before is the one who his initial open source.

1446
01:44:25,423 --> 01:44:29,783
contributions were to Spectre Desktop and integrating harder wallet support into Spectre

1447
01:44:29,783 --> 01:44:34,623
Desktop because it didn't exist. And he was a technical guy and wanted to have it there. And

1448
01:44:34,623 --> 01:44:43,503
so he just stepped up and built it. And then I mentioned people who saw that initial presentation

1449
01:44:43,503 --> 01:44:51,963
I made at Bitcoin Miami. There's an amazing UI UX designer. He's a NIMH who goes by Easy or Easy

1450
01:44:51,963 --> 01:44:57,863
UXD. And he was one of the people that saw that first presentation and then circled around

1451
01:44:57,863 --> 01:45:08,283
and contacted me. And his daytime job is a UI UX designer for, I don't want to give the field he

1452
01:45:08,283 --> 01:45:14,103
works in, but he works on a national level with products that millions of people have their hands

1453
01:45:14,103 --> 01:45:20,863
on. And in his spare time, with no expectation of financial reward, has leaned into Seed Signer

1454
01:45:20,863 --> 01:45:26,283
and really turned it from this clunky thing that feels like an almost DOS-like interface

1455
01:45:26,283 --> 01:45:31,203
to once you build it, it's kind of one of those, the sum is greater than the parts kind of thing

1456
01:45:31,203 --> 01:45:33,063
because of the magic and the software and the UI.

1457
01:45:33,203 --> 01:45:37,063
We really have a first-class UI if you haven't worked with a seed signer.

1458
01:45:37,123 --> 01:45:41,523
After you've built one, it feels more like something you've bought than what you've built.

1459
01:45:41,523 --> 01:45:50,143
And that's feedback that I consistently get from people all the time is just the beauty of the UI,

1460
01:45:50,143 --> 01:45:55,303
the simplicity of it, the graphic-driven nature of it. And we've really put a lot of thought into

1461
01:45:55,303 --> 01:46:02,023
the decision tree of using a seed signer in terms of what we give access to and what we,

1462
01:46:02,283 --> 01:46:08,263
as you talked about with CoinKite, what you kind of hide and make available under advanced settings.

1463
01:46:08,343 --> 01:46:15,803
But we really try to pare down the decision tree and make it to where using the device is as much

1464
01:46:15,803 --> 01:46:19,963
of a process of securing your Bitcoin is, you know, when you're initially using it, it's also

1465
01:46:19,963 --> 01:46:26,583
an education process because it teaches you how to, you know, how you collect entropy to create a

1466
01:46:26,583 --> 01:46:31,723
private key and then how you create the public version of that private key that you need to set

1467
01:46:31,723 --> 01:46:37,423
up a wallet. And then when you import a partially signed Bitcoin transaction, what the elements of

1468
01:46:37,423 --> 01:46:42,243
that are and what you need to pay attention to to verify that your coordinator's not trying to

1469
01:46:42,243 --> 01:46:48,003
tricky when you're doing something you don't want to do. So I'd just encourage anybody who hasn't

1470
01:46:48,003 --> 01:46:56,683
used one, SeatSigners is a grassroots thing. And that's okay, because it's generally passed along

1471
01:46:56,683 --> 01:47:01,723
from one Bitcoin or to another, primarily at meetups. And it's like you, people who build one

1472
01:47:01,723 --> 01:47:06,963
and use it get so excited about it, that they want to build one and give it to a random podcaster

1473
01:47:06,963 --> 01:47:12,163
that they've never met before. Like it's just, it's one of those very Bitcoin-y Bitcoin things

1474
01:47:12,163 --> 01:47:13,883
that you get excited about.

1475
01:47:14,583 --> 01:47:16,623
So I'd encourage people to,

1476
01:47:17,163 --> 01:47:18,823
maybe it doesn't end up being

1477
01:47:18,823 --> 01:47:20,763
your go-to cold storage device.

1478
01:47:20,903 --> 01:47:22,143
Maybe you keep using harder wallets

1479
01:47:22,143 --> 01:47:23,303
and that's totally fine.

1480
01:47:24,823 --> 01:47:26,163
But if one day you wake up

1481
01:47:26,163 --> 01:47:27,743
and you plug in your harder wallet

1482
01:47:27,743 --> 01:47:28,463
and it says Bricked,

1483
01:47:29,123 --> 01:47:30,143
you're going to be super glad

1484
01:47:30,143 --> 01:47:31,203
you have that seed tower around

1485
01:47:31,203 --> 01:47:32,583
that you can type your seed words into

1486
01:47:32,583 --> 01:47:34,143
and prove you have access to your funds.

1487
01:47:35,603 --> 01:47:36,283
So yeah.

1488
01:47:36,823 --> 01:47:37,203
Very cool.

1489
01:47:37,343 --> 01:47:38,763
I mean, Bitcoin is building things

1490
01:47:38,763 --> 01:47:39,563
is always good.

1491
01:47:39,963 --> 01:47:41,403
So where do you want to send anyone

1492
01:47:41,403 --> 01:47:44,163
to find you on Twitter or find out more about SeedSigner,

1493
01:47:44,283 --> 01:47:45,503
contribute to the project, anything?

1494
01:47:45,843 --> 01:47:49,503
Yeah. No, just at SeedSigner on Twitter

1495
01:47:49,503 --> 01:47:52,283
is kind of our marquee social media presence.

1496
01:47:52,463 --> 01:47:53,463
We're on Noster as well.

1497
01:47:53,963 --> 01:47:57,163
And you can find a verified SeedSigner account on Noster.

1498
01:47:58,623 --> 01:47:59,743
SeedSigner.com.

1499
01:47:59,843 --> 01:48:04,963
Please don't go to ne.edu.variance, just SeedSigner.com.

1500
01:48:05,683 --> 01:48:08,123
And from there, you can find a link to the GitHub repo,

1501
01:48:08,123 --> 01:48:10,563
which is where we provide documentation.

1502
01:48:11,303 --> 01:48:22,743
We've also, within the GitHub repo, I've written an independent custody guide that kind of explains in probably a much better well-thought-out format some of the issues that we've been talking about throughout this conversation.

1503
01:48:22,743 --> 01:48:27,223
It lays it all out in terms of making a case for our vision of cold storage.

1504
01:48:27,223 --> 01:48:35,303
yeah through the and we also have on the dot com website a link to all sorts of explainer videos

1505
01:48:35,303 --> 01:48:42,863
made from everyone from bcc sessions to all sorts of other people who do educational bitcoin content

1506
01:48:42,863 --> 01:48:49,803
in a variety of languages that feature seed signer and explain the value of one and how to use it how

1507
01:48:49,803 --> 01:48:53,723
to build one how to set it up and all that kind of stuff yeah i can i've not seen it but i can be

1508
01:48:53,723 --> 01:48:57,703
almost positive that sessions setup video is probably the best one out there.

1509
01:48:57,703 --> 01:49:01,363
He just did a refreshed one within the last couple of months.

1510
01:49:01,883 --> 01:49:02,363
So, yeah.

1511
01:49:02,463 --> 01:49:02,643
Nice.

1512
01:49:02,903 --> 01:49:03,863
Well, thank you for this.

1513
01:49:03,883 --> 01:49:04,423
It's been great.

1514
01:49:04,823 --> 01:49:05,583
Appreciate the time.

1515
01:49:06,543 --> 01:49:06,663
Yeah.

1516
01:49:07,243 --> 01:49:07,943
Appreciate the invite.

1517
01:49:08,083 --> 01:49:08,483
Thanks so much.

1518
01:49:08,543 --> 01:49:09,183
No, thank you.

1519
01:49:23,723 --> 01:49:53,703
Thank you.