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All right, welcome back to Bitcoin Study Sessions. I'm Lucas. I am joined by Mr. Grant Reichert Esquire, who shares the same professional designation as W. Aaron Daniel Esquire, the author of Dispute Resolution Without the State.

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This is an academic work printed in the Satoshi Papers by Natalie Smolenski.

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I'm pretty sure I'm smart enough to figure out how to put a link to this.

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And I hope that you read along.

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That is our goal with these talks is that we elevate discussion around Bitcoin and around the topics that Bitcoin touches,

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which as we're finding out as we further pursue this topic is basically everything.

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But today is an interesting one because today goes into how does enforcement work from a judicial perspective?

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In the court of law, what we're trying to do is resolve disputes.

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and essentially that comes down to power and control because without the ability to coerce

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someone into a resolution then your courts have no power but what happens when we live in a world

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where the money cannot be controlled by any individual power how does that affect be a

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resolution and where could we possibly go? How could this perhaps improve our legal system and

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make it better and more fair and possibly cheaper for all those involved? So as always, to kick it

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off, Mr. Grant Riker to Esquire, please give us a beautiful summary of what we've read today and

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then let's have a talk about it. Thanks, Lucas. And I like Lucas gave a really kind of

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of, you know, 60,000 foot aerial view. That's an excellent broad context summary of what we read

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today. And I'm going to give a bit more of a granular summary. And our purpose in doing this,

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again, is when we talk about something, Lucas and I, we want to make sure we're talking about

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what the author wrote, fairly discussing their point. So I'm going to try to get those arguments

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out on the table. And then Lucas and I are going to, you know, kind of try to parse them apart a

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bit and then add our own perspective. So as Lucas mentioned, this essay in the Satoshi Papers is

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Dispute Resolution Without the State by W. Aaron Daniel.

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He's a practicing attorney with a Florida Bar-certified

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Appalice Specialist designation, years of practice,

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founder of the Open Source Justice Foundation,

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a nonprofit dedicated to supporting development of open source tools and software,

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founder of Bitcoin Grove, a community accelerator and co-working space in Miami,

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many other things, including he has an app called Resolve now,

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which I think we might discuss just a bit towards the end.

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this essay is going to cover another use case for bitcoin which is always exciting to see and it's

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going to cover to something near and dear to my heart lawyers built on bitcoin which is something

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i want to see more and more different professional designations building on bitcoin from their own

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respective skill sets so as lucas mentioned you know i guess to step back a bit further so one

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problem that bitcoin solves is universal permissionless access to a stable financial

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system. We know that large swaths of the world population live in countries with rapidly

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inflated currency. Large swaths of the world's population are unbanked. They have no access to

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bank accounts. Bitcoin fixes that, provides everybody permissionless access to a stable

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financial system. Just have to have a cell phone internet connection. What other problems can

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Bitcoin fix? Another problem, access to justice. More than 4 billion people live outside the

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protection of the law without access to justice. They can't get into the courthouse doors to

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a fair, neutral, and accessible court system.

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54% of the people globally live in authoritarian countries where kind of ultimately justice

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is at the whim of people who control the system.

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And even in the U.S., there's large and disparate access to the courthouse.

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So this article proposes a new type of dispute resolution system, which can be built on Bitcoin

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to remedy some of those access issues.

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First, the author kind of gives some background generally, and Lucas mentioned this.

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Let's talk about courts, the court system. It seems like courts have to be state run because they rely on the monopoly of coercion that the state has to actually enforce the judgments produced by the courts.

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Civil court systems produce judgments that declare the rights and obligations of parties, which are different than other types of kind of judgments decisions in society because they're forcible.

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You can get the police to come over and make the other party pay what they owe you that the court has said that they owe you.

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Within our court system or our current judicial system, or rather kind of outside of it on the peripheries of it, we also have private non-coercion based options for resolving disputes.

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These are kind of known as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or ADR.

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You can get the decision in ADR from an arbitrator saying that party A should pay party B, but then if that party refuses to comply with that ADR resolution, you then have to go to court to get the coercive power of the state to make them pay.

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If a private system then is going to be a viable substitute for that state-run court, it's going to need to solve this problem. How can judgments be enforced in the absence of the state monopoly of force, coercion, etc.?

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So the author, Daniel, is two things. An alternative dispute resolution system, an ADR system, is going to need to be truly independent of the state. One is control of the flow of funds. Two is processes that closely reflect the norms of a community in which the ADR system is embedded.

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So first, control of the funds.

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That's going to allow enforcement of the judgment

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because then you can just direct the funds to the winning party

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without having to get the police to come in, the troops to come in,

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whoever, and make them hand over the money.

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The system just automatically diverts funds to the winning party.

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Second, processes that reflect the norms of the community.

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That's going to convert the perception of legitimacy experiments

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on the ADR system, which is necessary

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if you actually have to get people to use it.

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You can design the most beautiful, intricate ADR system, but if nobody believes it's fair, just, or legitimate, nobody's going to use it.

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Here, then, I'm going to read this thesis, broadly written, of Daniel and his own words.

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This essay proposes a new class of ODR, online dispute resolution systems, that enable any community to resolve its disputes through control over the flow of funds.

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Bitcoin dispute resolution, or BDR, is a new class he proposes.

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This new class of ODR, online security resolution, uses the Bitcoin network, the world's most decentralized communication protocol for the transfer of value.

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By anchoring dispute resolution systems in Bitcoin's interoperable, programmable, and global network, self-executing monetary judgments can be rendered that do not rely on the courts for enforcement.

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The essay then has a two-part structure.

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The first part examines existing ODR systems, and then the second part examines why the Bitcoin network is particularly well-suited to be an ODR, online dispute resolution system, and then gives two specific formulations of the way that a BDR could be constructed.

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Existing ODR systems, the author gives two broad categories for these, off-chain and on-chain.

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Off-chain don't use crypto, on-chain do.

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Off-chain, we get it as examples from the author.

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Very interesting.

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I mean, if you're interested in examining the way that it's resolved around the world in alternative ways, very interesting.

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We get eBay in India, the MGR in Afghanistan, the Benoam system in Israel, and the Prospera Arbitration Center system in Honduras.

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So eBay in India.

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eBay just has control of funds, which is the first criteria for private enforcement.

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And in India, the eBay there all has a community court system built into it where the seller can dispute reviews, jurors are selected by an algorithm, review evidence for both parties, and then disperse funds automatically or whatever to the winning party.

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So eBay is one example of an ODR.

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Another example, the MJRGA in Afghanistan.

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The mobile JIRGA, MJRGA, was a proposed system in 2010.

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And it was observed at the time that Taliban courts were perceived as, more people use the Taliban courts than the national court systems for reasons of perceptions of legitimacy and efficiency of the court system.

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So people were like, we need to get people away from those courts.

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They developed this mobile Jirga idea.

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The Jirga is a traditional system where a bunch of elders got together and kind of talked about a resolution for a dispute and said the resolution and the people followed it.

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And then the mobile jirga essentially is a way to make this process online. You can do it remotely. The elders can intervene remotely. People upload their evidence, etc.

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This wasn't actually put into place. It was a proposal. But Daniel notes that it shows how ODR systems can resolve not just disputes in e-commerce like with eBay, but like real-world substantive disputes about what happened.

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Then the Benoim in Israel, this is incredibly interesting. The Benoim alternative online dispute resolution system, ODR system, is kind of in Israel for small fender bender style property disputes.

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There's this ODR between insurance companies, kind of like a private court system specific to a particular industry.

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This uses experts to decide cases, and if the experts do not have their cases overturned on appeal, they are sent more cases.

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The control of funds stays within the system.

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All these insurance providers basically maintain the system together.

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All the funds are kept internally with them and then paid out to the winning insurers at the end of the month.

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Daniel notes that this system shows that you can build a whole non-coercive, functional ODR system if the parties consent to it and all come together to enter into it based on consent.

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Last for the non-champing ODR examples is the Prospera Arbitration Center.

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Prospera, if you haven't heard of it, is a semi-autonomous city in Honduras, part of the Free Cities Movement.

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The Prosper Arbitration Center, their manner of arbitration, where the citizens, the residents of Prospera consent to this ODR system, like in Venom, and then they agree they're going to abide by the judgment.

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That makes it functional.

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So these are all samples of off-chain.

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The author, Daniel, then gives two examples of on-chain systems, BISC and Scleros.

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BISC is a peer-to-peer Bitcoin for fiat exchange

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operated by a DAO, Decentralized Autonomous Organization.

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Resolves disputes that the traders have about their trades, essentially.

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And he talks about how this cloud distinctions.

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You can have lots of ways to construct things like this.

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This uses a two-of-two multi-stakes.

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So the parties put their funds in this containment vessel

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that they both have to sign to get out.

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And then that allows for the control of funds

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that then makes a judgment enforceable

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without having to have an authority to enforce it.

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Kleros is an example on Ethereum

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used by freelance workers to resolve disputes

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with an interesting crowdsource decision-making mechanism

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in which jurors are chosen that try to,

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they decide not based on any body of law,

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but they predict what the other jurors

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are most likely to decide, essentially.

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It's kind of a shelling point, as Daniel notes,

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for jurors taking the winning solution

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and then getting rewarded for that.

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And then Kleros really shows, Daniel says,

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the use of smart contracts

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to achieve automatic enforcement

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that can substitute for the force of law

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if people voluntarily enter into the system.

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So we have eBay, Benom, Bisque, and Kleros.

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These show that ODR systems that are private

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and don't rely on the state can function.

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The MJERGA and Prospera Arbitration Center

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show that you could actually resolve

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real world disputes through ODR systems,

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not just like e-commerce, eBay limited disputes,

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if the parties consent and buy into the system.

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That's the author's,

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that's the end of the first part of the essay,

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the author's survey of ODR systems.

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The second part, again,

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is what role can Bitcoin play in a potential ODR?

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But before I do that, Lucas,

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I want to get your perspective

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and just see if that makes sense,

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like what ODR systems are

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and how they could be important and game-changing

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if they were more widely used.

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Yeah.

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When I read through this,

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what came to me was the idea

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that truth is just simply what we agree on.

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And so we're trying to find truth.

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And what ODRs allow for

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is effectively a crowdsourcing

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of that truth-seeking model.

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The Kleros one is really interesting

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because I think it's almost like

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a prediction market. It's almost like poly market where instead of, instead of like what

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you believe, what you're trying to do is just predict what other people, um, are going to,

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are going to, um, settle upon. Um, because if the juror picks, if you get paid as a juror,

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if you are on the majority juror position, so you want to kind of try to coordinate what are

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the majority of other jurors going to pick.

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Yeah, so that's a really fascinating approach

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because it compensates jurors for being on the popular side.

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So they have, in effect, they have skin in the game, right?

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If you're on the losing side, then you actually lose,

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because you're staking totems, right?

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Yeah, so it would be like, you know, it'd be like,

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I'm going to go be a juror at a regular trial in a courthouse.

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And I walk in and they're like, all right, put up a thousand bucks.

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Yeah.

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And you can't talk to any of the other jurors and take in the evidence and then cast your vote guilty or not guilty or however you want to do it.

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And then if there's 12 people and you're the one that votes and the 11 vote the other way, then your thousand bucks goes, I think it goes to the Dow, right?

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Or it goes to, maybe it goes to feed the payments to the other jurors.

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But I find that interesting because, you know, I like I've been a juror before and it's ridiculous.

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Like you bring in these people that have no idea what's going on.

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They're very easily persuaded one way or another.

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And you've got two people that are professional persuaders who are attempting to get you to see their side.

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But you began saying that the juror system is supposed to – or a dispute resolution system is supposed to find the truth.

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But the Kleros is not designed to find the truth.

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It's explicitly not designed – don't decide what's true.

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Maybe you want to find the true thing because you think other jurors are going to pick the true outcome.

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But it's not really the criterion you're deciding.

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Final popular, I guess.

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So, yeah, that's a – I don't know.

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That's just a really fascinating – really fascinating one.

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Well, I'll just say Daniel's perspective on that. He does say that that method, that shelling point method of juror decision making, he thinks that it's maybe, you know, it's not good in the sense that it's interesting, maybe it works, but it's going to, it makes it tougher to confer legitimacy and fairness neutrality from an external point of view.

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If you realize that jurors are deciding on that basis maybe you less likely to go into that system because you don think you going to be the popular part Exactly Yeah And so you you know you can see it maybe working for certain instances but for anyone who is like oh I have a complex case to make that is going to require you know people to really think it probably wouldn work

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Let's define for people who may not know shelling point.

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So a shelling point would be basically where actors in an environment that have other actors, they're making decisions not based upon what they think will happen or not based upon what they believe, but based upon what they think other actors will do.

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the more general idea of a shelling point is how do you coordinate multiple actors without direct

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communication between the parties so say that you and i um are going to go meet in new york city

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but we realize when we get there that we didn't say where in new york are going to meet so we'd

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have to find this we'd have to like the shelling points like is it the empire state building the

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statue of liberty is it grand central station we'd like think of the places where's lucas

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most likely. So we try to coordinate

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between parties with

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no communication possible.

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And so you're trying to kind of guess what

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the other party's thinking. I would be at the

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Carnegie Deli, which I think still exists

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but I'm not sure, eating a very large

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pastrami sandwich. That narrows

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it down. Yeah, good.

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So

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we've got these

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online dispute resolution

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platforms.

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BISC is an interesting one.

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The Benoam

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Kind of let's talk a little bit about that, I think, because that's one that when reading through this, it seemed like it's the one that's working the best because it has really narrowed the scope of what they do, where this is a dispute resolution platform that only addresses very narrow cases,

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which would be disputes between insurance providers and claimants regarding very specific types of claims on automobiles and accidents.

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So one of the things that is constantly bandied about when I was at the network state and being around all these founders and things like what Balaji would say and other people that came in and talked to us was do things that don't scale.

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and that's really where you want to start, where everybody's always like, well,

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how do I build this platform that manages everything in the world,

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when instead what you really need to do is find out if what you do provides value.

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And so I wonder, is that a good example of doing things that don't scale,

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where it's like, yeah, we can resolve whether or not I dinged your door with my door,

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but we're probably not going to be able to move into the realm of being maybe like a DUI

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or a reckless driving plane or something like that.

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How do we take that narrow view and then apply it to a wider subset of disagreements

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Or are we always going to need to have this legacy system in order to dispute those more complex?

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I mean, if you want to expand on the Benoim system, I think you begin by abstracting its elements and seeing why generally it functions.

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Is it because it's insurance?

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No, maybe not.

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Maybe what's more general about it that allows it to succeed is it has the same recurring parties, the insurance providers.

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It has parties that are often on one side of the dispute, then being on the other, plaintiff and defendant.

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So nobody's trying to establish precedent that's going to be favorable to them in the future because they don't know what side of the game they're going to be on when they're playing it next time.

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You do have, again, the recurring type of dispute.

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It doesn't have to be insurance.

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There are lots of recurring types of disputes within the legal realm that you could design a court around.

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But you're going to, again, need to have recurring parties and industry that is able to coordinate between the parties.

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So it is going to be limited in scope on what you can coordinate on.

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And there are going to be some types of, you know, even an ADR system or an ODR system, rather, online dispute resolution system that tries to regulate real world conduct outside of like e-commerce.

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You know, there's so many types of disputes we can get into and types of resolutions.

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it begins to be tough to think of something that's going to, in the manner of the Benoim system,

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be able to encapsulate all forms of legal dispute, I guess.

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But I think we're going to talk about in a second the BDR, Bitcoin dispute resolution.

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And we can kind of think then, will this handle the range of real world disputes?

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Because the author does have a suggestion.

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So we'll move on to the second part of the essay.

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Again, this part is what role can Bitcoin play?

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We've talked about these ODR systems.

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Can we construct on them with Bitcoin?

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So Bitcoin meets two conditions for a successful ODR system.

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Remember, control of the flow of funds, community embedment, essentially consistency with community norms are the two conditions.

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So control of the flow of funds in order to enforce judgment.

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Bitcoin is a stable, independent, programmable financial system, which includes its own internal transaction rails.

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If all the parties are using it, you can agree in advance and allow the funds to be dispersed by some sort of smart contract using the Bitcoin system.

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You're all operating within the same financial system.

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And there's also decentralized verification with nodes and other measures of decentralization so there's less third-party risk when you trust the system.

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The second part, community buy-in.

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And ODR systems that are embedded in the community can get people to actually perceive the system as fair and therefore use it.

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Bitcoin permissionless has communities across the world.

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The author lists various countries in which there are nascent or established Bitcoin communities.

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And to quote the author, the Bitcoin network embodies the principle that justice should be accessible to all, not only those with bank accounts, credit cards, or state-issued identification.

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The different Bitcoin communities around the world then can adapt, can use Bitcoin as the control of funds mechanism and then design rules around the ODR system they want to use that is consistent with the norms of that society.

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The author gives two examples of BDR systems that illustrate this.

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The first is a local community BDR, Bitcoin Dispute Resolution Court model.

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Again, Bitcoin is programmable, so you can have second layers on top of it.

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And a lot of times we casually throw around second layer.

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So the author gives a good example of what that means, though.

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An example of a second layer, SMPTP for email, which integrates into the TCP IP-based internet protocol.

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So email is a second layer on top of the internet.

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In the same way, Bitcoin can have second layers on top of it that give it more functionality.

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Fediment is one example of a way that Bitcoin can be elaborated upon.

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It's a community banking model for Bitcoin in which people hold their money together, their Bitcoin together, in this eMint that then issues them a cash-style token that they use amongst themselves, transfers instantly, doesn't have to settle on the underlying Bitcoin protocol.

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and so it allows Bitcoin's functionality

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amongst a trusted community

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that's willing to participate in this structure.

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To quote the author,

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in short, sediment enables communities

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to create what might be called

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their own financial operating system.

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This allows for control of funds,

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one necessity for an ODR,

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and then the community can then designate

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a dispute resolution system

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according to their needs and values.

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Lucas and I talked about different ways

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that jurors can be picked and decide, like the Schelling Point model or something different.

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And then the judgments will be automatically enforced by the people who consent to enter

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into that system, thereby substituting consent for the coercion of the state.

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The other example, the second one, is an example.

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A Prosper-like city could implement this.

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The parties in the community agree in advance to participate in the BDR system.

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They deposit and maintain the minimum amount of Bitcoin in that community Fediment model.

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Upon taking residence in that community, when the dispute arises, the funds are already locked in.

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Both parties submit evidence to that Fediment community app to some BDR panel.

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A decision is issued and the Bitcoin transfers automatically.

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So that's the first example, like a community model, a local court option.

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In addition to that local court option model using FedEmit, where a community makes their own dispute system, Daniel gives another example of BDR for already existing online communities.

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The example he gives is the open source software development community, which uses sometimes a bounty model where people who want some code offer a bounty for the production of it.

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Whoever does the code, they claim the bounty, but then that depends on the bounty offer actually agreeing to pay out based on the code they get.

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BDR could automate bounties, Daniel says.

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You can have a panel of third-party reviewers that are selected as jurors to adjudicate whether a bounty was met.

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And if so, that can trigger the release of Bitcoin from an escrow that was previously funded by the person offering the bounty.

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That type of escrow can be done through tools.

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Daniel mentions a couple.

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Discrete log contracts in the FedEmit protocol or Bitcoin mini-script.

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Not really familiar with the discrete log contracts specifically.

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He also notes that a bounty bulletin board, which the bounties are noted, can be maintained through the decentralized NOSTER data protocol.

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So those are the two models.

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One is that local community court model amphetamine, and the other one is given in the context of software seeking, like offering bounties for code.

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What do you think of those two types of potential BDR systems?

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So we had this at the network state and this was something that you can immediately see the moral hazard, which is the it's called the earn program.

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And the networks network school posts these bounties for primarily it's like media stuff.

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So the network state wants to get something done for the network state.

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So they offer a bounty for whoever in the network state does that task.

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And it's not even just specifically for the network state.

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Like I remember one of them, my friend Juba submitted one.

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There was a bounty to create a 59-second vertical video that chronicled Naya Bukele's rise to power in El Salvador.

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Right.

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So it's not specifically that.

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But this is, again, this is kind of in line with the open source software idea, which is that the reason why people create open source software, even though they don't financially benefit from the immediate use of that software, is that they and everyone else benefit down the line.

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The best case example of this is Bitcoin, where it was created, it was put into the world without holding back coins, without pre-mining, without investors, without cashing out, because it made it better.

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You know, this is why, you know, if you're running a household and you're in charge of the food, then it's a benefit for you to purchase healthy food.

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Even though you're not the only one consuming it, it makes everyone healthier around you.

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So if you're in a neighborhood and you take care of your lawn and you take care of your garden, then it not just benefits you, but it also benefits the neighborhood because it makes it better for everyone.

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These are these certain sacrifices that people make.

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But back to the idea, so you posted bounty under the earn program and you could immediately see that there is a moral hazard, which is that there could be 10,000 submissions.

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And if you wanted to, there's actually nothing to stop you from just taking the best one and using it and not compensating the user for it.

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And so Daniel does a really good job of outlining that moral hazard and proposing a solution to it using this kind of layer two that you can build on top of it where you have this adjudication layer that is basically community sourced and community enforced through software.

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one thing that Claro does really well, they're the ones that place it in a, they place the

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disputed funds into a time-locked multi-signature smart contract, which is basically just like

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saying, hey, you're suing me for $10,000. I'm going to have to put $10,000 into an envelope

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and hand it to this guy, and this guy is not going to hand it to anybody

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until a dispute has been resolved, until there is a decision.

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I think that it really is needed because Daniels does a very good job of outlining,

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even though I think he does it quickly.

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But the system that we live in right now, it offers justice,

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but only through power and control.

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And you can't escape that system.

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You're just part of it, and it can reach out and touch you.

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But these systems, they offer dispute resolution,

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and all they ask for in return is consent.

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And consent meaning control over the flow of funds

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in order to reward the winner or the truth seeker, I guess.

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And also a consent, like to maintain,

342
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maybe you have to maintain a bond, essentially,

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amount of funds in an account

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so that if you become party to a dispute,

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that is already locked in.

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So you have to consent in advance to be part of a court system.

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And then, yeah, you're already...

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Yeah, he gives that example of like,

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if you're posting a bounty, you know, the person posting the bounty has to put up the

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funds, but the person applying for the bounty has to put up an application fee as well.

351
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And so everybody has some skin in the game and you can I guess again like skin in the game ensures that people act morally more than anything

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Yeah.

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You mentioned the network state, Lucas, and I was curious.

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You mentioned the EARN program sort of bounty system to get things done.

355
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It sounds like the Prospera dispute resolution, the Prospera arbitration center,

356
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was more broad in resolving disputes among the residents.

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I mean do you even know like was is the network state subject to Malaysian law as far as people

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resolving disputes or is it semi-autonomous in the same way where the network state could have

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its own internal law and arbitration center that applies that law so as far as I understand and I

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think we covered this one time when I was there not you and I but when I'm Sarah I do believe

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that you are subject to Malaysian law

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and the exclusions that are put in place

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for the special economic zone

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where Forest City is located,

365
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which is the fake island that it sits on.

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So, no, there is no standboxing, really,

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of autonomy that Prospera has.

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And I do think that's...

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I personally think that's vital.

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If you're trying to create a society that you need to be able to set your rules and do what you want within that boundary.

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There's a guy there, James of Arc, who is a charter city guy.

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So charter cities are different than network states.

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Charter cities simply hope to exist within existing cities but have their own prerogatives, have their own laws, have their own rules.

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And I think about the importance of that.

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I heard somebody once define like what a nation is as the only jobs that a nation has is to defend property rights and defend borders.

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And if you view a nation or a country in that way, then the charter city model is one that really, I think, gets it right in terms of, look, we're going to have our own disputes.

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We're going to have our own court system.

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We're going to have our own laws.

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We're going to have our own taxes.

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We need to be able to enforce that among our community.

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So, yeah, the current model of the network state, I don't believe, has any sort of ordinary laws.

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Even if there was Malaysian law generally applied, you could have a second layer of network state law on top, which would just be essentially the power of biology to evict people that – or the network state higher-ups to evict people who don't abide by certain community norms.

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and then you could have an arbitration center that resolves people consent that okay i'm part

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of the network state i consent um if there's dispute that rises with me and somebody else

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it goes through this arbitration mechanism and i automatically consent that i will abide by the

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result of it and then there's like that there still might be within the united states you then

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maybe have to the person doesn't want they say they're going to abide by it but then they don't

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you might still have to go to the court system to get an enforceable judgment because you don't have

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like control of the funds unless again a person bought into the system maybe they have to post a

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bunch of money leave it in the system and then if they don't abide by the result of the arbitration

391
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if they go to the court and they forfeit all the funds i mean that would be one enforcement mechanism

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to get people to abide by the judgment even if the judgment regulates their behavior which is

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not being coerced you know you could make forfeit all the funds that they posted if they don't act

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accordingly to the judgment so i can see it that is something that exists where you know

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like you sign a contract and that contract is basically outlawed in certain

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behaviors and stuff like that.

397
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If you break those and they beat you out, it's a, it's a fairly informal process,

398
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but ultimately the it's,

399
00:36:13,125 --> 00:36:16,305
it's not really enforceable until there's, you know,

400
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the power and control of Malaysian lobby.

401
00:36:19,365 --> 00:36:22,985
Yeah. But if you log in money into a, you know, some sort of smart contract,

402
00:36:23,025 --> 00:36:27,065
even if, you know, the ultimate eviction was according to Malaysian law,

403
00:36:27,065 --> 00:36:33,185
You could make people suffer if they sought that remedy going to the court because they've already forfeited all the money they posted.

404
00:36:33,185 --> 00:36:39,705
So even if they might just abide by the result because they don't want to lose their money that they posted in the system.

405
00:36:41,325 --> 00:36:53,745
So that's the way that control of funds, as the author notes, is an essential way that you can get, I think, judgments maybe that regulate conduct beyond merely the disposition of the funds themselves.

406
00:36:53,745 --> 00:37:20,005
Another part that I thought was interesting. So we recently read Sal Pineda's take on Bitcoin's potential role in transitional justice, situations of transitional justice, which are situations where countries are transitioning away of after a situation of mass atrocity, genocide, civil war, an authoritarian, extended authoritarian rule.

407
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The country is unstable. It realizes there was past injustice. The country both needs to process that past injustice, but also stable itself to move forward. So the seal of transitional justice has arisen to enable a framework for people to apply when the country's in that situation.

408
00:37:41,225 --> 00:37:47,785
Salvin talked about how Bitcoin used as a way to help reconstitution a neutral financial system.

409
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He also noted, this is the part that's relevant, that court systems in transitional settings are often compromised because there's partisans of one side of the past dispute.

410
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Maybe the people against whom Jeff Fried was committed now can come to court systems that are heavy-handedly going after everybody.

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Daniel, though, he's offering a way, we could say, apply a BDR in a transitional society setting. The BDR, Bitcoin to be resolution system, is a stable court system, completely independent of the state in a sense.

412
00:38:19,905 --> 00:38:37,945
I mean, you're still going to have to select independent jurors somehow, which can be difficult, but at least it offers somewhat of an enforcement framework, perhaps, if someone wanted to try to design one in a transitional setting that would be more resistant to the ways in which transitional courts are compromised.

413
00:38:37,945 --> 00:38:59,345
I mean, one would need to sit down and do the math and find a real creative way to select jurors, enough information anonymous so they render fair verdicts and then weed out jurors in the future if their types of decision making aren't in accord with, you know, or exhibit certain trends of bias or something.

414
00:38:59,345 --> 00:39:27,905
This is a massive problem that presents a massive opportunity for resolution. I talked about this in one of my seminars on status games. And there's, you know, there's like three ways to gain status. One is to effectively be a bully and to take from others. One is to effectively be a victim and oblige others. And the third is to be meritocratic and to earn it.

415
00:39:27,905 --> 00:39:42,505
And the instance that we see, like in El Salvador, I remember when we were living up in Wenatchee, you had a lot of clients when you were doing immigration law that had come from El Salvador.

416
00:39:42,505 --> 00:39:53,305
and some of them did not have this rosy picture of what Nayib Bukele is like that many of us see

417
00:39:53,305 --> 00:40:01,705
because it was such a sweeping thing that occurred where there is no other way to do it.

418
00:40:01,705 --> 00:40:08,625
When you're living under a authoritarian regime, what you're doing is you're living under a bully

419
00:40:08,625 --> 00:40:13,345
and the only way that you can take out a bully is to be a bigger bully.

420
00:40:13,945 --> 00:40:21,345
And so you replace one thing with another, even if it is better intentioned,

421
00:40:21,345 --> 00:40:25,005
then you still end up with the bully problem.

422
00:40:25,005 --> 00:40:30,785
And so you can see how this naturally is going to create hellacious bias

423
00:40:30,785 --> 00:40:36,805
when you go to the court system because the people who are now running the courts

424
00:40:36,805 --> 00:40:44,265
are, we've seen this in America now, where we saw the Biden administration weaponize

425
00:40:44,265 --> 00:40:48,805
the justice system, and now we're seeing the Trump administration do the same thing.

426
00:40:49,465 --> 00:40:49,785
All right?

427
00:40:49,905 --> 00:40:51,305
It's just whoever's in power.

428
00:40:51,725 --> 00:40:56,165
I will say that Bitcoin, I mean, philosophically, right down to its foundations, is designed

429
00:40:56,165 --> 00:40:59,265
around the ethos that maybe it doesn't take a bigger bully.

430
00:40:59,845 --> 00:41:05,845
Maybe it takes the creation, a bottom-up, like Bitcoin, like Satoshi creates a bottom-up

431
00:41:05,845 --> 00:41:13,825
solution to this banking the chancellors on the brink situation. So maybe you can,

432
00:41:14,345 --> 00:41:18,245
cypherpunks write code, that's their solution. It's not to join some political party and try to

433
00:41:18,245 --> 00:41:24,425
be the bigger bully. It's to create solutions outside and independent of the state that based

434
00:41:24,425 --> 00:41:28,425
on our consent, we can substitute for the mechanisms of the state. It's exactly what BDR

435
00:41:28,425 --> 00:41:35,025
is. An online dispute resolution generally, how can we take consent of the governed and make that

436
00:41:35,025 --> 00:41:39,665
the foundation instead of top-down coercion,

437
00:41:39,745 --> 00:41:42,265
which generally is the project of the Satoshi papers,

438
00:41:42,345 --> 00:41:44,045
is to get back to the consent of the government,

439
00:41:44,205 --> 00:41:45,745
the ideals of our founders,

440
00:41:46,145 --> 00:41:50,705
that Bitcoin can represent a more general remedy to tyranny

441
00:41:50,705 --> 00:41:51,865
than a bigger tyrant.

442
00:41:52,645 --> 00:41:54,145
Yeah, last night I read,

443
00:41:54,925 --> 00:41:59,625
so I was reading in the Our Tribal Future book,

444
00:42:00,265 --> 00:42:04,465
and there was a line in there that really struck me,

445
00:42:04,465 --> 00:42:08,685
which is that we need to remember that we are citizens, not subjects.

446
00:42:08,685 --> 00:42:23,165
And I think that even in America, and maybe particularly in America, we've somewhat forgotten that, that we are citizens,

447
00:42:23,385 --> 00:42:32,105
that we are living in a country that exists because we consent for it to exist, not because we are under the umbrella of Powell.

448
00:42:32,105 --> 00:42:35,905
and therefore subject to whatever comes down.

449
00:42:36,625 --> 00:42:40,285
You bring up, I think, the most important point about Bitcoin

450
00:42:40,285 --> 00:42:42,645
and about change just in general,

451
00:42:43,185 --> 00:42:47,125
not with regard to monetary policy,

452
00:42:47,245 --> 00:42:48,485
but just any sort of change.

453
00:42:49,245 --> 00:42:52,385
And beneficial change, it seems to me,

454
00:42:52,425 --> 00:42:54,225
can only come from the ground up.

455
00:42:54,225 --> 00:42:55,585
It can only come bottoms up.

456
00:42:55,645 --> 00:42:57,205
When we try to do things top down,

457
00:42:57,545 --> 00:43:01,665
then we end up with all the second and third order consequences

458
00:43:01,665 --> 00:43:02,905
that we never think about.

459
00:43:03,145 --> 00:43:04,885
And of course, if it comes top down,

460
00:43:05,305 --> 00:43:07,985
then it comes from the position of power

461
00:43:07,985 --> 00:43:11,445
and the position of power is always going to do things

462
00:43:11,445 --> 00:43:15,105
and set laws and regulations and codes of conduct

463
00:43:15,105 --> 00:43:17,705
that allows it to stay in power.

464
00:43:18,965 --> 00:43:21,305
And so, yeah, bottoms up,

465
00:43:21,925 --> 00:43:24,945
Bitcoin dispute resolution is something that

466
00:43:24,945 --> 00:43:29,165
once the mechanisms are in place

467
00:43:29,165 --> 00:43:44,685
And it seems like they are falling into place and there are options through Fediment and through online smart contracts that allow people to lock up funds in a time dispersed manner and to only disperse those funds if they both agree and consent to the ruling.

468
00:43:44,685 --> 00:43:51,425
we have these tools and we have these mechanisms and they are being slowly adopted and they're

469
00:43:51,425 --> 00:43:59,585
being adopted in areas where people are most likely to be negatively affected by what the

470
00:43:59,585 --> 00:44:09,945
top-down system is. Because you mentioned in your initial summary, you know, four billion people

471
00:44:09,945 --> 00:44:11,545
don't have access to justice,

472
00:44:11,705 --> 00:44:14,425
but there's also the other 4 billion people,

473
00:44:15,005 --> 00:44:16,925
the justice that they have access to

474
00:44:16,925 --> 00:44:21,125
is a two-tiered system, at least two-tiered.

475
00:44:22,125 --> 00:44:25,205
You know, the United States is a perfect example

476
00:44:25,205 --> 00:44:29,425
of if you have money, you can avoid prison,

477
00:44:29,645 --> 00:44:31,185
you can avoid certain things.

478
00:44:31,265 --> 00:44:33,125
If you don't, then you're subject to the wind.

479
00:44:33,485 --> 00:44:35,005
Yeah, no, and that's, I mean, that wasn't,

480
00:44:35,085 --> 00:44:38,085
I mentioned that because Daniel puts that front and center too,

481
00:44:38,085 --> 00:44:46,945
And I want to read his concluding paragraphs because they tie back to that notion that Bitcoin banks the unbanked as a permissionless, decentralized global financial system.

482
00:44:47,305 --> 00:44:50,885
I don't know if you want to say courts the uncoordered, but it does something like that.

483
00:44:51,025 --> 00:44:51,985
It can do something like that.

484
00:44:52,405 --> 00:44:56,445
If you have a BDR system, it can also potentially solve an access to justice problem.

485
00:44:56,805 --> 00:45:01,545
So I'll just read these couple paragraphs because it does an excellent job summarizing this paper.

486
00:45:01,545 --> 00:45:18,225
The global, interoperable, permissionless nature of the Bitcoin network now enables any community, regardless of its location or size, to create an ODR, online dispute resolution, system that uses programmable money to generate self-executing judgments.

487
00:45:18,785 --> 00:45:24,425
These systems can only obtain control over user funds with the consent of the disputants.

488
00:45:24,865 --> 00:45:30,505
This means that state-backed coercion can be removed from the dispute resolution process entirely.

489
00:45:30,505 --> 00:45:42,845
The Bitcoin network and its native asset provide democratic tools for communities to establish the rule of law irrespective of the quality, efficacy, or fairness of any particular state or court.

490
00:45:43,305 --> 00:45:55,205
Transforming ODR into BDR will advance and normalize the practice of dispute resolution without the state expanding access to justice for all of the community.

491
00:45:56,225 --> 00:45:56,445
Yeah.

492
00:45:56,985 --> 00:45:57,565
I like it.

493
00:45:57,565 --> 00:45:58,385
I do too, man.

494
00:45:58,385 --> 00:46:10,945
And like never accuse Bitcoiners of simply number go up when you see the applications that are being built and the promise that the protocol offers in so many different ways.

495
00:46:10,945 --> 00:46:21,505
Yeah, this is the, you know, when people initially get into Bitcoin, I remember hearing Andreas Antonopoulos talk about when he first discovered Bitcoin.

496
00:46:21,505 --> 00:46:49,985
I think he said he spent the next three months or four or five or six in a just what he described as a fugue stake where he is realizing as he looks at the world in front of him with new eyes, what are the consequences of money that is decentralized, money that is finite, like money that cannot be taken.

497
00:46:49,985 --> 00:46:59,485
it can only be given. And these are the Bitcoin solves this type of questions that are worth

498
00:46:59,485 --> 00:47:08,945
asking because if it is simply number go up, then it's degeneracy and you may as well

499
00:47:08,945 --> 00:47:15,485
put your money into some sort of moon coin, doge coin, whatever. But if you are looking

500
00:47:15,485 --> 00:47:17,585
for something that is greater.

501
00:47:17,965 --> 00:47:22,405
You're looking for something that really can affect humanity

502
00:47:22,405 --> 00:47:29,085
at a base level and put us in a mode of cooperation

503
00:47:29,085 --> 00:47:34,145
instead of competition, but competing against ourselves

504
00:47:34,145 --> 00:47:36,385
in order to cooperate at a higher level.

505
00:47:37,585 --> 00:47:43,225
I think it is beautiful to consider these avenues.

506
00:47:43,225 --> 00:47:48,865
you wanted to talk I'm going to change subjects a little bit you wanted to bring up the resolve

507
00:47:48,865 --> 00:47:53,505
app can you tell us a little bit about that I don't know enough about it to discuss it in depth

508
00:47:53,505 --> 00:47:57,905
I just wanted to know and this does bring up like a question I had or something I want to mention so

509
00:47:57,905 --> 00:48:12,468
the resolve app is something that Daniels has he an entrepreneur working with others put out an app it deals with something like risk management for insurers by allowing them to denominate in bitcoin my understanding is something like um

510
00:48:12,468 --> 00:48:18,587
if you're insuring bitcoin but you're not also like holding bitcoin but you're holding fiat to

511
00:48:18,587 --> 00:48:23,067
reimburse people that's not a good solution because people lose their bitcoin yeah right

512
00:48:23,067 --> 00:48:26,047
you're insuring something asset that's going way up and you're holding an asset that's going down

513
00:48:26,047 --> 00:48:30,867
or something like that but i don't want to it's so i've heard just he has a podcast about it look

514
00:48:30,867 --> 00:48:36,567
it up it's very interesting but that's like you know this is an article written by an attorney

515
00:48:36,567 --> 00:48:43,347
a practicing attorney their bitcoin is a technology that has as we're seeing a vast number of social

516
00:48:43,347 --> 00:48:48,327
applications like dispute resolution that's something we need because of the social nature

517
00:48:48,327 --> 00:48:56,107
of um so bitcoin is um again a technology that has a bunch of social applications because we're

518
00:48:56,107 --> 00:49:00,267
social animals and we're exploring the ways that bitcoin's unique aspects it's immutability

519
00:49:00,267 --> 00:49:05,567
decentralization, permissionlessness is interacting with the ways that humans organize

520
00:49:05,567 --> 00:49:09,227
ourselves in various ways through our financial interactions, court interactions, etc.

521
00:49:09,547 --> 00:49:12,127
This is an article by an attorney.

522
00:49:12,887 --> 00:49:18,907
And I'm really curious, like what other like attorneys are building on Bitcoin, thinking

523
00:49:18,907 --> 00:49:23,727
about building on Bitcoin, or what other ways can attorneys, people with knowledge of the

524
00:49:23,727 --> 00:49:29,867
legal systems, knowledge of our social arrangements through law, use this new technology to offer

525
00:49:29,867 --> 00:49:31,587
decentralized solutions.

526
00:49:31,767 --> 00:49:37,367
Benoim is another way that attorneys built an ODR resolution system in an area of law.

527
00:49:37,488 --> 00:49:42,507
What can Bitcoin now do, not just for dispute resolution, like resolvers, maybe a way that

528
00:49:42,507 --> 00:49:45,127
it's changing insurance risk management.

529
00:49:46,087 --> 00:49:49,747
On Twitter, there's, you know, I wanted to find more attorneys.

530
00:49:49,867 --> 00:49:54,047
There's one called Bitcoin Laws by Julian Farah Farrar.

531
00:49:54,488 --> 00:49:59,468
And that's a great, if you want to look for like a summary of change, the changing nature

532
00:49:59,468 --> 00:50:02,867
of laws around Bitcoin around the United States,

533
00:50:03,148 --> 00:50:05,227
a summary of pending house bills, et cetera.

534
00:50:05,688 --> 00:50:07,207
I mean, it's just an excellent account to follow.

535
00:50:07,668 --> 00:50:09,688
Zach Shapiro gives,

536
00:50:09,987 --> 00:50:11,148
like another thing that attorneys do

537
00:50:11,148 --> 00:50:14,347
is give commentary on legal cases that affect Bitcoin.

538
00:50:14,707 --> 00:50:16,307
I always remember reading a ton of his stuff

539
00:50:16,307 --> 00:50:20,387
on the cash situation with Roman Storm.

540
00:50:20,727 --> 00:50:23,748
And so attorneys can also kind of discuss

541
00:50:23,748 --> 00:50:27,507
what's happening in criminal or penal settings

542
00:50:27,507 --> 00:50:30,487
for people who are doing Bitcoin-related things

543
00:50:30,487 --> 00:50:31,367
and also defend them.

544
00:50:31,607 --> 00:50:32,287
But I'm just like,

545
00:50:32,567 --> 00:50:35,287
what can attorneys build on Bitcoin?

546
00:50:35,748 --> 00:50:36,927
And then the broader question,

547
00:50:37,207 --> 00:50:40,887
what can anybody with their own particular professional

548
00:50:40,887 --> 00:50:44,168
or non-professional skillset build with Bitcoin?

549
00:50:44,327 --> 00:50:45,527
It's just a fascinating thing.

550
00:50:45,527 --> 00:50:47,168
One of the things that I think about,

551
00:50:47,627 --> 00:50:49,407
I mean, you're in an apartment,

552
00:50:49,547 --> 00:50:51,087
you had to put a security deposit down.

553
00:50:52,487 --> 00:50:53,527
There is a...

554
00:50:53,527 --> 00:51:10,087
So there is often a problem, especially in like college towns, where you see lessors, the people that are renting out the property.

555
00:51:10,948 --> 00:51:17,207
They're often very heavy handed with the security deposit.

556
00:51:17,767 --> 00:51:22,367
And people find themselves being taken advantage of because they're a college student.

557
00:51:22,367 --> 00:51:37,087
They don't have the funds to dispute that, oh, this, you know, this mark that I left on the wall, you know, I'm going to lose my entire security deposit, you know, $1,500 or something because of that.

558
00:51:37,087 --> 00:52:03,468
And that's like an area where I could see this really being useful with this community resolution, much like the like the bounty system proposal where, you know, you enter into the contract, you put your security deposit not in your not in your renters or in the lessor's name, but you put it into a time locked two party system.

559
00:52:03,468 --> 00:52:09,907
And then if there is a dispute at the end of it, then the evidence is submitted by both parties.

560
00:52:10,127 --> 00:52:20,287
And then you have people that are voting whether or not the owner deserves to get the security deposit or the person deserves to get it back.

561
00:52:20,287 --> 00:52:35,347
But that's when that having lived in a couple of college towns and I used to finance some people that owned a lot of properties that I saw up front that it was not, it's a moral hazard.

562
00:52:35,587 --> 00:52:36,827
It's really just the problem.

563
00:52:36,927 --> 00:52:38,227
It's not like the people are bad.

564
00:52:38,327 --> 00:52:44,648
It's just that, look, if somebody's already given you the money, then you're probably not going to give it back unless there's a really good reason.

565
00:52:45,507 --> 00:52:47,587
And so they look for reasons to keep it.

566
00:52:47,927 --> 00:52:48,668
That's one.

567
00:52:48,668 --> 00:52:53,227
I'm trying to think how can how can Bitcoin play a role in murder trials?

568
00:52:53,387 --> 00:52:59,727
And I'm so at the start of this, you'll note that Daniel says he begins talking about civil court judgments.

569
00:53:00,007 --> 00:53:03,668
And so that's the easiest one. Right. Right. Because it doesn't require coercion.

570
00:53:04,248 --> 00:53:10,427
Right. Where it's just like, yeah, control of flow funds usually is sufficient to resolve a civil case.

571
00:53:10,427 --> 00:53:12,507
Like someone's got to pay somebody else. Yeah.

572
00:53:12,507 --> 00:53:21,688
And he notes, too, that the M. Jerga model is based on not on retributive justice, but in like compensating parties.

573
00:53:21,688 --> 00:53:27,767
So retributive justice is like there's no in some situations, there's no amount you can pay somebody.

574
00:53:28,448 --> 00:53:33,827
An eye for an eye needs to happen between the parties to restore some sense of moral equilibrium.

575
00:53:34,248 --> 00:53:35,987
Like you just have to put the person in a cage.

576
00:53:36,168 --> 00:53:37,248
They have to physically suffer.

577
00:53:37,387 --> 00:53:38,987
Maybe the death penalty is merited.

578
00:53:39,127 --> 00:53:39,327
Right.

579
00:53:39,827 --> 00:53:40,087
Yeah.

580
00:53:40,087 --> 00:53:56,968
The Im Jirga one I think is interesting because he notes that it hasn't worked, right? The mobile Jirga thing hasn't been taken. And when I was reading it, so the way that it exists right now is what they do is they get together a group of elders.

581
00:53:56,968 --> 00:54:01,527
And if it's like from two different tribes, they get, you know, six elders from here, six elders from there.

582
00:54:01,787 --> 00:54:03,067
They go meet under a tree.

583
00:54:03,287 --> 00:54:07,307
Somebody supplies a, you know, a bar.

584
00:54:07,767 --> 00:54:09,968
And it makes me laugh.

585
00:54:10,087 --> 00:54:13,127
It makes me think of, you know, we're both from western Kansas.

586
00:54:13,367 --> 00:54:20,367
And the standard unit of account for any sort of volunteer work is a steak dinner.

587
00:54:21,227 --> 00:54:21,327
Yeah.

588
00:54:21,847 --> 00:54:23,547
And people love their steak dinner.

589
00:54:23,668 --> 00:54:25,107
A pack of beer and you'll leave that behind.

590
00:54:25,107 --> 00:54:26,668
Yeah, or a 30-pack, yeah.

591
00:54:26,968 --> 00:54:35,347
Yeah. And so they're not they're not going to let that go easily. And I was like, dude, you just you just need to throw a steak dinner on top of this M. Jirga thing.

592
00:54:35,347 --> 00:54:38,327
It's interesting you were describing, you say they meet in front of a tree.

593
00:54:38,507 --> 00:54:40,327
And that's one of the details they mentioned in this article.

594
00:54:40,787 --> 00:54:44,127
And that's what, like, it's not ridiculous to say that.

595
00:54:44,188 --> 00:54:51,567
Because when I was reading this M. Jirga, and they were talking about how they wanted to make this Jirga embodied system face-to-face into a mobile thing,

596
00:54:51,567 --> 00:54:56,727
I immediately became skeptical because it's all of the rich tradition of this face-to-face encounter.

597
00:54:56,847 --> 00:55:01,547
The system kind of works based on shame in the parties that, oh, the elders have rendered a result.

598
00:55:01,748 --> 00:55:05,027
I'm going to abide by it because if I don't, the people know that I'm disobeying the elders.

599
00:55:05,347 --> 00:55:12,207
But if it's this abstract system and they, yeah, yeah, then I could see how that system would lose, you know.

600
00:55:12,207 --> 00:55:20,707
But again, this is every community with a Fediment model around the world in which Bitcoin funds are controlled locally.

601
00:55:21,188 --> 00:55:28,907
They can, according to their own norms and customs, try to design some sort of ODR system, maybe with a face-to-face element somehow.

602
00:55:29,287 --> 00:55:31,668
However, that abides by their norms, right?

603
00:55:31,668 --> 00:55:36,648
Everybody can like iterate and you don't have to have a one size fits all type thing.

604
00:55:37,587 --> 00:55:46,668
That was an interesting one, this community thing that he proposed where, you know, say you have the little town that I grew up in, a couple thousand people.

605
00:55:46,668 --> 00:56:09,688
And in order to be a citizen of that town, you would have to put up a certain amount of money that is kept within the fediment system of that town in order to ensure that if there is some sort of dispute that you have the funds that are available to pay if you're found liable.

606
00:56:09,688 --> 00:56:16,767
So, you know, I think you look at these little towns, most of these people bank in community banks.

607
00:56:17,627 --> 00:56:19,627
It's no different than that.

608
00:56:20,148 --> 00:56:24,367
It's just that it would be under one umbrella instead of eight or ten.

609
00:56:24,627 --> 00:56:31,468
And it would be enforceable through consent, which I like that idea.

610
00:56:31,847 --> 00:56:36,407
The thing that the thing that I wonder about is like, how much money would you have to put in?

611
00:56:36,407 --> 00:56:50,487
Like, you know, it may be like because you think about like it may be a significant amount that you would need to keep as a balance in there because of, you know, what if I burn your house down?

612
00:56:50,707 --> 00:56:50,827
Yeah.

613
00:56:50,948 --> 00:56:51,188
Right.

614
00:56:51,188 --> 00:57:13,847
But like as your risk profile declines over time, as you get older, maybe you post a bond in Bitcoin, that Bitcoin appreciates over time, and then suddenly you built in a social security mechanism from that initial bond amount because it pays out in your later years just on like a time-locked or whatever manner where it's like you get distributions every year from it because it's appreciated so much over 40 years.

615
00:57:13,907 --> 00:57:19,307
You can now retire on the initial bonds you posted to participate in civil society or whatever.

616
00:57:19,307 --> 00:57:24,268
Yeah. You would want more for the old people because they're the ones that always drive through the wall.

617
00:57:24,487 --> 00:57:37,607
That aspect. I said lower risk profile, but there is a certain people could then, yeah, maybe they would be more cautious about modifying their own risky behaviors if they're like, oh, I've already posted this cash amount that I can get back if I don't do something very stupid.

618
00:57:37,607 --> 00:57:56,768
Yeah, because then it's like, yeah, it removes a step. It removes a step where it's like, oh, not only do I have to get caught, I also have to get coerced into paying. It's like, no, now I just need to get caught. Because if I screw up, then my money is.

619
00:57:56,768 --> 00:58:02,927
This brings up one aspect of the article that kind of concerned me, not in the article, but this whole notion.

620
00:58:04,087 --> 00:58:11,768
I mean, like maybe it becomes easier to impose like social credit system once you're the thing is you've consented to enter into the system.

621
00:58:11,927 --> 00:58:25,727
But if the system is big enough where exit becomes difficult, like if we first the communities, you know, Norton, Kansas, then it's Kansas, then it's the United States, then it's the Western Hemisphere that are within the same system or something.

622
00:58:25,727 --> 00:58:30,847
you post an amount of money suddenly you're locked in and they can impose automatic debits from that

623
00:58:30,847 --> 00:58:37,507
if the people if it's not constructed well you know i mean bitcoin is resistant to that because

624
00:58:37,507 --> 00:58:42,148
you can construct the arrangement to be separate apart from that with the with the external party

625
00:58:42,148 --> 00:58:47,567
third party not having control but if it's designed ex-ante from the ground up with the

626
00:58:47,567 --> 00:58:55,327
third party having control they can also do that yeah there's uh that's it's it's so interesting to

627
00:58:55,327 --> 00:59:00,748
see how those systems work because you think about like London, which has, I think, more

628
00:59:00,748 --> 00:59:06,327
security cameras than any place in the world and San Francisco, which is very heavily,

629
00:59:06,327 --> 00:59:15,768
heavily surveilled. Washington, D.C., very heavily surveilled. These are really dangerous places to

630
00:59:15,768 --> 00:59:20,987
be. Like these are among the most dangerous places in the world for physical violence.

631
00:59:20,987 --> 00:59:25,688
but you can definitely get caught for walking across the street.

632
00:59:26,268 --> 00:59:28,768
And so you put these systems in and you're right,

633
00:59:28,867 --> 00:59:34,748
it creates that moral hazard that allows for the nitpicking

634
00:59:34,748 --> 00:59:38,227
and the nickel and diming of parking violations

635
00:59:38,227 --> 00:59:41,227
and jaywalking and this, that, and the other.

636
00:59:41,987 --> 00:59:50,227
But in practice, it doesn't seem to be breaking down the violence

637
00:59:50,227 --> 00:59:55,787
and that the actual yeah so it quite allows you if you start off with the right principles to

638
00:59:55,787 --> 01:00:01,807
build a system that doesn't allow for a third party to control it and that's and that's the

639
01:00:01,807 --> 01:00:05,807
beauty of it you don't have like ethereum you can build on that at the end of the day there's always

640
01:00:05,807 --> 01:00:11,148
a third party risk if you build on bitcoin you can build something resilient to a state later

641
01:00:11,148 --> 01:00:16,248
coming in and say we want to impose yeah we want to impose our own social credit aspect on top of

642
01:00:17,087 --> 01:00:19,507
Yeah, that's what we need is we need a group that votes on it.

643
01:00:19,547 --> 01:00:26,127
When they see me jaywalk and they review the video and they're like, he walked across and there was no cars coming.

644
01:00:26,248 --> 01:00:29,567
It was just red and he just had shit to do and he had a place to go.

645
01:00:29,927 --> 01:00:31,067
We'd be like, fine, we'll let that guy.

646
01:00:31,307 --> 01:00:35,987
But if you've got the guy that walks out into traffic and causes an accident, maybe we can find that guy.

647
01:00:35,987 --> 01:00:47,327
we can determine that crowdsourced from bottom up in a way that it's fairness something that

648
01:00:47,327 --> 01:00:55,248
is I think less important than usefulness and common sense like you know you walk across an

649
01:00:55,248 --> 01:01:02,367
empty street that has a red light fine like it's it's not fair because you're you're doing the

650
01:01:02,367 --> 01:01:10,527
thing that is supposedly against the law but it's stupid well it just comes down to community norms

651
01:01:10,527 --> 01:01:15,467
like i've heard if you have a japanese person they're never going to cross when there's not

652
01:01:15,467 --> 01:01:20,587
a walk sign blinking like their notion of jaywalking is just very culturally embedded that

653
01:01:20,587 --> 01:01:24,668
you don't do that and there's social coercion if you do do that whereas other cultures are much more

654
01:01:24,668 --> 01:01:29,287
open with it's okay you know to walk in a situation and neither one is absolutely correct

655
01:01:29,287 --> 01:01:31,188
or incorrect. It's just, again, every community

656
01:01:31,188 --> 01:01:33,188
can build their system according

657
01:01:33,188 --> 01:01:33,948
to their norms.

658
01:01:34,768 --> 01:01:37,387
Yeah, that is

659
01:01:37,387 --> 01:01:38,268
a very American

660
01:01:38,268 --> 01:01:41,248
thesis that I'm proposing, which is

661
01:01:41,248 --> 01:01:43,527
basically like, I'm just going to do what I want

662
01:01:43,527 --> 01:01:45,307
up until the point

663
01:01:45,307 --> 01:01:46,567
that it affects somebody else.

664
01:01:47,207 --> 01:01:48,987
The right to swing nice to the Santa Claus

665
01:01:48,987 --> 01:01:50,827
since its nose begins and all.

666
01:01:51,527 --> 01:01:53,207
Yeah. I like it.

667
01:01:53,627 --> 01:01:55,148
For an ODR system to function,

668
01:01:55,367 --> 01:01:56,927
I'm just going to give a broad concluding summary.

669
01:01:57,027 --> 01:01:58,768
For an ODR system to function that needs to have

670
01:01:58,768 --> 01:02:00,787
control of the flow funds

671
01:02:00,787 --> 01:02:02,927
and you need to have a community in which it can be embedded

672
01:02:02,927 --> 01:02:05,007
so people actually use it. A BDR

673
01:02:05,007 --> 01:02:07,227
system can conceptually

674
01:02:07,227 --> 01:02:08,527
achieve both.

675
01:02:08,768 --> 01:02:10,907
That community is also worldwide so we can

676
01:02:10,907 --> 01:02:12,907
begin to patchwork, implement this wherever

677
01:02:12,907 --> 01:02:15,027
you are. And BDR

678
01:02:15,027 --> 01:02:16,948
then could be a way in which the

679
01:02:16,948 --> 01:02:19,087
uncorded or courted,

680
01:02:19,168 --> 01:02:20,587
right? Is that the...

681
01:02:20,587 --> 01:02:22,887
We court the uncorded.

682
01:02:22,887 --> 01:02:23,367
Of course.

683
01:02:25,007 --> 01:02:25,487
Yeah.

684
01:02:26,407 --> 01:02:28,688
I think you're just making up words now.

685
01:02:28,768 --> 01:02:37,148
court yeah that's fine so yeah yeah i it so what what i think what we found through this discussion

686
01:02:37,148 --> 01:02:46,627
is that bitcoin does hold the technological ability to export a fair and just legal system

687
01:02:46,627 --> 01:02:53,268
to places where it's not domestically available and i think we also have uncovered that it's

688
01:02:53,268 --> 01:02:55,688
not really domestically available anywhere.

689
01:02:56,027 --> 01:02:57,567
That even in the country,

690
01:02:58,127 --> 01:02:59,607
the United States, that supposedly

691
01:02:59,607 --> 01:03:01,507
has the best legal system in the world,

692
01:03:01,847 --> 01:03:03,847
we still have a two-tiered legal system.

693
01:03:03,967 --> 01:03:05,867
We still have opportunities for injustices.

694
01:03:06,207 --> 01:03:07,668
So I think

695
01:03:07,668 --> 01:03:09,207
it can make everything better for everyone.

696
01:03:10,107 --> 01:03:10,547
You can always

697
01:03:10,547 --> 01:03:13,387
improve access to justice.

698
01:03:13,607 --> 01:03:15,567
The court system in the United States is notorious

699
01:03:15,567 --> 01:03:17,427
for various things.

700
01:03:17,527 --> 01:03:19,448
I mean, it can be expensive. You've got a lawyer up,

701
01:03:19,507 --> 01:03:21,727
and it's adversarial, which is not good in some situations.

702
01:03:22,047 --> 01:03:22,248
So, yeah.

703
01:03:22,248 --> 01:03:25,387
Yeah. All right. All right. Well, we're going to take this out.

704
01:03:25,507 --> 01:03:42,327
That's all I got. All right, guys. Thank you for joining us. Once again, we are reviewing the Satoshi Papers by Natalie Smolinski. Very much encourage you to take a read. And if you'd like to please view our videos that are online that can go as a companion with these.

705
01:03:42,327 --> 01:03:47,427
thank you to W. Aaron Daniel Esquire

706
01:03:47,427 --> 01:03:50,087
for fantastic work

707
01:03:50,087 --> 01:03:50,827
thank you to Grant

708
01:03:50,827 --> 01:03:55,827
for our first in-person ability

709
01:03:55,827 --> 01:03:57,087
to discuss these things

710
01:03:57,087 --> 01:03:59,047
and as always

711
01:03:59,047 --> 01:04:02,748
please if you find value in this

712
01:04:02,748 --> 01:04:03,827
share it with your friends

713
01:04:03,827 --> 01:04:05,387
and consider it yours

714
01:04:05,387 --> 01:04:06,768
we're all in this together

715
01:04:06,768 --> 01:04:07,967
so have a good one