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Jameson, welcome to the Bitcoin Infinity Show.

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Thank you for joining us.

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Great to be here.

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Yeah.

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Welcome.

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Um, we just saw a panel about, uh, Bitcoin security, um, moderated by Luke and, uh,

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with you and two, two other guys there.

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And I was sitting there listening to it, trying to, uh, my, my

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inner Bitcoiner was screaming.

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Yeah.

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It's just information for fuck's sake.

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Like you're, you can't really own these things.

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They're, they're information.

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So, uh, But, what's your take on, like, what do people misunderstand

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about Bitcoin the most?

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Oh dear, uh, you know, this is a tough one because, um, you know, Bitcoin

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is kind of like a mirror, right?

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It's like you, you, you gaze upon Bitcoin and it tends to reflect back

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upon you what your own biases and skills and personal life and perspective are.

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So, you know, it varies from person to person, right?

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If, if you're.

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More on the, like, Austrian economics side, then you're gonna

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see more of the economics stuff.

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If you're a computer scientist like me, you're gonna see a neat protocol

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and data store and decentralized peer to peer network that you

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can do all kinds of stuff with.

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So it, you know, it really comes down to each person.

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Uh, I would say though, we're at the point now where, you know, Bitcoin

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is so mainstream that most people only look at it as an investment.

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So I think that the average person misses out on a lot of the cypherpunk

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ideals, the history of the struggles that led us to where we are today.

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And to most people, they probably think that Bitcoin just appeared out of thin

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air and it's this, you know, magic internet money that will make you rich.

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This is one of the biggest challenges, I think, to bridge these worlds

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between the computer nerds and the Austrian economics nerds.

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Because the computer nerds need to tell the Austrian economics

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nerds how the thing actually works.

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But the Austrian economics nerds need to tell the computer nerds why money

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has a very important function and other shit doesn't in the same way.

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And why, why we need to, why we should view this thing in a certain way.

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Uh, to, to understand the, uh, economic incentives that drive people's behavior.

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And so how do we bridge the two worlds?

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Well, this is why I think that the most important thing that we can do to

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help Bitcoin is to talk about Bitcoin.

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Uh, you know, we, if, so I view Bitcoin as an open source project.

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This is like one of the initial reasons why I got so interested in it so long ago.

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was not because I knew anything about money, uh, but rather that I thought

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it was a fascinating idea to take this concept of money, which for

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many generations now has been, you know, controlled by small elitist

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groups, and instead open it to the world as a collaborative project.

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You know, the idea around open source being that The more people that you have

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looking at a problem and trying to find a solution, the more likely it is that

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because you're attacking it from so many different perspectives, it's just going

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to end up being more robust, you know.

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It's, uh, it is various, innumerous, you know, strength.

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A strength in numbers, a strength in diversity of perspectives and

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skill sets to be able to find the flaws that other people may miss.

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So, talking about Bitcoin is how we continue to improve it, how we find

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the weaknesses in it, and hopefully continue to progress forward.

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Yeah, absolutely.

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This was one of the interesting things you said on stage.

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It's about like how Casa has, uh, So for those of you that don't know, you were

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the co founder of Casa, a bitcoin company.

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Uh,

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Oh, yeah, I forgot to

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yeah, yeah, we forgot to introduce, everyone knows

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introduction

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yeah, yeah, it goes straight into the action.

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So, Casa, I may or may not have called you a shitcoin apologist

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in Prague, and you answered that, well, Casa was never a bitcoin

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company, it's a key storage company.

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And that is something you alluded to on stage here, that, what Casa is

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doing is not really a financial thing, it's, it's, uh, it's just helping

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people store this valuable information.

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So, can you go deeper into that than

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so I mean, it's, it's about self sovereignty, right?

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It's like our really long term mission and hope for Casa is that

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we will help people to be able to secure a variety of different things.

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Non monetary things.

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The idea being that fundamentally, cryptography is this incredibly powerful

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tool for the individual because it gives you this asymmetric defensive capability.

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It's just, you know, the power of large numbers that makes it, um, orders of

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magnitude more costly for someone to attack than for you to defend against.

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And so Uh, you know, we, from from that perspective, I think, uh, the,

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the crypto, the, the cryptography space has been progressing a bit slower

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than we would like, but, you know, we, we do hope that things like, you

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know, even identity, and you could, you can make an argument Nostr is,

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is one, uh, potential path forward.

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There's a number of different, you know, decentralized identity projects out there.

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Um, but we expect that, you know, identity is going to be a key

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part of that because reputation.

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It's a key part of just the economy of doing business with people.

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So, you know, how do you solve the problem of having true peer to peer

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commerce if you don't have some sort of reputation system, preferably

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a standard reputation system?

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And how do you have a reputation system if you don't An identity system

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that you can attach reputation to.

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So there's a lot of different moving pieces here, but just many

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different aspects of our lives that we believe can be vastly improved

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with the use of applied cryptography.

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absolutely.

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And, uh, is multisig possible on Nostr?

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Excuse the ignorance, but,

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Uh, not, I'm not aware of any true multisig system.

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There may be someone working on a NIP for that,

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but I think the closest that I've seen is some sort of account delegation.

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Nips, where you can, like, you can

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have a master key, and then you can, you give, uh, a subkey that

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has, like, an expiration on it, um, but it's, it's not quite perfect.

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Otherwise, you might be able to do some sort of, you know,

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Shamir secret sharing, but

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Okay, so that's, that's my, uh, uh, mission for all you 180 IQ, uh, uh,

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computer geeks that don't, don't understand economics yet because

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you're too young, like go work on that multi sig Nostr BIP or NIP instead of,

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Yes.

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Nips.

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NIPS is so much better than bips.

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Yeah, so go work on a NIP instead of creating shitcoins and all that

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Yeah, and I think, you know, multisig is important, of course, for security,

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but Especially in the case of Nostr and identity, I think the ability to

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have key rotation is very important.

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So, you

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know, you don't want there to be a single point of failure in your identity.

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You also don't want your identity to be permanently attached to just one static

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set of keys, because things can go wrong.

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No, because, uh, for instance, you might have a company and that

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company might have, uh, an account.

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Uh, that you want to, if you sell the company, you want to give this,

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the access to someone else, and that's, that's always, I know how

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hard that can be, uh, with legacy accounts, like, uh, it's a tough thing.

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yeah.

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The, the, the key rotation thing, actually, this definitely is, is

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a, a major thing that needs to be solved for, I think Nora to work.

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But I, I also wonder, is this something in the, in the Bitcoin space generally, let's

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just generalize this whole thing out.

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Like what if one key gets compromised?

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How can you actually.

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Say, what is the next key to be the private key?

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Something like that.

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And how can you do this in a, in a secure way?

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Uh, is that, is this something you've, you've thought about or have any,

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any, uh, thoughts on, on this one?

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I mean, the only thing that really makes sense to me is you have multiple keys and

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you have a threshold that is signing off.

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To say, you know, this key, for whatever reason, we're no longer

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going to be using, you know, it's been compromised, lost, whatever.

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Yeah, and I mean, the complexity there turns into that if you have any sort of

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system that's based on public private key cryptography, you really have to

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secure your private key, basically, because any of the, uh, sort of trade

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offs, I suppose, that, I mean, that doesn't sound, uh, very good, right?

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Like, uh, at least not, it's not a system that works in any kind of automated way.

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Uh, you really, it gets back to the root of the conversation we were having before.

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It's, it's, security is in Your hands.

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And so what, what do you see as, cause with, with Casa and everything

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else that you're involved with, what, what do you see as being the big

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pain points for individuals right now in the Bitcoin space for security?

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It's, I think, an overwhelming concept for most people.

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Um, the root of this is actually just in how we have architected our

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society over the past millennia.

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Um, we have greatly improved our Efficiency and productivity through

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specialization of tasks and skills.

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And so, this is great for the individual in the sense that you

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can spend many years training to be very good at one thing and then get

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paid very well to do that one thing.

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And the result is that you get paid well enough that you can then pay

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many other people to do whatever their specialized tasks are.

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So, now We don't have to worry about growing our own food, for example.

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That was something that took up a lot of people's time for

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most of human civilization.

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Um, so, it's great for efficiency and productivity, but the downside

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is that it introduces a great deal of fragility and systemic risk.

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And, and, you know, what does that really mean?

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Well, it means you're now outsourcing wide swaths of your life, things

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that you're literally dependent upon for survival, you know?

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Um, to trusted third parties.

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So, for example, uh, if the supply chains break down, if your grocery

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store shelves get emptied out, uh, you're gonna have a really tough time,

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you know, getting past that hurdle.

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And so, I think, you know, we, we see some of that, uh, mindset happening

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in the Bitcoin space where people are taking this, you know, idea of self

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sovereignty and, uh, self sufficiency Back to its roots to say, okay, now

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Bitcoin has done so well for me and I've imbued a sense of personal responsibility

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for the financial aspects of my life.

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Why don't I apply that to other aspects of my life so that I and my family and

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more resilient against black swans?

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Well, here, here's the devil's advocate argument against, against doomsday

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prepping, I guess, not, not exactly against what you said, but, like, if

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you have, Instead of doomsday prepping, instead of stacking water and whatever,

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well water is kind of essential, it's stacking toilet paper, let's say.

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Uh, if you stack bitcoin instead, you can trade that for all the

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other shit that other people stack.

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So, uh, there's an argument to be made for the bitcoin being more important.

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And that's an argument I made before on a panel that, like,

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about KYC and why it matters.

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And someone asked me if there are any good reasons for KYC, and I

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simply said no, because I don't understand what it's good for.

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Like, money was invented to enable trade between people

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who didn't know one another, so that's the whole point of money.

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And, uh, which is why I think, sure, buy bitcoins on an exchange

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if you want to, but keep that stack separated from bitcoins you earn.

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And this is something you said on stage two, like, you earn your bitcoin.

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Like.

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Accept them for your goods and services.

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And this is what I say to everyone always, that that's the proper way.

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That's how you keep, that's how you get a non KYC stack.

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So if you need to flee the, uh, people's Republic of Europe in the future and fuck

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off to El Salvador, you can, they can take your fucking toothpaste and you can

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keep your 12 words and, and just do that.

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And part of my French.

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yeah, I mean, this is true both at the individual and corporate level, um,

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you know, we, we have our own corporate treasury at Casa, we have accepted Bitcoin

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from day one, um, and we've also been debanked several times, and thankfully

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we've always been able to find other bank accounts, but in the sort of worst case

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scenario, Hopefully we can start paying at least some, uh, of our providers,

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employees, whatever, uh, in Bitcoin.

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You know, we have that, that separate, you know, sovereign

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runway that we can tap into.

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Yeah.

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I think this, this is the dilemma this generation lives, we're going

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through this transition right now.

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Where we need one foot in each world.

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We need a foot in the old fiat world, because if we don't have any foot there,

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they'll probably come after you somehow.

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And we need a foot in the bitcoin world just to be secure.

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But there's this balancing act all the time, and everyone's

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situation is different.

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But you definitely need both.

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And KYC Bitcoin, or paper Bitcoin if you will, is the legacy world.

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The new world is doing it for real.

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Yeah, and I mean, I think one of the difficulties here, and we heard about

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00:14:51,594 --> 00:14:56,984
this in the previous discussion, this kind of lever, I suppose, between

232
00:14:57,514 --> 00:15:03,634
regulations that force KYC, but it also gets people in to use these

233
00:15:03,634 --> 00:15:06,004
services, like people do use KYC.

234
00:15:06,159 --> 00:15:11,949
Centralized exchanges vastly more than hold their own UTXOs who, or

235
00:15:11,949 --> 00:15:14,749
even, or even just come in through a lightning wallet or something like this.

236
00:15:14,819 --> 00:15:19,229
And so, I mean, KYC really just seems like this, this necessary evil at this point.

237
00:15:19,949 --> 00:15:24,419
But, avoiding it is kind of the, uh, the idea that, uh,

238
00:15:24,659 --> 00:15:26,199
really is the, the de risker.

239
00:15:26,339 --> 00:15:28,489
It, it's the only thing that, that takes away.

240
00:15:28,864 --> 00:15:33,494
All of the possibility of someone coming after you with KYC, and so I

241
00:15:33,494 --> 00:15:39,114
mean, what are your thoughts on that point generally, like, what is the,

242
00:15:39,384 --> 00:15:42,424
uh, is this really a binary thing,

243
00:15:42,697 --> 00:15:44,897
So I think the big problem is that, you know, we're not

244
00:15:44,897 --> 00:15:46,107
on the Bitcoin standard yet.

245
00:15:46,217 --> 00:15:50,657
Uh, it's true both in my personal life and the business life is

246
00:15:50,677 --> 00:15:56,857
that a lot of providers that we pay don't accept Bitcoin.

247
00:15:57,037 --> 00:16:03,447
And, uh, we're not going to try to force them to accept Bitcoin, um, but

248
00:16:04,042 --> 00:16:06,362
Hopefully this will change over time.

249
00:16:06,572 --> 00:16:11,842
Um, as it, as it stands right now, though, uh, we still, we're using

250
00:16:11,842 --> 00:16:13,782
the dollar as our unit of account.

251
00:16:13,822 --> 00:16:18,862
And, uh, uh, I mean, we don't spend our Bitcoin.

252
00:16:18,942 --> 00:16:23,262
Um, it is, it's really, it's the emergency savings account.

253
00:16:23,412 --> 00:16:26,572
It's how we look at it, you know, both at the corporate level and that's how

254
00:16:26,572 --> 00:16:27,642
I look at it at the personal level,

255
00:16:28,927 --> 00:16:33,407
how, um, how is there a KYC process for Casa?

256
00:16:33,984 --> 00:16:35,164
Not for our clients.

257
00:16:35,234 --> 00:16:35,802
for your clients?

258
00:16:35,919 --> 00:16:35,939
No.

259
00:18:05,118 --> 00:18:06,638
so, um, what do you do?

260
00:18:06,868 --> 00:18:09,428
Explain, give the TLDR on how Casa works,

261
00:18:09,623 --> 00:18:10,173
right.

262
00:18:10,253 --> 00:18:15,973
Uh, so, you know, because We are a software wallet provider,

263
00:18:15,993 --> 00:18:19,373
but that, I would say, is not our most valuable service.

264
00:18:19,383 --> 00:18:23,033
Really, uh, I think it makes the most sense to think of us as

265
00:18:23,043 --> 00:18:25,423
a security consulting service.

266
00:18:25,453 --> 00:18:29,113
That's where our kind of unique value proposition lies.

267
00:18:29,393 --> 00:18:31,193
And that's more at our higher tiers.

268
00:18:31,323 --> 00:18:34,503
Like, that's why our more expensive plans are more expensive, is because

269
00:18:34,503 --> 00:18:38,343
what you're doing is you're paying for a personal advisor that you can literally,

270
00:18:38,413 --> 00:18:41,833
you know, get on a call with and talk about whatever you want to talk about.

271
00:18:42,283 --> 00:18:44,923
Um, so, you know, what do we do?

272
00:18:45,083 --> 00:18:50,773
Uh, well, we do provide, you know, native mobile apps, and these are really designed

273
00:18:50,853 --> 00:18:59,363
to guide you in as simple a fashion as possible down the path of building what

274
00:18:59,363 --> 00:19:05,073
we believe is a incredibly strong and robust architecture for self custody.

275
00:19:05,373 --> 00:19:09,943
The short version is of how we think about architecting it is the goal is

276
00:19:09,943 --> 00:19:11,723
to eliminate single points of failure.

277
00:19:12,728 --> 00:19:16,588
So that basically means whenever you have a moving part, you know, something

278
00:19:16,588 --> 00:19:20,628
that could go wrong, there needs to be some sort of backup mechanism

279
00:19:20,628 --> 00:19:25,508
so that when and if that thing fails, you can use something else.

280
00:19:25,518 --> 00:19:29,048
So that's why the main aspect of it is multisig.

281
00:19:29,598 --> 00:19:31,478
Which basically means multiple keys.

282
00:19:31,758 --> 00:19:37,848
So, most of our users are either in a 2 of 3 setup or a 3 of 5 setup.

283
00:19:38,288 --> 00:19:43,398
And these keys are going to be distributed in a number of different ways.

284
00:19:43,778 --> 00:19:48,428
Um, usually you'll have one that is stored, um, actually

285
00:19:48,428 --> 00:19:49,818
on the mobile phone itself.

286
00:19:49,818 --> 00:19:52,608
You know, secured with the secure element and whatever.

287
00:19:52,973 --> 00:19:59,443
The operating system on that device, uh, supports, um, and the, the nice

288
00:19:59,443 --> 00:20:02,893
thing about that key, even though it is weaker, it is a hot key, it's on an

289
00:20:02,903 --> 00:20:08,393
internet connected device, uh, that gives you, uh, additional level of resiliency

290
00:20:08,443 --> 00:20:13,483
against loss, because that key gets automatically encrypted and backed up.

291
00:20:14,043 --> 00:20:20,003
Uh, so it, it's almost impossible to lose your mobile key, uh, in that setup.

292
00:20:20,013 --> 00:20:24,158
Not completely impossible, but Uh, very, very difficult unless you start

293
00:20:24,158 --> 00:20:27,888
mucking around under the hood, you know, in your cloud, uh, backups.

294
00:20:28,468 --> 00:20:33,218
Uh, so then, you know, you're going to have either one or three

295
00:20:33,328 --> 00:20:37,688
other keys, and those are going to be on dedicated hardware devices.

296
00:20:37,708 --> 00:20:42,098
We support, um, you know, Ledger, Trezor, Coldcard.

297
00:20:42,443 --> 00:20:47,983
Um, Passport, several others, really the most popular ones that are well vetted.

298
00:20:48,333 --> 00:20:52,913
And the idea being there that you actually use a diversity

299
00:20:52,913 --> 00:20:54,323
of different manufacturers.

300
00:20:54,613 --> 00:20:58,693
And this is to protect you against edge cases like supply chain risk.

301
00:20:58,733 --> 00:21:03,653
Which has happened from time to time, and uh, we expect will probably

302
00:21:03,653 --> 00:21:07,263
happen More frequently in the future if, you know, the space continues

303
00:21:07,563 --> 00:21:10,243
getting bigger and, uh, worth more.

304
00:21:10,243 --> 00:21:11,673
So, um,

305
00:21:12,418 --> 00:21:15,198
I don't know if we're necessarily going to get exploding hardware

306
00:21:15,198 --> 00:21:16,248
wallets anytime soon though.

307
00:21:16,578 --> 00:21:19,208
Well, keep key sort of exploded.

308
00:21:20,378 --> 00:21:23,838
I was meaning literally, but, uh, sorry, continue.

309
00:21:24,293 --> 00:21:29,053
But so then, uh, the idea is that you physically distribute

310
00:21:29,093 --> 00:21:31,233
these keys geographically.

311
00:21:31,423 --> 00:21:35,733
And, you know, that gives you an additional level of protection against

312
00:21:35,743 --> 00:21:43,773
both physical attackers and against, uh, just extreme Edge cases, house burning

313
00:21:43,773 --> 00:21:46,433
down, natural disasters, whatever.

314
00:21:46,723 --> 00:21:50,113
Um, and, and this is where things get complicated.

315
00:21:50,143 --> 00:21:53,253
And, you know, to be clear, you know, multi signature setup has more moving

316
00:21:53,253 --> 00:21:54,943
pieces than a single signature setup.

317
00:21:55,253 --> 00:21:59,333
So, uh, going into multi sig doesn't automatically make

318
00:21:59,333 --> 00:22:00,743
you safer than single sig.

319
00:22:00,763 --> 00:22:04,513
It's only if you go down the right path of architecting your multi

320
00:22:04,513 --> 00:22:05,873
sig and distributing the keys.

321
00:22:06,243 --> 00:22:09,923
So, um, you know, that's why I think the consulting aspect of this is fairly

322
00:22:09,923 --> 00:22:13,053
important because you can still shoot yourself in the foot and, you know,

323
00:22:13,083 --> 00:22:16,543
put all three of your multi sig devices in your house, for example, and you

324
00:22:16,543 --> 00:22:18,123
create a single point of failure.

325
00:22:18,543 --> 00:22:26,203
So, um, yeah, the, the idea is that you have a great deal of flexibility

326
00:22:26,363 --> 00:22:29,863
and decisions that you can make and how you distribute those keys.

327
00:22:29,873 --> 00:22:34,553
So you can distribute them amongst semi trusted friends and family.

328
00:22:35,893 --> 00:22:39,763
At the extreme end, we have people who are most concerned

329
00:22:39,763 --> 00:22:41,473
about nation state resistance.

330
00:22:41,523 --> 00:22:46,023
So if you really want to Then you can make, you know, pretty much all

331
00:22:46,023 --> 00:22:49,863
of these decisions are trade offs between convenience, uh, and security.

332
00:22:50,183 --> 00:22:54,653
And so the extreme end of security, with very, very low convenience, is that we

333
00:22:54,653 --> 00:22:59,553
have some clients who literally distribute their keys in different countries, you

334
00:22:59,553 --> 00:23:03,648
know, preferably different countries Aren't on very good terms with each other.

335
00:23:04,008 --> 00:23:07,608
Uh, so you, you, you essentially have that, uh, jurisdictional arbitrage.

336
00:23:07,878 --> 00:23:10,818
But of course the downside is, uh, you know, some of our clients

337
00:23:11,028 --> 00:23:14,718
literally have to get on a plane or a boat or, or what have you, uh, in

338
00:23:14,718 --> 00:23:18,738
order to reach a sufficient quorum of their keys, uh, to sign with them.

339
00:23:19,088 --> 00:23:22,908
And then finally, uh, the last key is, uh, Casa.

340
00:23:23,238 --> 00:23:27,398
Emergency recovery key that's held offline, incredibly

341
00:23:27,458 --> 00:23:29,578
difficult to get access to.

342
00:23:29,578 --> 00:23:34,468
You basically have to request a signature from CASA and then depending

343
00:23:34,468 --> 00:23:38,708
upon what your tier is, you have different levels of authentication.

344
00:23:38,708 --> 00:23:42,508
At our higher level tiers, we can do some extreme customization of what

345
00:23:42,508 --> 00:23:44,518
your authentication parameters are.

346
00:23:44,928 --> 00:23:48,478
And does this involve calling a very special phone number and asking

347
00:23:48,478 --> 00:23:50,178
for a very special vacuum cleaner?

348
00:23:51,658 --> 00:23:58,518
you know, we, we, we can in fact set up, uh, For example, instructions of like,

349
00:23:58,528 --> 00:24:04,248
you know, if you request a key, then we call or reach out to some other contact.

350
00:24:04,558 --> 00:24:10,078
Um, you know, we also have, um, on the higher tiers, uh, emergency lockdown,

351
00:24:10,258 --> 00:24:15,948
uh, mechanisms where Um, you can specify ahead of time what actions we should

352
00:24:15,958 --> 00:24:19,158
take if you hit the big red button to do an emergency lockdown on your

353
00:24:20,445 --> 00:24:27,805
Yeah, well, so, and on a practical level, the main thing here is that in a 2 or 3

354
00:24:27,815 --> 00:24:32,035
setup, if I'm counting correctly, this means it's one physical key, one mobile

355
00:24:32,035 --> 00:24:33,985
key, and one emergency key, right?

356
00:24:34,045 --> 00:24:38,605
Yeah, we also support two physical keys if you want that, because there is a little

357
00:24:38,635 --> 00:24:43,405
bit of trust, like, if you don't want to trust that Casa isn't, you know, stealing

358
00:24:43,405 --> 00:24:44,885
the mobile key out of the app, then

359
00:24:44,885 --> 00:24:46,855
you can use two hardware devices.

360
00:24:46,995 --> 00:24:50,350
Like I said, the downside there is that you More responsibility,

361
00:24:50,710 --> 00:24:53,470
uh, falls onto your shoulders to make sure you have good backups.

362
00:24:53,785 --> 00:24:56,505
So to clarify that, that's still a three out of five

363
00:24:56,995 --> 00:24:59,175
multisig, but you own two keys.

364
00:24:59,810 --> 00:25:00,980
And Cass Owens too.

365
00:25:01,130 --> 00:25:03,030
uh, well that was the two of three.

366
00:25:03,320 --> 00:25:04,510
The two of three setup.

367
00:25:04,650 --> 00:25:07,780
Okay, okay, so, alright, I'm already lost here.

368
00:25:08,015 --> 00:25:11,695
So you can do a 2 or 3 with, uh, would you take out the mobile app, or

369
00:25:11,695 --> 00:25:13,325
would you take out the emergency key?

370
00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:14,040
the mobile app.

371
00:25:14,360 --> 00:25:16,050
Yeah, there's always the emergency key.

372
00:25:16,140 --> 00:25:16,740
Alright, alright.

373
00:25:16,865 --> 00:25:16,975
yeah.

374
00:25:17,735 --> 00:25:18,715
I didn't know about that, actually.

375
00:25:18,715 --> 00:25:19,505
That's an interesting one.

376
00:25:19,505 --> 00:25:22,625
And then I guess the 305 is a whole other level.

377
00:25:22,625 --> 00:25:24,375
Yeah, we'll just keep Knut

378
00:25:24,400 --> 00:25:27,260
But it's, it's, yeah, yeah, you're the organized one and all that.

379
00:25:27,260 --> 00:25:33,060
But like, what I'm seeing is like, uh, uh, is this a setup, uh, a three out

380
00:25:33,060 --> 00:25:37,900
of five where, where Casa owns two of the keys and, uh, you own two of them.

381
00:25:38,360 --> 00:25:40,030
Like, or is that,

382
00:25:40,560 --> 00:25:42,700
It depends on what you think of as own.

383
00:25:42,700 --> 00:25:44,030
Uh, if you're, if you're

384
00:25:44,050 --> 00:25:44,250
being

385
00:25:44,260 --> 00:25:46,190
yeah, You can't really own a key at all.

386
00:25:46,280 --> 00:25:47,920
It's all you can do is memorize it.

387
00:25:47,920 --> 00:25:48,170
So,

388
00:25:48,340 --> 00:25:54,345
uh, well from, from Casa's perspective, we don't have We don't touch your mobile

389
00:25:54,345 --> 00:25:58,635
key, you know, like, it stays on your device, uh, the encrypted, the way the

390
00:25:58,635 --> 00:26:05,995
encrypted backup works is that, um, a, an encryption key is generated on your device

391
00:26:05,995 --> 00:26:08,925
that encrypts your mobile key seed phrase.

392
00:26:09,305 --> 00:26:13,965
The encrypted blob then gets stored onto your cloud storage, so even if

393
00:26:13,965 --> 00:26:17,955
your cloud storage gets compromised by Apple or Google, they can't do

394
00:26:17,955 --> 00:26:19,615
anything with it because it's encrypted.

395
00:26:20,015 --> 00:26:25,935
The decryption key then gets sent to Casa and secured by an HSM that Casa

396
00:26:25,955 --> 00:26:30,965
controls, so it's kind of like a two of two setup, so, you know, if you lose

397
00:26:30,965 --> 00:26:35,670
your phone, if you get a new phone, What happens is you have to log into your

398
00:26:35,670 --> 00:26:40,750
Casa app and have to log into your cloud account and then what it does is it pulls

399
00:26:40,770 --> 00:26:46,160
both of those, the encrypted blob and the decryption key together onto your

400
00:26:46,160 --> 00:26:47,820
device to be able to reconstitute it.

401
00:26:49,585 --> 00:26:53,955
So it semi literally is that your phone is another hardware

402
00:26:53,955 --> 00:26:55,105
wallet with a fancy screen.

403
00:26:55,265 --> 00:26:55,575
Semi

404
00:26:55,780 --> 00:26:59,550
Yeah, yeah, yeah, it uses the hardware, the secure element that's built into

405
00:26:59,550 --> 00:27:04,180
your smartphone and like, that's another Another one of our major theses,

406
00:27:04,240 --> 00:27:10,320
uh, you know, going forward is, um, that secure elements on phones are

407
00:27:10,340 --> 00:27:16,050
going to make, you know, application of cryptography more practical.

408
00:27:16,680 --> 00:27:21,780
Um, this is something where, you know, when, um, when smartphones

409
00:27:21,810 --> 00:27:27,785
came out, And they made, uh, GPS available to the average person.

410
00:27:27,825 --> 00:27:31,005
You know, that's when a lot of apps like ride sharing actually became

411
00:27:31,165 --> 00:27:35,565
practical and a whole new sort of economy, uh, bloomed from that.

412
00:27:35,845 --> 00:27:41,315
And we think that the proliferation of secure elements on smartphones

413
00:27:41,375 --> 00:27:46,045
is gonna enable, uh, another sort of blossoming of new applications.

414
00:27:46,340 --> 00:27:50,950
Okay, let's take a, like, a little dip into this particular rabbit hole.

415
00:27:50,950 --> 00:27:53,840
What is a secure element and why are they prolifer

416
00:27:55,389 --> 00:28:01,569
Yeah, so, I mean, it's basically, uh, you know, a A chip, a piece of silicon

417
00:28:01,629 --> 00:28:07,279
that is in your device that is dedicated to really doing nothing more than

418
00:28:07,669 --> 00:28:10,089
keeping small pieces of data secure.

419
00:28:10,869 --> 00:28:16,199
Basically, keeping the data in that chip and not allowing it to be extracted.

420
00:28:16,579 --> 00:28:20,929
And then, you know, at the sort of application programming layer,

421
00:28:20,929 --> 00:28:23,579
you know, the operating system can interface with that chip.

422
00:28:24,144 --> 00:28:28,584
It provides APIs to higher level applications that can then request

423
00:28:28,614 --> 00:28:31,804
to interact with the chip, but there's no way for them to request

424
00:28:31,814 --> 00:28:34,074
to actually extract the data.

425
00:28:34,084 --> 00:28:38,344
You can only, you know, send requests to, uh, to actually make

426
00:28:38,354 --> 00:28:40,014
use of whatever is in that chip.

427
00:28:40,444 --> 00:28:47,374
So, um, I don't know the detailed history of how this came about being, but I

428
00:28:47,374 --> 00:28:52,444
suspect it was probably just related to, uh, The fact that, um, phones

429
00:28:52,674 --> 00:28:57,304
need to have some ability to do secure operations, whether that's like the

430
00:28:57,304 --> 00:29:03,044
biometrics of unlocking the phone itself, or, um, you know, commonly with the,

431
00:29:03,064 --> 00:29:07,114
the key rings, uh, password management at the operating system level, they're

432
00:29:07,114 --> 00:29:08,584
going to make use of secure elements.

433
00:29:08,824 --> 00:29:12,824
So, it's just, um, you know, it's a, you can think of it as

434
00:29:12,864 --> 00:29:17,902
a, um, hardware security device that's just built into the phone.

435
00:29:18,612 --> 00:29:22,812
So does every phone on the market today have a secure element or like almost

436
00:29:22,882 --> 00:29:25,772
I think some of the cheaper Android phones do not.

437
00:29:26,222 --> 00:29:32,352
Uh, pretty much all of the iPhones should, uh, any of the, uh, Android

438
00:29:32,352 --> 00:29:35,642
phones that are like more than a few hundred dollars should have secure

439
00:29:35,692 --> 00:29:42,319
Yeah, so, so, Samsung, Google, what about something like Xiaomi, isn't

440
00:29:42,319 --> 00:29:44,249
that the cheap Chinese version of

441
00:29:44,399 --> 00:29:44,659
Yeah,

442
00:29:44,659 --> 00:29:44,759
I

443
00:29:44,769 --> 00:29:48,419
don't know, off the top of my head, I know that we have, Um

444
00:29:48,491 --> 00:29:49,454
fun staying poor.

445
00:29:49,984 --> 00:29:55,884
We have, you know, specific things that we require to be, you know, enabled

446
00:29:55,894 --> 00:29:59,694
at the hardware and operating system level on Android phones in order

447
00:29:59,694 --> 00:30:02,014
for the Casa app to actually run.

448
00:30:02,569 --> 00:30:06,899
Is this, uh, that you can't even install it if your phone doesn't

449
00:30:06,899 --> 00:30:09,739
have these capabilities or you just don't get the mobile key option?

450
00:30:11,164 --> 00:30:14,184
Uh, I think the app probably refuses to run at all.

451
00:30:14,254 --> 00:30:17,374
Uh, it's, but it's not even an issue that I think we've ever had come

452
00:30:17,374 --> 00:30:20,114
up because it's only really the cheapest and cheapest of phones.

453
00:30:20,374 --> 00:30:22,814
So I think that the people that are using those phones probably wouldn't be able

454
00:30:22,814 --> 00:30:24,424
to afford our service in the first place.

455
00:30:25,551 --> 00:30:26,461
Okay, um,

456
00:30:28,631 --> 00:30:30,521
yeah, that's what I was going at, you executed better.

457
00:30:30,801 --> 00:30:35,091
Um, the, the, returning back a little bit to something else

458
00:30:35,091 --> 00:30:36,161
you mentioned was backups.

459
00:30:36,461 --> 00:30:40,511
And a system like multisig generally, but I think slightly more like

460
00:30:40,511 --> 00:30:44,151
CASA specifically, uh, one of the features that I understand about this

461
00:30:44,161 --> 00:30:47,351
is that you don't really actually need to backup your seed phrase.

462
00:30:47,571 --> 00:30:52,611
It's, the idea is you lose a key, well, then you just reconstitute your

463
00:30:52,691 --> 00:30:55,474
multisig Is that, is that the solution?

464
00:30:55,504 --> 00:30:56,524
Am I, am I getting that right?

465
00:30:57,280 --> 00:31:01,430
Yeah, so part of it is due to the nature of the automatic backups, right?

466
00:31:01,430 --> 00:31:03,990
So if you're using the mobile key, that's automatically backed up.

467
00:31:04,010 --> 00:31:07,360
The CASA key, of course, has multiple redundant backups.

468
00:31:07,640 --> 00:31:11,200
And so then the question is, what's the state of your other keys?

469
00:31:11,470 --> 00:31:16,860
Now, in a 3 of 5, you do probably want to back up one of the hardware devices so

470
00:31:16,860 --> 00:31:19,905
that you have That threshold, uh, setup.

471
00:31:20,155 --> 00:31:24,495
So basically because the, uh, the extreme edge case failure scenario in

472
00:31:24,495 --> 00:31:27,935
a 3 of 5 is like some Carrington event.

473
00:31:28,195 --> 00:31:33,095
Just wipes out all of your electronics and wipes out all of your hardware devices.

474
00:31:33,105 --> 00:31:36,705
So if you didn't have some sort of offline backup, then you would

475
00:31:37,335 --> 00:31:40,275
be down to two keys, which is problematic when you need three.

476
00:31:40,455 --> 00:31:46,935
Um, so, um, you know, it's still, it's It's always preferable, I think, to

477
00:31:46,935 --> 00:31:51,945
have backups, but this is what it comes down to, this, you know, convenience

478
00:31:52,005 --> 00:31:57,215
trade off of what are people willing to do, because especially creating steel

479
00:31:57,225 --> 00:32:01,155
backups can be a pain, uh, especially if you're doing the stamping type of

480
00:32:01,165 --> 00:32:02,895
backups, I really hate doing those.

481
00:32:03,285 --> 00:32:03,695
But,

482
00:32:03,885 --> 00:32:04,875
You need a good hammer.

483
00:32:05,445 --> 00:32:11,535
the nice thing, though, about having, uh, like, metal backups that are part of a

484
00:32:11,535 --> 00:32:17,830
multi sig wallet, So, Is that you don't have to worry about a physical, like an

485
00:32:17,840 --> 00:32:21,780
evil maid attack, or a physical attacker getting a hold of one of those backups.

486
00:32:21,780 --> 00:32:25,220
As long as they're geographically distributed, because if they

487
00:32:25,220 --> 00:32:27,710
get one of your seed phrases, they can't actually do anything.

488
00:32:28,275 --> 00:32:33,335
This is, those metal plates, uh, I think there's around 70 companies making them.

489
00:32:33,540 --> 00:32:33,690
At

490
00:32:33,935 --> 00:32:41,255
And, and, um, uh, so, so disclaimer, we're we're sponsored by one of them, So anyway,

491
00:32:41,615 --> 00:32:48,495
uh, the, the, the whole thing, I, I think that paradigm is, I'm not entirely sure

492
00:32:48,495 --> 00:32:53,145
that it will be the same way in a hundred years from now because it's such a while.

493
00:32:53,145 --> 00:32:56,325
It, it provides you with another level of security.

494
00:32:56,325 --> 00:33:00,245
It also, it also provides you with an extra attack vector because once you've.

495
00:33:00,715 --> 00:33:02,315
Put the seed on the plate.

496
00:33:02,325 --> 00:33:03,845
It's kind of hard to destroy the plate.

497
00:33:03,855 --> 00:33:04,745
That's the whole point.

498
00:33:04,775 --> 00:33:05,895
Like a piece of,

499
00:33:06,250 --> 00:33:07,200
about that recently.

500
00:33:07,365 --> 00:33:08,235
Oh, Oh, you did.

501
00:33:08,475 --> 00:33:08,785
Okay.

502
00:33:08,785 --> 00:33:09,615
Can you go into that?

503
00:33:09,945 --> 00:33:13,355
Like, that's a reason to prefer a piece of paper with,

504
00:33:13,720 --> 00:33:15,430
Um, no, not necessarily.

505
00:33:15,430 --> 00:33:16,910
Not if you choose the right backup.

506
00:33:17,170 --> 00:33:21,640
Um, so the short version, the takeaway from my presentation, because as you

507
00:33:21,640 --> 00:33:25,050
know, one of my many projects was, like, destroying all of these metal

508
00:33:25,355 --> 00:33:25,685
Oh yeah.

509
00:33:25,685 --> 00:33:26,005
Yeah.

510
00:33:26,095 --> 00:33:26,765
Remember that?

511
00:33:26,895 --> 00:33:27,915
How robust are they?

512
00:33:28,625 --> 00:33:34,045
Um, and so, uh, recently, like in the past year, I had a situation where

513
00:33:34,045 --> 00:33:36,395
I needed to destroy a metal backup.

514
00:33:36,515 --> 00:33:40,705
Um, because, uh, I wanted to split it.

515
00:33:40,845 --> 00:33:43,635
I wanted to split it and, you know, seedsore it, basically,

516
00:33:43,715 --> 00:33:45,010
into multiple, uh, pieces.

517
00:33:45,170 --> 00:33:50,480
Backups, so that there was no single point of failure, um, and what I determined

518
00:33:50,560 --> 00:33:57,350
was that, uh, that actually, like, my, my general advice on backups, which is to

519
00:33:57,350 --> 00:34:01,990
use, like, a single steel plate with the center punch, the, the divot mechanism,

520
00:34:02,470 --> 00:34:06,690
um, it turns out those are actually the best, not only for creating, but also for

521
00:34:06,690 --> 00:34:12,220
destroying, because, um, I had, uh, I had both a stamped, you know, letter stamped

522
00:34:12,240 --> 00:34:15,740
backup, and I had an etched backup.

523
00:34:16,390 --> 00:34:20,600
And when I went to destroy them, I mean, you can't actually

524
00:34:20,600 --> 00:34:23,040
destroy the media that it's on.

525
00:34:23,290 --> 00:34:27,230
Um, you know, you'd probably have to have like a furnace that does 5,

526
00:34:27,230 --> 00:34:30,240
000 or 10, 000 degrees or something in order to be able to melt it.

527
00:34:30,610 --> 00:34:32,430
Uh, and, and, you know, destroy the whole thing.

528
00:34:32,640 --> 00:34:37,140
So instead, what you end up doing is, uh, you know, trying to overwrite

529
00:34:37,160 --> 00:34:39,510
or erase or you make it illegible.

530
00:34:39,840 --> 00:34:42,370
And so on the stamp one, I'd have to like, you know, hit, uh, I had

531
00:34:42,370 --> 00:34:45,710
to put 50 different stamps in the same spot so that like each letter

532
00:34:45,710 --> 00:34:48,140
was just completely, uh, illegible.

533
00:34:48,480 --> 00:34:53,610
Uh, and then, you know, with the etched one, I had to, you know, put on my, uh,

534
00:34:54,430 --> 00:34:59,210
my ear protection and get out the Dremel and just sit there for like an hour, back

535
00:34:59,210 --> 00:35:01,040
and forth, back and forth, back and forth.

536
00:35:01,250 --> 00:35:04,970
It was extremely unpleasant to go through both of these.

537
00:35:05,240 --> 00:35:09,550
And then I realized, well, if you have the grid with the straight

538
00:35:09,550 --> 00:35:13,940
punches on them, You just punch every other, you know, part of the grid.

539
00:35:13,940 --> 00:35:17,120
It takes, like, two or three minutes, and you're done.

540
00:35:17,190 --> 00:35:21,410
It's, it's become similarly illegible because you can't tell the difference

541
00:35:21,420 --> 00:35:24,230
between, like, what the original divots were and what the new divots are.

542
00:35:24,570 --> 00:35:30,980
And there's no, like, carbon 14 method of, of, of, like, figuring

543
00:35:30,980 --> 00:35:32,940
out the age of each punch, I guess.

544
00:35:33,050 --> 00:35:33,960
I doubt it.

545
00:35:34,050 --> 00:35:37,770
I mean, maybe a nation state attacker might be able to

546
00:35:37,770 --> 00:35:39,175
do something on that level.

547
00:35:39,175 --> 00:35:40,000
But, yeah, I'm a Bitcoin

548
00:35:40,365 --> 00:35:43,735
Yeah, because it's funny that you mentioned, well not funny, but you

549
00:35:43,735 --> 00:35:46,505
mentioned nation state attacker, because one of the concepts in cyber

550
00:35:46,505 --> 00:35:51,235
security basically is that somebody with unlimited resources and unlimited time

551
00:35:51,575 --> 00:35:57,105
will actually defeat you, will actually defeat you, and so it's really about

552
00:35:57,185 --> 00:36:00,625
putting up as much, as many barriers as possible, but also not putting up

553
00:36:01,220 --> 00:36:02,870
Being a target, not becoming a target.

554
00:36:03,140 --> 00:36:06,050
And so this is, yeah, well maybe we'll get back to some of

555
00:36:06,050 --> 00:36:07,490
these other, uh, points here.

556
00:36:07,490 --> 00:36:09,440
But this is a whole other rabbit hole, basically.

557
00:36:09,770 --> 00:36:14,300
The, uh, the whole thing of, of OPSEC in, uh, in the physical security world,

558
00:36:14,300 --> 00:36:18,230
basically for, for Bitcoiners these days, I mean, literally everyone who is a public

559
00:36:18,380 --> 00:36:23,330
bitcoiners is now a target to some degree, as in they probably have some Bitcoin.

560
00:36:23,720 --> 00:36:25,670
Uh, now, I mean, who knows?

561
00:36:25,670 --> 00:36:28,790
Maybe, maybe, maybe Newton and I, uh, really have zero Satoshis between the

562
00:36:28,790 --> 00:36:30,050
two of us, and we're just, I don't know.

563
00:36:30,310 --> 00:36:31,020
Of course we don't,

564
00:36:31,540 --> 00:36:34,770
And neither does Jameson, the most famous Bitcoin privacy

565
00:36:35,035 --> 00:36:38,515
you, you, you only have a Bitcoin test, net Bitcoin, but, uh, right.

566
00:36:38,780 --> 00:36:40,460
testnet whale.

567
00:36:40,625 --> 00:36:40,775
yeah.

568
00:36:40,775 --> 00:36:41,015
Yes.

569
00:36:41,042 --> 00:36:41,435
Very good.

570
00:36:41,435 --> 00:36:41,825
Very good.

571
00:36:41,825 --> 00:36:42,275
There you go.

572
00:36:42,395 --> 00:36:42,725
There you go.

573
00:36:42,725 --> 00:36:43,535
That's good to, yeah.

574
00:36:43,805 --> 00:36:47,195
Uh, but, but, uh, so, so the thing is, what, what are the, what are the concerns

575
00:36:47,195 --> 00:36:51,395
about, uh, opsec basically, and what are some of the ways that, that an individual

576
00:36:51,395 --> 00:36:55,265
can, can, uh, increase their privacy?

577
00:36:55,655 --> 00:36:56,495
Um, what is it?

578
00:36:56,495 --> 00:36:57,755
Minimize their privacy footprint.

579
00:36:57,755 --> 00:36:59,255
I'm trying to footprint something

580
00:36:59,330 --> 00:37:00,040
Oh yeah, yeah,

581
00:37:00,430 --> 00:37:00,740
yeah.

582
00:37:00,970 --> 00:37:02,150
Decrease their

583
00:37:02,415 --> 00:37:03,735
decrease your privacy

584
00:37:04,040 --> 00:37:07,790
Not your privacy, privacy footprint is sort of an oxymoron, isn't

585
00:37:07,830 --> 00:37:08,880
It's something like that.

586
00:37:09,215 --> 00:37:10,315
Yeah, just your footprint in

587
00:37:10,315 --> 00:37:13,865
general, whether it's online or meatspace.

588
00:37:17,945 --> 00:37:22,435
The right way to approach it is to not make the mistake that

589
00:37:22,435 --> 00:37:26,035
we've all made, which is to use our real names and faces, uh,

590
00:37:26,045 --> 00:37:27,935
when you're talking about Bitcoin.

591
00:37:28,305 --> 00:37:31,405
Uh, so, you know, the best way to do it is really to take the Satoshi

592
00:37:31,415 --> 00:37:35,225
method of, like, if you really want to engage in the space, then just use

593
00:37:35,225 --> 00:37:40,520
a nym and, you know, don't reveal Uh, personal identifiable information.

594
00:37:41,050 --> 00:37:45,820
Uh, but if you do start to reveal aspects of yourself, then you have to

595
00:37:45,820 --> 00:37:49,780
understand that they probably can and will be used against you at some point.

596
00:37:50,120 --> 00:37:54,950
So now you have to start thinking more adversarially about how might it be used

597
00:37:54,950 --> 00:38:01,130
against you, and, uh, what what types of attacks might people use against you,

598
00:38:01,130 --> 00:38:06,530
how, How difficult is it to find you on a day to day basis when you might

599
00:38:06,890 --> 00:38:08,880
have your guard down and be vulnerable?

600
00:38:08,920 --> 00:38:13,610
Um, you know, just a couple of days ago, the CEO of a company in Toronto

601
00:38:13,850 --> 00:38:17,630
got kidnapped in broad daylight, probably as he was, like, leaving

602
00:38:17,640 --> 00:38:22,020
his company headquarters, um, and was held ransom for a million dollars.

603
00:38:22,480 --> 00:38:23,430
Oh, yeah, yeah.

604
00:38:24,330 --> 00:38:25,960
There's a flip side to that coin, though.

605
00:38:26,030 --> 00:38:29,170
They can be used against you, but they can also be used for you.

606
00:38:29,280 --> 00:38:33,300
Like, there's a point to being public, too.

607
00:38:33,330 --> 00:38:37,035
Like, there's a security, even a security point to it, because you have

608
00:38:37,695 --> 00:38:42,395
The more powerful friends you are, the more protected you are by them.

609
00:38:42,465 --> 00:38:45,805
Or say if you run into legal trouble, you have a

610
00:38:45,850 --> 00:38:48,590
Yeah, reputation, Reputation is a form of currency,

611
00:38:48,675 --> 00:38:49,155
it is.

612
00:38:50,135 --> 00:38:52,715
And I think that's important going into the future too.

613
00:38:52,715 --> 00:38:57,515
Like, reputational capital is like the only, that is the second best.

614
00:38:57,535 --> 00:39:01,295
Like, there is a second best, and it's your reputational capital, I

615
00:39:01,350 --> 00:39:01,790
Fair.

616
00:39:02,920 --> 00:39:07,950
So, are there any other practical things that people can do other than

617
00:39:08,590 --> 00:39:10,750
trying to not use their real identity?

618
00:39:10,750 --> 00:39:14,490
Like, what if somebody has made this mistake, like all of us?

619
00:39:15,600 --> 00:39:21,420
Uh, yeah, so If you're worried about wrench attacks, then you

620
00:39:21,470 --> 00:39:26,640
need to look into how difficult it is to find where you live.

621
00:39:26,950 --> 00:39:30,270
Because that's where most people are going to get targeted.

622
00:39:30,700 --> 00:39:32,630
People tend to feel safe in their home.

623
00:39:33,280 --> 00:39:36,700
And so then, if it's easy to find where you live, and this is

624
00:39:36,700 --> 00:39:41,160
going to vary depending on if you own publicly registered property

625
00:39:41,170 --> 00:39:45,820
versus renting, it's going to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction

626
00:39:45,830 --> 00:39:50,280
depending upon the laws there, like, don't live in Sweden, for example.

627
00:39:50,805 --> 00:39:53,145
I took that security measure.

628
00:39:53,215 --> 00:39:53,565
Yeah.

629
00:39:54,380 --> 00:39:57,660
because they require you to publish everything, is my understanding.

630
00:39:57,670 --> 00:40:03,650
And so Um, you know, if, if you're going to choose to live in a place where you

631
00:40:03,650 --> 00:40:08,210
can't have privacy, then hopefully you can have stronger physical security.

632
00:40:08,660 --> 00:40:15,880
Um, but I think a lot of people in this space have not properly prepared

633
00:40:15,880 --> 00:40:19,980
their physical security commensurate to their risk profile, especially

634
00:40:20,050 --> 00:40:21,850
those of us who are higher profile.

635
00:40:22,030 --> 00:40:27,740
Like, Look, Michael Saylor, he has a correct level of security.

636
00:40:27,820 --> 00:40:34,130
I have seen it with my own eyes, but I think a lot of other of us who aren't

637
00:40:34,130 --> 00:40:39,370
quite at that level do not have the right level of security, and that's why I think

638
00:40:39,370 --> 00:40:43,540
that we're going to keep seeing these physical attacks happening and actually

639
00:40:43,540 --> 00:40:45,760
accelerate along with the exchange rates.

640
00:40:46,230 --> 00:40:51,560
Because, this is the nature of security, you know, as, as the, the value of

641
00:40:51,600 --> 00:40:55,380
targets continues to increase, then it's going to attract more attention

642
00:40:55,380 --> 00:40:59,560
from the criminal element who are going to want to test the waters and figure

643
00:40:59,560 --> 00:41:04,450
out what is the return on investment of, uh, trying out these new attacks.

644
00:41:05,075 --> 00:41:05,315
Yeah.

645
00:41:05,865 --> 00:41:07,285
So two things there.

646
00:41:07,305 --> 00:41:12,455
First of all, inflation fixes the, the, uh, uh, 5 wrench attack because

647
00:41:12,455 --> 00:41:14,315
no one can afford a 5 wrench anymore.

648
00:41:14,715 --> 00:41:18,045
Uh, but the other thing that I want to double click on is the Sweden thing.

649
00:41:18,545 --> 00:41:22,835
Uh, the whole thing that lead led up to that you having to reveal

650
00:41:22,945 --> 00:41:26,305
basically everything in Sweden is something called Offentlighetsprincipen

651
00:41:26,615 --> 00:41:28,425
which is like comes from.

652
00:41:29,320 --> 00:41:32,210
The fact that the country hasn't been at war for like

653
00:41:32,220 --> 00:41:34,340
300 years, officially at least.

654
00:41:35,610 --> 00:41:42,135
And so this has led to an extremely high trust in institution, but also In

655
00:41:42,135 --> 00:41:47,975
the institutions trusting the people to a large extent, so the whole point

656
00:41:47,985 --> 00:41:51,915
of that law is to make everything transparent, including all the government

657
00:41:51,925 --> 00:41:54,095
stuff, which is the good part about it.

658
00:41:54,465 --> 00:41:59,325
What they leave out is like, in the internet age, it's super

659
00:41:59,325 --> 00:42:03,465
dangerous, because all the data is there, you can see exactly how much

660
00:42:03,515 --> 00:42:04,965
people own and where they live.

661
00:42:05,410 --> 00:42:09,130
And you can, and now when crime rates are skyrocketing in

662
00:42:09,130 --> 00:42:11,270
Sweden, it's, it's extra bad.

663
00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:15,000
And there, there are some cases of, of, of people having been

664
00:42:15,000 --> 00:42:16,760
attacked and it's been quite nasty.

665
00:42:17,260 --> 00:42:20,920
So, uh, it's not a recommended practice.

666
00:42:21,253 --> 00:42:26,738
Yeah, so unfortunately, like, you have to get adversarial and, uh, Preferably,

667
00:42:26,738 --> 00:42:32,668
you know, find someone like a private investigator, someone who is, uh, used

668
00:42:32,668 --> 00:42:37,788
to tracking people down for a living and figure out like how hard is it to track

669
00:42:37,798 --> 00:42:42,738
you down because if someone, I would say in the United States, for example,

670
00:42:42,748 --> 00:42:46,928
you can track most people down for 50 bucks and that's just due to the level

671
00:42:46,938 --> 00:42:51,378
of corporate surveillance that happens in America, uh, with data brokers, uh,

672
00:42:51,738 --> 00:42:56,178
Uh, you know, you, you pay 50 bucks to any of these data brokers and you

673
00:42:56,178 --> 00:43:00,958
can find almost anybody who is like living a default American lifestyle.

674
00:43:02,703 --> 00:43:03,403
That was scary.

675
00:43:03,483 --> 00:43:08,143
Is there anything that can be done on the Bitcoin layer to solve this?

676
00:43:08,503 --> 00:43:14,973
Anything that would minimize the effects of one of these 5 wrench attacks?

677
00:43:16,168 --> 00:43:23,148
Well, yes, uh, though, uh, some people get a little bit confused because I think

678
00:43:23,148 --> 00:43:25,878
they conflate two separate problems.

679
00:43:26,208 --> 00:43:29,878
There is the problem of securing your Bitcoin.

680
00:43:30,318 --> 00:43:32,168
And then there's the problem of securing your Bitcoin.

681
00:43:32,418 --> 00:43:33,498
Your physical body.

682
00:43:34,298 --> 00:43:38,468
Uh, so, um, you know, this is one of the big pushbacks that I get, uh,

683
00:43:38,478 --> 00:43:42,398
when I, I talk to people like about multisig and about Casa and they're

684
00:43:42,418 --> 00:43:46,928
like, well, but they can, even if I have my keys geographically distributed,

685
00:43:46,938 --> 00:43:50,858
you know, they can torture me or, uh, they can take my child hostage

686
00:43:50,868 --> 00:43:54,218
and hold them ransom and, and then I have to go around and I'm like, yes.

687
00:43:54,608 --> 00:43:55,948
Like we, we cannot.

688
00:43:56,523 --> 00:43:59,063
We can't protect you against the single point of failure

689
00:43:59,063 --> 00:44:00,943
that is our physical forms.

690
00:44:01,033 --> 00:44:04,313
Maybe in a hundred years we'll be able to have, you know, some

691
00:44:04,323 --> 00:44:07,168
sort of Transhumanism stuff,

692
00:44:07,278 --> 00:44:11,908
yeah, but as of today, yeah, single point of failure in your body, and

693
00:44:11,908 --> 00:44:17,708
so that is a very different type of security that has, you know, different

694
00:44:17,708 --> 00:44:22,148
solutions that you should put into place in addition to securing your bitcoin.

695
00:44:22,958 --> 00:44:25,528
So, you know, the short version is how do you protect against

696
00:44:25,568 --> 00:44:27,148
a five dollar wrench attack?

697
00:44:27,188 --> 00:44:32,378
Well, the only way to do that, when you're focused on your Bitcoin

698
00:44:32,388 --> 00:44:36,378
security, is to understand that your body is a single point of failure.

699
00:44:36,848 --> 00:44:43,063
And so, if you can be coerced, into sending your bitcoin because

700
00:44:43,063 --> 00:44:46,903
you're being tortured or whatever, then that's going to happen.

701
00:44:47,383 --> 00:44:51,923
Uh, so, that's why it's important, if you want to be protected against

702
00:44:51,923 --> 00:44:55,873
this, is to put your keys, like, sufficiently far enough away and in

703
00:44:55,873 --> 00:44:59,983
different physical security setups that it's just not feasible for an

704
00:45:00,043 --> 00:45:02,023
attacker to coerce you into doing that.

705
00:45:02,333 --> 00:45:06,593
Because they would literally have to take you hostage and keep you for a long time.

706
00:45:06,593 --> 00:45:08,813
And like attackers don't want to have to do that.

707
00:45:08,813 --> 00:45:09,823
They want to be in and out as

708
00:45:09,903 --> 00:45:13,093
No, no, taking you hostage and then putting you on a plane and

709
00:45:13,093 --> 00:45:14,673
sitting next to you is kind of hard.

710
00:45:14,863 --> 00:45:19,403
We're having to get through like security to get into a safety deposit box at a

711
00:45:19,403 --> 00:45:24,293
bank or some sort of other high security institution where you might keep one key.

712
00:45:24,573 --> 00:45:32,433
Um, but yeah, so the, the flip side of that, of course, is that, um, if it's,

713
00:45:32,493 --> 00:45:37,453
if it's a loved one who has been taken hostage, then, uh, you are perfectly

714
00:45:37,453 --> 00:45:41,533
capable of going around and doing those things, and so that's why, you know,

715
00:45:41,533 --> 00:45:46,283
you need a different set of privacy and security for your family to prevent

716
00:45:46,283 --> 00:45:47,703
this from happening in the first place.

717
00:45:47,783 --> 00:45:49,493
Or, or just don't love anyone.

718
00:45:49,493 --> 00:45:50,923
Yes.

719
00:45:51,623 --> 00:45:53,033
I definitely recommend that option.

720
00:45:55,153 --> 00:45:59,843
It's an interesting thing, and I really wonder how this is going

721
00:45:59,843 --> 00:46:01,053
to play out into the future.

722
00:46:01,053 --> 00:46:06,613
Do you have any thoughts on this as basically number go up towards, I don't

723
00:46:06,903 --> 00:46:10,803
know if you have a price target lately or something, but you know, we're at

724
00:46:10,803 --> 00:46:15,193
all time high at time of recording, literally, like it happened last night.

725
00:46:15,573 --> 00:46:19,583
So, I mean, if this thing keeps doing what it's going to do, uh,

726
00:46:19,593 --> 00:46:22,588
do you see these risks as only increasing as well when numbers go up?

727
00:46:23,313 --> 00:46:32,705
Yes, uh, because, it's almost like a, a herd inoculation mindset, and, and

728
00:46:32,705 --> 00:46:39,785
what I mean by that is, As more and more bitcoiners successfully wrench

729
00:46:39,785 --> 00:46:45,915
attacked, that teaches the criminal element that this is a good return on

730
00:46:45,915 --> 00:46:50,295
investment, and therefore they're going to invest more into those attacks.

731
00:46:50,675 --> 00:46:54,925
Um, I do not foresee wrench attacks decelerating.

732
00:46:56,805 --> 00:46:59,125
Until more of them start failing.

733
00:46:59,640 --> 00:47:03,870
Including governments, they, they are the wrench attackers, like, uh,

734
00:47:03,960 --> 00:47:07,770
and if they're successful and you're giving up parts of your Bitcoin to

735
00:47:07,770 --> 00:47:13,920
them, then that, that tells them that that was a, an attack worth doing.

736
00:47:14,845 --> 00:47:20,825
Yeah, so as of today, um, I have 171 physical attacks that

737
00:47:20,975 --> 00:47:23,495
are cataloged on my project.

738
00:47:23,795 --> 00:47:26,735
There have been a lot more than that, because I suspect actually that the

739
00:47:26,735 --> 00:47:31,715
majority of attacks never get publicized, because the victims are too afraid to

740
00:47:31,715 --> 00:47:37,130
talk about it, and they're afraid that talking about it will make them And there

741
00:47:37,130 --> 00:47:41,420
is a legitimate fear there, because there have been people who have been attacked

742
00:47:41,470 --> 00:47:48,330
multiple times, but, um, you know, until we see more failures, and we've only,

743
00:47:48,330 --> 00:47:56,360
I think, seen two successful defenses out of that 171, um, and I think both

744
00:47:56,370 --> 00:48:00,220
of those, I think both of those were in, no, no, one was in Florida and one was

745
00:48:00,220 --> 00:48:06,230
in California, and both of those were because The, um, the victims had guns and

746
00:48:06,230 --> 00:48:09,020
they started shooting at the attackers.

747
00:48:09,760 --> 00:48:15,070
Um, yeah, that's not, maybe not the most preferable scenario to end up in.

748
00:48:15,540 --> 00:48:18,380
And so, so, um, okay.

749
00:48:18,390 --> 00:48:23,760
So yeah, I've, I've written a lot about like how, how Bitcoin Reduces the

750
00:48:23,930 --> 00:48:30,460
profitability motive of, uh, aggressive behavior from a very certain perspective.

751
00:48:30,530 --> 00:48:35,290
And that is that, uh, you cannot know how much bitcoins, uh, or

752
00:48:35,290 --> 00:48:39,960
how many Satoshis rather another Bitcoin, uh, another person owns.

753
00:48:40,030 --> 00:48:41,570
And that's true for everyone on earth.

754
00:48:41,780 --> 00:48:45,270
You can make an educated guess, but you cannot absolutely know it.

755
00:48:45,690 --> 00:48:48,450
So you can have, you can give up parts of your Bitcoin.

756
00:48:48,450 --> 00:48:50,430
You can have dummy wallets and stuff like that.

757
00:48:51,005 --> 00:48:57,795
But the attacker can't really prove that he got all the bitcoins out of the, the

758
00:48:57,795 --> 00:49:00,015
victim or all the SATs outta the victim.

759
00:49:00,595 --> 00:49:05,995
So, so, uh, and from those attacks I know of in Sweden, they've, they've attacked,

760
00:49:06,115 --> 00:49:10,585
uh, not Bitcoiners, but like crypto people and simply pointed a gun at their heads

761
00:49:10,585 --> 00:49:13,135
and, and, and use the password for your.

762
00:49:14,620 --> 00:49:16,410
Take the coins off the exchange.

763
00:49:16,710 --> 00:49:21,210
So like the first step, like always, like not your keys, not your coins.

764
00:49:21,250 --> 00:49:24,040
Like that, that's, that's the, that's the easy one

765
00:49:24,170 --> 00:49:31,873
Yeah, and we've seen, um, for example, um, there are certain types of organized

766
00:49:31,883 --> 00:49:34,693
crime that are getting into this.

767
00:49:34,713 --> 00:49:39,753
Um, and so, for example, in South America, uh, this has happened for a while.

768
00:49:39,753 --> 00:49:45,548
There are types of organized crime that Basically, employ women to go on

769
00:49:45,548 --> 00:49:51,178
dating apps and, you know, date the gringos that are visiting and slip

770
00:49:51,178 --> 00:49:54,078
them drugs that make them compliant.

771
00:49:54,408 --> 00:49:58,508
And traditionally, they would just, you know, steal all of your

772
00:49:58,518 --> 00:50:01,838
valuables that you had on you.

773
00:50:02,048 --> 00:50:08,618
But those gangs have started learning, oh, Get him to open up his, uh, app

774
00:50:08,618 --> 00:50:12,728
on his phone, open up, look for all of his exchange accounts and, you

775
00:50:12,728 --> 00:50:16,018
know, drain all of those exchange accounts and, and possibly any, you

776
00:50:16,018 --> 00:50:19,438
know, single SIG hot wallets that are on the phone while you're at it.

777
00:50:19,868 --> 00:50:25,198
Um, we've, I think we've also seen some organized activity mostly

778
00:50:25,308 --> 00:50:30,548
in the, like, Philippines area where it seems to be Russian.

779
00:50:30,818 --> 00:50:35,958
Mafia that is going down there and targeting, uh, like expats.

780
00:50:36,038 --> 00:50:37,168
Uh, so,

781
00:50:37,833 --> 00:50:38,743
using girls,

782
00:50:39,237 --> 00:50:45,627
uh, no, in those cases, it seems like they somehow just have information

783
00:50:45,637 --> 00:50:49,127
about Russians who have left the country because they're crypto

784
00:50:49,137 --> 00:50:49,547
rich

785
00:50:49,592 --> 00:50:50,812
it's not from Russia with the

786
00:50:50,847 --> 00:50:51,247
country.

787
00:50:51,297 --> 00:50:51,587
Yeah.

788
00:50:51,587 --> 00:50:51,807
Yeah.

789
00:50:52,652 --> 00:50:53,782
the don't love anyone.

790
00:50:53,792 --> 00:50:55,192
It's still a thesis still holds.

791
00:50:55,192 --> 00:50:56,566
Yeah.

792
00:50:56,642 --> 00:50:57,542
Yeah, something like that.

793
00:52:03,906 --> 00:52:06,936
I don't want this, I don't want that to be the actual takeaway from this episode.

794
00:52:06,936 --> 00:52:10,606
So, um, uh, maybe we can turn this around a little bit.

795
00:52:10,606 --> 00:52:13,636
What, what are you excited about in Bitcoin these days?

796
00:52:13,636 --> 00:52:14,886
What's making you optimistic?

797
00:52:16,996 --> 00:52:17,786
Hopefully not nothing.

798
00:52:18,791 --> 00:52:19,931
Not nothing.

799
00:52:20,011 --> 00:52:23,101
Um, I mean, you know, I'm a technologist.

800
00:52:23,111 --> 00:52:23,601
I.

801
00:52:23,901 --> 00:52:28,851
I do like that we seem to be having more innovation happening, more

802
00:52:28,851 --> 00:52:30,501
proposals happening within Bitcoin.

803
00:52:30,501 --> 00:52:33,421
You know, there's the whole Layer 2 explosion, which is

804
00:52:33,461 --> 00:52:35,091
a whole other rabbit hole.

805
00:52:36,291 --> 00:52:42,541
But, um, the past few years, I think, have been pretty good for Bitcoin.

806
00:52:42,821 --> 00:52:49,231
Um, but I also see a lot of problems, long term future problems,

807
00:52:49,231 --> 00:52:50,981
that I'm starting to talk about.

808
00:52:51,416 --> 00:52:57,106
Uh, because I think there's still a ton of room of, for improvement, that, uh,

809
00:52:57,546 --> 00:53:02,166
I'm, I'm worried about complacency, um, I'm worried about us resting upon our

810
00:53:02,166 --> 00:53:06,356
laurels because we have succeeded so much, um, and of course there's many

811
00:53:06,356 --> 00:53:12,206
different issues here, um, but, you know, the, the ETFs and the institutions and

812
00:53:12,206 --> 00:53:14,356
stuff, It's really a double edged sword.

813
00:53:14,636 --> 00:53:20,746
Great for Bitcoin price, uh, great for getting, uh, you know, new big names

814
00:53:20,946 --> 00:53:27,011
and proponents in, um, I mean, it's There's, you know, no small number

815
00:53:27,011 --> 00:53:31,841
of people now who are, like, direct advisors to the next president of the

816
00:53:31,841 --> 00:53:34,621
United States that are orange pilled.

817
00:53:35,081 --> 00:53:38,331
And so, even though, you know, I don't believe that Trump

818
00:53:38,351 --> 00:53:42,691
really understands Bitcoin, it's not, it's not really about him.

819
00:53:42,701 --> 00:53:46,261
It's about all the people whispering in his ear, and how that is gonna

820
00:53:46,321 --> 00:53:47,551
affect the future trajectory.

821
00:53:47,551 --> 00:53:52,266
And so that's, you know, that's good in a sense, but But it's also bad because

822
00:53:52,266 --> 00:53:55,846
there's a lot of centralization pressure, I think, that comes with the institutions

823
00:53:55,846 --> 00:54:02,306
and the ETFs and that can have long term consequences to like the governance and

824
00:54:02,306 --> 00:54:07,326
and the future evolution of Bitcoin as a protocol and as how people use Bitcoin.

825
00:54:08,166 --> 00:54:11,766
Yeah, like, what I'm going to talk about tomorrow in my talk is, is

826
00:54:11,816 --> 00:54:16,516
we can't know that Bitcoin is going to succeed in its current form.

827
00:54:16,746 --> 00:54:18,086
Basically, it might.

828
00:54:18,296 --> 00:54:23,466
There's people who are all like, if Bitcoin is actually anti fragile, it's

829
00:54:23,466 --> 00:54:27,876
just going to work, but that doesn't necessarily play out, especially if

830
00:54:27,876 --> 00:54:32,516
you actually know about the technology and the protocols, so yeah, I certainly

831
00:54:32,516 --> 00:54:36,256
echo the vigilance side of this, yeah.

832
00:54:36,676 --> 00:54:36,946
Yeah.

833
00:54:36,946 --> 00:54:43,926
And complacency is The main villain here, I think, like my view on this is, uh,

834
00:54:44,736 --> 00:54:48,826
like people will have to understand that Bitcoin is not really backed by energy.

835
00:54:48,826 --> 00:54:52,056
It's backed by human action and human incentives.

836
00:54:52,066 --> 00:54:53,686
It's not a wall of encrypted energy.

837
00:54:54,061 --> 00:54:55,911
no, it's not a wall of encrypted energy.

838
00:54:56,311 --> 00:55:02,341
Uh, there's a wall of encrypted energy somewhere, maybe if you have a wild

839
00:55:02,341 --> 00:55:06,901
imagination, but, but that is only there because people acted in a certain way.

840
00:55:07,381 --> 00:55:10,961
So, so, and the, I think that these misconceptions are the

841
00:55:10,961 --> 00:55:15,301
widespread, like the, everything is in Bitcoin is probabilistic, right?

842
00:55:15,331 --> 00:55:16,831
And, and holding a key.

843
00:55:17,146 --> 00:55:20,806
It's not owning something or even possessing something, it's just having a,

844
00:55:21,016 --> 00:55:23,116
it's access to a string of information.

845
00:55:23,726 --> 00:55:28,626
And the reason you trust, you, you, you, you view that as owning

846
00:55:28,626 --> 00:55:32,676
a Bitcoin, is that, you know how, how in infinitesimally.

847
00:55:33,006 --> 00:55:34,026
Is that the word?

848
00:55:34,326 --> 00:55:35,316
Uh, small.

849
00:55:35,556 --> 00:55:39,966
The odds are that someone else owns the same string of information, and same

850
00:55:39,966 --> 00:55:45,246
with the 21 million finite cap and all the, the rule set and the block size.

851
00:55:45,246 --> 00:55:50,206
Even, you know that the, the odds that this is ever going to change

852
00:55:50,236 --> 00:55:52,846
are also infinitesimally small.

853
00:55:53,266 --> 00:55:56,176
So that's why you believe in this rule set and that's why you

854
00:55:56,176 --> 00:56:00,586
believe that this thing, uh, is robust enough to last forever or.

855
00:56:01,701 --> 00:56:03,011
Trending towards forever.

856
00:56:03,361 --> 00:56:08,121
So, uh, so I think that there's a lot of confusion there, uh, especially when you

857
00:56:08,121 --> 00:56:13,261
get these boomer institutions in, into the space, like the ETFs and whatnot.

858
00:56:14,470 --> 00:56:20,690
What do you think is the biggest upcoming issue that needs

859
00:56:20,690 --> 00:56:22,100
to be solved or dealt with?

860
00:56:22,100 --> 00:56:22,360
for listening.

861
00:56:23,255 --> 00:56:29,375
Uh, well, I'm a technologist, so for me, it's, um, it's seeing people wanting to

862
00:56:29,375 --> 00:56:33,855
do more permissionless innovation and it being just really difficult, right?

863
00:56:33,970 --> 00:56:35,110
Isn't that the point though?

864
00:56:36,015 --> 00:56:39,885
yeah, I mean, it's supposed to be difficult to change Bitcoin, um, but

865
00:56:40,790 --> 00:56:46,310
For the past 10 years, we've been talking about, oh, you know, we just

866
00:56:46,320 --> 00:56:48,200
build other layers on top of Bitcoin.

867
00:56:48,790 --> 00:56:53,770
And I think what has been missed by a lot of people is that sometimes

868
00:56:53,770 --> 00:56:56,980
in order to build other layers, you, you need the basic building

869
00:56:56,980 --> 00:56:58,870
blocks on the base protocol.

870
00:56:59,080 --> 00:57:00,450
That's what Segwit was.

871
00:57:00,500 --> 00:57:00,760
Yeah.

872
00:57:00,900 --> 00:57:04,310
yeah, well, you know, we enabled, we did three different soft forks

873
00:57:04,310 --> 00:57:05,290
to enable lightning networks.

874
00:57:06,285 --> 00:57:07,785
Um, and,

875
00:57:07,830 --> 00:57:08,490
no hard fork.

876
00:57:08,675 --> 00:57:13,095
yeah, yeah, um, and, uh, so, kind of, to get back to your question of, like,

877
00:57:13,095 --> 00:57:17,805
things that I really like, um, I'm, I'm pretty bullish on Rusty's great script

878
00:57:17,835 --> 00:57:21,605
restoration project, I think there's a lot of potential there, I think that could

879
00:57:21,615 --> 00:57:25,735
also boost, uh, permissionless innovation, make it easier for people to actually

880
00:57:25,735 --> 00:57:29,345
build second layers, because you, you look at a lot of the second layers that are

881
00:57:29,355 --> 00:57:33,295
being built right now, and they're just making, you know, Really weird trade-offs.

882
00:57:33,415 --> 00:57:39,235
Either they're like a federation or like fully custodial, um, or

883
00:57:39,265 --> 00:57:42,895
they're doing, they're having to do like crazy game theory.

884
00:57:43,135 --> 00:57:46,315
I don't know if you saw the paper that came out yesterday for how, how to enable

885
00:57:46,315 --> 00:57:48,265
covenants on Bitcoin without a soft fork.

886
00:57:48,920 --> 00:57:52,190
And essentially it has to do with hash collisions, and having to expend

887
00:57:52,200 --> 00:57:55,790
millions of dollars worth of energy to collide hashes together, like,

888
00:57:56,010 --> 00:57:56,280
these

889
00:57:56,310 --> 00:57:59,150
But is that really categorized as a layer two though?

890
00:57:59,150 --> 00:58:00,340
Like, uh, Bitcoin.

891
00:58:01,145 --> 00:58:04,655
Bitcoin being used for other use cases than the monetary use case.

892
00:58:04,715 --> 00:58:06,675
I wouldn't, I wouldn't call that a layer 2.

893
00:58:06,725 --> 00:58:09,655
I would call that a, an offside project,

894
00:58:09,950 --> 00:58:14,970
Yeah, no, no, Covenants itself, uh, well, that itself is not a Layer 2, but you

895
00:58:15,020 --> 00:58:19,810
could use Covenants, I think, to build Layer 2s, though that specific type of

896
00:58:19,810 --> 00:58:24,740
Covenant I think is way too Impractical and expensive to actually make use of,

897
00:58:25,160 --> 00:58:30,350
uh, but, uh, so, you know, look at, I think BitVM is a very interesting

898
00:58:30,350 --> 00:58:34,190
example of this, of like, how do we enable more generalized computation

899
00:58:34,200 --> 00:58:37,940
without changing the Bitcoin protocol, and it, it gets really complicated.

900
00:58:38,065 --> 00:58:38,765
But why?

901
00:58:39,125 --> 00:58:40,795
Because builders want to build.

902
00:58:40,835 --> 00:58:40,895
I

903
00:58:40,905 --> 00:58:41,205
mean, that's

904
00:58:41,205 --> 00:58:43,295
but builders could build on Nostr instead.

905
00:58:43,305 --> 00:58:45,245
They've got Nostr to nerd out on now.

906
00:58:46,408 --> 00:58:46,778
Uh,

907
00:58:47,728 --> 00:58:48,848
it's two different things.

908
00:58:48,938 --> 00:58:53,458
Um, or, or, you know, one that I like because, uh, there's actually

909
00:58:53,458 --> 00:58:57,028
several former Casa employees working their, uh, botanics, uh,

910
00:58:57,068 --> 00:58:58,878
and their spider chain concepts.

911
00:58:59,198 --> 00:59:04,498
Uh, basically, they were trying to figure out a, a way to, to do a,

912
00:59:04,538 --> 00:59:06,788
um, a permissionless two way peg.

913
00:59:07,338 --> 00:59:09,078
Between Bitcoin and sidechains.

914
00:59:09,448 --> 00:59:13,208
And it's a very interesting idea that's complicated as hell.

915
00:59:13,418 --> 00:59:15,908
I did a whole write up on it like a year ago.

916
00:59:16,198 --> 00:59:22,678
Um, and it's gonna take a lot of work to kind of fine tune all of the economic

917
00:59:22,708 --> 00:59:24,458
and game theory parameters around it.

918
00:59:24,458 --> 00:59:28,833
Because the short version is the spider chain is like It's almost

919
00:59:28,833 --> 00:59:30,923
like a blockchain of multisigs.

920
00:59:30,953 --> 00:59:36,753
It's like a series of connected multisigs where you have many different people

921
00:59:36,763 --> 00:59:41,733
who are signers on different overlapping multisigs and it's like, it's way

922
00:59:41,733 --> 00:59:43,303
too complicated to try to explain it.

923
00:59:43,608 --> 00:59:49,678
Uh, in, in a short period of time, but, like, that's the type of gymnastics

924
00:59:49,698 --> 00:59:53,078
that developers are having to go through in order to try to build better layer

925
00:59:53,088 --> 00:59:57,008
But what is the real world problem that spiderchain solves?

926
00:59:57,428 --> 01:00:01,168
Uh, well, so, the, the problem is that people want to be able to do

927
01:00:01,198 --> 01:00:03,608
decentralized finance, whatever you call

928
01:00:03,803 --> 01:00:05,213
Yeah, no, no, no, yes.

929
01:00:05,273 --> 01:00:07,433
But how is that solving a real world problem?

930
01:00:08,161 --> 01:00:11,061
I mean, you could argue about whether or not people need it, right?

931
01:00:11,121 --> 01:00:18,789
Uh, so, the question is, Is the, like, decentralized finance world

932
01:00:18,819 --> 01:00:22,529
and applications that people are doing on other networks, like

933
01:00:22,539 --> 01:00:26,589
Ethereum, Solana, whatever, should we be able to do that in

934
01:00:26,589 --> 01:00:28,669
a more Bitcoin native fashion?

935
01:00:29,014 --> 01:00:29,404
Yes.

936
01:00:29,429 --> 01:00:33,249
So, should we be able to have pegged sidechains with that functionality,

937
01:00:33,309 --> 01:00:34,869
but without changing Bitcoin itself?

938
01:00:35,744 --> 01:00:35,974
Yeah.

939
01:00:36,004 --> 01:00:38,244
And, uh, my answer would be no.

940
01:00:38,524 --> 01:00:39,444
But I know that,

941
01:00:39,501 --> 01:00:39,654
uh,

942
01:00:39,769 --> 01:00:40,689
is market demand

943
01:00:40,694 --> 01:00:43,924
yeah, yeah, there are differences of opinion here and I don't decide

944
01:00:43,924 --> 01:00:45,904
and no one else decides either.

945
01:00:46,184 --> 01:00:48,994
But, but, and there might be a market demand for it.

946
01:00:49,474 --> 01:00:54,694
Uh, I think though, the, the, the danger in going, going down those rabbit holes

947
01:00:54,694 --> 01:00:57,774
is that Anything you do that takes away.

948
01:00:57,844 --> 01:01:04,414
So just like the gold being used for jewelry or being used for

949
01:01:04,414 --> 01:01:08,654
industrial use cases, that sort of chips away at gold's functionality

950
01:01:08,654 --> 01:01:10,824
as a store value or as money.

951
01:01:11,204 --> 01:01:12,744
And I think the same is true for Bitcoin.

952
01:01:12,774 --> 01:01:17,934
If you mess with incentives, you might mess with Bitcoin's function as money.

953
01:01:18,114 --> 01:01:22,474
And Bitcoin's function as money is so crucial to the whole system.

954
01:01:22,784 --> 01:01:26,624
That's what the whole system is built upon, that the satoshi is worth something.

955
01:01:27,124 --> 01:01:30,424
And that anything else is, like, the whole system is built around

956
01:01:30,674 --> 01:01:32,154
the scarcity of the satoshi.

957
01:01:32,584 --> 01:01:35,024
Not, not the function, not the other stuff.

958
01:01:35,584 --> 01:01:39,604
So that's why I argue for all of these things being, you

959
01:01:39,604 --> 01:01:40,814
know, red herrings at best.

960
01:01:41,329 --> 01:01:47,659
I guess, I mean, I think one counterpoint to that would be that if you're doing,

961
01:01:47,699 --> 01:01:52,599
like, actual native pegging of satoshis from base chain into other chains,

962
01:01:52,599 --> 01:01:54,419
then that scarcity is preserved.

963
01:01:54,949 --> 01:01:58,449
Like, the problem that I have right now is that, you know, everybody's using

964
01:01:58,449 --> 01:02:00,699
wrapped bitcoin on these other networks.

965
01:02:00,709 --> 01:02:04,159
So they're just putting all of the satoshis into a single custodian.

966
01:02:04,484 --> 01:02:08,744
Who could be, you know, issuing more IOUs than they actually

967
01:02:08,944 --> 01:02:11,514
Yeah, so you're saying the incentives are already being messed

968
01:02:11,574 --> 01:02:12,054
Oh yeah.

969
01:02:12,054 --> 01:02:12,234
yeah.

970
01:02:12,304 --> 01:02:12,484
Yeah,

971
01:02:12,484 --> 01:02:14,584
I'll, I'll take, I'll take the devil devil's advocate.

972
01:02:14,584 --> 01:02:17,914
Point on, on this one, and, and actually I, I kind of, sort of believe this one

973
01:02:17,914 --> 01:02:22,504
is that, is that people are going to do these things if they want to do it, and I

974
01:02:22,504 --> 01:02:26,314
would rather that they just fuck off and go to the other chains and, and do that.

975
01:02:26,314 --> 01:02:29,254
And so, and, and so, so I don't actually mind the idea of a wrap

976
01:02:29,254 --> 01:02:30,634
Bitcoin or, or something else.

977
01:02:30,634 --> 01:02:34,204
If someone wants to do that and they send their Bitcoin to some other place and then

978
01:02:34,204 --> 01:02:35,824
they go shit coin as much as they want.

979
01:02:35,944 --> 01:02:36,244
Okay.

980
01:02:36,244 --> 01:02:37,474
They're, they're free to do that.

981
01:02:37,564 --> 01:02:39,994
And I don't think, and I, I think what the key point that.

982
01:02:40,189 --> 01:02:43,289
What I agree with is if it doesn't change Bitcoin, if we're not doing

983
01:02:43,289 --> 01:02:47,179
anything to enable this, and it doesn't increase the transaction volume,

984
01:02:47,389 --> 01:02:52,869
it doesn't bloat the UTXO set, it doesn't add dickbutts onto everyone's

985
01:02:52,869 --> 01:02:55,309
nodes, then I actually don't see a

986
01:02:55,399 --> 01:02:57,049
problem is where you draw the line.

987
01:02:57,109 --> 01:03:00,379
What, what, what do you categorize as changing Bitcoin?

988
01:03:00,589 --> 01:03:05,059
Because if the incentive structure around it is changed, it is changed

989
01:03:05,059 --> 01:03:10,149
in a very indirect way, but, but it's still changed, which is what I thought.

990
01:03:10,149 --> 01:03:12,729
Think we, we've seen with the spam and stuff like

991
01:03:12,869 --> 01:03:17,339
But if somebody just has, literally, you send A-U-T-X-O to another UTXO and

992
01:03:17,369 --> 01:03:20,579
through that you get the ability to do your shit coining somewhere else.

993
01:03:20,579 --> 01:03:22,679
I, I don't, I don't think there's anything there.

994
01:03:22,679 --> 01:03:23,789
Like, I'm not gonna do it.

995
01:03:24,479 --> 01:03:26,849
And I mean, there is an actual, there is an actual thing here.

996
01:03:26,849 --> 01:03:30,089
Like for example, if someone's using opera turn for this right?

997
01:03:30,089 --> 01:03:33,719
To, to, to have some data to, to track what's going on here.

998
01:03:33,779 --> 01:03:34,259
Well.

999
01:03:34,559 --> 01:03:38,669
That could be filtered out by something like the zero data template

1000
01:03:38,719 --> 01:03:41,569
that Ocean just has out now, or Datum, or something like that.

1001
01:03:41,739 --> 01:03:44,089
That's actually, that's actually possible, and I think that's where

1002
01:03:44,249 --> 01:03:47,489
we can have a debate, but I, I don't actually see a problem.

1003
01:03:48,239 --> 01:03:50,599
Unfortunately, taking the devil's advocate a little

1004
01:03:50,629 --> 01:03:50,834
hard

1005
01:03:50,834 --> 01:03:51,044
here, I, I, I,

1006
01:03:51,304 --> 01:03:54,504
of just sending one UTXO to another UTXO.

1007
01:03:54,524 --> 01:03:57,884
That, that's, people, if people are going to do it anyway, right?

1008
01:03:58,029 --> 01:03:58,259
So.

1009
01:03:58,429 --> 01:04:03,119
the whole issue of changing Bitcoin, I think, is a pretty touchy topic.

1010
01:04:03,149 --> 01:04:03,409
Like,

1011
01:04:04,229 --> 01:04:09,639
I, well, so I get triggered, uh, actually, as a part of the ossification

1012
01:04:09,669 --> 01:04:13,799
debate with, you know, if we ossify the protocol, then Bitcoin

1013
01:04:13,809 --> 01:04:15,249
doesn't change, it's gonna be safe.

1014
01:04:15,964 --> 01:04:20,494
Uh, but the problem is the rest of the world does not ossify, and so

1015
01:04:20,494 --> 01:04:24,134
we've already seen this happening, both in Bitcoin and with other network

1016
01:04:24,134 --> 01:04:29,664
protocols, that the protocol itself may not change, but the nature of how people

1017
01:04:29,684 --> 01:04:33,374
interact with the protocol changes, and so my favorite example, of course, is

1018
01:04:33,434 --> 01:04:41,584
SMTP, the email protocol, where, let's ask ourselves, is email a success?

1019
01:04:43,114 --> 01:04:46,264
I would say no because it, it got super centralized.

1020
01:04:47,464 --> 01:04:47,734
Yeah.

1021
01:04:47,794 --> 01:04:48,544
But see.

1022
01:04:49,014 --> 01:04:51,804
We have a very nuanced, sophisticated view of this.

1023
01:04:51,984 --> 01:04:52,474
You ask.

1024
01:04:52,514 --> 01:04:53,624
the man on the street, and

1025
01:04:53,624 --> 01:04:54,994
they'll say, Oh, I use email every

1026
01:04:54,994 --> 01:04:55,234
day.

1027
01:04:55,234 --> 01:04:55,784
It's great.

1028
01:04:56,014 --> 01:04:57,964
They don't even know that they're not using

1029
01:04:58,194 --> 01:04:58,974
no, no.

1030
01:04:59,134 --> 01:05:00,424
That can totally happen to

1031
01:05:00,424 --> 01:05:07,194
And TCP IP, TCP IP four that they've been trying to upgrade to the version six.

1032
01:05:07,194 --> 01:05:11,374
Isn't that a thing also like never happens because people are used to the old shit.

1033
01:05:11,984 --> 01:05:14,294
Yeah, no, there are arguments to be made.

1034
01:05:14,294 --> 01:05:18,144
I mean, ossification is an interesting word because.

1035
01:05:18,869 --> 01:05:23,709
I'm for it when, when we're done and we're done at some point.

1036
01:05:23,709 --> 01:05:27,109
I don't know when the point is and I don't think anyone else does either.

1037
01:05:27,109 --> 01:05:31,679
And the whole point of having Bitcoin being hard to change is that sort of

1038
01:05:31,689 --> 01:05:33,379
nature will tell us when we're done.

1039
01:05:33,819 --> 01:05:35,799
And if we fucked up, we fucked up.

1040
01:05:36,484 --> 01:05:38,904
I think it's pretty obvious that Bitcoin is already very hard to

1041
01:05:38,904 --> 01:05:43,024
change, and it's entirely possible that we have already ossified.

1042
01:05:43,034 --> 01:05:44,554
We won't really know for sure for a while.

1043
01:05:44,649 --> 01:05:47,779
No, and that may or may not be a good thing.

1044
01:05:47,999 --> 01:05:52,769
It's, it's definitely going to be a problem in what's the year, like 2094 or

1045
01:05:52,769 --> 01:05:54,609
something where it's predicted that this.

1046
01:05:54,614 --> 01:05:58,194
Yeah, the timestamp issue, though, I really think that quantum computing

1047
01:05:58,204 --> 01:05:59,634
is going to be an issue before that.

1048
01:06:00,244 --> 01:06:01,924
Oh, the quantum computing fund.

1049
01:06:02,044 --> 01:06:02,884
Let's save this for

1050
01:06:02,884 --> 01:06:03,104
next

1051
01:06:03,124 --> 01:06:03,214
time.

1052
01:06:03,214 --> 01:06:03,999
Yes, exactly.

1053
01:06:04,029 --> 01:06:04,519
Exactly.

1054
01:06:04,654 --> 01:06:07,954
That's a let's go into compute, uh, quantum computing next time.

1055
01:06:08,242 --> 01:06:09,004
Jameson, thank you

1056
01:06:09,224 --> 01:06:10,014
Yeah, you bet.

1057
01:06:10,774 --> 01:06:13,864
great conversation and, uh, enjoy the rest of the conference.

1058
01:06:13,969 --> 01:06:14,959
Yeah, thanks a lot, Jameson.

1059
01:06:14,959 --> 01:06:16,479
This has been a great conversation.

1060
01:06:16,479 --> 01:06:20,419
I'll add slightly more words to the outro than this, but yeah, really great to

1061
01:06:20,419 --> 01:06:22,439
have your perspectives on the security.

1062
01:06:22,439 --> 01:06:27,439
I don't think we've had like a security person like quite so hard in a really long

1063
01:06:27,594 --> 01:06:29,124
Well, you are a security person, aren't you?

1064
01:06:29,124 --> 01:06:29,394
Oh yeah, Well,

1065
01:06:29,849 --> 01:06:30,219
well we haven't,

1066
01:06:30,489 --> 01:06:33,969
not a guest, but no, but this has been awesome, so thanks a lot for this.

1067
01:06:34,369 --> 01:06:37,349
We'd love to do it again and continue having these deep conversations,

1068
01:06:37,349 --> 01:06:38,819
so thank you again, Jameson.

1069
01:06:39,204 --> 01:06:39,654
Anyway.

1070
01:06:39,834 --> 01:06:42,714
You want to send our listeners like casa, I guess

1071
01:06:43,074 --> 01:06:44,924
Uh, well yeah, you can check out CASA.

1072
01:06:44,954 --> 01:06:47,774
It's C A S A dot I O.

1073
01:06:48,134 --> 01:06:50,224
Uh, check out my resources at bitcoin.

1074
01:06:50,894 --> 01:06:51,524
page.

1075
01:06:52,214 --> 01:06:52,904
Bitcoin page.

1076
01:06:53,474 --> 01:06:53,804
Alright.

1077
01:06:54,919 --> 01:06:56,429
This has been the Bitcoin Infinity Show.

1078
01:06:56,439 --> 01:06:57,269
Thank you for listening.