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Hey, one quick thing before we get into it.

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Trust Revolution runs on value for value.

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No ads, no sponsors.

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Fountain is how it works for me and for the show.

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Pay per episode or subscribe, lightning or card.

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You get something from the show, you can send something back.

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No guilt, no gimmicks.

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Go to trustrevolution.co.

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That's trustrevolution.co.

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Okay, let's get into it.

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Pip, welcome.

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Hello.

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Hi, Sean.

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I appreciate it.

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Yeah, I'm very well.

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Thanks for joining.

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I appreciate you taking the time.

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It's very busy toward end of year and toward Christmas.

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But I think we're going to have a great conversation, and it is going to, in my view, go to the

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heart of really why I started this thing, which is trust and what is broken, why, and

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how do we fix it?

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And so what I'd love to do today, Pip, is, you know, you have done technical deep dives on Vertex before.

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I want to go somewhere different, which is why this matters.

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But before we do that, in, say, 60 seconds, what is Vertex?

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So Vertex is a service built on top of Noster that simplifies the topic of this discussion, I presume, which is going to be Web of Trust.

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And so basically the tagline is you don't have to worry about spam prevention techniques or having to reinvent accurate search or having to create your own recommendation engine on top of Noster because all of that you can have and you can access through Vertex.

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and yeah, it's going to simplify your experience

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in building great experiences for your users,

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your customers.

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Fantastic.

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And you know, you talked with Matt O'Dell

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on Citadel Dispatch back in July

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and I'll be sure to include a link to that.

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It was a great conversation.

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What has changed with Vertex since then, since July?

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Mostly improvements over the whole stack.

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So the server or relay is now more performant,

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it's faster.

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And I'm also working on some schemes so you can, well, to expand the services in multiple ways.

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They are not ready yet, but the way I want to expand the services other than the current one I have

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is also adding some endpoints for detecting pornography

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or images as explicit content

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so that you can decide whether your user wants to see that

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or don't see that.

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So imagine like having a setting in your application

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where you can turn it on and off

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and then remove all of the explicit content.

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And if, for example, your user is someone that doesn't want to see this content, is a kid, you know, those.

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And also, yeah, mostly actually building low-level stuff that makes the services faster, more precise.

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It's not really something very sexy I'm working at the moment, but it's just grinding and making the whole thing better.

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Yeah, better, faster, stronger. That's important. Great. And we'll get into a little more detail there. Let's, as I mentioned, let's sort of zoom out. So right now, if I want to know whether an account is real or a bot, I'm trusting Twitter X or whoever runs the platform to tell me that. What's wrong with that model? Why shouldn't that be enough?

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Yeah, so there are really these two models. And as you outlined, there is one that we are currently used to, which is the centralized trust model, where there is someone, the platform, most of the case, most of the times, where it's telling you who is real, who is fake.

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and this really lacks a lot of transparency

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so you don't know how they take this decision

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and they force those decisions on you

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and you cannot really get

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you cannot really take different decisions

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or use different theoristics

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for example if you wish to send a message

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to someone on Twitter

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because you think he is a really interesting person

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and you want to know more about his work

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or maybe you have your friends.

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But Twitter decided that no, they are a bad person,

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so they should be censored.

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Their account should be closed and stuff like that.

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And also, in general, this goes along with the trend

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that we have seen in the past years

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where this platform, they tend to request

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more and more identifying information.

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For example, this started with emails

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and then phone numbers and then,

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They are slowly going towards a full KYC for basically everything.

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And this is also the reality today in some jurisdictions.

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And they do that on the surface.

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They do it for spam prevention.

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So they say, oh, to guarantee your safety, you have to give me all of your data and personal information so I can stop bots and spammers and things.

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and well in reality

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it's just maybe I think an excuse

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just to increase

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the platform revenue

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through ads because most of this

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platform actually their whole business

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model is track you

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and then serving you ads

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and

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so this is one model

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the old model

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now we are entering a new model

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where

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it's described by the word

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web of trust

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So just to give a small, I think, or my definition, because many times this term is used as a catch-all.

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So I prefer to have a very clear definition.

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So for me, web of trust is any network of relationship where trust is distributed and is emergent.

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So it emerges organically from interaction and connections and is not imposed by someone else.

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So it's not imposed by the service providers, it's not imposed by the platforms.

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It emerges spontaneously as it happens in midspace or, you know, in the real world, so to speak,

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where you go to a bar and you hang out, you talk with some people,

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and then you establish connections and there is no one watching you and saying that no you should

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not be friends with that person because they are bad you know and yeah this is very tied to

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obviously Noster so like Noster is the only successful web of trust because in reality the

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Web of Trust was born with the PGP.

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So PGP is, for those who don't know,

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it means pretty good privacy.

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It's basically a scheme for an identity for emails.

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So you can share encrypted emails or signed emails.

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And then, but how do you know that Sean is this email address

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and not this other email address, right?

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How do you link an external identity to an address?

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Well, the solution was, again, Web of Trust.

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So instead of relying on Google to tell you who is the real address for this person,

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you would use these things called, I don't remember the name,

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they basically were like messages saying from Pip, me, I trust that this email address.

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An attestation, I think.

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Yeah, I attest that, I verified that test that's shown is this email address.

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Yeah, these attestations.

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And it was pretty, it was not a successful implementation of Web of Trust, in my opinion.

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it is still used by some but

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the problem is that it was not social enough

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so you want to attest

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to as many people as you trust

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that actually there is a link between them and their email address

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but also you want to keep these attestations up to date

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all the time. If someone's address is stolen or compromised

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or whatever, you want to revoke that attestation.

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And there is no incentives to do that

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because fundamentally it's not,

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sending emails is not a social phenomena.

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Well, on Noster, what is a social phenomena

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is your follow list.

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So you don't, if someone is hacked

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and start posting terrible content,

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you don't want to see that content,

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so you unfollow and then you follow the new key.

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And this is very non-technical and doesn't give you strong cryptographic guarantees, but fundamentally it just relies on humans.

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Strong signal.

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Yeah, exactly. Humans maintaining this list for their own sake because they want to use those lists in certain social applications.

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Like in a client, your follow list is used to show you content and you want to curate that.

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Otherwise, you see bad content fundamentally.

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Yeah, and I think it's a great point.

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I mean, Phil Zimmerman, PGP.

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So we've now had 30 years, to your point, of attempts.

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You know, back to your comments about Twitter, about X.

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Imperfect as it was, verification used to mean something.

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Now it means you paid $8, right?

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And so how did identity verification become both, you know, both meaningless and controlled by one company?

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How did we get from groups of, you know, nerds, and I'll count myself in that category, gathering in person to attest to a PGP, you know, web or ring of trust to pay me $8?

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Like, you know, what's your take on how we sort of got from one to the other?

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I think it's just a matter of incentives.

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if you can control what verified means,

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then you can get paid to give out these attestations.

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Fundamentally, and also lack of competition,

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that's also a big one,

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because if Twitter blue check

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were just one of the ways you can verify,

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you can get a badge on Twitter,

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like imagine on the Twitter app

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that there are other...

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service providers that gives these different attestations,

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like a purple check, an orange check, those kind of things.

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And then you can go to the settings and you add a new,

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a different providers for this.

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So you don't want to use the paid verification.

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You want to use some other kind of verification.

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Then probably less people would use,

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would pay for the blue check.

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But at the moment you have lack of competition,

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which means if you want to get verified, you have to pay.

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And also the incentives, which is, well, the company gets paid.

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So it happens.

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Yeah.

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Well, and I think, you know, and that kind of goes to my next question,

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which you've answered in part.

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But if a platform, you know, can decide you're not verified anymore,

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that you don't exist effectively, that's enormous power,

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be that X, YouTube, whatever.

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For those, again, who may be sort of coming to understand this, who benefits from that arrangement?

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Well, I think I don't want to put my, you know, hat.

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Your tinfoil?

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Yeah, my tinfoil hat.

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But, you know, if there is power to censor people, obviously that power is going to be used somewhere by some government, by some agencies.

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like it's not

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you know

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I don't want to name because honestly I don't

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really know about individual cases

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but you know if there is

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a political

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opponent in a dictatorship

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that wants to, is rising up

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and has, is gathering consensus

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you can just go to Twitter

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and say remove it or you go

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to jail and

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you know, if there is that

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choke point is going to be used

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fundamentally by someone

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Absolutely. Yep. In fact, I was just scanning through to see if I could find, speaking of our friend Matt O'Dell, he posted an excerpt from, you know, the latest draconian legislation. I'll dig it up for the show notes from the UK and the effect of it, or it is in effect clarifying that you can be accused and convicted of criminal behavior without malicious intent in posting something that causes destruction.

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stress, right? So I think it is an extreme example of your point, which is there are plenty,

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plenty of powers, plenty of individuals and nation states who want the power to erase someone

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online. And I think, you know, to some that may sound dramatic, but I think to the degree that we

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live our lives online and that some, many people generate their income and they're living online,

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content creators, what have you, then it's enormous. Well, if we then sort of go to

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maybe a more utilitarian view, which is, I think, one that most of us have, spam and impersonation,

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right? So that's everywhere. The platforms that control verification can't stop it. So are they

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failing in one of their fundamental jobs, Pip? Or to your point, do they just not have the right

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incentives or they're perverse incentives therefore they don't stop it i think i think both

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both like the answer lies in in between those two points so they're probably failing to some extent

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even though they they they could technically have access to all the data and all the

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analysis that that can stop this kind of spam also because they control everything so they can

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monitor every activity, even of the spammers.

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But I think the bigger reason now that I think about it

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is that they have perverse incentives.

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I think that the biggest example of this is meta

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because I think I read somewhere,

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or maybe it was a podcast, I don't really remember specifically,

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but the thing is that a large percentage of meta revenue

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comes from scams.

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like complete scams.

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And the anti-spam department,

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if the spammer pays enough in advertisement,

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they cannot even remove it.

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So they really, it was something silly like that.

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Like if the budget of the spammer is higher

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than a certain amount,

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then they need permission to remove that spammer,

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even though they have identified it,

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they need permission from above

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or from, you know, manager or whatever.

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And yeah, because fundamentally scams,

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they pay a lot in ads

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because they can get a lot of money

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because, you know,

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you don't have to send a product or a service.

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You just take it and go away.

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So the fines become just a cost of doing business

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for the spammer scammer.

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Yeah, yeah, exactly.

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And yeah, all of these companies,

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they are profiting in some way or another

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from this kind of things.

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And also, they benefit in their quarterly report

243
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if they say they have more users.

244
00:16:53,120 --> 00:16:54,520
And guess what?

245
00:16:54,580 --> 00:16:57,240
If you don't identify bots as bots,

246
00:16:57,700 --> 00:16:58,800
then you have more users.

247
00:17:00,020 --> 00:17:00,160
Right.

248
00:17:00,540 --> 00:17:04,160
If instead you say, ah, yeah, we have 30% bots,

249
00:17:04,800 --> 00:17:07,720
then someone says, ah, so you have less real users,

250
00:17:07,720 --> 00:17:22,862
less paying less people that we can sell to Because fundamentally if you rely on ads you need to say how many potential customers you have to your advertisers

251
00:17:23,722 --> 00:17:24,082
Eyeballs.

252
00:17:24,842 --> 00:17:27,562
Yeah, how many eyeballs and bots don't count as eyeballs.

253
00:17:28,042 --> 00:17:32,902
So maybe we don't identify bots very well.

254
00:17:32,902 --> 00:17:37,622
Well, and I think, you know, I mean, so all this clearly you are driven to build an alternative.

255
00:17:37,622 --> 00:17:57,802
And I think we, you know, in this conversation, as you and I already are predisposed to believe, this is broken. And I think, you know, we're talking about identity, reputation, spam, content moderation.

256
00:17:57,802 --> 00:18:05,622
many of these have become conflated with a lot of negative behaviors, negative outcomes by the

257
00:18:05,622 --> 00:18:14,102
platforms, by nation states, but they are not in and of themselves negatives. These are, I think,

258
00:18:14,162 --> 00:18:21,122
very understandable sort of primitives that both a user and a builder want to address. I don't want

259
00:18:21,122 --> 00:18:27,962
to see certain content. And pardon me, I don't want the ability for a third party to yank me

260
00:18:27,962 --> 00:18:34,982
off the platform to erase my identity online, my reputation, et cetera. And so with all of that,

261
00:18:34,982 --> 00:18:43,882
and you've talked to some of this, what are the very high-level primitives, Pip, that need to

262
00:18:43,882 --> 00:18:53,262
exist in order for an individual to have, one might say, sort of a healthy engagement or experience

263
00:18:53,262 --> 00:19:00,322
with a community online? So, if we sort of start at that high level, what's your view on what

264
00:19:00,322 --> 00:19:07,842
enables, maybe mediates is the wrong word, with no central authority, but what enables healthy

265
00:19:07,842 --> 00:19:18,242
discourse online. I think what enables healthy discourse and a healthy aggregation of people

266
00:19:18,242 --> 00:19:27,382
online is the ability to choose fundamentally and to filter. So you want to decide and you want to

267
00:19:27,382 --> 00:19:36,342
be able to decide what to see and what not to see. And so fundamentally, this means filtering.

268
00:19:36,342 --> 00:19:46,162
And also, it helps if you have access to tools that makes it easy to filter and also to search.

269
00:19:46,722 --> 00:19:50,142
So fundamentally, we are talking about the problem of ranking, right?

270
00:19:50,682 --> 00:19:56,282
You want some things to be on the top where you want to give more attention to,

271
00:19:57,022 --> 00:20:03,222
and then some things at the bottom where you don't want to give much attention or maybe any attention.

272
00:20:03,222 --> 00:20:11,882
And those include impersonations, impersonators or spammers in general, people that just annoy

273
00:20:11,882 --> 00:20:18,962
you and don't give you value and then just distract you from other more meaningful purposes.

274
00:20:19,902 --> 00:20:28,742
And so fundamentally, the role of Vertex and other also service providers is to be able

275
00:20:28,742 --> 00:20:32,082
to deduce what you like and what you don't like

276
00:20:32,082 --> 00:20:34,422
and then offer you that.

277
00:20:35,262 --> 00:20:38,862
But the difference with the monopolistic

278
00:20:38,862 --> 00:20:41,542
and the traditional alternative

279
00:20:41,542 --> 00:20:46,822
is that the goal here is not to give you some ads

280
00:20:46,822 --> 00:20:49,282
and the goal here is not to identify you

281
00:20:49,282 --> 00:20:51,462
and sell your information to other people.

282
00:20:51,682 --> 00:20:54,902
You decide what information is public

283
00:20:54,902 --> 00:20:56,882
and what information basically I can use.

284
00:20:56,882 --> 00:21:04,722
So the service provider now is in service to you or in service to an app that you are using.

285
00:21:05,842 --> 00:21:14,062
So, for example, for a business model, Vertex is more oriented towards B2B.

286
00:21:14,722 --> 00:21:20,542
So apps maybe decide to use Vertex to improve their experience.

287
00:21:20,542 --> 00:21:28,082
But fundamentally, the app does so because it can give a better experience to the user.

288
00:21:28,542 --> 00:21:34,082
And a better experience to the user means more ability to choose what to see, what not to see.

289
00:21:34,462 --> 00:21:43,222
Right. And if we go into that a little more deeply, so in the model or the approach of Web of Trust and Vertex, your product specifically,

290
00:21:43,742 --> 00:21:48,742
my reputation comes from the people who know me, not from a company's database.

291
00:21:48,742 --> 00:21:52,922
What does that actually change for someone navigating the Internet?

292
00:21:52,922 --> 00:22:01,302
I think the biggest leap you have to make is understanding that reputation is not a value.

293
00:22:01,562 --> 00:22:05,262
It's not, but it's more, it depends on the point of view.

294
00:22:06,082 --> 00:22:12,202
So for me, your reputation is quite high because I follow you directly.

295
00:22:12,762 --> 00:22:20,142
And there are also other different types of relationship, not just follows, for example,

296
00:22:20,142 --> 00:22:27,822
mutes, but also other types of relationship that can be analyzed to extract important data and

297
00:22:27,822 --> 00:22:34,782
important metrics. But the biggest thing, yes, it's that reputation is personalized to a certain

298
00:22:34,782 --> 00:22:41,402
point of view. And yeah, I don't know. And that's, you know, you jump right to one of my follow-ups,

299
00:22:41,522 --> 00:22:45,882
which is, I would just sort of state perhaps what you have just pointed out, which is,

300
00:22:45,882 --> 00:23:09,962
You know, web of trust means different people can have different views as to who's trustworthy and to what degree. And I think that that level, you know, having those sliders is incredibly important, whether they're explicit to the end user or to your point, they are baked into an application such that it is not a black box, but it is not something that I have to worry about or think about.

301
00:23:09,962 --> 00:23:26,262
And maybe more specifically, you know, if let's pretend I'm on Twitter, if I get banned from Twitter or X tomorrow, my reputation on Nostra stays intact. I mean, is that sort of the core shift your identity and associated reputation travels with you?

302
00:23:26,262 --> 00:23:39,282
Yeah, yeah, that's one of the biggest strengths of Nostra is that your identity is portable across apps and also your data, your posts are actually interoperable across apps.

303
00:23:39,282 --> 00:23:50,142
So this means that for you to not get seen anywhere, it means that all the relays, or maybe also all the clients, they will have to ban you.

304
00:23:50,142 --> 00:23:51,762
and

305
00:23:51,762 --> 00:23:54,242
well if that happens

306
00:23:54,242 --> 00:23:56,762
it's probably because you did something

307
00:23:56,762 --> 00:23:58,782
really bad because it means that

308
00:23:58,782 --> 00:24:01,142
the whole world is deciding to ban you

309
00:24:01,142 --> 00:24:01,662
you know

310
00:24:01,662 --> 00:24:05,042
so it's not one decision of one company

311
00:24:05,042 --> 00:24:06,442
it's multiple

312
00:24:06,442 --> 00:24:08,462
companies and multiple operators

313
00:24:08,462 --> 00:24:10,502
and people that do it just for

314
00:24:10,502 --> 00:24:12,882
fun but also even in that

315
00:24:12,882 --> 00:24:14,482
case you can run your own

316
00:24:14,482 --> 00:24:16,762
you can run your own relay and then

317
00:24:16,762 --> 00:24:18,882
invite people you want to talk to

318
00:24:18,882 --> 00:24:28,822
And if they accept, you get to, you know, enjoy, you know, Nostra in a very private setting.

319
00:24:30,022 --> 00:24:30,662
Right.

320
00:24:31,602 --> 00:24:41,222
And the fact that the identity is portable, yes, means or also makes it so that your reputation is also portable.

321
00:24:41,222 --> 00:24:51,262
In practical sense, it means that regardless of the app you use, your audience, meaning your followers, remains the same.

322
00:24:51,902 --> 00:24:54,142
No one can take them away from you.

323
00:24:55,462 --> 00:25:07,282
And also, fundamentally, those rankings that I've mentioned, they don't consider the client you're using because that's just not one dimension.

324
00:25:07,462 --> 00:25:10,602
It's not a dimension that I consider, for example.

325
00:25:10,602 --> 00:25:15,482
So you don't get a bonus if you use client A or client B.

326
00:25:15,802 --> 00:25:32,902
It's just derived from the interaction you have with other people and whether they give you attention by following or maybe by muting and they remove your attention from you, their attention from you.

327
00:25:32,902 --> 00:25:49,842
Right. Might be surprising to some people. But, you know, basically, there are individuals on NOSTER who have very specific points of view, very specific sort of personas, I suppose. Most of them are NIMS who are now, you know, disappointed and or bragging about the number of mutes they have. Right.

328
00:25:49,842 --> 00:26:01,142
But I think what's telling about that, some people might find that a little odd, but what's telling about it is it demonstrates the granularity of what Noster and Web of Trust specifically make possible.

329
00:26:01,142 --> 00:26:11,062
You know, you may find incredible engagement with a particular audience or niche or segment, and you may repel others.

330
00:26:11,522 --> 00:26:13,322
But it is not all or nothing.

331
00:26:13,542 --> 00:26:27,442
And it treats the individual user as an adult who can make that decision as opposed to the steward or rather the, you know, captive of some corporate steward who gets to make that decision on their behalf.

332
00:26:28,362 --> 00:26:29,762
And, you know, on that note,

333
00:26:29,902 --> 00:26:31,782
and you've illustrated some of this, Pip,

334
00:26:31,862 --> 00:26:34,542
for someone who's starting to question

335
00:26:34,542 --> 00:26:35,702
the platforms they use,

336
00:26:35,742 --> 00:26:38,662
and I hope that that is one of the outcomes

337
00:26:38,662 --> 00:26:41,402
of people who listen and watch,

338
00:26:41,682 --> 00:26:43,222
maybe they've been burned.

339
00:26:43,542 --> 00:26:44,742
You know, we see on Noster

340
00:26:44,742 --> 00:26:49,382
numerous examples of content creators

341
00:26:49,382 --> 00:26:50,122
who build, you know,

342
00:26:50,182 --> 00:26:51,862
pretty significant audiences on YouTube

343
00:26:51,862 --> 00:26:54,002
and they get cut off just like that.

344
00:26:54,002 --> 00:26:55,682
So whether they're, you know,

345
00:26:55,722 --> 00:26:57,022
internet famous or not,

346
00:26:57,442 --> 00:27:03,682
Help me further understand and help them understand, us understand, why this matters.

347
00:27:03,882 --> 00:27:14,222
Like what is, you know, if Web of Trust succeeds and becomes sort of the standard, what changes about how individuals navigate online?

348
00:27:14,222 --> 00:27:39,662
I think Nostr gives really a superpower to these, let's call them creators, because you do not rely on one single platform. And so you, whatever you build, even if it's small, your audience on Nostr is going to be yours forever. Unless obviously you screw it up and people decide to leave you.

349
00:27:39,662 --> 00:27:43,682
But, you know, that's how it works.

350
00:27:44,102 --> 00:27:49,422
And the fact that your reputation moves with you, well, gives you freedom.

351
00:27:49,802 --> 00:27:56,362
It's insurance against any kind of service or platform going bankrupt.

352
00:27:56,542 --> 00:28:03,882
Like, for example, if we don't think about it, but many social platforms, they just closed, closed down.

353
00:28:03,882 --> 00:28:10,222
For example, now there is Divine, which is like a second attempt at Vine.

354
00:28:11,042 --> 00:28:13,502
But it means that Vine closed.

355
00:28:13,702 --> 00:28:18,122
And many people had maybe millions of followers there and then, oops, they closed.

356
00:28:18,862 --> 00:28:26,542
So on Noster, it's very unlikely that all relays and all clients and all apps, they all close down.

357
00:28:26,722 --> 00:28:28,562
So it's really an insurance.

358
00:28:29,002 --> 00:28:31,522
What you're building on Noster stays with you.

359
00:28:32,122 --> 00:28:33,682
And it's tied to your key.

360
00:28:33,882 --> 00:28:36,862
And the key, you are the only one who can control it.

361
00:28:37,822 --> 00:28:45,602
And the reputation you build can only realistically improve over time, unless, again, you just screwed up.

362
00:28:47,162 --> 00:28:47,882
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

363
00:28:47,882 --> 00:28:54,262
And I think, you know, that so that maybe is the flip side.

364
00:28:54,582 --> 00:29:02,062
And so Web of Trust built on Nostra could liberate identity from corporate control.

365
00:29:02,062 --> 00:29:08,042
it could also create a new kind of exclusion people who you know aren't able to build reputation

366
00:29:08,042 --> 00:29:15,422
and therefore community sort of freeze out dissenting opinions i think web of trust fails

367
00:29:15,422 --> 00:29:21,942
if humans fail fundamentally but i intend to be very optimistic so i don't think that's an issue

368
00:29:21,942 --> 00:29:30,562
i mean uh people throughout history has always been able to find their own niche their own

369
00:29:30,562 --> 00:29:36,222
communities and have a more or less healthy relationship with them.

370
00:29:36,222 --> 00:29:41,882
Like at least the majority of people, they have decent relationship with their neighbors,

371
00:29:42,542 --> 00:29:45,962
with, you know, their people with the same interests.

372
00:29:46,282 --> 00:29:53,262
Obviously, there are going to always be those three, five percent of sociopaths that are

373
00:29:53,262 --> 00:29:57,962
going to try to manipulate this ranking, for example.

374
00:29:57,962 --> 00:30:07,002
And so that's part also of my job of trying to come up with algorithms that are resistant to manipulation as much as possible.

375
00:30:08,902 --> 00:30:17,282
For example, what happens if someone creates one million bots and those one million bots, they all follow him back.

376
00:30:18,102 --> 00:30:22,362
This is not so evil, evil form of manipulation.

377
00:30:22,362 --> 00:30:31,222
and basically the way I'm doing it is that I have multiple defense lines

378
00:30:31,222 --> 00:30:33,162
against this type of civil attacks.

379
00:30:33,662 --> 00:30:39,602
So before including a new MPub, a new key inside my database

380
00:30:39,602 --> 00:30:43,862
so it can get recommended and so that sort of things,

381
00:30:43,862 --> 00:30:47,262
I test multiple checks.

382
00:30:47,422 --> 00:30:51,622
One of them is their own, let's call it global reputation.

383
00:30:52,242 --> 00:30:55,922
So previously I said that reputation is personalized.

384
00:30:56,362 --> 00:30:57,722
It depends on the point of view.

385
00:30:58,582 --> 00:31:03,642
But sometimes, for example, you are a service provider

386
00:31:03,642 --> 00:31:07,082
that wants to give out a service for free.

387
00:31:07,082 --> 00:31:12,782
And so that is an attack vector because if it's free and you don't check,

388
00:31:12,902 --> 00:31:16,222
you can get one billion requests and then your service is down.

389
00:31:16,902 --> 00:31:21,002
So how can you give something for free when the number of entities

390
00:31:21,002 --> 00:31:23,822
that can request it is potentially unlimited,

391
00:31:24,002 --> 00:31:25,042
like the number of keys.

392
00:31:26,622 --> 00:31:29,242
So for that, there is an algorithm

393
00:31:29,242 --> 00:31:30,522
that is not personalized,

394
00:31:30,802 --> 00:31:32,502
just takes like an average perspective,

395
00:31:33,162 --> 00:31:34,802
which is global page rank.

396
00:31:35,742 --> 00:31:37,922
And I'm using that in my own thing.

397
00:31:37,922 --> 00:31:41,442
So before adding this swarm of bots

398
00:31:41,442 --> 00:31:44,582
that try to increase the reputation of a certain actor,

399
00:31:45,322 --> 00:31:49,622
I check if those bots are worthy of being added, basically.

400
00:31:49,622 --> 00:31:56,162
they themselves have a reputation or or none yeah yeah exactly and there is also time time

401
00:31:56,162 --> 00:32:03,622
decay like i don't add unless they have have been reputable for at least uh one week so it also

402
00:32:03,622 --> 00:32:09,242
takes a lot of time for for that for people to start adding many bots and so i will probably

403
00:32:09,242 --> 00:32:16,842
figure out this is one strategy fundamentally this kind of analysis they are not a hard

404
00:32:16,842 --> 00:32:20,142
there is no perfect solution.

405
00:32:21,002 --> 00:32:25,182
So someone could become Vertex but evil,

406
00:32:26,122 --> 00:32:29,542
but it would be, how costly would it be?

407
00:32:29,802 --> 00:32:31,602
Like what is that, how does that sort of play out,

408
00:32:31,662 --> 00:32:32,002
do you think?

409
00:32:32,262 --> 00:32:34,242
So you mean like a new service provider

410
00:32:34,242 --> 00:32:36,442
that is used by others?

411
00:32:37,362 --> 00:32:37,602
Right.

412
00:32:38,282 --> 00:32:40,382
Yeah, it's possible, of course.

413
00:32:40,382 --> 00:32:42,202
The thing is that there are already

414
00:32:42,202 --> 00:32:44,162
multiple service providers.

415
00:32:44,702 --> 00:32:45,922
There are like three now.

416
00:32:46,622 --> 00:32:51,382
So while my own Vertex, then there is Relator built by Jesus.

417
00:32:51,882 --> 00:32:57,362
And then there is Brainstorm built by David, who also was on the show.

418
00:32:57,682 --> 00:33:00,282
And so, yeah, there are already three service providers.

419
00:33:00,282 --> 00:33:03,162
I hope if NOSR grows that there will be more.

420
00:33:04,342 --> 00:33:11,102
And so fundamentally it's going to be competition that improves the quality of the services

421
00:33:11,102 --> 00:33:15,662
and make sure that bad actors don't get used.

422
00:33:15,922 --> 00:33:22,362
or by many you could reframe the same question in many other situations like for example absolutely

423
00:33:22,362 --> 00:33:29,862
a silly example would be like a restaurant what stops you know restaurants that poisons people

424
00:33:29,862 --> 00:33:35,882
from becoming uh the mcdonald of the world yeah it's the poisoning thing huh that's where that's

425
00:33:35,882 --> 00:33:40,222
where it trips you up um no and i take your point and a lot of these questions you know clearly are

426
00:33:40,222 --> 00:33:46,822
are designed to preemptively answer what those who are still kind of coming up the learning curve.

427
00:33:47,102 --> 00:33:51,602
But I think that's a great, it's a great metaphor. You know, I mean, ultimately, and you said this

428
00:33:51,602 --> 00:33:59,422
earlier, I think it's an easy to overlook, but incredibly important point of emphasis, which is

429
00:33:59,422 --> 00:34:07,042
service providers in service to the individuals who, you know, are paying with time, money,

430
00:34:07,042 --> 00:34:15,622
attention and that's often lost. Well, and so let's shift now, Pip, to focusing on, you know,

431
00:34:15,682 --> 00:34:21,622
business builders and for those individuals who may, you know, find it interesting to see how this

432
00:34:21,622 --> 00:34:35,243
stuff works under the hood You made you made the choice to make Vertex free and you designed it so to your point anyone can compete with you And I think that one of the you know incredible dichotomies of free and open source software

433
00:34:36,943 --> 00:34:40,503
But infrastructure that doesn't sustain itself dies, right?

434
00:34:40,863 --> 00:34:42,443
Commercialization is important.

435
00:34:42,443 --> 00:34:53,123
And so what's the path from free to drive adoption, you know, sort of the current state to sustainable without becoming what you're fighting against?

436
00:34:53,123 --> 00:35:09,823
Yeah, that's a good question. I think my model now is a freemium. So it has a limit of 100 requests per day per reputable mpub.

437
00:35:09,823 --> 00:35:20,603
So as I made the example before, I want to give out some credits to those MPubs that I deem reputable.

438
00:35:20,923 --> 00:35:22,863
And it's my choice because it's my server.

439
00:35:23,023 --> 00:35:23,703
I pay the bills.

440
00:35:25,003 --> 00:35:32,584
And so I use my own reputation system to say, okay, these are the MPubs that can get access for free.

441
00:35:32,783 --> 00:35:35,483
And everyone else, I'm sorry, you have to pay.

442
00:35:36,503 --> 00:35:38,443
Now, if you want to use...

443
00:35:38,443 --> 00:35:38,943
And let's pause there.

444
00:35:38,943 --> 00:35:42,703
I think, and forgive me, Pip, I think that that's worth putting sort of an underline.

445
00:35:43,783 --> 00:35:59,263
If you're a builder, if you're a developer, the traditional approach to wait listing, you know, certainly there are tried and true methods of you get an invite and with that come three other invites that you can give out.

446
00:35:59,703 --> 00:36:03,383
Presumably, you're going to give that out to other capable builders, developers.

447
00:36:03,383 --> 00:36:20,883
But I think what you've just underscored is sort of this iterative benefit to Web of Trust, which is that you yourself are using your Web of Trust to filter or screen who gets in to get the free credits to build.

448
00:36:20,883 --> 00:36:28,423
So it's not, you know, Amazon Web Services giving anybody who can fog a mirror $1,000 in credits, which, you know, whatever.

449
00:36:29,303 --> 00:36:37,883
But it's you being able to actually onboard developers with strong reputations first, if I heard you correctly.

450
00:36:38,983 --> 00:36:40,123
Yeah, that's exactly right.

451
00:36:40,183 --> 00:36:41,663
And also their users.

452
00:36:42,003 --> 00:36:45,523
So imagine you use a client.

453
00:36:45,523 --> 00:36:51,303
this client can use your own user key to sign the request.

454
00:36:52,443 --> 00:36:56,863
And so you can get, your request will be fulfilled

455
00:36:56,863 --> 00:37:01,123
because you are reputable according to my own metrics.

456
00:37:01,943 --> 00:37:06,723
This is just for giving free credits so people can try it out

457
00:37:06,723 --> 00:37:11,103
and also developers can try it out without having to pay first.

458
00:37:11,103 --> 00:37:13,883
then if they want to add

459
00:37:13,883 --> 00:37:15,363
more

460
00:37:15,363 --> 00:37:17,983
bigger limits and maybe in the future

461
00:37:17,983 --> 00:37:20,283
more maybe premium features

462
00:37:20,283 --> 00:37:21,483
then

463
00:37:21,483 --> 00:37:24,323
they can pay simply pay for the

464
00:37:24,323 --> 00:37:26,003
credits and it's a pay per

465
00:37:26,003 --> 00:37:27,223
request

466
00:37:27,223 --> 00:37:29,943
so every request consumes

467
00:37:29,943 --> 00:37:31,723
some credits you pay

468
00:37:31,723 --> 00:37:33,863
for the credits you get the credits

469
00:37:33,863 --> 00:37:35,103
and that's it

470
00:37:35,103 --> 00:37:36,643
and you don't

471
00:37:36,643 --> 00:37:39,023
I don't like

472
00:37:39,023 --> 00:37:40,983
subscriptions because

473
00:37:40,983 --> 00:37:43,203
many times you're underutilizing

474
00:37:43,203 --> 00:37:44,943
them or other times you are

475
00:37:44,943 --> 00:37:47,183
overutilizing, well over, you have to

476
00:37:47,183 --> 00:37:48,544
you have to

477
00:37:48,544 --> 00:37:50,023
take the other

478
00:37:50,023 --> 00:37:52,963
next tier, next pricing tier

479
00:37:52,963 --> 00:37:55,064
yeah exactly, instead here just

480
00:37:55,064 --> 00:37:57,263
what's my cost? My cost is

481
00:37:57,263 --> 00:37:58,403
fundamentally computation

482
00:37:58,403 --> 00:38:01,223
and so for any

483
00:38:01,223 --> 00:38:03,243
unit of computation you pay one

484
00:38:03,243 --> 00:38:05,343
credit and you buy credits from me

485
00:38:05,343 --> 00:38:06,223
and that's it

486
00:38:06,223 --> 00:38:09,363
you don't have to buy more, you can just try

487
00:38:09,363 --> 00:38:10,703
it with the one dollar

488
00:38:10,983 --> 00:38:12,683
Yeah, consumption-based, yes.

489
00:38:13,323 --> 00:38:16,943
Maybe in the future I can also add some other types of payment,

490
00:38:17,064 --> 00:38:19,023
but I think this one makes sense.

491
00:38:19,084 --> 00:38:23,463
Also because for a developer can cost like the minimum is $1.

492
00:38:23,823 --> 00:38:28,243
You want to try it out, you pay $1, you get some credit, you try it.

493
00:38:28,923 --> 00:38:34,303
Or maybe the developer can try it with his own key,

494
00:38:34,923 --> 00:38:36,123
so he doesn't even have to pay.

495
00:38:36,564 --> 00:38:39,423
And yeah, that has been working, I think,

496
00:38:39,423 --> 00:38:41,503
because now the clients using Vertex

497
00:38:41,503 --> 00:38:43,483
are increasing in number.

498
00:38:44,483 --> 00:38:47,283
The one that was using it from the beginning

499
00:38:47,283 --> 00:38:51,223
is App Store, which, yeah, I know you.

500
00:38:51,763 --> 00:38:53,803
Yeah, I'm also a big fan.

501
00:38:54,663 --> 00:38:57,923
And there, I think this concept of Web of Trust

502
00:38:57,923 --> 00:39:02,584
with an App Store really is a match, a great match.

503
00:39:03,383 --> 00:39:04,923
And in fact, you know, I want to ask you, Pip,

504
00:39:04,963 --> 00:39:06,243
to speak on Fran's behalf,

505
00:39:06,243 --> 00:39:08,123
and I'll refer back to the conversation

506
00:39:08,123 --> 00:39:09,263
I had with Fran on this show.

507
00:39:09,423 --> 00:39:24,683
Talk us through, it's a great example, talk us through how Web of Trust and Vertex are changing the fundamentals of the traditional App Store model and what they enable in place of that.

508
00:39:24,683 --> 00:39:42,743
Yeah, so Google Play Store or the Apple Store, they have a model that I think is going obsolete very quickly. The model is reviewing everything. So before your app is accepted, they review it. And that's it.

509
00:39:42,743 --> 00:39:52,983
So this is very problematic in many situations because it makes developers extremely frustrated because many times these guidelines are bullshit.

510
00:39:53,363 --> 00:39:59,703
They require you to do some kind of gymnastic of this is not.

511
00:40:01,203 --> 00:40:03,123
I'm not paying for content.

512
00:40:03,263 --> 00:40:06,223
I'm donating to the profile that created the content.

513
00:40:06,383 --> 00:40:10,104
You're trying to work around all of these stupid guidelines.

514
00:40:10,104 --> 00:40:15,183
And many times they fail because a malicious app gets added to the app store.

515
00:40:15,683 --> 00:40:17,503
And it happens multiple times.

516
00:40:17,643 --> 00:40:24,564
For example, that Sparrow Wallet was added for mobile, but there is no Sparrow Wallet on mobile.

517
00:40:24,863 --> 00:40:26,123
We saw that with BitChat, right?

518
00:40:26,223 --> 00:40:34,903
BitChat got, there were 14, you know, plus presumed publishers of BitChat when it first hit.

519
00:40:35,923 --> 00:40:36,663
Yeah, yeah, exactly.

520
00:40:36,763 --> 00:40:38,903
And this is the problem of impersonation, right?

521
00:40:38,903 --> 00:40:39,483
Right.

522
00:40:40,104 --> 00:40:46,023
So the ZapStore model is using Vertex now to do something,

523
00:40:46,643 --> 00:40:48,544
to do like the first line of defense.

524
00:40:49,223 --> 00:40:52,523
Who is, okay, who is behind this application?

525
00:40:52,683 --> 00:40:55,963
You want to know who is behind it, and you know because there is a signature.

526
00:40:56,544 --> 00:40:59,023
Every app is signed by the developer.

527
00:40:59,803 --> 00:41:03,883
But now you ask, okay, is this developer the one I know,

528
00:41:03,883 --> 00:41:09,803
or is it some new key that probably has no reputation,

529
00:41:10,163 --> 00:41:11,104
it's just an impersonator?

530
00:41:11,604 --> 00:41:14,723
And for that line of defense, the first one is vertex.

531
00:41:15,723 --> 00:41:19,163
So there is an endpoint that you can call

532
00:41:19,163 --> 00:41:21,143
called verify reputation.

533
00:41:21,723 --> 00:41:22,863
So it's very straightforward.

534
00:41:23,064 --> 00:41:27,723
You send a key, you get reputation metrics.

535
00:41:28,203 --> 00:41:30,623
For example, how many followers it has,

536
00:41:30,623 --> 00:41:34,463
what is the rank according to the algorithm you specified,

537
00:41:34,983 --> 00:41:37,683
and then also something very important and very visual,

538
00:41:38,263 --> 00:41:43,023
which is who are the top followers according to the algorithm that I specified.

539
00:41:43,963 --> 00:41:48,863
And so basically this shows you, okay, this app is from this developer,

540
00:41:48,943 --> 00:41:52,463
and this developer is followed by maybe Odell, Gigi, Jack.

541
00:41:53,263 --> 00:41:57,723
And you say, okay, okay, I see that how I am connected to this developer,

542
00:41:57,723 --> 00:42:00,763
and I see that he has some reputation.

543
00:42:01,023 --> 00:42:03,223
So already with this first scanner,

544
00:42:03,303 --> 00:42:06,403
you can remove the vast majority of impersonators

545
00:42:06,403 --> 00:42:10,303
because they don't have any kind of social proof behind them.

546
00:42:11,423 --> 00:42:12,263
And then in the future,

547
00:42:12,263 --> 00:42:15,343
I know Fran wants to have multiple levels,

548
00:42:15,783 --> 00:42:16,983
more levels of defense.

549
00:42:17,283 --> 00:42:19,623
Maybe the second would be

550
00:42:19,623 --> 00:42:23,763
maybe some kind of AI scanning for malwares.

551
00:42:23,763 --> 00:42:33,523
but also it's important to to the order is important like you cannot ask for an ai scan

552
00:42:33,523 --> 00:42:40,943
of an apk that might be quite big everything for every single app release yeah every app yeah so

553
00:42:40,943 --> 00:42:47,923
you kind of first because everyone can take an app change a line of code and then republish it

554
00:42:47,923 --> 00:42:50,023
right, in this new model, which is open,

555
00:42:50,143 --> 00:42:51,883
and it's like the Wild West.

556
00:42:52,564 --> 00:42:55,503
So the verification first needs to constrain

557
00:42:55,503 --> 00:42:58,203
this set of potentially unbounded keys,

558
00:42:58,823 --> 00:43:03,723
unbounded, to a very narrow subset.

559
00:43:04,303 --> 00:43:07,923
So only apps that are signed by people

560
00:43:07,923 --> 00:43:10,143
with some kind of reputation.

561
00:43:11,403 --> 00:43:14,604
And this is also, I think, part of its direction,

562
00:43:14,604 --> 00:43:20,003
is like enabling the user to set his own threshold.

563
00:43:20,383 --> 00:43:23,943
So for all of these lines of defense,

564
00:43:24,143 --> 00:43:26,963
like, okay, what kind of proof do I want?

565
00:43:27,223 --> 00:43:30,423
Do I want a high reputation or medium or low?

566
00:43:31,544 --> 00:43:32,683
Yeah, and I think, you know,

567
00:43:32,763 --> 00:43:34,323
I think about particular use cases

568
00:43:34,323 --> 00:43:36,403
and again, perhaps to frame this

569
00:43:36,403 --> 00:43:37,943
for someone who's not a developer,

570
00:43:37,943 --> 00:43:39,263
what I would assert,

571
00:43:39,584 --> 00:43:41,483
and I think it's observably true,

572
00:43:41,483 --> 00:43:46,263
is that the centralized models are failing left and right.

573
00:43:46,363 --> 00:43:49,923
I mean, that's the central tenet of trust revolution.

574
00:43:50,584 --> 00:43:54,363
And so we can black pill and give up all hope,

575
00:43:54,463 --> 00:43:57,303
yee-hoo, enter, or we can look for better solutions.

576
00:43:57,303 --> 00:43:58,823
And I think this is a great example.

577
00:43:58,823 --> 00:44:02,483
And so many of us, if we're technically inclined,

578
00:44:03,183 --> 00:44:05,763
you know, we're the family CTO for mom or dad,

579
00:44:05,883 --> 00:44:08,463
uncles, you know, grandparents, whatever that looks like.

580
00:44:08,463 --> 00:44:28,203
And so the ability to dial a setting that says, okay, you know, thinking about my mom, let's perhaps not click install for anything that I or a close network of friends and family have also used and trusted.

581
00:44:28,203 --> 00:44:40,743
Now, you know, maybe that's a little in the weeds, but the point being, you can create or sort of zoom in and out that locus of control or locus of influence, I guess we could say.

582
00:44:41,643 --> 00:44:47,203
And so to me, the sort of one, two is one, the as is ain't working, right?

583
00:44:47,243 --> 00:44:48,443
They're missing imposters.

584
00:44:48,584 --> 00:44:49,923
They're missing malware.

585
00:44:49,923 --> 00:44:57,703
where they are, whether an individual cares or not, they're inflicting mass pain on developers,

586
00:44:57,703 --> 00:45:03,084
which makes them less inclined to build great applications and put them on any centralized

587
00:45:03,084 --> 00:45:12,283
app store. And so in lieu of that, we have got a legitimate trust-based approach. So long,

588
00:45:13,123 --> 00:45:19,843
granted, as you have a follow graph, if you have individuals, you know, who are engaging with those

589
00:45:19,843 --> 00:45:23,963
applications using them and that you can in turn, you know, to some degree sort of out

590
00:45:23,963 --> 00:45:25,803
trust your due diligence too.

591
00:45:25,943 --> 00:45:27,423
Is that kind of a fair characterization?

592
00:45:29,104 --> 00:45:30,123
Yeah, I think it is.

593
00:45:30,123 --> 00:45:39,743
And in the example of your mom or your mom could use, could say, okay, I'm going to use

594
00:45:39,743 --> 00:45:46,683
Sean's personalized page rank as my own like guideline.

595
00:45:47,443 --> 00:45:49,403
So, and you can use that too.

596
00:45:49,403 --> 00:45:51,743
like if you have a friend which you trust

597
00:45:51,743 --> 00:45:53,143
because he is very technical,

598
00:45:53,843 --> 00:45:55,643
you don't understand any of these things,

599
00:45:55,983 --> 00:45:58,183
you can say, okay, for this particular reason,

600
00:45:58,423 --> 00:45:59,983
this particular aspect,

601
00:46:00,143 --> 00:46:03,463
I just choose this friend as my point of view.

602
00:46:03,943 --> 00:46:06,383
And he follows all these nerd developers

603
00:46:06,383 --> 00:46:07,423
that I don't follow.

604
00:46:07,523 --> 00:46:09,023
I don't understand what they talk about.

605
00:46:09,423 --> 00:46:12,044
But I want to access that data,

606
00:46:12,203 --> 00:46:15,523
access that familiarity with the matter

607
00:46:15,523 --> 00:46:17,104
in my own application.

608
00:46:17,323 --> 00:46:18,403
And you can just do that.

609
00:46:18,403 --> 00:46:25,883
You just have to, well, granted, you know, the client will have to explore those kind of things, but fundamentally it's all possible.

610
00:46:26,743 --> 00:46:27,983
Yes. I mean, that's what I did.

611
00:46:28,104 --> 00:46:41,283
You know, I've spoken about this before when I moved from having been on iPhone since day one, oh seven, when the first one released to a Google Pixel running Graphene now two, three months ago.

612
00:46:41,283 --> 00:46:51,003
That's why ZapStore was so powerful for me and continues to be is I am a deeply technical person, capable, all that good stuff.

613
00:46:51,123 --> 00:46:52,584
And yet this was a new world.

614
00:46:52,923 --> 00:46:57,783
You know, I went from Apple App Store to APK's application.

615
00:46:59,363 --> 00:47:00,044
What is that?

616
00:47:00,123 --> 00:47:01,084
Application package kits.

617
00:47:01,143 --> 00:47:01,423
I forget.

618
00:47:01,723 --> 00:47:03,703
Anyway, point being in the Android world now.

619
00:47:03,703 --> 00:47:16,203
And so the ability to see, you know, these three people I know and I'm connected with have also trusted this publisher, developer, and have installed this application, boom, solves a big problem for me.

620
00:47:16,203 --> 00:47:30,463
And I think that goes to one of the interesting points about Web of Trust that I'd love to get into a bit, Pip, is that is, in effect, hiring Web of Trust to do a job for me.

621
00:47:30,483 --> 00:47:35,663
Or perhaps more accurately, I'm hiring people in my Web of Trust.

622
00:47:35,843 --> 00:47:39,503
You know, I'm outsourcing that I'm not going to understand everything.

623
00:47:39,683 --> 00:47:44,643
And I think David Stringhorn does a great job of conveying this.

624
00:47:44,643 --> 00:47:58,223
You know, I'm not going to be an expert about everything. And so in a particular context or domain, I can outsource my due diligence, my trust, my homework to others in my network.

625
00:47:58,223 --> 00:48:08,383
And so with all of that, let's sort of shift to outside of Bitcoin, outside of Nostra, outside of FreedomTech, traditional builders, traditional developers.

626
00:48:08,383 --> 00:48:23,463
If they're looking at centralized systems and we see this, right, they're skeptical because they don't understand or frankly, what they've always known has been handed down from them, from the Apple developer program or Google's equivalent.

627
00:48:23,463 --> 00:48:28,943
what do they usually get wrong about Web of Trust and what would you say to them

628
00:48:28,943 --> 00:48:35,263
in terms of not underestimating what's possible and reframing how they approach building on it?

629
00:48:35,263 --> 00:48:43,163
I think the biggest mistake, I would call it, before even arriving at Web of Trust is the identity part.

630
00:48:43,443 --> 00:48:49,584
So most games, most apps maybe are not taking up, you know.

631
00:48:49,584 --> 00:48:52,343
why do I have to sign up

632
00:48:52,343 --> 00:48:54,564
and create a new damn account

633
00:48:54,564 --> 00:48:55,943
with this new app?

634
00:48:56,243 --> 00:48:57,483
Like why do I have to have

635
00:48:57,483 --> 00:48:58,943
1,000 accounts

636
00:48:58,943 --> 00:49:00,203
and a password manager

637
00:49:00,203 --> 00:49:01,883
with a 1,000 password?

638
00:49:02,123 --> 00:49:03,683
They can just use Noster.

639
00:49:04,363 --> 00:49:06,143
If you want to have a commenting session,

640
00:49:06,963 --> 00:49:09,084
some kind of social activity

641
00:49:09,084 --> 00:49:13,503
like let's play together this game,

642
00:49:13,604 --> 00:49:14,783
I invite you to this game,

643
00:49:14,843 --> 00:49:15,443
those kind of things.

644
00:49:15,723 --> 00:49:16,803
If you integrate Noster,

645
00:49:16,803 --> 00:49:19,303
it's going to take not a lot of time

646
00:49:19,303 --> 00:49:23,723
probably same time it takes for you to build your own authentication,

647
00:49:24,323 --> 00:49:28,064
but then you get access to a network that is already alive.

648
00:49:29,743 --> 00:49:34,303
And this, I think, is the biggest problem because everyone is trying to...

649
00:49:35,183 --> 00:49:40,923
And also, it's part of the mentality that maybe fuels VC funding

650
00:49:40,923 --> 00:49:44,663
that you have to coach your users.

651
00:49:45,403 --> 00:49:45,683
Crucial.

652
00:49:45,683 --> 00:49:52,703
The thing is that those models is really very, it's like a power law.

653
00:49:52,883 --> 00:49:57,883
So a few gets everything and then everyone else has 100 users.

654
00:49:57,883 --> 00:49:58,223
Perhaps.

655
00:49:58,403 --> 00:49:58,883
100 accounts.

656
00:49:58,883 --> 00:50:00,203
I think that is so important.

657
00:50:00,363 --> 00:50:14,383
And I would, again, just underline what you're saying, which is the perception, be it VC-fueled or otherwise, that you must own identity versus the reality that you ain't going to own identity, right?

658
00:50:14,903 --> 00:50:19,243
X and Meta and Google and Microsoft, to a lesser degree, own identity.

659
00:50:19,243 --> 00:50:27,763
And so the alternative is to compound by allowing the individual to own their own identity by using Nostre.

660
00:50:28,023 --> 00:50:29,203
But please continue.

661
00:50:30,243 --> 00:50:40,203
Yeah, I think this is the first step is allowing people to use their existing accounts, at least for this kind of logins.

662
00:50:40,443 --> 00:50:44,223
So at least it's less painful to use.

663
00:50:44,383 --> 00:50:56,544
And if you choose to add as one of the options, because we don't live in a bubble, so you probably are going to have some kind of Google sign-in or stuff like that.

664
00:50:56,564 --> 00:50:57,523
Off of some sort, yeah.

665
00:50:57,983 --> 00:50:59,623
Yeah, but you could add also Noster.

666
00:51:00,443 --> 00:51:04,763
Since you are already five O-Off, why not adding the six?

667
00:51:05,023 --> 00:51:10,604
You add Noster, you get a slightly bigger network of people that can use it.

668
00:51:10,604 --> 00:51:26,223
And then once you have it, you can benefit from a whole network and a whole, yeah, a network of people building on it and also content being created.

669
00:51:26,223 --> 00:51:36,863
Because how extremely difficult it is to convince people to build content on your newly created game application.

670
00:51:37,124 --> 00:51:52,865
Like it going to be so damn difficult A cold start Yeah the cold start when you have three users or 10 users like why should i invest one hour of my time to build to write content for this free user well where the

671
00:51:52,865 --> 00:52:00,545
when the audience is so small with no sir you can you can jump start it and arrive at let's say

672
00:52:00,545 --> 00:52:04,385
slightly shorter than half a million of people.

673
00:52:04,725 --> 00:52:06,705
So clearly it's not super big,

674
00:52:06,845 --> 00:52:10,245
but from 10 users to half a million,

675
00:52:10,445 --> 00:52:12,105
it's a massive improvement.

676
00:52:13,625 --> 00:52:14,445
And once you have it,

677
00:52:14,505 --> 00:52:18,105
you also get access to a lot of services actually

678
00:52:18,105 --> 00:52:22,225
that are now serving Nostra, for example.

679
00:52:23,225 --> 00:52:26,025
Web of Trust services, but also media hosting.

680
00:52:26,305 --> 00:52:28,705
And then you also get access to relays,

681
00:52:28,705 --> 00:52:32,785
which are, most of them are a free service

682
00:52:32,785 --> 00:52:35,065
where you can, your user can publish

683
00:52:35,065 --> 00:52:38,845
and you don't have to host your own server

684
00:52:38,845 --> 00:52:41,145
to store your user content.

685
00:52:41,325 --> 00:52:41,945
You just...

686
00:52:41,945 --> 00:52:43,145
You get resilience, right?

687
00:52:43,605 --> 00:52:45,945
Yeah, yeah, you can, your user will,

688
00:52:46,265 --> 00:52:48,265
your app when someone creates a content

689
00:52:48,265 --> 00:52:50,925
can just blast it to many relays

690
00:52:50,925 --> 00:52:52,725
and then people will read it from it

691
00:52:52,725 --> 00:52:53,785
and that's it.

692
00:52:53,865 --> 00:52:55,385
Maybe someone writes a blog post

693
00:52:55,385 --> 00:52:58,065
about how great your game is, right?

694
00:52:58,705 --> 00:53:02,545
That's all for free if you plug it into Nostra, basically.

695
00:53:03,665 --> 00:53:07,385
Because people are going to use the same relays to read blog posts.

696
00:53:07,745 --> 00:53:08,045
Right.

697
00:53:08,185 --> 00:53:11,345
If you create your new blog post,

698
00:53:11,665 --> 00:53:15,145
only people that have an account with your game,

699
00:53:15,265 --> 00:53:17,125
which are 10 people, are going to read it.

700
00:53:17,785 --> 00:53:21,325
So you get a massive, massively increased distribution.

701
00:53:22,865 --> 00:53:27,765
And frankly speaking, the cost is just adding a new sign-in.

702
00:53:28,705 --> 00:53:33,745
Yeah, and I think, you know, I'm to the degree that I'm a gamer, which is not much, or I wouldn't admit it if I were.

703
00:53:35,645 --> 00:53:37,845
I'm thinking about Apple Game Center, right?

704
00:53:37,845 --> 00:53:48,225
Like here is a Goliath, a big tech Goliath, who I think objectively has failed in creating a social network, in effect, for gaming.

705
00:53:48,725 --> 00:53:52,485
And so Sony and Microsoft dominate, you know, Steam to a lesser degree.

706
00:53:52,625 --> 00:53:58,205
And so, you know, if you're a builder, back to your point, you're just not going to take that on and win.

707
00:53:58,205 --> 00:54:06,525
Or rather, if you even could, if you had a chance, what an incredible burn of capital that's going to require versus focusing on the core experience.

708
00:54:07,245 --> 00:54:19,965
And so I think, you know, this has been, I hope, useful for builders looking to invest where it matters most, which is differentiation and end user experience.

709
00:54:19,965 --> 00:54:22,765
and individuals who, as you say,

710
00:54:22,845 --> 00:54:24,065
I mean, I've got, you know,

711
00:54:24,605 --> 00:54:25,745
once was 1Password,

712
00:54:25,805 --> 00:54:26,505
now it's BitWord,

713
00:54:26,565 --> 00:54:28,385
and I've got 1,400 logins

714
00:54:28,385 --> 00:54:30,265
saved in BitWord.

715
00:54:30,365 --> 00:54:31,185
It's insane.

716
00:54:31,545 --> 00:54:32,485
And so I think there's

717
00:54:32,485 --> 00:54:34,145
a tremendous amount to benefit

718
00:54:34,145 --> 00:54:35,105
both sides,

719
00:54:35,225 --> 00:54:36,485
both the application developers

720
00:54:36,485 --> 00:54:38,345
and the users.

721
00:54:39,605 --> 00:54:41,165
Well, let's wrap up here, Pip.

722
00:54:41,225 --> 00:54:42,865
Where does this go next?

723
00:54:43,005 --> 00:54:44,865
What capabilities are you building

724
00:54:44,865 --> 00:54:46,045
toward with Vertex

725
00:54:46,045 --> 00:54:47,345
that don't exist yet?

726
00:54:47,345 --> 00:54:55,065
What should we look forward to, both in Web of Trust broadly and Vertex specifically, if you care to get into that?

727
00:54:56,125 --> 00:55:04,685
I think a great new feature would be the ability to detect explicit content.

728
00:55:05,045 --> 00:55:16,885
That's a big one because a lot of people nowadays in Nostra are actually publishing more or so discussing content from my point of view, at least, you know.

729
00:55:16,885 --> 00:55:21,145
Yes, and everybody will, you know, that beauty is in the eye of the beholder and so is the inverse.

730
00:55:22,045 --> 00:55:22,845
Yeah, yeah, exactly.

731
00:55:23,305 --> 00:55:31,765
And so, but some kind of, let's say, objective quantification of, okay, is this non-safe for work or safe for work?

732
00:55:31,865 --> 00:55:35,005
Is this safe to be shown to the child?

733
00:55:35,785 --> 00:55:36,705
Yeah, I don't want this.

734
00:55:36,825 --> 00:55:43,005
I don't want to open up, you know, my Nostra app of choice in a crowd and have something pop up on my feed that nobody wants to see.

735
00:55:43,885 --> 00:55:44,545
Yeah, exactly.

736
00:55:44,545 --> 00:55:46,485
So this is like a very obvious thing.

737
00:55:48,305 --> 00:56:00,825
So an endpoint where you can send maybe an MPub or an event ID and it tells you what's the likelihood that it contains explicit content and what kind maybe of explicit content.

738
00:56:01,465 --> 00:56:08,205
So you can maybe, if you're a builder, you can use that to remove stuff your users don't want to see from their feats.

739
00:56:08,845 --> 00:56:14,205
Maybe it's highly politicized, I assume, you know, which is a different category and perhaps a different severity.

740
00:56:14,205 --> 00:56:20,025
but there are people who just don't want to see certain political topics or content.

741
00:56:20,185 --> 00:56:23,645
Is that a different problem or does it fall into that same sort of rubric?

742
00:56:24,565 --> 00:56:27,905
No, I was more thinking about pornography.

743
00:56:28,505 --> 00:56:29,625
Okay, yeah, straight up.

744
00:56:29,625 --> 00:56:39,785
Yeah, those things where you really know before you start a session of looking at,

745
00:56:39,985 --> 00:56:43,505
scrolling through the feed if you want to see pornography or not.

746
00:56:43,505 --> 00:56:45,825
Got it. So it's pretty binary. Yeah.

747
00:56:46,385 --> 00:56:53,985
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, the result could be classifying the type of and then also the likelihood.

748
00:56:54,865 --> 00:57:02,085
So you can have more because some form of arts, maybe they have a naked body, but they are not pornography.

749
00:57:02,765 --> 00:57:06,985
So obviously there is going to be difficult to do.

750
00:57:07,765 --> 00:57:09,405
There's no objective measure there.

751
00:57:09,405 --> 00:57:18,245
Now, tricky question or tricky sort of subject here that occurs to me is how do we not fall into chat control?

752
00:57:18,465 --> 00:57:26,945
How do we not fall into scanning content in a way that becomes KYC or otherwise violates privacy?

753
00:57:27,405 --> 00:57:28,125
How is this different?

754
00:57:29,085 --> 00:57:32,285
Now, this is different because it can only analyze public data.

755
00:57:32,285 --> 00:57:37,565
And this is one part where Noster is really shining.

756
00:57:37,565 --> 00:57:40,145
is really proving itself.

757
00:57:40,505 --> 00:57:43,065
But the other part is if you have some content

758
00:57:43,065 --> 00:57:44,985
you don't want people to see,

759
00:57:45,985 --> 00:57:46,965
you can encrypt it.

760
00:57:47,525 --> 00:57:49,505
You have a key, you encrypt it, it's yours.

761
00:57:50,425 --> 00:57:52,725
You can store it locally, that's the best.

762
00:57:52,845 --> 00:57:54,685
Encrypted and stored locally, that's the best.

763
00:57:55,285 --> 00:57:57,285
Or even encrypted and stored somewhere else,

764
00:57:57,485 --> 00:57:59,065
like in a relay, still encrypted.

765
00:57:59,545 --> 00:58:02,985
So you can have private data and then public data

766
00:58:02,985 --> 00:58:05,605
and I can only work with the public data fundamentally.

767
00:58:05,605 --> 00:58:16,025
or maybe data like well maybe data you have and decrypted for me like someone send you

768
00:58:16,025 --> 00:58:23,885
a picture or in your dms ah i see that might you decrypt it for me you send it to me

769
00:58:23,885 --> 00:58:30,365
maybe in a kind of anonymized way if you want it's all opt-in obviously the fact that

770
00:58:30,365 --> 00:58:35,305
so i can decouple i could not to get in the weeds too far but you know if we had

771
00:58:35,305 --> 00:58:37,845
subkeys or key rotation.

772
00:58:37,985 --> 00:58:38,985
I suppose it's not rotation,

773
00:58:39,105 --> 00:58:40,245
but if we had a subkey,

774
00:58:40,665 --> 00:58:41,925
I could spin up a subkey,

775
00:58:42,405 --> 00:58:44,205
submit content to the service,

776
00:58:44,685 --> 00:58:45,425
have it scanned,

777
00:58:46,145 --> 00:58:46,985
get a result back,

778
00:58:47,105 --> 00:58:47,805
discard that key.

779
00:58:47,945 --> 00:58:49,825
There's no tether or connection

780
00:58:49,825 --> 00:58:52,265
between my primary identity

781
00:58:52,265 --> 00:58:55,745
and a particular payload or message.

782
00:58:57,205 --> 00:58:57,865
Yeah, that's right.

783
00:58:58,425 --> 00:58:58,965
There is no,

784
00:58:59,205 --> 00:59:00,185
you could do that.

785
00:59:00,185 --> 00:59:00,845
At the moment,

786
00:59:01,005 --> 00:59:03,965
the experience is not great

787
00:59:03,965 --> 00:59:11,005
because you would have to buy credits for that subkey.

788
00:59:11,425 --> 00:59:17,385
You cannot get at the moment credits for that subkey

789
00:59:17,385 --> 00:59:19,525
because the subkey would probably have no reputation,

790
00:59:19,825 --> 00:59:21,805
would be indistinguishable from a bot.

791
00:59:22,225 --> 00:59:22,305
Right.

792
00:59:22,845 --> 00:59:25,065
And I took us down that rabbit hole,

793
00:59:25,185 --> 00:59:27,485
but I think, you know, not to take away your key point,

794
00:59:27,485 --> 00:59:31,625
which is explicit content is a job to be done.

795
00:59:31,625 --> 00:59:34,305
It's a service to be rendered.

796
00:59:34,905 --> 00:59:44,185
What else is interesting to you in terms of delivering greater capabilities to applications and users through Web of Trust?

797
00:59:44,185 --> 00:59:56,245
Well, we talk about a lot about impersonation detection, but there are also many other things that because impersonation detection and spam prevention, they are like the basic.

798
00:59:56,985 --> 00:59:59,845
Like if you don't have those, your app is barely working.

799
01:00:00,545 --> 01:00:00,665
Right.

800
01:00:00,665 --> 01:00:03,325
Right. It's a garbage heap and nobody wants to be there.

801
01:00:04,125 --> 01:00:09,425
Yeah, exactly. But you can also use Web of Trust to improve the experience.

802
01:00:09,425 --> 01:00:20,885
So one way I'm offering now is giving you personalized recommendation like, oh, you might want to follow these people because they are quite popular in your own subnetwork.

803
01:00:21,865 --> 01:00:25,445
So onboarding. Well, I don't know if that goes to onboarding because you've got to have some.

804
01:00:25,445 --> 01:00:30,425
No, no, it goes to onboarding because you can specify different algorithms.

805
01:00:30,785 --> 01:00:33,225
One is, well, personalized page rank.

806
01:00:33,505 --> 01:00:38,085
It's going to be personalized to you, but if you don't follow anyone, it's not going to work.

807
01:00:38,365 --> 01:00:42,225
But you can also give at least use a global page rank.

808
01:00:42,465 --> 01:00:43,245
Topics, yeah.

809
01:00:43,665 --> 01:00:44,505
Yeah, maybe, yeah.

810
01:00:44,565 --> 01:00:46,025
Also topics in the future, yes.

811
01:00:46,025 --> 01:00:56,665
So you can get like the global, like the average perspective of who is popular in art, in Bitcoin, in those kind of topics.

812
01:00:57,625 --> 01:01:03,705
And for onboarding, that's also pretty, pretty good because you don't have to reinvent your own onboarding.

813
01:01:04,385 --> 01:01:10,325
Well, and what I think here, too, what I would underscore, you know, we're jumping around between sort of end user and developer, which is great.

814
01:01:10,325 --> 01:01:18,265
But I would say here, too, that the you're here again, that the message to a builder is this will only get better.

815
01:01:18,385 --> 01:01:37,325
Right. Speaking of compounding, you know, and the benefits of compounding to be able to recreate that from scratch versus to be able to get this for, quote, free or inherit this capability in this this social graph and all of the signals of this web of trust just gets better over time.

816
01:01:37,325 --> 01:01:43,625
yeah exactly and then there is also search which if you have used the nostril it's a

817
01:01:43,625 --> 01:01:50,625
it's not the best feature it's not a shining moment no exactly most of the time you you search

818
01:01:50,625 --> 01:01:57,085
for jack and then what happens is you get every possible impersonator under the sun

819
01:01:57,085 --> 01:02:04,425
of jack dorsey and but not jack dorsey right right right right and mostly because most relays

820
01:02:04,425 --> 01:02:10,965
most clients use the search capabilities of the relays and the relays just do some text

821
01:02:10,965 --> 01:02:18,565
similarity. So if someone calls themselves Jack, it's going to be Jack, right? So obviously that-

822
01:02:18,565 --> 01:02:23,185
I'm suddenly reminded of Silicon Valley's hot dog, not hot dog for all of those fans of the HBO show.

823
01:02:23,185 --> 01:02:28,745
But yeah, yeah. So it's pretty brittle right now of limited use and sort of what,

824
01:02:28,745 --> 01:02:40,405
You know, fast forward us a year or two, like what would search on Nostr or a Nostr powered application do differently than X?

825
01:02:40,725 --> 01:02:46,785
Or is it, hey, you get the same quality or caliber of search without the centralization, which is enough?

826
01:02:48,045 --> 01:02:53,905
Yeah, I think I think the first step is reaching, matching the quality of decentralized solution.

827
01:02:53,905 --> 01:03:03,045
Most of them, they have good search unless search is a part of their revenue model where they put ads in search.

828
01:03:03,765 --> 01:03:03,785
Right.

829
01:03:04,245 --> 01:03:10,005
Which it is because I think on Google, obviously, like the first three results are ads.

830
01:03:10,485 --> 01:03:15,625
And then on Twitter, the blue check, they get massive boost in search.

831
01:03:15,625 --> 01:03:21,225
so obviously if someone even is more interesting than according to your own point of view

832
01:03:21,225 --> 01:03:30,585
more interesting than a blue check mark but uh you know the the search result would not match your own

833
01:03:30,585 --> 01:03:39,025
taste they would match what the company what wants to push on to you absolutely yeah i wrote a piece

834
01:03:39,025 --> 01:03:43,485
recently called extraction is rational and and that is it right like to extract value in every

835
01:03:43,485 --> 01:03:48,425
potential scenario like that from the standpoint of these centralized platforms and due to broken

836
01:03:48,425 --> 01:03:52,185
money, whole of the conversation. But that is the rational approach. And so I think, you know,

837
01:03:52,185 --> 01:04:01,125
as you're saying, I get the caliber and quality of search without or at the same time, I can

838
01:04:01,125 --> 01:04:08,465
verify that those results have not been interdicted. You know, someone hasn't jammed something into my

839
01:04:08,465 --> 01:04:12,785
search results in a way that is this black box. And I think that's what's so powerful,

840
01:04:12,785 --> 01:04:13,865
among other things.

841
01:04:14,565 --> 01:04:18,525
I think one aspect of Vertex in particular

842
01:04:18,525 --> 01:04:20,205
that I think is very interesting

843
01:04:20,205 --> 01:04:24,125
is that, yes, it is trusted to some extent.

844
01:04:24,365 --> 01:04:24,705
Sure.

845
01:04:24,945 --> 01:04:28,385
Because to check that the scores

846
01:04:28,385 --> 01:04:30,345
are exactly those scores,

847
01:04:31,005 --> 01:04:32,525
you would have to recompute

848
01:04:32,525 --> 01:04:34,905
on the same data also.

849
01:04:36,105 --> 01:04:38,605
Well, the service, the call is open source,

850
01:04:38,605 --> 01:04:41,845
but that there is no guarantee, actually,

851
01:04:41,845 --> 01:04:43,145
that I'm running that code.

852
01:04:43,265 --> 01:04:45,345
Like I can tell you, yes, I'm running that,

853
01:04:45,845 --> 01:04:48,225
but you cannot prove it cryptographically

854
01:04:48,225 --> 01:04:49,405
that I'm doing so.

855
01:04:49,785 --> 01:04:53,125
But what you can do is have a kind of optimistic proof,

856
01:04:54,645 --> 01:04:58,205
which I think most of the times is enough.

857
01:04:58,965 --> 01:05:01,045
Meaning when I send you a response,

858
01:05:01,525 --> 01:05:03,625
my response is signed by my key.

859
01:05:04,525 --> 01:05:08,105
If later you find out that that response was compromised,

860
01:05:08,105 --> 01:05:12,145
that I put an impersonator in the first part of Jack Dorsey,

861
01:05:12,265 --> 01:05:13,865
so you message the wrong person,

862
01:05:13,945 --> 01:05:15,165
you send money to the wrong person,

863
01:05:15,245 --> 01:05:16,985
whatever the case was,

864
01:05:17,745 --> 01:05:20,025
then you can just reshare the event and say,

865
01:05:20,165 --> 01:05:22,685
look, Vertex is lied here,

866
01:05:22,945 --> 01:05:26,245
and then my repetition is gone in just one response

867
01:05:26,245 --> 01:05:27,885
because every response is signed.

868
01:05:27,885 --> 01:05:31,885
I cannot say, no, that's false because...

869
01:05:31,885 --> 01:05:33,805
Attribution is absolute, right?

870
01:05:34,685 --> 01:05:34,905
Yeah.

871
01:05:34,905 --> 01:05:40,965
And I think that, again, is just one of these things that is worth highlighting.

872
01:05:42,405 --> 01:05:46,705
And, you know, instead of turtles, it's reputation all the way down, right?

873
01:05:46,725 --> 01:05:58,665
And I think what's really powerful that you've drawn out, Pip, is that at each stage, there is a signal that affects reputation positively, negatively, otherwise.

874
01:05:58,665 --> 01:06:12,965
And as this gets built out, as Web of Trust becomes integral, you know, there's countless bits of science fiction I can recall that I've read, you know, which is, which are, you know, they talk about sort of this reputation that follows you in credits, right?

875
01:06:12,965 --> 01:06:19,985
sci-fi authors always just use credits and now we say Bitcoin. But I think it is a really powerful

876
01:06:19,985 --> 01:06:29,905
vision of what's coming and what can be built when there is no way to escape bad actions in the sense

877
01:06:29,905 --> 01:06:36,505
that if you are a bad actor, you know, it is attributable to some cryptographically verifiable

878
01:06:36,505 --> 01:06:38,005
verifiable identity.

879
01:06:38,625 --> 01:06:39,705
And so, you know,

880
01:06:40,225 --> 01:06:41,325
there's nowhere to hide.

881
01:06:41,425 --> 01:06:42,605
That's good and bad,

882
01:06:42,745 --> 01:06:43,965
but only bad, I think,

883
01:06:44,085 --> 01:06:45,245
if you're a bad actor.

884
01:06:45,485 --> 01:06:48,325
So, well, I really appreciate it, Pip.

885
01:06:48,925 --> 01:06:50,045
This is exciting.

886
01:06:50,865 --> 01:06:54,145
For builders who want to dive in,

887
01:06:54,245 --> 01:06:55,625
what are the next one or two steps

888
01:06:55,625 --> 01:06:56,405
they should take

889
01:06:56,405 --> 01:06:57,825
to get started with Vertex?

890
01:06:58,945 --> 01:07:03,045
They can go to vertexlab.io

891
01:07:03,045 --> 01:07:07,285
and or search for Vertex on Noster.

892
01:07:08,105 --> 01:07:09,725
And as I often say,

893
01:07:10,065 --> 01:07:14,465
if they use a client that has some kind of decent search,

894
01:07:14,565 --> 01:07:15,345
they will find it.

895
01:07:16,705 --> 01:07:18,805
And if not, they should be using Vertex, right?

896
01:07:18,825 --> 01:07:20,305
Yeah, they can go to the website.

897
01:07:22,445 --> 01:07:26,805
And then you have, I think, well-written documentation.

898
01:07:27,265 --> 01:07:28,425
And then if you have any question,

899
01:07:28,425 --> 01:07:30,845
also there is a link to my signal.

900
01:07:31,025 --> 01:07:32,585
So you can just send me a message

901
01:07:32,585 --> 01:07:34,745
and I'm going to help you out.

902
01:07:34,745 --> 01:07:41,145
Usually I found that developers take a couple of hours

903
01:07:41,145 --> 01:07:45,725
between starting and implementing some kind of feature

904
01:07:45,725 --> 01:07:51,685
because fundamentally it's very easy.

905
01:07:51,865 --> 01:07:56,965
It's just you sign an event with some kind of parameters

906
01:07:56,965 --> 01:08:00,605
like what algorithm you want to use,

907
01:08:00,605 --> 01:08:05,065
who is the personalization source kind of things,

908
01:08:05,745 --> 01:08:07,145
how many results you want.

909
01:08:07,185 --> 01:08:08,405
You want 10, you want 100.

910
01:08:08,765 --> 01:08:11,405
You send it and then you get the response.

911
01:08:11,725 --> 01:08:13,045
And it's all Noster events.

912
01:08:13,725 --> 01:08:15,045
So if you're already using Noster,

913
01:08:15,165 --> 01:08:18,085
it's going to take literally maybe less than one hour

914
01:08:18,085 --> 01:08:19,265
and you can get started.

915
01:08:20,805 --> 01:08:20,925
Brilliant.

916
01:08:21,485 --> 01:08:22,605
So if you're a builder, do that.

917
01:08:22,665 --> 01:08:24,545
If you're not a builder,

918
01:08:24,965 --> 01:08:27,365
but you know some, point them that way

919
01:08:27,365 --> 01:08:29,985
or demand better of your applications.

920
01:08:30,605 --> 01:08:36,865
Super. Pip, thank you so much. And I hope we can do an update in the near future.

921
01:08:37,585 --> 01:08:37,945
Thank you.

922
01:08:38,625 --> 01:08:39,545
Okay. Take care.